Faith in science?

[TagliatelliMonster]

Problems weigh what? What are the objective physical properties of problems? What is the scientific theory of problems?

It tastes like purple.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

It tastes like purple.

Yes, finally some science.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

What is the natural world?

Not the matrix.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

Yes, finally some science.

It was a hint to illustrate the nature of your error.
I guess it went flying over your head.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Not the matrix.

Well, the matrix is physical and natural in the end as an idea.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

It was a hint to illustrate the nature of your error.
I guess it went flying over your head.

You use a lot of subjective reasoning and very little evidence for your claim of success. You do know that success is subjective, right?

 

[Heyo]

And, I think that exactly *what* is required for consciousness may profitably be analyzed by considering which things that are alive we would consider to be conscious.

For example, there seems to be agreement that jellyfish are not conscious. I would bet there is a similar consensus that dogs and cats are conscious. I am personally less certain as we go further towards baseline animals. Octopi seem to have some sort of consciousness, but probably of a quite different sort than humans. Some insects seem to be conscious (bees?) and others not so much (the programmed patterns of some wasps, for example).

Are all vertebrates conscious? I'm inclined to say yes, but I am not absolutely convinced.

Anyway, it seems to me that one way to proceed is to figure out some clear examples of conscious beings and ones that are NOT conscious and figure out what the differences are.

Yes, we are pretty much still in the phenomenology part of the understanding of consciousness. But even so I'd use a more strict approach. Our human consensus of which animals are conscious doesn't say that they really are. We need a measuring device and a scale of consciousness. (Which can be, in behavioural biology, a human observer with a list of roughly objective, observable behaviours. That may later be matched by a count of (active) brain structures in neurobiology.)

 

[Polymath257]

Well yes exactly and I agree about the zombies. The sensation of redness for one person might - conceivably - be the sensation of greenness for another (though I bet it's not). We can't know as we are not them and there is no objective way to get a handle on "the sensation of redness".

I'm not even sure how to make sense of that claim. The experiences are in different minds, so they are NOT the same, no matter what. My experience of 'red' is not the same as your experience of 'red' because they are experiences for different people.

The question is whether they are *similar* in some reasonable sense.

And, as far as I can see, this is the same as asking if the processes that 'are' the experience in me are 'similar' to those that 'are' the experience for you. And that seems like a matter that can be settled by a deep enough knowledge of what happens in our respective brains (one we decide how similar they need to be).

It may well be the case that the process in my brain when I see 'red' is most similar to the process in your brain when you see 'green'. In that case, I would be willing to say your experience of 'green' is the same as my experience of 'red'.

And we *know* that some people experience color in a different way than others. Those that are color blind do not see a difference between, say, 'red' and 'green', so we know that their experience on one or the other is different than someone who can see the difference.

 

[Polymath257]

https://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/0_0_0/whatisscience_12
Morality, utility, aesthetics and religion are the limits. And of course metaphysics in general.

In other words, those things that are matters of opinion and not of fact.

 

[Heyo]

Well I think the solution lies in philosophy rather than science. Pigliucci thinks the question only arises, at all, as a result of a category mistake by the questioner.

If we wait for philosophers to answer the question, we are lost. Instead, we should ignore them.

 

[shunyadragon]

The quote you gave does reflect a faith in science and a faith in naturalism when there seems to be no evidence for it except that faith.

No it does not.

 

[shunyadragon]

What is the natural world?

Our physical existence that can be falsified by 'objective verifiable evidence.'

 

[Polymath257]

If we wait for philosophers to answer the question, we are lost. Instead, we should ignore them.

From what I have seen, philosophy seems to be a trailing subject: it is rarely the origin of new and useful ideas when it comes to science. Instead, the new and useful ideas are provided by the scientists and the philosophers have to figure out how to deal with the new information.

it isn't clear to me that philosophers have dealt with the scientific revolution at all, let alone the huge changes brought about by the last century in physics. A LOT of concepts that philosophers have seen to be 'necessary' have either been shown to be false or completely *unnecessary*. Waiting for them to catch up isn't going to get us very far.

 

[shunyadragon]

Well yes exactly and I agree about the zombies. The sensation of redness for one person might - conceivably - be the sensation of greenness for another (though I bet it's not). We can't know as we are not them and there is no objective way to get a handle on "the sensation of redness".

It feels to me as if Pigliucci is right and there is a category mistake in demanding that science explain "experience", when it is inherently subjective.

It is getting worse science is not demanding that it explains "experience."

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

You do know that success is subjective, right?

Science successfully figured out what atoms are and how to tap into the enormous power hidden therein.

But it's all "subjective", ie "opinion" ha?

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

In other words, those things that are matters of opinion and not of fact.

Yes. And that is a fact, that they are opinions.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Our physical existence that can be falsified by 'objective verifiable evidence.'

Yes, and that is all there is, right?

 

[shunyadragon]

Eh? Your hovercraft appears to be full of eels.

Stir fry with Chinese Leeks, Hua Jiao and garlic then serve with bean sprouts and brown rice

Eh? Failure to respond. Your source as cited supported my view.

 

[shunyadragon]

Yes, and that is all there is, right?

Not necessarily, but as far as defining the 'Natural World' it works.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Yes, we are pretty much still in the phenomenology part of the understanding of consciousness. But even so I'd use a more strict approach. Our human consensus of which animals are conscious doesn't say that they really are. We need a measuring device and a scale of consciousness. (Which can be, in behavioural biology, a human observer with a list of roughly objective, observable behaviours. That may later be matched by a count of (active) brain structures in neurobiology.)

Well, that is your subjective standard for consciousness. I.e. you choose your standard for what you subjectively consider consciousness.