M. J. Fernandes said:
This definition was the basis for the post in the first place. The following text was at the beginning of the post, and the proof mentioned is based on such a definition
:
As Mestemia said in post 144, "First you must demonstrate an uncaused cause."
Actually, from God's definition, cause & effect come 'after' God. He is not ruled by it. He is the first cause. He is not a machine.
Whether or not you regard god as caused or uncaused, he would have to be imbued with certain characteristics that distinguishing him as god and different from everything else or nothing at all. So, we can assume that god possessed (s) certain identifying characteristics: A, B, C, D, E, F, . . . . . . Now, one of those characteristics must have been his operating system. There has to be some principle by which he operates. And in as much as I don't believe you care to claim his actions are absolutely random, you are left with admitting that everything that happens to him---his thoughts and actions---is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Now, if you agree that one of his innate characteristics (A, B, C, etc.) is his operating system---why wouldn't you---and that this was freewill and not determinism then you'll have explain exactly how freewill operates sans determinism and randomness.
So, my question then is, just how does freewill operate? If god does something out of freewill, how is he doing it? And saying that he chooses to do X, Y, and Z means nothing.
Perhaps you are right in a sense that God does not have the ability to do differently since He has done what He has done. But at the same time He freely chose those actions without any outside constraint or rule.
Ah ha! So this is what you mean by freewill: No one is holding a gun to god's head making him do what he doesn't want to. As I told Gambit in another thread when he suggested the same understanding of freewill, "you're speaking of freewill in its most trivial sense."
Where freewill is
actually important is when it deals with innate culpability aside from any outside forces. To what degree, if any, are we responsible for what we do? The freewiller says, "
People are culpable because they could have freely chosen to have done differently." On the other hand, the determinist will say, "
at its very roots what we did we had to do. There's no such thing as a choice or choosing in the matter." And this is the REAL issue of the freewill problem. Explain how it operates without resorting to cause/effect or utter randomness, because if either of these is in the machinery you can't claim it operates freely. All of which. . . .of course . . . . . also applies to god. God does what he does because he can do no differently, just like us mere Earth bound folk.