Jeremiah,
Last June I posted an OP on free will V. determinism in which I set out my argument for determinism. If you never read it I invite you to take a look at it here. The comments that followed (about 500 of them)---see LINK below--- are very interesting.
"In the last month or so there's been an increased interest in free will.
"Defining Free Will" by Penumbra
"God and his free will" by Skwim
"Do Atheists believe in free-will?" by SPLogan
"Freewill or Fate" by The Sum of Awe
"Free Will? Where?" by ejay286
This interest has usually centered around the affirmation of free will and/or a denunciation of it. Some very interesting thoughts on both sides have come out of these discussions, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's been a frequent problem with some of the terms involved, most often those concerning "free will" and "will." People have either failed to let others know what they had in mind when they use them, or have provided definitions that got mired in misunderstandings and confusion. Even when directly asked to define these terms people have skirted the request, and have proceeded to side topics, leaving the issue of free will no more resolved than before. So what's going on here?
As I see it, free will is important to many because without it would mean each of is nothing more than Robbie the Robot, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If I have no freedom of choice how can I be blamed for what I do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.
Any exception to free will is seen as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't at all what the issue of free will is about. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished.
Those who most disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic level: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice," "choosing,"chosen," or any other form of the word.
Here's how I see it.
There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.
So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.
What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..
Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .
This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.
Comments?"
LINK