So, you deny the existence of conscience? I guess scientific research probably wouldn't change you mind either would it?
Over the past twenty years, there has been growing evidence for a universally shared moral faculty based on findings in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, anthropology, economics, linguistics, and neurobiology -- findings Harvard Moral Sense Test
I don't like untrained juries either. They are perfectly fine on questions of conscience, but they're weak on questions of fact. I'd like to see the USA go to professional jury system.
Slavery was changed by economics? I see. How could those slave masters compete with employers paying wages and providing other benefits to employers as they do today?
Yes indeed, industrial productivity based on free, skilled and motivated labor outcompeted every other production system by exponential margins from 18th century onwards. Read a little economics. What you are rolling your eyes about is simply extremely well established historical truth. When machines are available to replace muscle power, one needs motivated smart labor force to increase productivity, not slaves.
That which you call moral sense falls under the rubric of empathy and reciprocal altruism and is an essential instinct that helps in group and family cohesiveness. Rats have it too.
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/05/rats-forsake-chocolate-save-drowning-companion
Problem is it only works within an informal family or close informal group setting. And even there, one has widespread divergences (patriarchy, polygamy, honor systems, matriarch, communal family you name). What moral psychologists are studying and consider universal are extremely extremely rudimentary blocks out of which vastly different morality structures can be built, based on situation.... like is the case for our linguistic ability. In fact our moral intuitions are far more underdeveloped than was first suspected.
Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
At the same time, there exists a long experimental tradition in social psychology—often cited, for reasons that will become obvious, under the title of “situationism”—that unsettles the globalist notions of character central in much philosophical theorizing.[
16] For example:
- Isen and Levin (1972: 387) discovered that subjects who had just found a dime were 22 times more likely to help a woman who had dropped some papers than subjects who did not find a dime (88% v. 4%).
- Darley and Batson (1973: 105) report that passersby not in a hurry were 6 times more likely to help an unfortunate who appeared to be in significant distress than were passersby in a hurry (63% v. 10%).
- Mathews and Canon (1975: 574–5) found subjects were 5 times more likely to help an apparently injured man who had dropped some books when ambient noise was at normal levels than when a power lawnmower was running nearby (80% v. 15%).
- Haney et al. (1973) describe how college students role-playing as “guards” in a simulated prison subjected student “prisoners” to intense verbal and emotional abuse.
- Milgram (1974) found that subjects would repeatedly “punish” a screaming “victim” with realistic (but simulated) electric shocks at the polite request of an experimenter.
These experiments are not aberrational, but
representative: social psychologists have repeatedly found that the difference between good conduct and bad appears to reside in the situation more than the person; both disappointing omissions and appalling actions are readily induced through seemingly minor situational features. What makes these findings so striking is just how insubstantial the situational influences effecting troubling moral failures seem to be; it is not that people fail to adhere to standards for good conduct, but that the can be induced to do so with such ease. (Think about it: a
dime may make the difference between compassionate and callous behavior.) At the same time, research predicated on the attribution of character and personality traits has enjoyed limited success in the prediction of behavior; standard measures of personality have very often been found to be tenuously related to behavior in particular situations where the expression of a given trait is expected.[
17]
The skeptical argument suggested by the empirical record may be formulated as a
modus tollens :[
18]
- If behavior is typically ordered by robust traits, systematic observation will reveal pervasive behavioral consistency.
- Systematic observation does not reveal pervasive behavioral consistency.
- Therefore, behavior is not typically ordered by robust traits.
If this argument is sound, a central thesis in characterological moral psychology—so long as it is committed to empirically assessable descriptive claims—is seriously undermined.
.......
The research on “heuristics and biases” described in section two is an excellent example of this, and subsequent research by Gigerenzer and associates (1999, 2000) has shown that the manifestation of heuristics like framing effects may vary quite strikingly according to minor variations in the problems cognizers face. Another suggestive line of research indicates that the salience of values is readily malleable. Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee (1999; cf. Brewer and Gardner 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, and Hochschild 2002) found that subjects “primed” by searching for first personal
plural pronouns (e. g.,
we, ours) in a writing sample were subsequently more likely to report that “interdependent” values (belongingness, friendship, family security) were a “guiding principle in their lives” than were subjects primed by searching for first personal
singularpronouns (e. g.,
I, mine). Apparently, what matters to people—or seems to them to matter—can be influenced by things that don't matter very much; circumstance can have a surprising and powerful impact on the experience of value and thus on episodes of practical reasoning in which such experience plays a role.