Existence vs Real

[dyanaprajna2011]

From the Buddhist point of view, what I've said can be easily explained by the ideas of anatta and sunyata. But I'm aware that this isn't a decent explanation for readers of this thread. So I'll try and explain my viewpoint. I might be everywhere on the map, so bear with me.

Everything exists, because everything is a product of the mind, whether in thoughts, or in reality. Even if only the idea exists, the thing still exists as an idea. For instance, I don't believe in god. However, even if god doesn't exist ontologically and existentially, it still exists in the minds of those who do believe. And this belief affects their thoughts and actions, so there's still an indirect existence. However, this doesn't mean that god is real. Some people believe in fairies, and this can affect how they act in the world, as such, fairies exist, even if just as a product of the mind. But they're not real. As far as things like you and me, cars, dogs, buildings and such, which are more than products of the mind- they exist, but aren't real. For instance, what exactly is a human? Can you locate where and what a human is? Or is a human, as both the Buddha and David Hume taught, just a composite of various elements? And, if humans are just this composite, then can these be further broken down? According to quantum physics, yes they can. And to the point where their substance is mostly...nothing? a vacuum? I'm not sure how physicists explain it, but at the heart of the atom, apart from the small amount of space that sub-atomic particles take up, is something else besides what is commonly understood. And this...whatever...takes up the major portion of the atom. So, what is real? Reality is whatever our minds make it to be.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Everything exists, because everything is a product of the mind, whether in thoughts, or in reality.

What about possible objects of thought that are never actually thought about? Do they exist as well?

Even if only the idea exists, the thing still exists as an idea. For instance, I don't believe in god. However, even if god doesn't exist ontologically and existentially, it still exists in the minds of those who do believe.

Wouldn't it be more accurate, and less confusing, to say that while God does not exist, the concept of him does? (rather than that God exists, "as an idea") Since God is defined as an entity or being, not a thought, saying that "God exists", when God does not exist but what does exist is a particular pattern of human thought and behavior, would seem to just be false. Take Sherlock Holmes- a fictional detective. There is no such person. But does Sherlock Holmes exist? Or is what exists rather a description of a person, and accounts of their actions (descriptions and accounts which do not denote anything/that are not satisfied)?

 

[The Sum of Awe]

That's what I'm saying. I have "real" thoughts in my head however you define thought. But the image that I hold there does not actually exist.

The image exists and is real as a thought.

 

[The Sum of Awe]

Fair enough: two words that mean the same thing. But if a day comes when you do notice a different meaning for each in the way you use them in sentences, do note it.

If a day comes when humans can distinguish real and illusion, then the day will not come, and the lack of notes will be noted.

 

[dyanaprajna2011]

What about possible objects of thought that are never actually thought about? Do they exist as well?

Not until thought is given to them.

Wouldn't it be more accurate, and less confusing, to say that while God does not exist, the concept of him does? (rather than that God exists, "as an idea") Since God is defined as an entity or being, not a thought, saying that "God exists", when God does not exist but what does exist is a particular pattern of human thought and behavior, would seem to just be false.

I don't think it would be more accurate, but it would be just as valid to say so. Whether god exists ontologically/existentially or not isn't really the point of what I'm getting at; whether in actuality or just in thought, the concept, if you will, is real enough. The fact that this concept is, whether directly or indirectly, affective in causation of events, particularly in believers, makes the concept just as real as the thing itself.

Take Sherlock Holmes- a fictional detective. There is no such person. But does Sherlock Holmes exist? Or is what exists rather a description of a person, and accounts of their actions (descriptions and accounts which do not denote anything/that are not satisfied)?

Yes, I would say Holmes does exist. Even if just as conceptual thought. However, this doesn't make him real, as he's only a work of fiction, an act of creativity. This is the way I see the difference between what exists and what is real. Now, I understand what you're asking me, isn't there a difference between a concept and it's reality? And the answer would be yes. But to me, this is the difference between exist and real.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

I don't think it would be more accurate, but it would be just as valid to say so.

It doesn't seem so. If I say that "X exists", this is true if and only if there is something which exists that satisfies the definition of X. Thus, if X is defined as a concept, then "God exist" is true as long as there is merely a concept of God. However, if God is defined as an entity or being, as he is by virtually all theists, then "God exists" is false if all that exists is a concept- because what exists does not meet the definition of God (since a concept=/= a being or entity).

Whether god exists ontologically/existentially or not isn't really the point of what I'm getting at; whether in actuality or just in thought, the concept, if you will, is real enough. The fact that this concept is, whether directly or indirectly, affective in causation of events, particularly in believers, makes the concept just as real as the thing itself.

Sure- but does it make the concept the thing itself, or is a concept still distinct from an entity? Unless the concept of God satisfies the definition of God (again, usually a being with certain properties), then "God exists" is only true if God exists, not a concept of him.

I'm just not sure we can square your suggestion with some basic logic here.

Yes, I would say Holmes does exist. Even if just as conceptual thought.

But Sherlock Holmes is a detective, not "a conceptual thought".

Now, I understand what you're asking me, isn't there a difference between a concept and it's reality? And the answer would be yes. But to me, this is the difference between exist and real.

I thought that difference between a concept and its denotation was, essentially, the difference between a representation and that which is represented?

 

[dyanaprajna2011]

It doesn't seem so. If I say that "X exists", this is true if and only if there is something which exists that satisfies the definition of X. Thus, if X is defined as a concept, then "God exist" is true as long as there is merely a concept of God. However, if God is defined as an entity or being, as he is by virtually all theists, then "God exists" is false if all that exists is a concept- because what exists does not meet the definition of God (since a concept=/= a being or entity).


Sure- but does it make the concept the thing itself, or is a concept still distinct from an entity? Unless the concept of God satisfies the definition of God (again, usually a being with certain properties), then "God exists" is only true if God exists, not a concept of him.

I'm just not sure we can square your suggestion with some basic logic here.


But Sherlock Holmes is a detective, not "a conceptual thought".


I thought that difference between a concept and its denotation was, essentially, the difference between a representation and that which is represented?

Plato, in his idea of the theory of forms, taught that a mental conception is more real than the actuality of the thing itself. In my way of thinking, all things are products of the mind, nothing can be real without first existing as a conceptual thought. This is how we know things, IMO, this is how epistemology works. For a good example, think of numbers. Can you point to the existential existence of the number 3? Or do numbers only exist as abstract concept, whose 'reality' is found when it's applied as an adjective to describe quantity? For instance, let's say I say "three apples". Three is a descriptor of the quantity of the apples. But, does that "three" exist of itself? No. It's existence is produced by nothing more than our thought of it. This kind of explains how I see things.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Plato, in his idea of the theory of forms, taught that a mental conception is more real than the actuality of the thing itself.

Well sure, but several things; Plato's fateful epistemological error has long been noted (his bifurcation of knowledge and belief, and estimation of the relation between the two, is founded upon a false dilemma) and has been modified even by his later day intellectual heirs ("Platonists" or realists in ontology regarding universals/abstract objects), and for another, this thesis depends on many other philosophic claims, many of which are not especially plausible. Taking a single thesis out of a philosophical system doesn't really work- systematic philosophy is a package deal, sort of all or nothing.

In my way of thinking, all things are products of the mind, nothing can be real without first existing as a conceptual thought.

So... The natural world did not exist prior to the existence of humans with the ability to cognize objects?

For a good example, think of numbers. Can you point to the existential existence of the number 3?

That depends how one defines the number 3. Is it an immaterial acausal object, ala Plato? Then I would say that it does not exist. Is it a cardinality, which is merely instantiated or shared in common by various physical collections? Then yes, it does.

As before, whether X exists depends on how X is defined- if X is defined as a concept, then "X exists" is true if only a concept exists. If, however, X is NOT defined as a concept, then the existence of a mere concept is not enough to satisfy the proposition- we need X, not the concept of X, for "X exists" to be true.

 

[dyanaprajna2011]

So... The natural world did not exist prior to the existence of humans with the ability to cognize objects?

Not necessarily humans, but some sort of consciousness.

That depends how one defines the number 3. Is it an immaterial acausal object, ala Plato? Then I would say that it does not exist. Is it a cardinality, which is merely instantiated or shared in common by various physical collections? Then yes, it does.

I would have to disagree. '3' can only exist as an abstract concept, and has no meaning outside it's use as an adjective, at least in my way of thinking.

As before, whether X exists depends on how X is defined- if X is defined as a concept, then "X exists" is true if only a concept exists. If, however, X is NOT defined as a concept, then the existence of a mere concept is not enough to satisfy the proposition- we need X, not the concept of X, for "X exists" to be true.

The question then is, can something be real without first it's existence as a concept? Do feelings not start off as mental constructs in the mind? Take anger for instance. Where does it come from? While a person is angry, that anger is real, but once said anger is gone, does it cease to exist?

Of course, we could say that my theory only works for some things, but not others. But how would one differentiate between them? between what has material existence and what doesn't? Personally, I don't differentiate between the two. One could say that it would be harder to prove my theory for material objects, but I don't think it's impossible.

 

[Twilight Hue]

I'm afraid I don't follow. It also seems you're not seeing my point. If "everything exists and nothing is real", but "real" and "exists" are interchangeable, then it seems like we should be able to say that "everything is real and nothing exists"... But then, this is an explicit contradiction of the original statement.

Not a good result.

Firstly, your not wrong. There is a contradiction. However if you approach it differently the contradiction disappears.

The film obviously portrayed real people that existed during the era the film was shot, so hence every thing is real. Today everyone in the film is clearly dead, so we find that nothing exists. The original statement still applies that everything exists by way of
atomic makeup, and whatever the atoms rearrange into, we find that through the dynamics of consistent change nothing is actually real in any static sense.

Imo it's all on how you approach such paradoxes to make determinations on the qualities of real-ness and existence and the interchangibility of ones personal perceptions on existence and real-ness of form and substance.

 

[Willamena]

If a day comes when humans can distinguish real and illusion, then the day will not come, and the lack of notes will be noted.

Like "real" and "exists," we already have distinguished "real" and "illusion," as indicated by having different words with different uses.

 

[Contemplative Cat]

Its all very simple, but as they say some wood Burns faster than others.
Energy is real(& thus energies qualities)
but the perception of the world; the appearance is n illusion created by a brain and senses.

The actual world is real,
but the individual objects are just qualities of nature,
thus not real, individualization of objects comes from a desire and attachment to particular objects.

For example. A chair is an illusion, we only see a "chair" because we might need to sit down.
To a fish or something similar there are no chairs, just qualities of energy.

 

[Contemplative Cat]

Why does this bother some people?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Not necessarily humans, but some sort of consciousness.

So the world more or less leapt into existence as soon as something evolved consciousness? Does that strike you as a plausible story?

I would have to disagree. '3' can only exist as an abstract concept, and has no meaning outside it's use as an adjective, at least in my way of thinking.

I'm not sure you caught my point; I'm saying that I can live with different definitions here, but whether the number 3 exists depends on our definition. If the number 3 is defined as sort sort of abstract conceptual entity, then I'm not sure what it means to say that it exists (or is instantiated). If the number is merely a cardinality which certain physical collections share (namely, those with 3 members), then it seems like we can say that it does exist (as this quantity is instantiated).

The question then is, can something be real without first it's existence as a concept?

Well, I would say yes; concepts come from experience- but then, if nothing exists unless/until it is conceptualized, we'd be trapped in a vicious circle- we'd need concepts to have existents to experience to have concepts of, but to have concepts of them they need to exist, but to exist we need to have concepts of them, and so on.

On a side note, this strikes me as the most full-blown sort of anthropocentrism one could really imagine- supposing that things literally did not exist at all until humans (or conscious beings in general) deigned to take note of them... Really?

Do feelings not start off as mental constructs in the mind? Take anger for instance. Where does it come from? While a person is angry, that anger is real, but once said anger is gone, does it cease to exist?

This isn't anything peculiar to feelings, but is a general ontological problem- how does time affect ontology? Do past events exist? Future ones? I'm not sure we want to go there as this is a separate can of worms.

Of course, we could say that my theory only works for some things, but not others. But how would one differentiate between them? between what has material existence and what doesn't? Personally, I don't differentiate between the two. One could say that it would be harder to prove my theory for material objects, but I don't think it's impossible.

I'm not sure its a testable theory so much as its just a different manner of speaking. One I'm not sure is preferable; if everything exists and nothing is real, not only does this run afoul of some basic logic, as I've already pointed out, it basically destroys any usefulness the distinction between existing and not existing may have had. Or rather, the distinction becomes more complicated- rather than saying that Micheal Jordan exists and Sherlock Holmes does not, we have to start differentiating between various modes of existence. I just don't see any benefit to outweigh these difficulties to this manner of speaking.

 

[psychoslice]

A belief system can be real in the sense that everyone believes it, but when in fact its not real or has no truth in it, truth meaning proof.

 

[Twilight Hue]

Why does this bother some people?

Reactive mind.

 

[dyanaprajna2011]

So the world more or less leapt into existence as soon as something evolved consciousness? Does that strike you as a plausible story?

Not by that explanation. But I'm one who doesn't believe that consciousness is something that evolved.

I'm not sure you caught my point; I'm saying that I can live with different definitions here, but whether the number 3 exists depends on our definition. If the number 3 is defined as sort sort of abstract conceptual entity, then I'm not sure what it means to say that it exists (or is instantiated). If the number is merely a cardinality which certain physical collections share (namely, those with 3 members), then it seems like we can say that it does exist (as this quantity is instantiated).

Fair enough. But doesn't the number 3 only have meaning, then, when it's used as a descriptor? And, is it possible for 3 to cease existing if there's nothing 3 of to quantify?

Well, I would say yes; concepts come from experience- but then, if nothing exists unless/until it is conceptualized, we'd be trapped in a vicious circle- we'd need concepts to have existents to experience to have concepts of, but to have concepts of them they need to exist, but to exist we need to have concepts of them, and so on.

Or a cycle of becoming, based on cause and effect...but that's probably a digression.

On a side note, this strikes me as the most full-blown sort of anthropocentrism one could really imagine- supposing that things literally did not exist at all until humans (or conscious beings in general) deigned to take note of them... Really?

I don't think it's anthropocentric at all. Then again, my idea of consciousness is that it can exist independent of physical factors. I would see this view more as idealism.

This isn't anything peculiar to feelings, but is a general ontological problem- how does time affect ontology? Do past events exist? Future ones? I'm not sure we want to go there as this is a separate can of worms.

Agreed.

I'm not sure its a testable theory so much as its just a different manner of speaking. One I'm not sure is preferable; if everything exists and nothing is real, not only does this run afoul of some basic logic, as I've already pointed out, it basically destroys any usefulness the distinction between existing and not existing may have had. Or rather, the distinction becomes more complicated- rather than saying that Micheal Jordan exists and Sherlock Holmes does not, we have to start differentiating between various modes of existence. I just don't see any benefit to outweigh these difficulties to this manner of speaking.

I think I can agree with this. As far as the part I put in bold- this is the basic idea in Zen, and Buddhism in general.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Fair enough. But doesn't the number 3 only have meaning, then, when it's used as a descriptor? And, is it possible for 3 to cease existing if there's nothing 3 of to quantify?

Well, it would mean that "the number 3" would be sort of a deceiving shorthand for what we're talking about, because it is not an object, something which could be denoted by a definite description, but rather a property- a property instantiated by physical objects/collections (the property of having the same quantity or cardinality as all other collections of 3 objects)

Or a cycle of becoming, based on cause and effect...but that's probably a digression.

The problem is that it is a vicious circle- you need A to get B, but you need B to get A. There's no way to get the whole series going without some special exception. Seems better to say that concepts presuppose existence, not the other way around.

I don't think it's anthropocentric at all.

Well, its either that, or another, prima facie equally implausible thesis, that consciousness is either not a property of agents, or that there are other conscious agents than humans.

Then again, my idea of consciousness is that it can exist independent of physical factors. I would see this view more as idealism.

Right- you're stuck with the same problem Berkeley was, giving an account of persistence in light of the necessary finitude of perception (in short, how do objects persist, given that perception is fleeting?)- whereas he posited God to more or less anchor existence, you have to similarly posit some cosmic or transcendent consciousness (either that or say that there have always been conscious beings, or that at one time there was nothing in existence and existence emerged more or less fully-formed along with consciousness- not very attractive options). Unfortunately, this will be at odds with virtually everything reliable we know about consciousness (namely that it is a function of neural activity).

 

[dyanaprajna2011]

Well, it would mean that "the number 3" would be sort of a deceiving shorthand for what we're talking about, because it is not an object, something which could be denoted by a definite description, but rather a property- a property instantiated by physical objects/collections (the property of having the same quantity or cardinality as all other collections of 3 objects)

Fair enough.

or that there are other conscious agents than humans.

This.

Right- you're stuck with the same problem Berkeley was, giving an account of persistence in light of the necessary finitude of perception (in short, how do objects persist, given that perception is fleeting?)- whereas he posited God to more or less anchor existence, you have to similarly posit some cosmic or transcendent consciousness (either that or say that there have always been conscious beings, or that at one time there was nothing in existence and existence emerged more or less fully-formed along with consciousness- not very attractive options). Unfortunately, this will be at odds with virtually everything reliable we know about consciousness (namely that it is a function of neural activity).

The part I put in bold.

And actually, I've found, at least IMO, that we know next to nothing about consciousness. Even the standard scientific explanation, as you pointed out as a function of neural activity, doesn't really seem that plausible to me. I think there's something much deeper to it than that, but it's not exactly something that can be tested, just my own opinion.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

And actually, I've found, at least IMO, that we know next to nothing about consciousness. Even the standard scientific explanation, as you pointed out as a function of neural activity, doesn't really seem that plausible to me. I think there's something much deeper to it than that, but it's not exactly something that can be tested, just my own opinion.

Well, but whatever one may think, its pretty hard to deny the correlation between conscious states and brain states- researchers are even developing the ability to read people's minds simply from viewing brain activity. We have mapped various cognitive abilities onto specific areas of the brain with great reliability. We observe the (consistent and predictable) effects on conscious states that changes in the brain can have (such as brain damage). I'm just not sure what basis there is, whatsoever, for denying that consciousness is a function of neural activity, whatever other parts of the story we may currently be missing.