• Welcome to Religious Forums, a friendly forum to discuss all religions in a friendly surrounding.

    Your voice is missing! You will need to register to get access to the following site features:
    • Reply to discussions and create your own threads.
    • Our modern chat room. No add-ons or extensions required, just login and start chatting!
    • Access to private conversations with other members.

    We hope to see you as a part of our community soon!

Five Reasons to Believe in God

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
You keep saying that it is a category mistake to confuse the physical process of the brain and the mental process that is associated with the mind.

1. Brain - physical - itself controlled by cause and effect.
2. Mind - mental activity - caused by brain - controlled by cause and effect.
3. Brain and Mind related by cause and effect
3. Is there something else impinging on the mind that is not under cause and effect?

If there is a category error I am still missing it. :shrug:
Well, let's talk about the two different domains. Let's say that you are in a dark room, and you see something that strikes you as a monster. On the physical side, there is some visual sense stimulus that may or may not have been caused by photons impinging on the retinas of your eyes. The brain generates associations with perceived visual stimuli that cause a flood of chemical changes in the brain. On the mental side, you think of the danger presented by monsters, and you experience fear and panic, which we know to be associated with certain changes to brain chemistry. If you flooded your brain with alcohol or valium, you would likely have a different subjective experience to the incoming visual stimuli that would be related to those physical alterations in brain chemistry. You can describe these phenomena solely in terms of chains of physical events or chains of mental events (i.e. experiences). At a physical level, there are a lot of interactions that make no sense at the mental level and vice versa. They are different categories of description.
 

Sum1sGruj

Active Member
Cause and effect has no place in a truly random state, and vice versa.

A hella paradox in the context of this thread. Maybe too hella
 
Last edited:

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
Right. Where does freedom from cause and effect enter in so free will is possible?
I never agreed to your original definition. "Free will" does not mean "freedom from cause and effect". That makes absolutely no sense. An event can only be one of two things: caused effect or random occurrence. Decisions that people make are never random occurrences. If you choose to do something, and I ask you why you did it, you can usually come up with all kinds of explanations about what led you to make the decision you made. Free will usually means "free choice". It does not usually mean freedom from causal effects. You can explain what caused your choices, because you know intuitively that your decisions are determined by both circumstances and personal priorities. You do not necessarily get to choose either. You cannot always control the circumstances you end up in, and you cannot choose to have different desires from the ones you have. You can only suppress desires that conflict with greater desires.
 

lunamoth

Will to love
I never agreed to your original definition. "Free will" does not mean "freedom from cause and effect". That makes absolutely no sense. An event can only be one of two things: caused effect or random occurrence. Decisions that people make are never random occurrences. If you choose to do something, and I ask you why you did it, you can usually come up with all kinds of explanations about what led you to make the decision you made. Free will usually means "free choice". It does not usually mean freedom from causal effects. You can explain what caused your choices, because you know intuitively that your decisions are determined by both circumstances and personal priorities. You do not necessarily get to choose either. You cannot always control the circumstances you end up in, and you cannot choose to have different desires from the ones you have. You can only suppress desires that conflict with greater desires.

"Minimally, to say that an agent has free will is to say that the agent has the capacity to choose his or her course of action. But animals seem to satisfy this criterion, and we typically think that only persons, and not animals, have free will. Let us then understand free will as the capacity unique to persons that allows them to control their actions." - Free Will - IEP.

Compatibilism is an option. The arguments I've read for compatibilism, though, seem to each ultimately amount to the idea that free will/choice is actually an illusion.
 

Sum1sGruj

Active Member
Random and 'cause and effect' cannot exist in unison. Therefore, movement is the crux of cause and effect, and everything within it must have come from an independent, non-random movement.
If the independent motion had no cause, then everything else has to have the same property.
Therefore, free will not only exists, but is the law of physics. Such is why there is no exact symmetry in matter as a whole, even if a grand unification law is established.

It's also a reason to believe in God :)
 
Last edited:

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
Compatibilism is an option. The arguments I've read for compatibilism, though, seem to each ultimately amount to the idea that free will/choice is actually an illusion.
Luna, I can agree with you up to a point. If one defines free will as you have, then free will would be an illusion. But most of us take it to mean freedom to follow one's greatest desire. Free will is not an illusion. What is an illusion is the idea that there is an uncaused component in free will. We all have competing desires, and one of those desires usually trumps all others. We do not choose what we most desire to do. Circumstances--nature and nurture--"choose" that for us. In that sense, and by your definition, free will is an illusion. But, if you are doing what you most want to do, how is that not free will in a pragmatic sense?
 

9-10ths_Penguin

1/10 Subway Stalinist
Premium Member
I thought you would be pretty well acquainted with the connection between free will and ethical responsibility. If you are not free to choose your actions, if you are constrained by the past and the laws of nature, this is no different from being coerced. Are you responsible for actions you have no choice about?
If you want to do the thing you're being "coerced" to do, are you really being coerced? You're using language that implies that the forces of nature are going against our will while talking about a situation where you say we'd have no will at all; this is conflicted.

I don't really see ethics as being dependent on free will. Even in a completely deterministic setting, ethics have their place: we could just see ethical actions (whether they be modelling ethical behaviour or responses to unethical actions by others) as the "cause" that creates a more ethical "effect" in future.

If I were trying to prove God then the above would have weight. I can't prove God and am not trying to.
I thought you were giving reasons to believe in God; no? Or are you just trying to create a large enough philosophical hole that you can put God in it?

OK. That's not really the same at taking a position on the issue, but I realize that's are far as you want to go.
I think that it's largely irrelevant, frankly. I don't think we need to spend a lot of thought on the question of whether quantum physics allows for free will, because it seems to me that biology undercuts free will to the point that whatever's left probably couldn't be called "free will" any more. There's no point of asking whether quantum mechanics allows for our urges, desires and will to be the expression of some "soul" if we can trace those urges, desires and will back to some hormone; if a "soul" is in that equation at all, it a soul of the hormone, not the person.

This is about will being rational. You think there is not a necessary connection between our will (understood as freedom to choose) and reason. OK.

Added: I asked this because some of the compatibilist arguments require reason's involvment in free will.
Please stop putting words in my mouth.

And if that's what you're getting at, then try to be clearer. All I meant was that creatures that express will need not be rational. For instance, an ant can choose which direction it's going to go, but I'm not about to argue that its reasons for making that choice must be good ones.

OK. In process philosophy the rock would have will.
Meaning what, exactly? How is the "will" of a rock expressed?
 

lunamoth

Will to love
Luna, I can agree with you up to a point. If one defines free will as you have, then free will would be an illusion. But most of us take it to mean freedom to follow one's greatest desire. Free will is not an illusion. What is an illusion is the idea that there is an uncaused component in free will. We all have competing desires, and one of those desires usually trumps all others. We do not choose what we most desire to do. Circumstances--nature and nurture--"choose" that for us. In that sense, and by your definition, free will is an illusion. But, if you are doing what you most want to do, how is that not free will in a pragmatic sense?

If you have no control over the process, even if the outcome is the overall result that your combined past and physiology 'want' you to have, how is that free in any sense of the word?

I think the conclusion is that the will is 'real' but it is not rational. So, now the question is, do we have any control over our reason? Can we choose what we believe?
 

Willamena

Just me
Premium Member
I think the conclusion is that the will is 'real' but it is not rational. So, now the question is, do we have any control over our reason? Can we choose what we believe?
By "not rational" do you mean that it resides in unconsciousness? Is your question whether unconscious "forces" have any control over conscious actions? I can think of a number of examples...

But that's not how I see will. If I do something "against my will," for instance a habitual behaviour (like reaching for that piece of chocolate every time I make a "win" in my favourite video game), have I executed will freely?

And that's how I see free will: "I" executing actions "freely".

"Me, doing things."
 

lunamoth

Will to love
If you want to do the thing you're being "coerced" to do, are you really being coerced? You're using language that implies that the forces of nature are going against our will while talking about a situation where you say we'd have no will at all; this is conflicted.
It is not my intention to confuse the language, and I apologize if it seems that way. I don't think the point is conflicted. We can use a different word, maybe compelled seems less manipulative. But, the overall point is that, as far as will goes, somehow one dominant desire rises to the top and becomes the only possible will. And this is not, at this point, a rational process.

If you have a definition of will that you prefer we can go with that. I think we need to agree on a definition of will, and also free will if you see that as different, before we proceed. As I said in another post, if you are content with 'the ability to choose' as the complete definition of will, then we can't go any further.


I don't really see ethics as being dependent on free will. Even in a completely deterministic setting, ethics have their place: we could just see ethical actions (whether they be modelling ethical behaviour or responses to unethical actions by others) as the "cause" that creates a more ethical "effect" in future.
This is fine - our ethics are a useful social construct not dependent upon free will. This also implies, I think, that agents (people) have moral responsibility even when they have no ability to do otherwise. The free will defense has never gotten anybody out of jail!

Is this rational, or just 'reasonable' because it is what works?


I thought you were giving reasons to believe in God; no? Or are you just trying to create a large enough philosophical hole that you can put God in it?
As I said previously, I am exploring why it is reasonable to believe in God (at least as reasonable as the alternatives). You seem to be asking for empirical evidence (as demonstrated for your request for testable hypotheses in order to be convinces). I don't have that. There is another thread for evidence for God. I believe my entry was 'chocolate.'


I think that it's largely irrelevant, frankly. I don't think we need to spend a lot of thought on the question of whether quantum physics allows for free will, because it seems to me that biology undercuts free will to the point that whatever's left probably couldn't be called "free will" any more. There's no point of asking whether quantum mechanics allows for our urges, desires and will to be the expression of some "soul" if we can trace those urges, desires and will back to some hormone; if a "soul" is in that equation at all, it a soul of the hormone, not the person.
OK! That actually looks to me like a pretty clear position - you do not think free will is possible.


Please stop putting words in my mouth.
I am not trying to put words in your mouth - just trying to see if I am clear on your position.

And if that's what you're getting at, then try to be clearer. All I meant was that creatures that express will need not be rational. For instance, an ant can choose which direction it's going to go, but I'm not about to argue that its reasons for making that choice must be good ones.
Not trying to put words in your mouth, just trying to make sure I understand your point. You seem to say that will is separate from reason, and reason (if present) acts after will arises, or acts on the products that will puts forth and picks the 'best' one. And that when reason is present (in a human, as opposed to a sponge), reason may be more or less faulty, resulting in better or worse choices. If I am not getting you correctly I would be happy to work from your explanation.


Meaning what, exactly? How is the "will" of a rock expressed?
We'd need to discuss process philosophy to get into that. I'm happy to put that aside or we can start a different thread.
 

Orias

Left Hand Path
By "not rational" do you mean that it resides in unconsciousness? Is your question whether unconscious "forces" have any control over conscious actions? I can think of a number of examples...

But that's not how I see will. If I do something "against my will," for instance a habitual behaviour (like reaching for that piece of chocolate every time I make a "win" in my favourite video game), have I executed will freely?

And that's how I see free will: "I" executing actions "freely".

"Me, doing things."


I wouldn't necessarily say its "free" Will, since Will only has the desire to be free.
 
A

angellous_evangellous

Guest
Five Reasons to Believe in God

1. It is highly unlikely that the material world we have access to through our senses is all that there is.

2. There is something, rather than nothing.

3. Higher reasoning, abstract thinking (including logic), and philosphy are not rational without an objective basis outside of our sensory world.

4. Ethics (responsibility to others) are an illusion without an objective basis of right and wrong.

5. Values/virtues (personal integrity) are an illusion without an objective basis for good.

Discuss. :seesaw:

The existence of God is not required for any of these points to be true.

And nothing is objective.
 

lunamoth

Will to love
By "not rational" do you mean that it resides in unconsciousness? Is your question whether unconscious "forces" have any control over conscious actions? I can think of a number of examples...
In the post you are referring to, my reply to Cop, I'm not submitting my own views. I'm 1) trying to clearly understand Cop's view, and then 2) following it to its logical conclusion.

So far my understanding of Cop's position is that the will arises independently of reason, and so it is non-rational.

I think the question about where/when do we become aware of the process is also interesting.

But that's not how I see will. If I do something "against my will," for instance a habitual behaviour (like reaching for that piece of chocolate every time I make a "win" in my favourite video game), have I executed will freely?

And that's how I see free will: "I" executing actions "freely".

"Me, doing things."
OK. If I am understanding you, you see will as involving reason, or at least as involving sorting power - first-order desires (I want chocolate as a reward; too much chocolate is not healthy) sorted out by 2nd order desires (I want to be healthy, or even I want to want to be healthy). You might point to having second order desires that lead to volition (desire that moves to action) as free will.
 
Top