I've got a little time now so I'm back!
The big thing that struck me was the same thing I corrected the other guy for, when I said it's a historical fact that Jesus was a miracle worker and an exorcist, you expressed disbelief because you took me as saying it's a historical fact that Jesus actually performed miracles and exorcised demons. But it doesn't matter, just giving an example of what lead me to that conclusion.
Well hold on, then. If Jesus being a "miracle worker" does not mean that he
actually performed miracles, then the addition of that detail to the equation changes nothing in terms of assessing the probability of miracles happening. So let's read back your original question to me:
"Sure, on its own its unlikely but suppose I also knew the person claiming to have made it appear magically also has a reputation of a renowned magician. Would you say this changes nothing?"
So go ahead and answer your own question there, based on what we've both just agreed: if being a "magician" has no bearing on whether we can say he
actually did magic, then should that detail change anything in our assessment of whether magic made the cup appear?
Ok, what if we had a bunch of scientists doing all sorts of possible tests and they come to the conclusion that there is no conceivable way that he could've placed the cup there?
Now you're just straining to avoid admitting the obvious point. My hypothetical was very simple: if you walk into a room and see a drinking glass sitting on a table, and I tell you I made the glass appear by casting a magic spell, based on what you know about the world, is that explanation
plausible, or is it
implausible? There's one correct answer here.
(For whatever reason, maybe there was no one in the room at the time of it appearing or whatever.) If all possible natural explanations for the cup appearing fail to explain it adequately would you be willing to posit a miracle as an explanation or would you just chalk it up to mystery, saying we don't know how they did it but it must've been natural?
Well first of all, I don't know how we'd ever know that we exhausted all possible natural explanations. All we could say is that we've ruled out all
known potential explanations. We don't know what we don't know. Sometimes, the answer is simply that. If you want to put forward some positive explanation for an event, you need to have evidence
for that explanation in particular, not just say, "well we don't know, so it must be magic."
I'm not explaining the resurrection, I'm using the resurrection as an explanation for the historical bedrock. As stated in a previous post (I'll repeat it here since I intend to focus on our discussion as I said earlier) Licona doesn't make reference to God in the resurrection hypothesis which he states as follows:
"Following a supernatural event of an indeterminate nature and cause, Jesus appeared to a number of people, in individual and group settings and to friends and foes, in no less than an objective vision and perhaps within ordinary vision in his bodily raised corpse." (Chapter 5.7.1. Description of the Resurrection View)
But again, this still requires a premise that isn't included in the original "bedrock" facts. You have to assume that the supernatural exists. That was my point there - the three "bedrock" facts aren't sufficient to get you to the resurrection. You have to add at least that major 4th premise into the mix.
I know I made reference to God wishing to raise someone from the dead but if we're going to stick to Licona's argument as he defends it he would say that the plausibility of a miracle would be directly linked to one's horizon. If naturalism is true it's unlikely that a miracle is an explanation but if supernaturalism is true the miracle as an explanation becomes far more likely. We need to look at the data and bracket our worldviews or we'll be driven by our horizons rather than the evidence.
Even if miracles occur, you would reasonably have to concede that they're vastly less frequent than natural phenomena - and thus, vastly less probable an explanation, all else being equal. You're arguing for an event that is one out of trillions. You recognize this, yes?