One of the horns of Euthyphro's Dilemma often championed by theists is Divine Command Theory (DCT), which is described in brief as the notion that God is the sole arbiter of morality. A proponent of DCT would reply to the question, "Does God do good because it's good, or is it good because God does it?" with "It's good because God does it." In other words, there is no transcendental morality [to God]; only God's command to determine "good" from "evil."
This immediately implies that if God were to strike someone dead on the street then this act is "good," since God does it -- assuming DCT is true. Normally theists could draw from classical theodicies and say that God striking someone dead in the street could serve some ultimate good purpose even if we can't see it, so let me clarify a little further.
If God were to torture someone for the sake of torture -- purely to cause pain and suffering, with no ultimate purpose other than the person suffering and experiencing pain -- this would register as "good" if DCT is true. If I stopped my argument here, then I would be falling prey to the fallacy of arguing from adverse consequences, so bear with me while I get to my point.
We humans are arguably endowed with a sense of what's "good or evil" according to many theists and nontheists alike. With the semantics of what "good or evil" are left aside for some other discussion, many of us can agree that we have this sense or rational function, which I will henceforth call our "moral compass," even if our compasses don't always agree.
My moral compass tells me that anyone torturing for torture's sake -- even if God does it -- is not "good" whatsoever. Even if DCT were true, I could never subjectively agree that torture for torture's sake is "good."
I run into a conundrum then: if DCT is true, and my "moral compass" comes from God, then God has supplied me with at least one sense/rational function that isn't aimed at generating true beliefs. Assuming DCT is true, my "moral compass" is faulty since I mistakenly believe that God torturing for torture's sake would be "evil."
If God has endowed me with at least one rational function that isn't aimed at forming true beliefs, how can I be assured that ANY of my rational functions are aimed at forming true beliefs -- including arriving to the belief that DCT is true?
Using this Bayesian argument I aim to show that anyone who believes the following self-contradicts:
1) DCT is true
2) Our "moral compass" comes from God
3) God torturing for torture's sake is subjectively perceived as wrong or evil
If each of these beliefs is held by a person, they self-contradict because the person is admitting they have at least one rational function given by God which isn't aimed at generating true beliefs, and the question arises whether or not they can trust any of their rational functions.
Given that k is the notion that our mental faculties are aimed at generating true beliefs, and p is the notion that our mental faculties were given to us entirely by God, and q is the notion that at least one of our mental faculties (from p) is faulty in that it consistently generates at least one false belief (such as "God torturing for torture's sake is evil"), then we can make a Bayesian argument that Pr(k|p&q) is some low or inscrutable number. That is, the probability that k given p&q is some low or inscrutable number.*
What do you think?
(* - Avid readers of theological debates will recognize this line of argumentation from Alvin Plantinga's [in]famous argument against k given that "naturalism" is true and the human species evolved. He argues that Pr(k|E&N) is also some low or inscrutable number. While interesting, his argument would I suppose be better discussed in another thread.)
