Does consciousness play a fundamental role according to contemporary physics?

[Gambit]

The difference between dark matter and a metaphysically necessary being is that, with dark matter, there is an empirical observation that requires some adjustment to our physical models in order to reconcile them with the observation, but the cosmological argument is a logical argument rather than a matter of an unexplained empirical phenomenon.

That there is something rather than nothing is an empirical fact - a fact that requires an explanation.

The cosmological arguments follow from the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but that principle is not itself proven. It has to be assumed as a premise. It is a controversial premise that has been argued against in many ways. For example, there is an argument that elements of modern physics call the PSR into question. The PSR seems intuitively reasonable when dealing with simple questions of causation, but is there a sufficient reason to explain the apparent randomness (in the stochastic sense) of observations in QM?

Yes, it would appear that consciousness plays a role (which is, by the way, the subject matter of this thread).

So far, apart from what I just wrote, I've been granting the truth of the argument from contingency for the sake of argument. I haven't argued that we don't have to posit a necessary being. What I have said is that the universe itself can be necessary. Cosmological arguments generally argue the opposite, that the universe, as a collection of contingent beings, is itself contingent, but if argued this way I think it appears to be a fallacy of composition. It does not follow from the contingency of individual entities that the whole is contingent. When the conclusion is argued for metaphysically based on an intuition that the universe could have failed to exist, it's just unsubstantiated. There is not any reasonable way of knowing whether the universe could have failed to exist.

The problem is that you are presupposing something that is nonphysical and calling it the universe.

With regard to the objection about a first cause necessarily transcending spacetime, I believe it's been answered, and again there is a fallacy of composition. Each entity in the universe is located in space and time, but the universe as a whole is not.

The universe is coterminous with the spacetime continuum.

Perhaps it would clarify things somewhat to dispense with replacing "God" with "universe". The main point is simply that even if you grant the validity of the cosmological argument, the conclusion of the argument doesn't really have much to do with traditional concepts of God, which go far beyond the idea of a metaphysically necessary being.

I have already explained that there are other arguments for determining the divine attributes.

 

[Gambit]

There is no sense in which my personal beliefs are obvious from what I've written here

There most certainly is. You believe in a superfluous God (a God that is not necessary to explain anything).

 

[lovemuffin]

This is entirely irrelevant to the conversation as far as I can tell, but it is not my belief that God is a superfluous hypothesis.

 

[lovemuffin]

That there is something rather than nothing is an empirical fact - a fact that requires an explanation.

When I challenge the PSR, I challenge the idea that a fact requires an explanation (in the sense of a sufficient reason).

Yes, it would appear that consciousness plays a role (which is, by the way, the subject matter of this thread).

Perhaps. I don't think the question is settled.

I have already explained that there are other arguments for determining the divine attributes.

I think I mentioned this before you did It seems to me that there is some misunderstanding here, because in pointing out that there are other arguments you are actually agreeing with me on that point, as far as I can tell.

For what it's worth, I am not interested enough in the argument about the universe and time and all that so I'll concede it.

 

[viole]

Agreed. The idea that an objective world exists independently of all subjectivity is a patently false one.

I think it is exactly the other way round. To believe that all subjectivity exists independently of an objective world is patently false.

I am pretty sure that the Universe was objectively there when there was no subjectivity around. I can hardly imagine a subjectivity existing without an objective world hosting it.

Or do you have patently obvious evidence of the contrary?

Ciao

- viole

 

[Gambit]

I think it is exactly the other way round. To believe that all subjectivity exists independently of an objective world is patently false.

You're making a straw man argument. I never argued that all subjectivity exists independently of an objective world.

I am pretty sure that the Universe was objectively there when there was no subjectivity around.

How can you be sure if there is no subjectivity to observe it?

Or do you have patently obvious evidence of the contrary?

Yes. It's called the quantum mechanics.

 

[shawn001]

This reminds me of "If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?"

 

[Gambit]

This reminds me of "If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?"

I believe that is a Zen koan. And I suspect it is telling us the same thing quantum mechanics is telling us, namely, that objectivity does not exist independently of subjectivity. That's a materialistic myth.

 

[Bunyip]

I believe that is a Zen koan. And I suspect it is telling us the same thing quantum mechanics is telling us, namely, that objectivity does not exist independently of subjectivity. That's a materialistic myth.

Not really, given that the answer is yes.

If a tree falls and nobody is there to hear it, does it make a sound? A:Yep.

 

[Thornbrier]

You are misinterpreting quantum mechanics. An observer is not necessary to collapse the wave function, and there are methods of observing results without collapsing the wave function, this is the principle behind things like Bows-Einstein Condensates. Even if that were true it would not provide the claimed room for uncaused consciousness typically postulated in dualism for a few reasons, one major one being that none of those quantum events have any impact on neurological events.

As to your claim of consciousness being a sub-atomic property there is no evidence that consciousness can exist independently of the flesh that makes up the nervous system we are observing it in. And even if it was, then by your argument (using the fallacy I mentioned above) waveforms would never be in an uncollapsed state.

I especially find it pretentious how narrowly you define what belief is required to be a theist. Claiming that other theists aren't 'really' theists because they don't believe the way you do falls into the 'no true scotsman' fallacy.

I have yet to see you make a single valid argument (let alone a sound argument) for anything you are claiming. Every time I see you making an argument for your claim you keep contradicting your own false premises.