Did God make the rules?

[Wessexman]

But your argument was about debunking theism as illogical.

Anyway I think you have the wrong idea of "identity". It is better to say that identity exists because Being exists. Identity is simply to say Being is and must be Being or alternatively Being is simply identity in its fullest extent. When we talk of the law of identity though in terms of discursive thought we're simply noticing it is in certain things, it causing these things to be themselves. We can deduce that being has identity, that it is in a sense identity, as well but we cannot use deductions to fully understand what being is.

 

[Meow Mix]

But your argument was about debunking theism as illogical.

Anyway I think you have the wrong idea of "identity". It is better to say that identity exists because Being exists. Identity is simply to say Being is and must be Being or alternatively Being is simply identity in its fullest extent. When we talk of the law of identity though in terms of discursive thought we're simply noticing it is in certain things, it causing these things to be themselves. We can deduce that being has identity, that it is in a sense identity, as well but we cannot use deductions to fully understand what being is.

Just a certain type of theism. In any case we may need the next subject to talk about though because we're not disagreeing anymore ;P

 

[PolyHedral]

Is ontological physicalism true? What is "physical," really? The nonexistence of all physical objects still exhibits identity, and would still do so in the absence of any minds to observe or declare so.

But it doesn't make sense for "nothing" to still exhibit identity, because then it wouldn't be nothing; It would be a collection of abstract things, including identity and the excluded middle.

If no physical objects existed and no minds existed, then that would be the case. Identity is still efficacious there; it's what keeps "no physical objects" from being "some physical objects." Clearly it exists without being physical and without requiring a mind to observe that.

And now I think we're running into whatever the logical analogue of a divide-by-zero. If we go back to the logical statement (P=P), and substitute P with a null statement, (since we don't have a universe to make a statement about) we get (=)... which doesn't make sense.

I don't subscribe to the belief that the only things possible to exist outside of minds are physical objects. Mathematical and logical objects seem to exist fine in the absence of physical objects and minds.

Generalizing it to all things is the Law of Identity, that's how we conceive of identity. Identity, the thing itself we're describing with the law, still exists as you've noted ("...it is true that everything is what it is...")

But generalization of any sort requires pattern-matching ability, which requires cognition.

 

[Meow Mix]

But it doesn't make sense for "nothing" to still exhibit identity, because then it wouldn't be nothing; It would be a collection of abstract things, including identity and the excluded middle.

Exactly. You're on the cusp of it if what I'm saying is right. Identity is necessarily existent (because it's incorrigible). Why should we be able to assume nothing is a possible state of affairs? In fact, we shouldn't be able to -- we should find that it contradicts if we try. If identity is incorrigible, which it is, then even hypothetically assuming "nothing" in that context should self-contradict, which it does.

And now I think we're running into whatever the logical analogue of a divide-by-zero. If we go back to the logical statement (P=P), and substitute P with a null statement, (since we don't have a universe to make a statement about) we get (=)... which doesn't make sense.

But there is something "there," that which keeps the nothingness from being something. Identity. Without it (nonsensical sentence here, because of those first two words) the nothingness would be free to be somethingness and it would never have been nothingness at all. It needs identity to keep from being "something."

But generalization of any sort requires pattern-matching ability, which requires cognition.

Sure, but there's a difference between things that exist and generalizing from them. It takes a mind to know that length exists without rulers (the generalization "all physical objects have spatial extension") but even without anyone to cognize that generalization it would still be true.

 

[PolyHedral]

Exactly. You're on the cusp of it if what I'm saying is right. Identity is necessarily existent (because it's incorrigible). Why should we be able to assume nothing is a possible state of affairs? In fact, we shouldn't be able to -- we should find that it contradicts if we try. If identity is incorrigible, which it is, then even hypothetically assuming "nothing" in that context should self-contradict, which it does.

But if we consider "nothing" as not containing identity, then it doesn't have to contain the excluded middle either, which means that contradiction isn't a problem. (except if you want to say anything else coherently.) Identity might be a prerequisite for any actual idea, but it isn't required to exist if you don't assume that the universe is consistent.

But there is something "there," that which keeps the nothingness from being something. Identity. Without it (nonsensical sentence here, because of those first two words) the nothingness would be free to be somethingness and it would never have been nothingness at all. It needs identity to keep from being "something."

No there isn't, because there is nothing needed to prevent anything. There is nothing there to become something else. Nonentities can't do anything, including becoming entities.

Sure, but there's a difference between things that exist and generalizing from them. It takes a mind to know that length exists without rulers (the generalization "all physical objects have spatial extension") but even without anyone to cognize that generalization it would still be true.

It'd be true, but arguing that it exists sounds bizarre. Length, after all, does not exist as anything other than a generalization of other things.


I don't suppose the words "Null Pointer" mean anything?

 

[Meow Mix]

But if we consider "nothing" as gklutskjdst, then it doesn't have to fsdkuhfsdgjks either, which means that contradiction isn't a problem. (except if you want to say anything else coherently.) Identity might be a prerequisite for any actual idea, but sdgjhskdjghksd if you don't assume that fgklusdhgksgs.

Fixed. I've been underplaying the fact that you can't even raise these "possibilities" (they're not possibilities) because it's the same as saying gibberish. I could be justified in just stopping there since you haven't actually said anything meaningful, but because I'm not a jerk and for fun I'll try to answer the non-point as if anything meaningful was said. Indeed I know there is a powerful illusion that stringing words together makes them legitimate possibilities; it's possible to have a whole conversation about absolutely nothing meaningful but have a strong illusion that it is about something meaningful because we understand the individual words...

But anyway, I showed that assuming gjdksgjhsd only ends up becoming instantly consistent and only consistent. So even if we hold a powerful illusion that asdkjghsd is meaningful to talk about as if it imparts a possibility (it doesn't), it just ends up being identity/excluded middle as true anyway!

No there isn't, because there is nothing needed to prevent anything. There is nothing there to become something else. Nonentities can't do anything, including becoming entities.

Nonentities, or rather nonentity (plurality doesn't make much sense there) can do one thing: not become an entity. Besides, "can't" is identity. Identity = limitation.

It'd be true, but arguing that it exists sounds bizarre. Length, after all, does not exist as anything other than a generalization of other things.


I don't suppose the words "Null Pointer" mean anything?

Counterintuitive things aren't necessarily false though. If nothing is limited from being something then identity exists, and therefore nothing is not a possible state of affairs at all in that context. You can have the nonexistence of material objects and that would be consistent, but you can't have the nonexistence of anything including identity. (Should have said "but you can't have the adglksjdglds" and it would have been just as meaningful; that is.. not at all)

If identity is incorrigible (it is) then we should expect to find a contradiction if we assume the nonexistence of anything since "anything" includes identity. Indeed, it does self-contradict, further affirming identity's incorrigibility/ontological necessity.

 

[PolyHedral]

Fixed. I've been underplaying the fact that you can't even raise these "possibilities" (they're not possibilities) because it's the same as saying gibberish. I

But this is a circular statement; You can't say anything meaningful about inconsistent systems because the whole concept of meaning is based on identity/excluded middle/etc. That doesn't mean that identity is some thing actually existing in the universe, though, only that humans can't comprehend how the universe would work without it. In fact, I'm inclined to believe that identity is not an inherent part of the universe, because it can be proven to be impossible to prove.

But anyway, I showed that assuming gjdksgjhsd only ends up becoming instantly consistent and only consistent. So even if we hold a powerful illusion that asdkjghsd is meaningful to talk about as if it imparts a possibility (it doesn't), it just ends up being identity/excluded middle as true anyway!

But because we started by rejecting the excluded middle, the middle can entirely be both true and false, and this is not a problem. Also, "only consistent" can only be reached by contradicting one of the axioms.

Nonentities, or rather nonentity (plurality doesn't make much sense there) can do one thing: jsdfglkdfjg. Besides, "can't" is identity. Identity = limitation.

I don't believe treating not doing things as an action makes any sense at all. Can I not walk on the ceiling?

Counterintuitive things aren't necessarily false though.

So length does exist as something other than a generalization? Because that's what the logic I think you're arguing for implies.

If identity is incorrigible (it is) then we should expect to find a contradiction if we assume the nonexistence of anything since "anything" includes identity. Indeed, it does self-contradict, further affirming identity's incorrigibility/ontological necessity.

But identity is only ontologically necessary because denying it produces a contradiction. But a contradiction being "wrong" is only true if you assume the excluded middle, which an inconsistent universe doesn't.

 

[Meow Mix]

But this is a circular statement; You can't say anything meaningful about inconsistent systems because the whole concept of meaning is based on identity/excluded middle/etc. That doesn't mean that identity is some thing actually existing in the universe, though, only that humans can't comprehend how the universe would work without it. In fact, I'm inclined to believe that identity is not an inherent part of the universe, because it can be proven to be impossible to prove.

Even if the red part is true in some inexplicable way, it still means you have no business treating it like a possibility. You are forced to treat it as an existing thing. You can't not-do it. Even me saying "Even if it's true in some inexplicable way..." might as well have been "sdkjghsdk."

You can't even make an argument that "we must treat it like an existing thing because we're forced to, but that such is a part of the human condition and that it could be otherwise even if we can't comprehend that"; even that is outside your ability to say because even that is equivalent to "dslkglkdjgs."

You keep treating these things that you're saying as though you're conveying something to me but you're not; you're saying dslkgjhsldkgjlksd. The illusion that you're saying something that I can grasp because the words individually mean something is powerful, but it's an illusion. You haven't made an argument for anything. You've said "Dlkgjdslkgjsljhgsdtg."

I desperately wish I could find the quote from Bertrand Russell where he's talking about "the set of all sets which do not contain themselves." He explains it better than I've been able to: that it seems meaningful to say there is not a "set of all sets which do not contain themselves," but that even saying that one does not exist is nonsense because the thing said not to exist in the statement isn't a thing at all, it's dglksjdhglskd. Saying it doesn't exist is affording it the concession that it's a possibility or that the words strung together mean something that can be either true or false, but the words strung together don't mean anything at all and can't be uttered as though they do once the paradox is understood.

It's not just false, it never had the potential to be true or false in the first place because "dslkghsdlkhg" isn't true or false. That's what I'm trying to get at but I'm having difficulty doing it, and I can't find Russell's extremely eloquent quote that might impart an understanding of the concept I'm trying to convey better than I've been able to do it.

But because we started by rejecting the excluded middle, the middle can entirely be both true and false, and this is not a problem. Also, "only consistent" can only be reached by contradicting one of the axioms.

Again, playing devil's advocate by pretending we're talking about something here and not just clapping our hands and spinning in circles while urinating ourselves (which we might as well be doing when questioning identity), the moment you get ¬(P & ¬P) then you also get ¬[(P & ¬P)]. Let me try it like this:

X = (P & ¬P)
Y = ¬(P & ¬P)

X --> X & Y
X & Y --> Y & ¬X
Y

You will always end up with ¬(P & ¬P) because as soon as Y enters the picture, ¬X becomes the case.

I don't believe treating not doing things as an action makes any sense at all. Can I not walk on the ceiling?

Not walking on the ceiling is part of the identity of the physical laws

So length does exist as something other than a generalization? Because that's what the logic I think you're arguing for implies.

A meterstick would still be the same length if all sentient life disapeared, unable to generalize "length" from it. Yes.

But identity is only ontologically necessary because denying it produces a contradiction. But a contradiction being "wrong" is only true if you assume the excluded middle, which an inconsistent universe doesn't.

If you admit that denying identity produces a contradiction then how can you even hypothetically suggest an "inconsistent universe?" That term doesn't even mean anything, it's not even true or false! It's gibberish; it's dskljghdlskgd. You have an illusion that it means something because you know what the word "inconsistent" means and you know what the word "universe" means but putting them together doesn't create something that may be true or false any more than if I suggested the air might be slippery and that this chat box tastes purple. I haven't said anything in that last sentence!

 

[PolyHedral]

You will always end up with ¬(P & ¬P) because as soon as Y enters the picture, ¬X becomes the case.

But you're ignoring the consequence of our premise of (P &~P): ¬X does not mean that X is a false statement!

A meterstick would still be the same length if all sentient life disapeared, unable to generalize "length" from it. Yes.

The meterstick would still be composed of the same material in the same configuration, but saying it has the same length is begging the question, I think, since we're not sure "length" exists without someone to define it.

And because arguing high-level logic is probably going to get us nowhere, I'll get another metaphor. In some low-level programming languages, there is a construct called a pointer, which is essentially a signpost to something else. (For instance, I might have a pointer that points to an address that contains your age. Keep in mind that the pointer pointing there is not the same as the thing it is pointing to.) However, it is possible to say "This pointer does not point anywhere," and the result is called a null pointer. I think you are saying, quite correctly, that discussing what a null pointer points to is nonsensical and meaningless. However, I am trying to say that this is not actually a guarantee that the pointer points anywhere. The universe does not have to be understandable, and to say that would be unfounded.

 

[Meow Mix]

But you're ignoring the consequence of our premise of (P &~P): ¬X does not mean that X is a false statement!

The problem with this is that the consistency overrides the inconsistency. If inconsistency then consistency & inconsistency, but if consistency then ¬inconsistency -- the "inconsistency" ceases; in fact it can never begin.

Again we're talking about crazy nonsense but let me pretend we're talkinga bout something for a second. If no excluded middle, then we can have a basketball that isn't a basketball without problem -- but you can't have inconsistency that's consistency because the consistency overrides the "no consistency" premise.

The meterstick would still be composed of the same material in the same configuration, but saying it has the same length is begging the question, I think, since we're not sure "length" exists without someone to define it.

Circularity isn't always vicious, though. A rose is a rose is a rose because it is a rose.

And because arguing high-level logic is probably going to get us nowhere, I'll get another metaphor. In some low-level programming languages, there is a construct called a pointer, which is essentially a signpost to something else. (For instance, I might have a pointer that points to an address that contains your age. Keep in mind that the pointer pointing there is not the same as the thing it is pointing to.) However, it is possible to say "This pointer does not point anywhere," and the result is called a null pointer. I think you are saying, quite correctly, that discussing what a null pointer points to is nonsensical and meaningless. However, I am trying to say that this is not actually a guarantee that the pointer points anywhere. The universe does not have to be understandable, and to say that would be unfounded.

Well words are pointers, I understand what you're saying. I agree that the universe doesn't have to be understandable but it isn't unfounded to say that we must believe that identity is necessary; we must absolutely believe it. We can't not believe it. We can't even hypothesize about it. That's what I'm saying.

I'm also saying that arguing through some inexplicable means it's just a cosmic circumstance that we're forced to believe identity exists necessarily and that even though we can't talk about it possibly not existing that such is somehow possible in a way we can't comprehend or communicate. Even that is impossible to do. You and I and every other human is absolutely forced to believe and to believe absolutely that identity is ontologically necessary and incorrigible. It's not possible to doubt, not even hypothetically.

 

[PolyHedral]

The problem with this is that the consistency overrides the inconsistency. If inconsistency then consistency & inconsistency, but if consistency then ¬inconsistency -- the "inconsistency" ceases; in fact it can never begin.

But without the excluded middle, consistency doesn't mean that inconsistency is impossible.

Well words are pointers, I understand what you're saying. I agree that the universe doesn't have to be understandable but it isn't unfounded to say that we must believe that identity is necessary; we must absolutely believe it. We can't not believe it. We can't even hypothesize about it. That's what I'm saying.

Well, I'd say that you can't say anything coherent (including that you don't believe it) without assuming identity, but this is mostly the same thing.

I'm also saying that arguing through some inexplicable means it's just a cosmic circumstance that we're forced to believe identity exists necessarily and that even though we can't talk about it possibly not existing that such is somehow possible in a way we can't comprehend or communicate. Even that is impossible to do. You and I and every other human is absolutely forced to believe and to believe absolutely that identity is ontologically necessary and incorrigible. It's not possible to doubt, not even hypothetically.

But my argument is that just because an inconsistent universe is meaningless and nonsensical doesn't mean it can't "exist". (For a very sketchy value of exist) Any logic that says so must, by definition, be circular, since identity is a prerequisite of coherent logic.

Also, it is impossible to prove the universe consistent, since doing so would break Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

 

[Meow Mix]

But without the excluded middle, consistency doesn't mean that inconsistency is impossible.

The real problem emerges when it gets to itself... basketball & not-basketball doesn't cause excluded middle to exist, but excluded middle & not-excluded middle does have excluded middle existing, which precludes and overrides the "not-excluded middle."

Besides, inconsistency is impossible. You can't say it's possible or believe it's possible or that it's possibly possible without self-contradicting, so you're getting way ahead of yourself.

Well, I'd say that you can't say anything coherent (including that you don't believe it) without assuming identity, but this is mostly the same thing.

Then why are you stringing together words that don't mean anything as if you're making a point to me? (LOL that sounds vastly rude but I know you know what I'm saying ;P)

But my argument is that just because an inconsistent universe is meaningless and nonsensical doesn't mean it can't "exist". (For a very sketchy value of exist) Any logic that says so must, by definition, be circular, since identity is a prerequisite of coherent logic.

But you're not saying anything here. You feel this illusion that the words you're stringing together are making a point but no such thing is occuring. You're typing "sdlghlkdgdsgds" but you just don't realize it. Your sentence has the word "inconsistent" and the word "universe" in it and the word "exist" in it but it's not actually about anything involving consistency or universes or existence, since it means the same thing as "dslgjdlkgd." It's not that I'm saying we can't believe it's possible or possibly possible because we can't understand it, it's that I'm saying you can't believe "it" is possible because there's no "it" to believe; unless you think we can believe alsdkjghhgdl or say that Lkglkdsjgd is possible. There's no position or point to be had here, that's what I'm saying. You're responding to me with a tone of disagreement but you're not talking about anything, though I do experience this illusion that what you're saying might be able to be true or false since the individual words are usually meaningful. But it's just that -- an illusion.

Also, it is impossible to prove the universe consistent, since doing so would break Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

That might matter if it were both complete and consistent; and GIT was made in response to effectively generated systems... of which I'm not sure logic (and thus the universe) can be considered such. GIT may well prevent the formation of a TOE for physical (contingent) laws though.

 

[PolyHedral]

That might matter if it were both complete and consistent; and GIT was made in response to effectively generated systems... of which I'm not sure logic (and thus the universe) can be considered such. GIT may well prevent the formation of a TOE for physical (contingent) laws though.

GIT does apply to all forms of logic, and... I can't possibly imagine how the universe being incomplete is not even more nonsensical than the concept of it being inconsistent. After all, the universe being incomplete would mean that the universe is greater than itself, which would mean A != A... oops.

 

[Meow Mix]

GIT does apply to all forms of logic, and... I can't possibly imagine how the universe being incomplete is not even more nonsensical than the concept of it being inconsistent. After all, the universe being incomplete would mean that the universe is greater than itself, which would mean A != A... oops.

No, in order for GIT to apply the axioms must make the first GIT possible.

Here is a complete and consistent axiomatic system, for instance:

1) ∀x : ¬(0 = x + 1)
2) ∀x∀y : ¬(x = y) --> ¬(x + 1 = y + 1)
3) ∀x : x + 0 = x
4) ∀x∀y : (x + y) + 1 = x + (y + 1)

Since this system doesn't ever give rise to the axioms that make the first GIT possible, then neither GIT applies.

I haven't really thought about seeing if GIT applies to Aristotlianesque logic so I can't definitively tell you that GIT doesn't apply to it yet, but I strongly suspect that it doesn't.

 

[PolyHedral]

Wikipedia says that GIT applies to any system that includes number theory. I'd be very impressed if you can describe the universe with a logical system that doesn't include number theory, but now I think we're talking about subtly different things.

 

[Meow Mix]

Wikipedia says that GIT applies to any system that includes number theory. I'd be very impressed if you can describe the universe with a logical system that doesn't include number theory, but now I think we're talking about subtly different things.

Indeed -- as describing the universe with number theory would be describing its contingent aspects like the physical laws, which I've already agreed GIT probably applies to.

 

[PolyHedral]

Surely, if the concept of the number "5" exists as a thing, without needing something to comprehend it, number theory must also exist independent of things thinking about it?

 

[Meow Mix]

Surely, if the concept of the number "5" exists as a thing, without needing something to comprehend it, number theory must also exist independent of things thinking about it?

That's a really interesting question. I think my brain just exploded. I'll have to think on that.

I suspect it may have something to do with "5" existing as something other than a group if no minds are around to group things. We're wading into the limits of conceivability here, though at least as far as I know we're back to the realm of consistency and (attempted) understandability

 

[PolyHedral]

OK, so have a slightly different question: In a universe of 5 items, does 4 exist as a thing?

 

[Meow Mix]

OK, so have a slightly different question: In a universe of 5 items, does 4 exist as a thing?

Difficult to answer because I'm not sure what to think myself.

If we ignore the physical objects existing then we just have at least identity, which can be thought of like Ø or {}. Existence would be like an empty set because it's limited, and identity is sort of like the brackets that limit it.

With Ø there is {Ø}, and with {Ø} there is {{Ø}, Ø} and all of the rest of the integers and mathematics follow.

But is there {Ø} without a mind? It's like thought... thinking about nothing is Ø, thinking about thinking about nothing is {Ø}. How do we get to {Ø} without a mind existing? Does it exist without being conceived by way of grouping? I don't know.

I'm thinking something like a universe with just identity is Ø. But if Ø exists then identity applies to that, too, and since identity DOES exist then {Ø} would exist even without a mind to goad it into existing. Then that, too, has an identity {{Ø}}. And so on. In which case yes, "4" would exist in a universe that contained 5 physical objects even without minds; but not in the way that we typically think of "4" as a group. It's like the identity of an identity of an identity of an identity. I'd have to really think on it to connect that to how we normally think of "4" to make it more meaningful though.

Clearly this is difficult stuff, and I'm not explaining it simply so as Einstein said that means I don't understand it fully myself, yet. It seems to follow from the fact that identity exists though.