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Daniel Boyarin and the Jewish Problem of Hermeneutics.

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Depends. Are we finally talking about influence or are you still trying to measure intellect?

As the question applies to Daniel Boyarin, I would say "importance" of thought can often take time to properly evaluate. And since Paul's name has come up, I might give the example of 1 Corinthians 6:19 where Paul asks his audience if they're ignorant to the fact that their bodies are the temple of the holy spirit?

Paul's letter was written more than a decade before the temple in Jerusalem was ransacked and destroyed by the Romans, after which, in the absence of the temple, Pharisaical Judaism transformed what could be transferred of temple ritual, to the body of the Jew. In that vein, Rabbi Samson Hirsch claims the shel rosh is the ark of the covenant in miniature.



John
 
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Harel13

Am Yisrael Chai
Staff member
Premium Member
As the question applies to Daniel Boyarin, I would say "importance" of thought can often take time to properly evaluate
Indeed. Which is why I asked who else considers Boyarin "one of the most important thinkers alive".

At this point, I will take that you are unable to say, but rather chose to define Boyarin so because you think he has influenced you a great deal. That is fine, because I'm sure we all know people who we respect and are influenced by, but think it unfortunate that not too many people know them.
 

kaninchen

Member
If you've read enough of my arguments, and understand them well enough to "enjoy" them,

I enjoy people who write stylishly whether I agree with them in the slightest or not at all.

It's still all 'lit crit' though and CS Lewis' admonitions about discovering mare's nests whilst in pursuit of red herrings do apply.
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
It's still all 'lit crit' though and CS Lewis' admonitions about discovering mare's nests whilst in pursuit of red herrings do apply.

I'm of the Wittgensteinian school that believes language is a mirror of human reality so that literary criticism is a legitimate examination (criticism even) of human reality.

I'm glad you brought it up since Derrida's take on it appears to be a defense of the Judaism that I believe Boyarin has uncovered as camouflaging a serious problem. Noting Derrida's epistemological bias is probably a good segue into the meat of what I'd like to examine.



John
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Indeed. Which is why I asked who else considers Boyarin "one of the most important thinkers alive".

At this point, I will take that you are unable to say, but rather chose to define Boyarin so because you think he has influenced you a great deal. That is fine, because I'm sure we all know people who we respect and are influenced by, but think it unfortunate that not too many people know them.

There are a number of contemporary Jewish thinkers and writers who I believe are influencing Jewish thought in a profound way even if that influence isn't yet realized or recognized. I'm thinking of men like Daniel Boyarin, Elliot R. Wolfson, Michael Fishbane, et. al.. I've always personally considered Elliot R. Wolfson the most important of the group. And yet the more Boyarin's insights come into my field of view the more I see him as much more important (to me if not generally speaking) than I presumed.

One of the elements that led to this thread occurred quite a while back when Wolfson seemed bothered by a suggestion (in a private dialogue) that Boyarin seemed to be a Christian. Wolfson's response seemed to insinuate that the ideas was preposterous such that my thinking must be simple-minded. That stuck in my craw for a long time since I could quote Boyarin in ways that would seem to make it highly unlikely he isn't a Christian.

And yet the thought that he could say, and believe, many of the things he's said, and appears to believe, and not be a Christian, but a reasonably orthodox Jew, led to my supposition that he could be prematurely born into the post-Christian epoch, since that's the only way I can see whereby he could say some of what he's said and nevertheless not be a Christian.

Since I believe and have argued that we're at the end of the post-antidiluvian civilization, it would make sense that some of the nuances that could only be associated with the post-antidiluvian-post-Christian era might begin to appear as harbingers of just how close we are to the resumption of the Jewish historical calendar (specifically the arrival and universal recognition of messiah). For me Daniel Boyarin seems to be a possible candidate for one of those nuances or harbingers of the end of the age.



John
 
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oldbadger

Skanky Old Mongrel!

When orthodoxy finds a tough nut it's unable to crack it typically camouflages the problem as best it can so that it not create a complication orthodoxy is unable to open up and deal with transparently. Unfortunately, as Thomas Kuhn points out, it's often someone outside orthodoxy who, having dealt with the problem single-handedly, offers orthodoxy a solution that tends to burst the wine-skin of the current orthodoxy therein requiring the hard work of establishing a new orthodoxy. Scholem considered Saul of Tarsus the quintessential example of someone single-handedly handing orthodoxy a solution to a their problem which, the solution, causes more headaches than the problem itself.

Saul spoke of himself as a Jew prematurely born into the Christian epoch. If the spirit of this thread is correct, Talumdic scholar Daniel Boyarin might very well be a Jew prematurely born into the post-Christian zeitgeist of the rapidly approaching age.

John​

Don't worry about Jewish orthodoxy, it's Christian Interpretations of 'cherry-picked' scriptures that beat the blazes out of anything that an Orthodox Jew might find difficult.

Paul just spun his own version of what Jesus had been all about, without showing the slightest interest in anything that Jesus had done before the last hours of his mission. Some solution, eh?
 

kaninchen

Member
I'm of the Wittgensteinian school that believes language is a mirror of human reality so that literary criticism is a legitimate examination (criticism even) of human reality.

I'm of the Popperian school which, inter alia, views Wittgenstein as the wielder of pokers.
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Paul just spun his own version of what Jesus had been all about, without showing the slightest interest in anything that Jesus had done before the last hours of his mission.

Then I suppose I'm forced to learn about my Jesus from you. Where should I start?:shrug:

Btw . . . I love your avatar.



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Don't worry about Jewish orthodoxy, it's Christian Interpretations of 'cherry-picked' scriptures that beat the blazes out of anything that an Orthodox Jew might find difficult.

. . . What a great invitation to take the Nestea-plunge into the meat of the topic of this thread. Assuming you can forgive the bizarre mixed-metaphor that makes the church or synagogue sounds more like a mosh-pit than a place of intellection.:D



John
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
. . . What a great invitation to take the Nestea-plunge into the meat of the topic of this thread. Assuming you can forgive the bizarre mixed-metaphor that makes the church or synagogue sounds more like a mosh-pit than a place of intellection.:D

In a very interesting passage, Origen ---not for the first time, as we shall see ---connects the theoretical problem of "true" interpretation with the general problem of epistemology. He finds a hermeneutics ungrounded in the Logos to be the source of disagreement within "Judaism," precisely analogous to the problem of knowledge itself.

The Word and Allegory; or, Origen on the Jewish Question.

The hermeneutical problem Boyarin is using Origen to reference is the problem associated with what Professor Susan Handelman refers to as Judaism's "weak exegesis." As Professor Handelman uses the term, "weak exegesis" doesn't imply "weakness"; it's used to distinguish between Jewish exegesis versus the Christian kind she calls "strong exegesis" (which doesn't refer to power).

Strong exegesis implies the belief that throughout the Tanakh there's a dynamic interrelationship between words, signs, rituals, and narratives; so dynamic that every concepts can be thought of as directly related to every other concept in a complex matrix branching from, and anchored to, a single, seminal, word, Logos, or concept, that keeps the entire matrix and all its branches and branching from producing an infinite, polysemous, interrelationship between all things (specifically words and symbols) such that none of them can be anchored or completely known by reference to following any branch as it leads inevitably (in a fractalized manner) back to the root word, symbol, or Logos.

Professor Handelman, like Professor Boyarin, perhaps any serious Jewish thinker, finds herself drawn to the rather serious problem of Jewish polyseme; the problem that Jewish thought is situated in an infinite differential of meaning whereby every word or symbol gains its meaning through its relationship to every other word or symbol without reference to a transcendental signifier or Word/Logos that's the root out of which everything grows and toward which it points.



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
"John D. Brey, post: 7585425, member: 5630

Professor Handelman, like Professor Boyarin, perhaps any serious Jewish thinker, finds herself drawn to the rather serious problem of Jewish polyseme; the problem that Jewish thought is situated in an infinite differential of meaning whereby every word or symbol gains its meaning through its relationship to every other word or symbol without reference to a transcendental signifier or Word/Logos that's the root out of which everything grows and toward which it points.

Without acquiescence to a transcendental signifier, or Logos, that's literally the root from which everything grows, all words, signs, and signifiers, must be interrelated not asymmetrically, from a root, or root-word, that shares its seme with every single word or sign growing out of it, but must instead exist in an almost infinite web of interrelationships whom, which, i.e., each sign or symbol, contributes to understanding the whole, even though none of the parts contains a crystalized spirit, or meaning, truer, or asymmetrically pointing, to some anchoring reality or Truth.

What Professor Boyarin points out is that Origen gets this problem, and acknowledges first the fact that in any serious realm of knowledge or truth, so called, there's going to be sects, segments, or sectarianism based on the inability of any one sect or segment, or of any sign, or symbol, to prove itself without reference to the others since in a polysemous system the interrelationship is part and parcel of the epiphenomena arising out of the interrelationship. Based on these realities, Boyarin cuts to the chase concerning the spirit of this examination:

Because there is, apparently, no criterion with which to determine truth in interpretation, sectarianism must needs arise in all good faith. That this is indeed an issue confronted by Jews is well known and will be shown immediately below; the question is, rather, how does Origen imagine that it is not a Christian problem, how does he resolve the allegedly Jewish question? How does the problem of multiple possible interpretations of Scripture not trouble on this account the Christian writer but only Jews? As we shall see, his solution is both theological and philosophical.​

Boyarin next points out that the Rabbis aren't unaware of the problem. He quotes numerous passages showing that the Rabbis are fully aware of the problem of interpretation: no interpretation can justify itself without reference to every other in a polysemous web without beginning or end.

"These and these are the words of the Living God." The rabbinic text, despite its fairly blithe solution to the problem in its statement that all contradictory opinions are equally the words of God, nonetheless evinces, therefore, a sense of the same problem raised by Origen, namely that a doctrine based on the interpretation of a written text will inevitably result in controversy and discord, even if the late rabbinic theory of divine polysemy or indeterminancy solves the theoretical problem and reduces the danger of actual schism by celebrating the indeterminancy of divine language rather than lamenting it as earlier in the rabbinic tradition.​

Boyarin shows (and was attacked for suggesting) that there was a time before the problems of divine indeterminancy were fully appreciated within Jewish thought. He claims that once they were fully appreciated the solution was extremely problematic: Judaism merely accepted the polysemous nature of divine revelation as though that acceptance, in reducing the danger of schism, eliminated or limited the problem itself.



John
 
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oldbadger

Skanky Old Mongrel!
Then I suppose I'm forced to learn about my Jesus from you. Where should I start?:shrug:

Btw . . . I love your avatar.



John
Hi John :)
Thank you, about my avatar pic. The Reculver Towers, Herne Bay, UK on the site of an early Roman Fort,

Where to start?
Early 1st century Galilee, its main language, it's Lake Genesarret and it's boatmen, the gospel of Mark, ....... That's a good bite to start. :D

You already know that Paul didn't write a single report, anecdote or story about anything that Jesus and his did other than in the last hours.

You already know that Authors of Matthew and Luke were not witnesses, copied G Mark . You must know that the authors of G John had a useful bundle of documents but no idea when anything took place.

If you take it from there then the puzzle will slowly unwrap during your investigations.

And don't listen to me or anybody else.....you'll just have to investigate like hell, if you'll excuse that terminology.
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Boyarin shows (and was attacked for suggesting) that there was a time before the problems of divine indeterminancy were fully appreciated within Jewish thought. He claims that once they were fully appreciated the solution was extremely problematic: Judaism merely accepted the polysemous nature of divine revelation as though that acceptance, in reducing the danger of schism, eliminated or limited the problem itself.

This problem was referenced in this forum three years ago in the thread on Exegeting Genesis Chapter 17:17, where Ibn Ezra was shown to have tied himself in knots on the horns of this dilemma:

Ibn Ezra was confronted numerous times, as were many of the great Jewish Sages, with dizzyingly vertiginous Christian readings of the Hebrew Torah-text whereby the plain meaning of the text appears to allow a parallel to be established between the words of Jesus of Nazareth and the words of Moses, the Prophets, David, and most blasphemously, God, such that when the clear and undeniable relationship of Jesus’ words to the speaker in the Torah is presented, the Jewish Sages fall on their faces mocking the words of Jesus just as father Abraham mocked the words of God.​

As was noted in the noted essay, Ibn Ezra attempted to find a criterion whereby the interpretation of the Jewish sages could be shown to be superior to the Christian exegesis and interpretation. He initially refers to Shabbat 63a, which demands that the traditional interpretation of the text serve the plain meaning of the text. But as Ibn Ezra found out for himself, the statement of Shabbat 63a appears to be a tautology since if there's a plain meaning to the text, then the need for interpretation is superfluous. As pointed out in the noted essay, Ibn Ezra tangles himself in knots not to have to concede to the tautologous nature of Shabbat 63a, as well as his own criterion for interpretive superiority, since on some level of conceptualism he understood what's in the cross-hairs of this very examination as laid out by Boyarin.

In the Rabbinic Bible (Mikraot Gedolot), Ibn Ezra's five paths toward a correct interpretation of the holy text are laid out for the reader in the introduction to his interpretation of the text. But the fine print of the most recent edition of the Mikraot Gedolot, reads:

In the later version of this introduction, Ibn Ezra switches the order of the first and third paths, making clear in describing the allegorical path that he is talking about Christian interpreters, and ends his introduction with a discussion of the phonetics and grammatical structure of Hebrew.
When Ibn Ezra was confronted with the very issue in the cross-hairs of this examination, he realized that if the plain and straightforward meaning of the Hebrew text is subject to multiple correct interpretations, and it is, then what will serve as the criteria for authenticity in cases where a Christian interpretation goes against a Jewish interpretation if the Christian interpretation doesn’t break any rules of Hebrew grammar? Worse, what if the Christian interpretation seems to be closer to the literal straightforward meaning than the Jewish interpretation? And God forbid, what if there are contextual, interpretive, problems with the traditional Jewish interpretation of the literal text that are non-existent in the Christian interpretation of the holy text?

Confronted with not just these theoretical questions, but actual cases such as presented in this essay, Ibn Ezra shows the utter disorienting conundrum faced by post-first-century Jews and Jewish tradition when he tries to shuffle around his five points of correct interpretation only, in the end, to say, for he must, that when two grammatically correct interpretations exist (and the Mikraot Gedolot is clear he means the Christian interpretation versus the Jewish) without either transgressing the straightforward grammar of the Hebrew text, he, and Jewish tradition, will not judge by which interpretation is closer to the plain meaning of the text, or which interpretation presents less contextual problems, but will, get this:

. . . follow the one handed down by our righteous Sages. We can rely perfectly on them. . . Our Sages were true; all their words are true. May the true God guide His servants on the true path.
Ibn Ezra's final rule for correctly interpreting the straightforward, literal, text, is, just read the Sage's interpretation. Don't interpret; there’s no further interpretation, and thus no need for five paths to correct interpretation, since the five-fold rules that guide correct interpretations lead to the truth that interpretation is no longer needed: Don't read the Torah text at all; read the Jewish interpretation of the text since the duality between text and interpretation has be subsumed in the Sage’s interpretation. Ibn Ezra's final word on the path to correctly interpreting the Torah-text is don't.

Exegeting Genesis Chapter 17:17.

Seemingly seeing the problem through the same lens, Boyarin says:

For midrash, however, in its final development, there is no transcendental signified. God himself can only participate, as it were, in the process of unlimited semiosis and thus of limited interpretation. The result will be not simply a multiplicity of interpretations that we cannot decide between, nor even a plethora of interpretations that all stand in the Pleroma of divine meaning, but finally a rabbinic ascesis that virtually eliminates the practice of interpretation entirely. Midrash, in its culminating avatar, eschews not only allegory and a discourse of true meaning but renounces "interpretation" altogether . . .​



John
 
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oldbadger

Skanky Old Mongrel!
. . . What a great invitation to take the Nestea-plunge into the meat of the topic of this thread. Assuming you can forgive the bizarre mixed-metaphor that makes the church or synagogue sounds more like a mosh-pit than a place of intellection.:D

John
You know that it is true, that if a person cannot explain a thing simply, then they don't know enough about the subject. (Albert Einstein)

The most intellectual aspect of Judaism must surely be the amazing sense of the Old Testament laws, to produce a cohesive, strong, secure, healthy and fast growing people. There is not one law out of place for that time

Christianity never fully understood those laws mor took close interest in them, selecting only a few for its self righteous judgements.

Most Christians are so Involved with Paul's stuff that they don't actually know (for example) the details about what Jesus did during the six days of that last week, while in Jerusalem.
Try asking Christians what he and his did in Jerusalem and Temple on that last Palm Sunday......not one can tell you, all wrapped up on complexities ...... Try it.
 

oldbadger

Skanky Old Mongrel!
This problem was referenced in this forum three years ago in the thread on Exegeting Genesis Chapter 17:17, where Ibn Ezra was shown to have tied himself in knots on the horns of this problem:

Ibn Ezra was confronted numerous times, as were many of the great Jewish Sages, with dizzyingly vertiginous Christian readings of the Hebrew Torah-text whereby the plain meaning of the text appears to allow a parallel to be established between the words of Jesus of Nazareth and the words of Moses, the Prophets, David, and most blasphemously, God, such that when the clear and undeniable relationship of Jesus’ words to the speaker in the Torah is presented, the Jewish Sages fall on their faces mocking the words of Jesus just as father Abraham mocked the words of God.​

As was noted in the noted essay, Ibn Ezra attempted to find a criterion whereby the interpretation of the Jewish sages could be shown to be superior to the Christian exegesis and interpretation. He initially refers to Shabbat 63a, which demands that the traditional interpretation of the text serve the plain meaning of the text. But as Ibn Ezra found out for himself, the statement of Shabbat 63a appears to be a tautology since if there is a plain meaning to the text, then the need for interpretation is superfluous. As pointed out in the noted essay, Ibn Ezra tangles himself in knots not to have to concede to the tautologous nature of Shabbat 63a, as well as his own criterion for interpretive superiority, since on some level of conceptualism he understood what's in the cross-hairs of this very examination as laid out by Boyarin.

In the Rabbinic Bible (Mikraot Gedolot), Ibn Ezra's five paths toward a correct interpretation of the holy text are laid out for the reader in the introduction to his interpretation of the text. But the fine print of the most recent edition of the Mikraot Gedolot, reads:

In the later version of this introduction, Ibn Ezra switches the order of the first and third paths, making clear in describing the allegorical path that he is talking about Christian interpreters, and ends his introduction with a discussion of the phonetics and grammatical structure of Hebrew.
When Ibn Ezra was confronted with the very issue in the cross-hairs of this examination, he realized that if the plain and straightforward meaning of the Hebrew text is subject to multiple correct interpretations, and it is, then what will serve as the criteria for authenticity in cases where a Christian interpretation goes against a Jewish interpretation if the Christian interpretation doesn’t break any rules of Hebrew grammar? Worse, what if the Christian interpretation seems to be closer to the literal straightforward meaning than the Jewish interpretation? And God forbid, what if there are contextual, interpretive, problems with the traditional Jewish interpretation of the literal text that are non-existent in the Christian interpretation of the holy text?

Confronted with not just these theoretical questions, but actual cases such as presented in this essay, Ibn Ezra shows the utter disorienting conundrum faced by post-first-century Jews and Jewish tradition when he tries to shuffle around his five points of correct interpretation only, in the end, to say, for he must, that when two grammatically correct interpretations exist (and the Mikraot Gedolot is clear he means the Christian interpretation versus the Jewish) without either transgressing the straightforward grammar of the Hebrew text, he, and Jewish tradition, will not judge by which interpretation is closer to the plain meaning of the text, or which interpretation presents less contextual problems, but will, get this:

. . . follow the one handed down by our righteous Sages. We can rely perfectly on them. . . Our Sages were true; all their words are true. May the true God guide His servants on the true path.
Ibn Ezra's final rule for correctly interpreting the straightforward, literal, text, is, just read the Sage's interpretation. Don't interpret; there’s no further interpretation, and thus no need for five paths to correct interpretation, since the five-fold rules that guide correct interpretations lead to the truth that interpretation is no longer needed: Don't read the Torah text at all; read the Jewish interpretation of the text since the duality between text and interpretation has be subsumed in the Sage’s interpretation.

Ibn Ezra's final word on the path to correctly interpreting the Torah-text is don't.​
Appearing to see the problem through the same lens, Boyarin says:

For midrash, however, in its final development, there is no transcendental signified. God himself can only participate, as it were, in the process of unlimited semiosis and thus of limited interpretation. The result will be not simply a multiplicity of interpretations that we cannot decide between, nor even a plethora of interpretations that all stand in the Pleroma of divine meaning, but finally a rabbinic ascesis that virtually eliminates the practice of interpretation entirely. Midrash, in its culminating avatar, eschews not only allegory and a discourse of true meaning but renounces "interpretation" altogether . . .​

John
Accurate Translation only was required. After that no interpretation was orvis necessary. All is clear.

If you doubt this then please show a verse from either Leviticus or Deuteronomy for review.
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
You already know that Authors of Matthew and Luke were not witnesses, copied G Mark . You must know that the authors of G John had a useful bundle of documents but no idea when anything took place.

One of the first isagogics of proper exegesis, and thus interpretation, is that we must understand the historical zeitgeist, and practices, as they existed at the time the text in question was written. The number of glaring, even embarrassing errors, that come from reading an ancient text according to modern understanding are almost innumerable.

In the ancient world most persons were illiterate so far as the written word was concerned. Nevertheless, they, no less than we, wanted to archive important beliefs, events, and sayings, just as bad as we do. So they developed a process known as oral transmission and memorization that functioned in a manner the modern mind wouldn't believe.

In a form of evolution, functioning in every way like the science of natural selection implies, after Jesus spoke, say the Sermon on the Mount, groups would gather together in homes and those members known to have a phoneme-graphic memory (there is even an ancient name for these people, of whom there were many in the ancient world) would all stand and recite from memory what Jesus said. As the recitation took place, the members of the audience would note which recitations agreed on what Jesus said, and where, such that through a process of trial and error, natural selection, evolution, each group would develop the oral tradition for what had occurred earlier in the day.

Later, various groups would compare their oral tradition, with other groups, and the same natural selection, evolution, would weed out the weaker oral tradition, until a more perfect version of Jesus' Sermon on the Mount was archived not by the pen, not on inert, dead, matter, the scroll, but in the living material, the mind, the living, oral, tradition, that was highly privileged in the ancient world.

In truth, it was only when the persons who contained the living tradition, the oral tradition, in their memories, began to age and die out and become few in number from persecutions and death, that the undesired process of archiving a living tradition in dead letters, on dead skin, became a necessary evil.

In Paul's day, he wrote commentary on the living tradition and not the tradition itself. Anyone who's studied Paul can see that he repeatedly refers to the living tradition received from John, Peter, and the other Apostles, implying, repeatedly, that his letters are commentary on what they had already received orally, verbally: his letters were written commentary on the oral, living, tradition. It was after Paul's letters that the oral, living, tradition, was crucified again. This time not with iron nails, per se, but by the pen, on pressed wood, so that it couldn't speak, but could only lie their on the page, inert, like Jesus laid there when the wooden cross was laid down to take his dead body from it. . . Unless a person has access to the living tradition, they're painting a picture of Jesus not from his actual life and spirit, but from his corpse. Most Jews and Christians have a mental picture of Jesus painted from his corpse. His image is cruci-affixed in their mind.

Do you (the editorial you) have any other portraits in your home painted from the person's corpse? Or is Jesus the only one so dogged and of ill-repute so as to be treated that way?:D



John
 
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