One can agree with all of this, Dopp, (not sure about 'beingness') but does it really change anything. Please aid the understanding and indicate where this simple logic goes wrong: regardless of how 'theism' is defined, may it be called for this point 'whatever;' pan(whatever) means all is whatever and a(whatever) means without whatever. Can you reconcile those to be the same?
I think what you are not understanding Robert is that a word may have a root that originally had a particular meaning, but the word incorporating that root may no longer have a meaning that comports with the connotations of a root within that word. Does that make sense? The words we are comparing are not "theism" and "theism." They are "theism" and "pantheism." My point was that "theism" has, in modern language, more often than not taken on the character of belief in belief in one or more anthropomorphic gods. Many pantheists do not place attributes on "that which is signified" by "pantheism" - that means they do not place anthropomorphic attributes or even the quality of
otherness on what used to be fairly called "God." You want to have a classifier that has a definite content. Most pantheists and particularly mystics
do not do that. "Theists" do, on the other hand. I daresay doing so is the
sine qua non of "theism."
Robert Anton Wilson has a nice passage that gets to the meat of the issue in
Quantum Psychology:
The only "thing" (or process) precisely equal to the universe remains the universe itself. Every description, or model, or theory, or art-work, or map, or reality tunnel, or gloss, etc. remains somewhat smaller than the universe and hence includes less than the universe.
What is left in our sensory continuum when we are neither talking nor thinking remains non-symbolic, non-verbal, non-mathematical - ineffable, as the mystics say. One can speak poetically of that non-verbal mode of apprehension as Chaos, like Nietzsche, or the Void, like Buddha; but "Chaos" and the "Void" remain only words and the experience itself stubbornly remains non-verbal .
Now go back and look at the quote from Einstein. The pantheists and mystics I have been talking about (and many of the atheists mentioned in the two other threads I linked to above) are hypersensitive to idolatry and reject "theism" because it places limitations and "thingliness" (as Brunner would put it) on "God." So you do indeed, as Einstein points out, have spiritual geniuses who are both "saints" and "atheists" who share a common "cosmic religious feeling" with one another and it is a
very different thing that what is going on with much of what is commonly categorized as "theism."
In short the "-theism" in pantheism is no longer related in meaning to "theism" as a stand-alone term for many of the people using the word "pantheism." Does that make any sense to you?
One is not sure how to get from God as the Ground of Being and Power of Being which is prior to and the source of finitude (eg.s source of time, space, substance, causality, and prior to subject-object) to 'personality superimposed over pantheism' but that may be a subject for another thread. Tillich described 'panentheism' because in his view God transcends (ie. goes beyond) the universe.
Though even he ultimately admits in his more lucid moments that he has no idea what he means when he says that. One gets the distinct impression when reading Tillich that he really needs to feel a love for himself and direction for the universe and thus clings to this tiniest thread of what he cannot define even against his own logic and better judgment. That's my impression anyway. [Spong does the same thing, btw, particularly in
A New Christianity For A New World] And that, btw, is why I say that belief in "God" has been secretly replaced with belief in "belief in God" - not unlike how they replaced the fine coffee usually served at this establishment with Folger's crystals . . . and almost nobody noticed.
To say that "God" is something other or something more is to assign it a meaning that includes an "otherness" to distinguish "god" as a thing that stands in contrast to things that are 'not God.' This does not comport with pantheism. There's a nice passage from Nicholas of Cusa's
De Docta Ignorantia which brings this error to light. It is worth noting that Nicholas was writing 500 years ago and is frequently regarded by modern philosophy (as is Spinoza) as a non-"Theist" (agnostic or atheist).
[FONT="]It is self-evident that there is no comparative relation of the infinite to the finite . . . Therefore, it is not the case that by means of likenesses a finite intellect can precisely attain the truth about things. For truth is not something more or something less but is something indivisible. Whatever is not truth cannot measure truth precisely. (By comparison, a noncircle [cannot measure] a circle, whose being is something indivisible.) Hence, the intellect, which is not truth, never comprehends truth so precisely that truth cannot be comprehended infinitely more precisely. For the intellect is to truth as [an inscribed] polygon is to [the inscribing] circle.19 The more angles the inscribed polygon has the more similar it is to the circle. However, even if the number of its angles is increased ad infinitum, the polygon never becomes equal [to the circle] unless it is resolved into an identity with the circle. Hence, regarding truth, it is evident that we do not know anything other than the following: viz., that we know truth not to be precisely comprehensible as it is . . .
[/FONT] [FONT="]Therefore, opposing features belong only to those things which can be comparatively greater and lesser; they befit these things in different ways; [but they do] not at all [befit] the absolutely Maximum, since it is beyond all opposition. Therefore, because the absolutely Maximum is absolutely and actually all things which can be (and is so free of all opposition that the Minimum coincides with it), it is beyond both all affirmation and all negation. And it is not, as well as is, all that which is conceived to be; and it is, as well as is not, all that which is conceived not to be.[/FONT][FONT="] But it is a given thing in such way that it is all things; and it is all things in such way that it is no thing.[/FONT]
You can read almost the same thing in Brunner, Nietzsche and (in a more poetic version) the Tao te Ching. Compare this with Tillich in his more lucid moments:
"Thus the question of the existence of God can neither be asked nor answered. If asked, it is a question about that which by it's very nature is above existence, and therefore the answer - whether negative or affirmative - implicitly denies the nature of God. It is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it is to deny it. God is being itself, not a being." - Systematic Theology, Volume I.
Considered thus, it makes sense of a famous Tillich quote:
"
God does not exist. He is being itself beyond essence and existence. Therefore to argue that God exists is to deny him."
Was Tillich an "atheistic panentheist"?