And the choices you make to carry out those desires.
If we call our actions "choices," then sure. Again, though, I think there has to be an established idea of what the "choosing self" is before we can talk about whether actions are choices or not.
It's not that they're "relatable," it's that they're necessary for the concept of moral accountability to even cohere.
I don't think we need to choose
)) between understanding that humans have agency and that human behavior has causes and effects outside our direct control. Both can be true. The question is,
to what degree are our actions dictated by external causes over which we have no control. The determinist, to make her case, has to argue that number is 100%. I'm aware of no account of them ever having done so.
I think that depends on what one defines as "control." I'm not merely arguing that external circumstances absolutely restrict our ability to choose; I'm arguing that the very notion of a free, choosing agent implies some degree of separation of our concepts of self from our biological constitution and from natural laws.
If the experience of the self is merely a product of biology and natural laws, then the supposed agent we're talking about is simply the result of natural processes in action—be they random or deterministic. The expression of the self then becomes a more elaborate and detailed version of wind blowing on leaves: a natural process (wind) stimulates an organism (the plant), but the plant doesn't choose which way to go and isn't free from the influence of said natural process.
If we're in agreement that intent matters when administering punishments for crimes, then we're in agreement that our account of morality involves more than mere assessment of harm. And we're in agreement that someone whose intent is to harm merits greater punishment than one who doesn't. If our intents are completely uncontrolled by us, this distinction makes no sense.
Not necessarily: knowing someone's intent has predictive value about their future actions as well as the most suitable approach to limit or prevent further harm, so its usefulness doesn't have to be connected to some notion of moral accountability. Someone who intentionally kills another person has demonstrated a particularly malignant and dangerous tendency, whereas someone who inadvertently runs another person over may be a reckless driver but not an intentional murderer. Addressing each of the actors in these two scenarios would therefore require different approaches.
First, let's dispense with "free will" as the label here. I prefer agency. We have agency, ie the ability to make choices. Choices are decisions we have the ability to make between multiple options.
I see this as connected to my above point about the self and its emergent nature. If we offer a dolphin dog food and a fish, it will most likely "choose" the fish, but why did it do so? Does that exercise in opting for one option out of two possible alternatives imply that the dolphin has free will? It
intended some action, but why it intended it is a different story. It's merely expressing its nature and the effect of natural laws on its functioning.
Back to your question - I'd argue that yes, animals with higher intelligence probably do have greater agency over their actions than those with less intelligence.
They all still live and act according to their instincts, biology, and the result of the interactions between nature and their own bodies. We also act according to the thoughts and desires we have.
A quote I cited earlier on in this thread was, "I can do as I wish, but I cannot wish as I wish." For example, the thoughts that we have drive our actions and plans, yet we can't make ourselves
want to do something on demand or choose exactly what makes us have specific thoughts at specific times. You and I can't make ourselves believe that the Earth is flat on demand, nor can we will ourselves into desiring to eat roaches. A lot of what humans do and think is a product of nature interacting with our bodies, as I said above, even though it certainly feels quite elaborate and sophisticated in general.
It's more than us having more concepts in our heads. It's that we have more conscious control of our behavior, rather than reacting to stimuli purely on instinct.
The reactions are not the result of a conscious choice either; they're bound by natural processes and a manifestation of both our biology and psychology. I don't have anger issues, but I didn't "choose" this. It's just a result of my natural disposition and practice of certain techniques that I encountered. I didn't just will myself into being this way, nor did John Doe who rages at every little thing will himself into being that way—and in order for him to address the anger issues, he would have to undergo a treatment plan that also addressed cause and effect by teaching him how to cope and react to anger.
These are fascinating questions, to which I don't know the answer. I do agree, though, that agency seems to exist on a spectrum - we have relatively less agency or more, it's not black and white. Whether there's an upper limit of agency, beyond which greater intelligence lends no greater agency, I have no idea.
Sometimes I do wonder whether we would be more reasonable if we were more intelligent as a species (as I don't think reason and intelligence are synonymous), but since we have no higher frame of reference for intelligence than that of humans, I don't think we'll ever know the answer.