You seem to be saying that it all depends upon the situation and the topic at hand. I agree.
Perhaps if you could provide a real life example of what you would consider to be the imposition of a "superstitious taboo?"
The banishment of some state of affairs or action for which no demonstrable harm is rendered from -- so-called crimes of conscience, victimless crimes, justified only by beliefs that aren't readily demonstrated on an open, critical, rational basis.
It's difficult to define, and the above doesn't really do any justice (I'm also just waking up, though, haha). I want to say that it has to do with asking the question to ourselves, "Who/what is harmed by the action or state of affairs? Is the harm present in principle in the state of affairs, or is it incidental?"
By that I mean, if we can't readily determine and rationally demonstrate someone has been harmed by something (or someone's property, their rights, etc.) then what is the basis for determining its moral bankruptcy? If a coherent case can't be made for that, then how can it be rational to take away peoples' rights to do it without that being morally undesirable in
itself for being heavy-handed and tyrannical?
If a particular instance has caused harm, is the harm inherent with the action or state of affairs -- does the action/SOF involve harm in principle in order to be performed? For instance, hang gliding can cause broken bones, which burden loved ones and the community in the form of, say, taxes that provide some help for medical care -- but neither of these harms are inherent in hang gliding; they're incidental to other circumstances.
However, to bring back the pedophilia example, that does involve inherent harm because in order to engage in activities involving that notion it necessarily involves rationally demonstrable harm (at the very least in the form of nonconsent) to others; harm which can be demonstrated in a court of law to a group of peers without using dubious evidences like "faith."
Contrast this with examples like -- well, to again use a current and real-world example (I know it sounds like I'm hung up on it, but, well, who am I kidding, maybe I am?), homosexual marriage -- who is harmed? Is the harm inherent with the state of affairs?
Some people argue that God is harmed, that homosexuals are "spiritually" harmed, or that "traditional marriage" is harmed -- but aren't each of these arguments obviously a little nebulous? How can any of these be rationally demonstrated to peers such that it justifies banning it?
(For instance, 1) how can an omnipotent being be harmed at all coherently, 2) is there even a clear definition of "spiritual harm" that doesn't involve raising more ontological unknowns, and 3) what is the justification for the notion that traditional marriages would be harmed -- respectively, as demonstrations of the dubiousness of the proposed "harms" mentioned earlier)
Supposing that there is some demonstrable harm done -- say, with an increased risk of transmitting bloodborn pathogens if someone engages in promiscuous, unprotected anal sex. Is the harm inherent with the homosexuality? Of course not -- homosexuality doesn't
necessarily entail promiscuity, lack of protection, lack of partner history awareness, etc. -- so how can some state of affairs be banned for everybody as a punishment for the actions of a few; how is that just?
(Especially when there are promiscuous, unprotected heterosexuals, too? Can we ban heterosexual marriage because there are unprotected, promiscuous heterosexuals that exist who might have increased risks of disease transmission? Just a hypothetical example of why it's important to demonstrate harm is
explicit in a state of affairs, and demonstrably so, for its banning not to simply be superstitious taboo or otherwise fallacious/unjust.)
The word "taboo" is roughly synonymous with "censorship" in a small sense -- it just means something which society has largely decided against (e.g., a majority). Dictionary.com provides the example of using "strong language" like curse words.
The word "superstitious" means essentially of or relating to some belief in the importance of a thing or concept which isn't based on reason or knowledge.
Well, anybody can claim that anything is "actually" based on reason, so I'm just suggesting that before we go around banning things (especially if the banishment of them harms people in and of itself!), it's not very just to do so unless those reasons are demonstrable.
To clarify whether or not something is
demonstrable though would require a foray into the entirety of epistemology, though -- so I hope my examples above were clear enough.
Also, regarding the sophistry comment yesterday, I didn't mean to imply that... I was at work and in a *really* foul mood for unrelated reasons, I want to apologize for that coming through as frustration that you didn't deserve!
GreyGoose said:
The issues of pork consumption, banning gay marriage, banning interracial marriage as related to the white socks analogy strikes me as a bit of a stretch.
In your view, if an atheist were to object to gay marriage and organize an effort among his fellow atheists to ban it, would this equate to an effort to impose a "superstitious taboo?"
Yes, atheists can be as superstitious as anyone else when it comes to holding taboos and wanting to ban things unjustly. For instance, I've seen atheists who wish to do things like banish religious activity from schools whatsoever (even when amongst students, say, praying to themselves quietly or between themselves before class), which certainly qualifies as a superstitious taboo -- more cleanly said, an unjust banishment. Not to mention an unconstitutional banishment.
I would be just as against an unjust banishment of things I disagree with on a personal level (such as prayer) as I would for those I agree with! This is because I know I have every right not to engage in prayer and that others praying doesn't harm anyone; so how could it be just for me to impose my personal taboo onto others if I, and I believe my government and society, cherish civil liberty?
GreyGoose said:
Are laws aimed at banning pedophilia, rape, incest and murder to be equated with imposing a "superstitious taboo?"
No, because these can be demonstrated to inherently involve harm and/or the trampling of others' rights -- there are identifiable victims with demonstrable suffering.
Of those mentioned, incest is the trickiest one: the suffering involved there is in any potential offspring of the relationship in the form of severely increased chances for genetic defect; but not all incestual relationships would involve that capacity. That's something of a red herring that deserves an entire conversation to itself, though -- I think my meaning is clear enough for this conversation's purposes.
GreyGoose said:
Could I get you to expound on this a bit? I'm not following you with respect to how this relates to the question of God's existence.
It is true there is an ontological dichotomy: either God exists or God does not exist. However, there are multiple epistemic positions regardless; including neutral skepticism that God exists (e.g., "I'm not convinced that God exists, but am willing to accept evidence to re-evaluate this position.")
For instance,
ontologically, either extraterrestrial life exists or it does not: but that doesn't mean we must take the positive position or its negation; we are perfectly free to take the
epistemic position that we commit to neither and rather refrain from the propositions "There is ET life" and "There is not ET life" by saying, "There may or may not be, I'll await evidence," even if we "lean" one way or the other partially.
This is pertinent because we can't demonstrate a lack of evidence for some negation ("proving a negative") and call that evidence for some positive position.
GreyGoose said:
The "strong positive" and "strong negative" most often do seem to present themselves - particularly regarding issues of significant moral import. You disagree?
I'm not sure if I have enough knowledge to say that's the case "most" of the time. I'll agree that
some of the time that is the case. But these issues I've brought up during this conversation are examples of cases where I don't think that's true.