Does Desire Justify Need?

[Dunemeister]

But what if, in fact, all desires DO justify need (which is an opinion no one has yet to hold)?

If that's true, that would be a tragedy, considering that we assume that all desires, principally, ARE justified!

The first thing to do, tom, would be to get your intuitions straight. Do we have the opinion that all desires justify need (I take that to mean "all desires are justified") or not?

 

[Inky]

So, ultimately, this is a question of what is and is not moral and how what do we examine to come to this conclusion.

Exactly. : ) When deciding whether I think an action is moral I'll usually look at the intention, but not the desire behind the intention.

[Desires/Emotions] --> [Intentions/Plans] --> [Actions] --> [Real-world results]

A big question here is: where along the line do we start to evaluate morality?

Obviously having a desire to kill increases the likelihood of shooting someone, but owning a gun also increases that likelihood, and owning a gun is not inherently immoral. Likewise, I would say people should manage their desires in ways that don't lead to bad results. Someone with that desire for killing might wisely choose to not own a gun.

The prevailing reply seems to be that a person's "intention" decides whether or not a desire is fulfilled "morally".

But what does that even mean? Surely, any intention would be BIRTHED from the desire itself!

I'm not sure how that follows. It makes sense to me that someone could have an intention to fulfill a desire in a particular way, and the intention (i.e. plan) could be either moral or immoral without reflecting on the desire itself.

Even a very typical desire, like an attraction to the smell of flowers, could lead to the immoral intent to steal someone else's flowers.

So if there is nothing wrong with natural desires, then there must be a list of different responses one could have to any given desire. It is then implied that certain responses are more or less moral than others.

Makes sense to me.

My question would be HOW one can conclude which choices are moral and which ones are not?

Well, everyone has a different moral framework, but I usually go with "first, do no harm" and a general respect of certain rights on top of that.

For example, if you have a desire to have more money, is the desire innocent? Perhaps there is a more innocent desire beneath and the desire for more money is, in fact, an immoral response. Some would say that the desire for more money is not a question of morality at all, but how can you be sure? Robbing a bank may be considered an immoral act, while a child robbing food because he can't afford it may not.

I'm not sure what it would mean for a desire to be innocent or not. I would call a desire risky if it's likely to tempt someone into immoral plans and actions. Maybe in this case what you call "innocent" I would call "safe". If a hungry child robbing food is acting morally, then the child's desire for food is a safe one. If robbing a bank is immoral, and the desire for money often leads many people to rob banks, then the desire for money is risky and responsible adults should manage it in ways that lead them to not rob banks. Perhaps they would get therapy or fantasize about bring rich and/or robbing banks, whatever's effective.

But what if, in fact, all desires DO justify need (which is an opinion no one has yet to hold)? I won't say this is what I believe, but I feel the need to play devil's advocate. WHAT IF... all desires are in fact justified, but that it is the manner in which those desires are fulfilled that is either moral or not. So in the case of a child-molester, if all desires are justified, you might assume that there is nothing wrong with that. Ah, but what if there is a deeper desire behind a sexual attraction to children? What if an innocent and perfectly justified desire has, in fact, been mutated by circumstances into something that inevitably leads to immoral actions?

This would imply the existence of some desires that have NO proper and moral satisfaction.

Really not following this part. How does a desire being mutated imply that it has no moral means of satisfaction? I can even see some cases being positive. Freud theorized that desire for artistic expression is a sublimated version of sexual desire. (I don't believe that, just an example.)

If all desires are justified, then the desire to molest children is justified by definition, whether or not it is a mutated version of a different desire. In that case the original desire and the mutated desire would both be justified. Although I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "justified". Do you mean it's acceptable to have it in one's consciousness or psyche without trying to remove it, or that it's acceptable to try and fulfill it?

Also, a desire related to a particular action can often be satisfied without performing that action, so it seems possible to me that any desire could be satisfied morally if you're willing to compromise some. For instance, if all solid evidence showed that viewing child pornography illustrations (so no real children involved) did not increase someone's likelihood of molesting a real child, people with that desire could satisfy it with images, although the level of satisfaction might not be the same. Not to say that I'm completely confident that no desires exist that can't be satisfied morally, but I can't think of any that I'm certain fall into that category, so it's up in the air for me. It also depends on the person, most likely.

If that's true, that would be a tragedy, considering that we assume that all desires, principally, ARE justified! Going further, could we speculate that ALL present forms of desire and intent are tragically demented by circumstances in the same way? Then you would have a soul full of innocent desires that are ultimately incapable of being fulfilled in a moral fashion, because the desires themselves have become unrecognizable...

Pretty depressing, if you ask me. Makes you feel helpless.

Well, I can think of a lot of very positive and beneficial desires - helping others, creating art, or inventing new technologies. So if they're all mutated in some way, maybe that's just part of the human psyche and sometimes mutation is a good thing.

 

[Autodidact]

Why assume this?

Because, obviously, you can't know that you won't. Don't you think Larry Craig thought he wouldn't be caught? A little hanky panky in the men's room--who needs to know? What's the harm?

But then we've moved away from the terms set out in the OP, namely a consequentialist understanding of ethics. What's wrong with the tryst is not that it causes harm. It doesn't.

I would disagree. There is no way to lie without becoming a liar. There are two people at the end of every action. You can't lie without lying and knowing you're lying and having to live with that knowledge. Harm.

Further, you have deprived yourself of one of the best things life has to offer--to be known, truly and honestly known, and still loved. The only way to get this gift is to be honest. Again, no shortcut. As soon as you lie, you've deprived yourself of this. Harm.

I was watching a documentary the other day where several people were interviewed who had cheated on their spouses using an adultery Web site AshleyMadison.com. (Here's an article about it. They paid some firm to arrange alibis and all the other rigamarole to make sure their spouses were entirely in the dark. And if what these people say is true, the scam worked. The wife (typically but not exclusively) is none the wiser, and some of them swear on a stack of bibles that their relationships have improved as a result. They have various stories to say why that might be, but most of them devolve to learning through the affair just how much they love their spouses. We might want to scoff at such stories, but there is no reason to disbelieve them.

It's important to also point out that just because these stories are true, we should not give up on the conventional wisdom. All the truth of these stories entails is that it is possible to have an affair with no harm done. And if THAT's possible, then our consequentialist principle should be rejected in favor of something else.

Anecdotes are not data, especially self-serving anecdotes. Again, research shows that the most important thing in our own happiness is the quality of our relationships with those we love. Another important thing is our own estimation of the quality of whatever we are doing. If you can say to yourself that you're treating your wife well, that she feels loved, and that you, the real you, not the fake you, are loved by her, you're a very lucky, very happy man. (or in my case, woman.)

Didn't your mama never tell you: Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive?

For evolutionary reasons, we humans experience everything we do to others and empathize with its effects. You can't stop yourself, unless, as I say, you're a psychopath. There's a reason the golden rule asks us to treat others as we would be treated; it's the path to happiness. When you are cheating on your wife, you cannot stop your awareness that you are doing so, and that you would not want to be treated the same way. You know, and can't help but know, you are treating your mate, your partner, badly. And you can't help but feel bad about that, or at least not as good as you might feel.

It's one of those hedonism vs. wisdom things. It might sound appealing, but in the long run the wise choice leads to your greater happiness.

Basically, your antidote to harm is lying. So that brings up an interesting ethical question. Why do we all feel, intuitively, that lying is wrong?

The question is whether it is wrong to do so if you can arrange it so she can't ever know about it. If one can, it's apparently permissable (based on the ethic of "You can do it but only if it doesn't cause any harm").

1. You can't guarantee that. 2. More importantly, you will know about it.

Hey, we're talking about a one-off here not a lifestyle. That semi-facetious point aside, let me just say that this piece of homely, stock wisdom is entirely trustworthy. Nevertheless, it is possible (and that's all I need for my argument) to have a one-off tryst with no harm done. And if that's so, the consequentialist principle is refuted.

You have failed to show that no harm is done.

No doubt, there are those who cheat and get caught. Is the problem the cheating or getting caught?

Both. How do you think Ted Haggard felt before he got caught?

A few disclaimers. The only thing my story needs is the reduction of harm to zero or to such a small level that it's hardly worth considering. Doing this does not require the sort of psychology you attribute to my hypothetical character. No plan is perfect, so no, he can't be 100% sure he won't get caught, but the chances are, ex hypothesis, minimal, so he doesn't particularly worry. And of course the lifetime of trust is worth more than the one night stand. That explains the care with which he ensures his wife won't find out. If his wife doesn't find out, there's no loss of trust or intimacy.

This is where I disagree. By intimacy I'm referring to a relationships based on honesty, on reality. An intimate relationship is one in which I am real, authentic, what I really am, and also accepted or even loved. You've cheated yourself of that.

And of course, there's no need to assume that the intimacy of the relationship will improve. I only submit that it's possible, at least if we take the stories of some cheaters at face value (something we have no reason not to do). And all I've said is that if this is true, the consequentialist ethic gets turned on its head so that cheating may be obligatory. The fact you find this result counterintuitive (as I do) shows just that you don't seriously hold to a consequentialist theory of ethics.

Not the intimacy I'm talking about.

btw, note that the intimacy I'm talking about is NOT harmed by a polyamorous relationship, which is based on honesty and trust.