Then state an argument concluding that mathematical realism is false. All you've done here so far is write a bunch of silly vacuous sentences and post pictures.
Arguments for mathematical realism have already been noted and otherwise referred to on this thread. I will specify a few of my own, beginning by quoting myself from another thread --
Scientific Realism Begets Mathematical Realism -- where I stated a couple of indispensability arguments:
Do you agree that from scientific discoveries and theories we can infer the nature of empirical reality, at least insofar as determining if an entity constitutes (some part of) empirical reality, or concluding that the essential terms of scientific theories refer to something objectively existing? This is just the thesis of scientific realism. “Scientific realism is a realism about whatever is described by our best scientific theories”.
Scientific Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
E=mc2, F=ma, F=k(q1q2)/d2 (Coulomb’s law), ∆S ≥ 0 (second law of thermodynamics), Schrodinger’s equation, the laws of conserved quantities, etc., etc. These are the sorts of entities or facts that physicists discover about empirical reality. Obviously these are mathematical relations, i.e., relations between quantities. Energy is a quantity whose value is the product of two other quantities--the mass of a system multiplied by the speed of light squared. Granted, all the particular mathematical relations or laws just noted may be inexact approximations, their applicability limited to a particular domain or specific conditions. Nevertheless, we can hardly imagine the discovery of more exacting or truer statements about the nature and operation of empirical reality than relations between quantities.
[. . . ]
Perhaps one wishes to claim that physicists discover other kinds of stuff in addition to mathematical relations, such as, say, the discovery of the electron. Few people would quibble with that. I would note that, even so, everything we know about electrons pertains to their mathematical (measurable) nature and their relations with other quantities or mathematical relations. J. J. Thomson’s cathode ray experiments did not involve the discovery of anything of a non-mathematical nature about empirical reality: he deduced the particulate aspect of the rays (which had been speculated), that the particles have a negative charge, and he arrived at estimates of the size of charge and mass by way of calculations and deduction premised on the degree the rays were bent by electrical currents of differing strengths. The discovery of the electron was ultimately the discovery of a quantity or a set of quantities and mathematical relations.
[. . . ]
Thus, taking my cue from some of the characteristic claims of scientific realism--
“The entities described by the scientific theory exist objectively and mind-independently.”
Scientific realism - Wikipedia “The central terms of the best current theories are genuinely referential.”
http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~delittle/Encyclopedia entries/scientific realism.htm
--I wish to state an argument such as:
P1: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are genuinely referential.
P2: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are quantities (/mathematical relations).
C: Therefore, some quantities (/mathematical relations) are genuinely referential.
(AAI-3)
or
P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.
(AII-1)
The following is just a simple independence argument for mathematical realism:
P1: All objects that are not arbitrarily defined are objects that exist objectively.
P2: All objects whose ratio of circumference to diameter can only be calculated rather than subjectively concocted are objects that are not arbitrarily defined.
C: Therefore, all objects whose ratio of circumference to diameter can only be calculated rather than subjectively concocted are objects that exist objectively.
MaP
SaM
⁂ SaP
(AAA-1)
Obviously the subject term here includes all circles and ellipses, whether Euclidean or otherwise.
“Not arbitrarily defined” means that the object is not defined according to the meaning of the adverbial form of arbitrary as denoted by either definitions (1) and/or (5):
the definition of arbitrarily subject to individual will or judgment without restriction; contingent solely upon one's discretion; undetermined; not assigned a specific value.
“Concocted” means the adjectival form of concoct as denoted by definition (2):
the definition of concocted devised, made-up, contrived. “Fabricated” as denoted by definitions (3) and/or (4)
the definition of fabricated can be substituted for concocted.
“Subjectively” means the adverbial form of subjective as denoted by (1) and/or (2):
the definition of subjective existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought (opposed to objective); pertaining to or characteristic of an individual; personal; individual.
“Calculated” means the adjectival form of calculate as denoted by definition (1)
the definition of calculate to determine or ascertain by mathematical methods; compute.
One can also formulate a sound deduction by substituting “some objects” in P1 (and therefore in C) for “all objects” in the above argument. Doing so would render an AII-1 syllogism