The relevant point is that obervers that live in universes with relatively high entropy would be more abundant than observers that live in a universe with low entropy (like ours)………do you grant this point?
Yes, but I think we mean radically different things with "entropy".
Entropy, in a classical definition, is a measure of energy that can be used to do work. The more work you can do, the lower the entropy.
Entropy rises with work being done, so it can never get lower, only remain constant or rise.
Thus in an older universe or a bigger universe, there will be more observers than in a young or small universe. This is of course only true to a point; an old universe with a very high entropy doesn't have any energy left to sustain observers.
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sure I accept that version of the argument.
OK, then let's do some maths.
As I already hinted at, WLC scrutinizes necessity and chance. But we don't want to commit the
special pleading fallacy and exempt design from a closer look, do we?
Fortunately we don't have to rely on conjecture as we have real life data.
Michael Behe proposed design as an explanation for the coagulation cascade, the bacterial flagellum and the cilium motion. All three turned out to be not irreducible complex and the design hypothesis thus debunked.
(I concentrate on three as it is enough for the inequality I'm going to construct. I can cite more examples if you have objections to these or if you find a counter example that increases the numerator.)
If we generously assume that the setting of the natural constants would be designed, we'd have one in four cases of proposed design turn out to be true.
We can thus say that the probability of design being the right answer is (less than) 1/4.
Assuming that the conclusion is correct that the probability of design is higher than the probabilities for either necessity or chance (p(des) > p(nec) > p(cha)) we get that p(des) + p(nec) + p(cha) < 1.
But since the sum of probabilities of all possible outcomes has to be 1, we find a contradiction. I.e. we either miscalculated the probabilities or
premise 1 is a
false dichotomy (or in our case trichotomy).
To mend the later we'd have to formulate
Premise 1: The fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity, chance, design
or something other.
(And the probability for something other would be > 1/4.)
Which would be the last premise that didn't hold water.
Let's recall:
We had an
unnamed premise in premise 0, a
false trichotomy in premise 1, a
non sequitur, a
special pleading and an
appeal to authority in premise 2.
That's a bingo!