Yes, I do.
That is not to say that I believe that metacognition, awareness, or wakefulness do not exist.
However, the concept of "consciousness" is vague and often given traits that I do not believe accurately reflect reality. I think the "hard problem of consciousness" can only exist in reference to a form of consciousness that has no relationship with reality.
I am conscious right now, meaning that I am awake and self-aware. There is nothing inherently special about these features, though, in the way that the "hard problem of consciousness" proposes. I do not believe that phanerons "exist" or that qualia "exist." They are abstractions of patterns of activity in our nervous systems. What we call "red" is not a distinct qualia but how our eye reacts to a certain wavelength, the signals our eyes send to our brains, and how our brains react to those signals.
It can be understood, broadly, as a form of biochemical computation.
Questions about precisely when we can say that an artificial intelligence has gained consciousness or if they even can are, in my opinion, devoid of real meaning. Questions about whether "consciousness survives after death" can only be coherent when we conceive of consciousness as something other than a name for neural processes like metacognition, awareness, wakefulness, memory, identity, language, rational thought, etc.
Consciousness is a convenient metaphor or shorthand for real, physical processes but, in my opinion, it carries with it a variety of misleading baggage. This is quite in line with what Dennett has said on a number of occassions.
I think the quote you have given here attacks a straw man of Dennett's position.
The question is about reductive vs eliminative materialism, not about whether human beings are capable of mental processes.