Free Will Vs Determinism

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Understood; however, indeterminate ≠ utterly random.
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One cannot have deterministic indeterminacy. So if this is not random, then it is not true that everything is either determined or random, because it isn't deterministic or determined at all. Hence the original dichotomy "determined or random" can be seen as you write above to have clear flaws: we have something that isn't determined, and you argue isn't utterly random either.

 

[ratiocinator]

So if this is not random, then it is not true that everything is either determined or random, because it isn't deterministic or determined at all. Hence the original dichotomy "determined or random" can be seen as you write above to have clear flaws: we have something that isn't determined, and you argue isn't utterly random either.

The formalism of quantum mechanics (on which you seem to be resting mush of this) contains nothing that isn't a combination of determinism and randomness. The dichotomy holds. If something is not fully determined, it must, to the extent that it isn't, be undetermined (random).

 

[ratiocinator]

How else do things come into existence?

Randomly. I have no idea if true randomness really exists in the universe or not - neither does anybody else. It is, however, logically possible and QM seems to suggest that it does exist.

 

[Skwim]

Randomly. I have no idea if true randomness really exists in the universe or not - neither does anybody else. It is, however, logically possible and QM seems to suggest that it does exist.

Like unicorns, so far utter randomness has not been shown to exist. And failing this positing its existence as a sound alternative to causation is meaningless.

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[ratiocinator]

Like unicorns, so far utter randomness has not been shown to exist.

What do you mean by "shown to exist"? One of the best tested theories in the history of science includes randomness - what more are you looking for?

And failing this positing its existence as a sound alternative to causation is meaningless.

On the contrary - it works.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

The formalism of quantum mechanics (on which you seem to be resting mush of this) contains nothing that isn't a combination of determinism and randomness.

As I said in an earlier post, better examples for the utter failure of the kind of physical determinism claimed in the OP are to be found in classical physics, particularly in classical statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and relativistic physics. Quantum mechanics in particular is too narrow and linear to be of much use for anything other than what I have most recently used it for: an attempt to show that one of the simplest possible systems which exhibits exactly the property of both being indeterminate and indeterministic and completely predictable. It is a kind of statistical determinism or more generally is a simple example of the kind of combination the OP claims to be impossible by fiat. If everything is either determined or random, than the properties and behavior of the system in the simple example I gave should be one or the other, and it falls into neither.
Further, this is without getting into the fact that the issue of causality is quite distinct from that of physical determinism which relates to what can in principle be said to be true in the future of some system (including the universe as a whole) given a prior state. It does not assume any known causal connection between states (indeed, Newton famously declared of his "force" that seemed to him and his contemporaries absolutely acausal that whatever it was his mechanics described, clearly no force could act as gravitation does in his equations). In condensed matter physics, statistical mechanics, etc., most of the systems described are not even physical systems but idealized statistical ensemble or propabilities on some configuration states or quasiparticles or some other immaterial or non-physical entity. Clearly such a system cannot be said to have causal properties if it is not a real physical system, at least not in the sense of the OP.
So no, I'm not resting on QM, I tried that as a last resort after going over at length some of the clear problems that exist when making assumptions about the relationship between causality and determinism and the consequences for the evidence one has relating these two physical determinism. In classical physics, the distinction that Bohr and von Neumann (among others) attempted to reinforce between experimenters/observers and the systems that had in classical physics implicitly been treated in this manner was that it is a requirement of empirical science that the freedom of the experimenter to determine the specifications on the system and the manner of preparation or isolation be regarded as fundamental. Bohr wished that this be true whether or not the formalism of any physical theory required something like the operators acting on states to yield predictions or (as in classical mechanics) the states were clearly identified with the systems or the properties thereof. Others, particularly today (and including myself) disagree with him here, but it doesn't matter. In both classical and quantum physics, the assumption of superdeterminism of the kind described in the OP negates the logical basis for inference as well as the foundations for the very kind of classical determines that relates initial conditions in idealized systems with perfectly predictable future states (with or without known causal relations).

The dichotomy holds. If something is not fully determined, it must, to the extent that it isn't, be undetermined (random).

Putting random in parenthesis does not make it the equivalent of indeterministic or non-deterministic. Firstly, something can be indeterministic without being indeterminate, let alone random. Secondly, something can be fundamentally random and be deterministic. Both attributes or properties (determistic/determined and randomness) can be in opposition but can coexist and neither is the opposite of the other. Finally, SKwim's response seems to have been that something which is indeterminate need not be random, which is not compatible with what you just stated, so again there is a problem with the fundamental assumption of the OP.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Like unicorns, so far utter randomness has not been shown to exist.

Unicorns are more clearly defined than whatever "utter randomness" is supposed to be or how it is supposed to connect with the nature of actual randomness in mathematics or the sciences or even philosophy.

And failing this positing its existence as a sound alternative to causation is meaningless.

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There are many theories/models of causation. Determinism isn't one of them. Some philosophical positions on determinism seek to incorporate some model of causation in their metaphysics, but this must be done explicitly and independently of any argument for determinism. To argue that because a past state wholly determines a future state necessitates causality is simply to argue that because there is a past and a future cause must relate the two in some way. It's an additional assumption to an already problematic position (that of complete physical determinism).

 

[ratiocinator]

As I said in an earlier post, better examples for the utter failure of the kind of physical determinism claimed in the OP are to be found in classical physics, particularly in classical statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and relativistic physics.

You posted an awful lot of waffle but how about an actual example that isn't just an approximation to a deterministic system?

Putting random in parenthesis does not make it the equivalent of indeterministic or non-deterministic. Firstly, something can be indeterministic without being indeterminate, let alone random.

OK - would you like to define all those terms?

SKwim's response seems to have been that something which is indeterminate need not be random, which is not compatible with what you just stated, so again there is a problem with the fundamental assumption of the OP.

I'm not agreeing with @Skwim - my contention is that everything must be some combination of deterministic or random.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

You posted an awful lot of waffle but how about an actual example that isn't just an approximation to a deterministic system?

I don’t know of any examples of deterministic systems that aren’t approximations of indeterministic systems in more than one way. Firstly there is the trivial fact that classical systems are always approximations. But more importantly, even in classical physics the only truly deterministic systems are ones that cannot even in principle exist. Classical laws, and the structure of physics more generally, is due in a large part to the nature of experimentation (and the metaphysical presuppositions that guided its development). A system evolves fully deterministically from a given state only if 1) it can be measured with perfect accuracy 2) it can be completely isolated. But this crucial principle, which underlies the deterministic structure of classical physics and beyond, is inherently inconsistent and contradictory. If it were possible to completely isolate a system, it would be impossible to know anything about it.

We can never take fully into account all the details of physical systems various influences on them, but physics (and natural sciences) developed via the assumption that our freedom to determine the manner of specification and/or preparation of systems and to decide how and when a particular state could be deemed “initial” (as if e.g., the planets suddenly burst into existence for early astronomers or an object in motion has ever been observed to stay forever in motion).

Then too there is the need to freely related past and future states using these and other assumptions such as reversibility.

The problem of approximate determinism then runs into another contradiction, but this time an even deeper one. Wholly deterministic systems cannot be governed by wholly deterministic laws (at least not in any manner we have been able to conceptualize or find in nature). If they were, then there would be no time. The macroscopic laws that determine such fundamental principles as the conservation of energy, thermodynamics, entropy, and the arrow of time itself are all examples of statistical determinism.

I will get into this in response to your other post, but for the moment it suffices to summarize: deterministic systems in physics are the approximations, not the other way around. I can get into this at much greater depth, but understandably you don’t seem to wish to read more than a paragraph or so and thus I will refrain from more details until I read your objections (you can always refer back to my previous posts too and actually read them so that you can point to what you claim is “waffle”).

 

[ratiocinator]

I don’t know of any examples of deterministic systems that aren’t approximations of indeterministic systems in more than one way. Firstly there is the trivial fact that classical systems are always approximations. But more importantly, even in classical physics the only truly deterministic systems are ones that cannot even in principle exist. Classical laws, and the structure of physics more generally, is due in a large part to the nature of experimentation (and the metaphysical presuppositions that guided its development). A system evolves fully deterministically from a given state only if 1) it can be measured with perfect accuracy 2) it can be completely isolated. But this crucial principle, which underlies the deterministic structure of classical physics and beyond, is inherently inconsistent and contradictory. If it were possible to completely isolate a system, it would be impossible to know anything about it.

This is nonsense. You are talking about whether a system can be perfectly predicted in practice which has nothing to do with whether it's actually deterministic or not.

We can never take fully into account all the details of physical systems various influences on them, but physics (and natural sciences) developed via the assumption that our freedom to determine the manner of specification and/or preparation of systems and to decide how and when a particular state could be deemed “initial” (as if e.g., the planets suddenly burst into existence for early astronomers or an object in motion has ever been observed to stay forever in motion).

Then too there is the need to freely related past and future states using these and other assumptions such as reversibility.

And you still haven't said how exactly "freedom" is defined in this context and why minds being deterministic systems would be a problem for it.

Wholly deterministic systems cannot be governed by wholly deterministic laws (at least not in any manner we have been able to conceptualize or find in nature). If they were, then there would be no time. The macroscopic laws that determine such fundamental principles as the conservation of energy, thermodynamics, entropy, and the arrow of time itself are all examples of statistical determinism.

More nonsense. Certain macroscopic laws being statistical says nothing at all about whether the underlying laws are fully deterministic or not. The arrow of time appears to be due to low entropy in the past but that again says nothing about underlying determinism.

And you still haven't come up with a single example of a system that isn't some combination of determinism and randomness or even explained how such a system could possibly be defined.

 

[Straw Dog]

I take it then that free will can be scientifically proven beyond a shadow of a doubt. That about it?



What science is that? As far as I and everyone else who understands the doctrine contend, determinism isn't a scientific concept, but a philosophical one. You do understand the difference between the two don't you?

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Yes, of course. I’m just illustrating the difference in practice. It’s a philosophical faith either way, both free will and determinism are useful-to-believe in limited capacities. I agree that determinism probably has more explanatory power overall.

Personally, I just can’t rule out an element of chance or some form of tychism. I don’t know that the laws of nature are constant, or if they just happen to be the regular order of things at this time, like nature adopting habits of behavior. The possibility of irregularities is still present.

I also can’t rule out the role of practical responsibility for our actions, even if super-determinism is true. I see the sense of identity being congruent with the flow of things. We can only escape practical responsibility if our sense of identity were somehow (magically?) outside the chain of causality. Otherwise, we are at least accessories to the crime of being alive, if not co-conspirators.

 

[Straw Dog]

I don’t know of any examples of deterministic systems that aren’t approximations of indeterministic systems in more than one way. Firstly there is the trivial fact that classical systems are always approximations. But more importantly, even in classical physics the only truly deterministic systems are ones that cannot even in principle exist. Classical laws, and the structure of physics more generally, is due in a large part to the nature of experimentation (and the metaphysical presuppositions that guided its development). A system evolves fully deterministically from a given state only if 1) it can be measured with perfect accuracy 2) it can be completely isolated. But this crucial principle, which underlies the deterministic structure of classical physics and beyond, is inherently inconsistent and contradictory. If it were possible to completely isolate a system, it would be impossible to know anything about it.

We can never take fully into account all the details of physical systems various influences on them, but physics (and natural sciences) developed via the assumption that our freedom to determine the manner of specification and/or preparation of systems and to decide how and when a particular state could be deemed “initial” (as if e.g., the planets suddenly burst into existence for early astronomers or an object in motion has ever been observed to stay forever in motion).

Then too there is the need to freely related past and future states using these and other assumptions such as reversibility.

The problem of approximate determinism then runs into another contradiction, but this time an even deeper one. Wholly deterministic systems cannot be governed by wholly deterministic laws (at least not in any manner we have been able to conceptualize or find in nature). If they were, then there would be no time. The macroscopic laws that determine such fundamental principles as the conservation of energy, thermodynamics, entropy, and the arrow of time itself are all examples of statistical determinism.

I will get into this in response to your other post, but for the moment it suffices to summarize: deterministic systems in physics are the approximations, not the other way around. I can get into this at much greater depth, but understandably you don’t seem to wish to read more than a paragraph or so and thus I will refrain from more details until I read your objections (you can always refer back to my previous posts too and actually read them so that you can point to what you claim is “waffle”).

I applaud your efforts, Legion. I don’t think it’s just waffle and I haven’t actually seen a sufficient rebuttal to the core of your content.

This is why I brought up the point of a philosophical faith. In the absence of a religious or mystical dogma, we may adopt a philosophical belief system and defend it dogmatically even to the extent of ignoring or downplaying newer scientific insights. It becomes a logic box with the corners well-defined according to adequated doctrines. It’s a spoonful of certainty that is easily digested and preferred over a cart full of intangible possibilities.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

The formalism of quantum mechanics (on which you seem to be resting mush of this) contains nothing that isn't a combination of determinism and randomness. The dichotomy holds. If something is not fully determined, it must, to the extent that it isn't, be undetermined (random).

I should point out before going on that the above is not actually true. It is true that in textbook QM one typically finds a highly simplistic formulation of the Schrödinger picture: unitary and deterministic evolution of a given state on the one hand and on the other some projection postulate that speaks of the probabilities of finding the system in this or that eigenstate upon “measurement”.

But it is possible (actually, it is a requirement of QM) even in the Schrödinger representation to have a system that evolves deterministically with certain (not probabilistic) outcomes. In the von Neumann scheme or Heisenberg representation this overall picture is made clearer more easily, and superior modern formulations exist. Regardless, the point is that even in this very simple textbook version of QM in terms Schrödinger’s wavefunction and time-independent observables, a vital component of the formalism is the existence of systems that evolve deterministically with non-random observables that are clearly, obviously not determined.
[NOTE: I am not speaking here of the kind of non-random indeterminacy that Einstein thought showed QM must be incomplete (as first detailed in EPR 1935, reformulated in the modern form by Bohm in his 1951 textbook, and used by Bell in 1964 to derive his (in)famous inequalities). It is certainly true that systems such as these exhibit clearly non-random, indeterminate properties and states despite the fact that they are deterministic. It is also clear that this is built into the formalism, and indeed it is just such a combination of non-random indeterminacy and deterministic dynamics that prompted EPR's argument to begin with. Yet my example above is far simpler and more general.]

At the heart of QM (and in the best formulations of physics more generally) are algebras of observables, or sets of operators associated with physical systems (classical mechanics is a commatative C(X) algebra over some configuration space that emerges as a special case of the more general non-commutative algebras of QM and/or the ensembles of statistical physics). And of necessity, the QM formalism enables certain systems to have associated with them operators that will yield known values for the properties of the system before measurement. The problem is that the associated observables are non-commuting, meaning that the quantities or properties which characterize the system are not determined even when they are given with certainty or definitely in advance of observation and even when the system itself evolves deterministically, In other words, built in to the formalisms of QM is the requirement that even for non-random, definite states and properties, the system cannot be determined

 

[ratiocinator]

I should point out before going on that the above is not actually true. It is true that in textbook QM one typically finds a highly simplistic formulation of the Schrödinger picture: unitary and deterministic evolution of a given state on the one hand and on the other some projection postulate that speaks of the probabilities of finding the system in this or that eigenstate upon “measurement”.

But it is possible (actually, it is a requirement of QM) even in the Schrödinger representation to have a system that evolves deterministically with certain (not probabilistic) outcomes. In the von Neumann scheme or Heisenberg representation this overall picture is made clearer more easily, and superior modern formulations exist. Regardless, the point is that even in this very simple textbook version of QM in terms Schrödinger’s wavefunction and time-independent observables, a vital component of the formalism is the existence of systems that evolve deterministically with non-random observables that are clearly, obviously not determined.
[NOTE: I am not speaking here of the kind of non-random indeterminacy that Einstein thought showed QM must be incomplete (as first detailed in EPR 1935, reformulated in the modern form by Bohm in his 1951 textbook, and used by Bell in 1964 to derive his (in)famous inequalities). It is certainly true that systems such as these exhibit clearly non-random, indeterminate properties and states despite the fact that they are deterministic. It is also clear that this is built into the formalism, and indeed it is just such a combination of non-random indeterminacy and deterministic dynamics that prompted EPR's argument to begin with. Yet my example above is far simpler and more general.]

At the heart of QM (and in the best formulations of physics more generally) are algebras of observables, or sets of operators associated with physical systems (classical mechanics is a commatative C(X) algebra over some configuration space that emerges as a special case of the more general non-commutative algebras of QM and/or the ensembles of statistical physics). And of necessity, the QM formalism enables certain systems to have associated with them operators that will yield known values for the properties of the system before measurement. The problem is that the associated observables are non-commuting, meaning that the quantities or properties which characterize the system are not determined even when they are given with certainty or definitely in advance of observation and even when the system itself evolves deterministically, In other words, built in to the formalisms of QM is the requirement that even for non-random, definite states and properties, the system cannot be determined

Once again, lots of words and nothing that addresses the issue. If you have a description of a quantum state (the wave function or state vector), that develops deterministically, and it tells you the probabilities of finding a particular value of some observable if that observable is "measured" (combination of determinism and randomness). Non commuting observables don't fundamentally change that - you just get the generalised uncertainty principle.

So we still have absolutely no example of something that isn't a combination of determinism and randomness.

 

[Straw Dog]

So we still have absolutely no example of something that isn't a combination of determinism and randomness.

Fair point, perhaps. A proper hypothesis of freewill is still undeveloped. I guess I’m debating internally more the possibility of indeterminate events. So it’s more a matter of determinism vs indeterminism for me at this point, rather than grasping at an abstract or absolute freewill.

Do you believe in any degree of randomness, ratiocinator?

Or an element of chance? Or irregularities in the natural habit of things?

Is there a chance that I could have done otherwise? Even if I couldn’t have chosen otherwise.

 

[ratiocinator]

Do you believe in any degree of randomness, ratiocinator?

It's an open question. Certainly QM suggests that there is, but whether that is relevant at the level of the human brain is highly questionable. I don't see how it helps with "free will" anyway. Randomness may give a sort of "freedom" but it can hardly be desribed as "will".

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

This is nonsense. You are talking about whether a system can be perfectly predicted in practice which has nothing to do with whether it's actually deterministic or not.

I’m not at all. You asked me to provide an example “that isn't just an approximation to a deterministic system.” The problem is you have it the wrong way around. The only theories we have that describe the fundamental constituents of physical reality and that are not approximations are quantum theories, and these are all essentially non-deterministic and quintessentially indeterminate. Even classical statistical mechanics, which was never intended to do more than capture aggregate, collective behavior of macroscopic systems, ultimately fails because of the assumption that the microscopic “particles” in these macroscopic descriptions are at all times (at least in principle) distinguishable with a defined state. Both these assumptions are wrong. Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics fail, and ultimately any classical or semiclassical approach in statistical mechanics does too, because there are no classical systems, only approximately classical.

Additionally, it was to get around the idea that one cannot predict, even in principle, the actual properties or states of quantum systems, that Einstein and colleagues wrote EPR. They showed that one could perfectly predict the state/property of particular quantum systems without measuring them by performing measurements on another system with which the first had previously interacted. The problem is, as it turned out, that this fails to demonstrate what Einstein wished. The properties that are perfectly predictable after measuring e.g., the spin of one of a pair of photons or electrons do not exist until the other of the pair is found to be in a definite state. So perfect predictability (as I mentioned already) does not entail determinism, because we require for determinism that the predicted states exist physically with or without measurement. Both formally and empirically, this is not what is found.

 

[ratiocinator]

The only theories we have that describe the fundamental constituents of physical reality and that are not approximations are quantum theories, and these are all essentially non-deterministic and quintessentially indeterminate.

And every aspect of QM is a combination of determinism and randomness....

 

[rational experiences]

A male human thinks.

He is original to self, as a human, owns only his own life presence, and knows that if all humans died on Earth...….as humans, then animals would still be living without his presence and so would the Garden Nature.

So he already knows by knowing that he is not linked nor strung and held to existence by any state whatsoever.

What he knows...and he learnt that condition by watching other human bodies die before he did.

Reason, radiation fall out is sporadic and how it interacts with life mind and consciousness is also sporadic by conditions of.

What is what science states by conditions of Maths?

O 1 to 12 numbering, a circle, mass and numbers. Science.

D is half of the condition of 1 to 12 on Earth, and not O the whole.

O a male in his psyche claims is God the stone body planet.

D the atmospheric mass body is not God....as told time and time again in Biblical statements that prove to be a contradiction. contradiction stated to bring conscious awareness to self that science is wrong...it is an artificial practice.

It NEVER in any male realization owned nor represented what does exist.

2 forms of spatial existence.

Formed energy mass bodies in self formation.

Scattered energy bodies.

In space O formed energy bodies...……….scattered energy bodies is not 2 forms of space is it.

Yet you know empty space exists, one form of space and irradiated space or heated space exists, as information.

Your ideas, using thoughts that are separated non natural conditions.

Human natural, everything formed and whole is natural, natural awareness in wholeness.

Science to force separation, evil and a liar.

Night time half 1 to 12 sky, clear gas, non burning. Relative to its natural form.
Day time half 1 to 12 sky, clear gas burning.

2 half conditions that are not relative at all to O mass existence, what you said was the body of God in creation O the planet/stone.

Where you take mass from for the creation of machines in human science.

So you might pretend all you like that you are not including Planet Earth O God in your science themes of cosmological thinking, yet you already had by using a machine.

No machine, no science, and no forced unnatural reaction either, as based on concepts of no whole natural living conditions.

The changes of which seemingly have affected your mind psyche and ability to think rationally as a human.

Thinking about 2 half states as a natural consciousness in a natural human life as a whole atmospheric body.

 

[Straw Dog]

It's an open question. Certainly QM suggests that there is, but whether that is relevant at the level of the human brain is highly questionable. I don't see how it helps with "free will" anyway. Randomness may give a sort of "freedom" but it can hardly be desribed as "will".

Fair enough. We can ponder the possibilities possibly for our entire lives, which may still bring insight. What ultimately matters is what we do.

On a purely ethical level, I would say that the mechanism of willpower matters. It doesn’t have to be ‘free will’, it just has to have power. Like an internal combustion engine or electric motor being responsible for the performance of its vehicle.