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How Do We Know Something is True?

jonathan180iq

Well-Known Member
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SalixIncendium

अहं ब्रह्मास्मि
Staff member
Premium Member
I'm quite uncertain what you mean by "knowledge" here. Could you explain, please?

Pretty much the dictionary definition:

facts, information, and skills acquired by a person through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject.

knowledge - Google Search
Interesting reads. Thanks! I was, however, unable to figure out from either article precisely what their author's meant by "truth". What am I missing?

Good question. While the authors don't go as far as to offer a dictionary type definition, they reference how they're defining it throughout the article. Excerpts from the first article:

...the outer world of scientific discovery or in the explorations of our own consciousness...
...the flexibility to accommodate new understandings...
Open-mindedness is required for useful exploration and discrimination at every step...
...we may realize that we were operating under faulty conceptions and we need to move beyond them...
If we are willing to explore our worlds based on experience, study, and meditational insight, our life-roots will reach deeply into wisdom and truth

The second article expresses ideas of the definition by utilizing exerpts HP Blavatsky's "What is Truth?" :

...truth is a multifaced jewel, the facets of which it is impossible to perceive all at once...
From the time when the Delphic oracle said to the enquirer “Man, know thyself,” no greater or more important truth was ever taught. Without such perception, man will remain ever blind to even many a relative, let alone absolute, truth.

And from 12 Things Theosophy Teaches :
The “Truth” just mentioned has sometimes been called the Ancient Wisdom, the Ageless Wisdom, and the Divine Wisdom.

And while I'm referencing HP Blavatsky's "What is Truth?", here is a link to that:

What Is Truth? by H. P. Blavatsky

NOTE: These quotes are in direct response to @Sunstone 's query. I have no intention of debating any of the above excerpts out of context with one that has not read the article(s). Advance notice: if you throw out that bait, I won't bite.
 

PureX

Veteran Member
If truth is an ideal, etc., then how are you defining "truth"? I ask out of curiosity and not to debate.
The truth is what is. Which is something we cannot cognate, directly. We can only experience limited aspects of it with our bodies, and then imagine it in our minds from that limited experience.
 

Willamena

Just me
Premium Member
Knowledge is indefeasible justified true belief.
What do you mean by indefeasible? The dictionary says, "Not able to be lost, annulled, or overturned." Knowledge is lost and overturned all the time, although annulling it is a bit silly.
 

Willamena

Just me
Premium Member
Maybe you should differentiate between truth and fact. Truth is relative; therefore truth is fluid and subjective.
The relative state is true. The fluid and subjective states are true. Truth is not definable in terms of anything that is true, else it's just a circular definition.
 

Sunstone

De Diablo Del Fora
Premium Member
What do you mean by indefeasible? The dictionary says, "Not able to be lost, annulled, or overturned." Knowledge is lost and overturned all the time, although annulling it is a bit silly.

Indefeasible in the sense of being annulled or overturned. As it happens, justified true beliefs can be annulled or overturned by Gettier cases.
 

Sunstone

De Diablo Del Fora
Premium Member
And looks to me like the same thing as 'accuracy'.

Yes, perhaps accuracy is not precisely the same thing as truth, but it is certainly very close to it -- if one assumes the Correspondence Theory (CT). Other theories might not give the same result. But with the CT, we could say, "Truth is the accuracy with which a proposition corresponds to reality", "A true proposition accurately corresponds to reality", etc.

A slightly imperfect analogy would be the correspondence of a map to its terrain. The map is analogous to a proposition. The terrain is analogous to a reality or -- perhaps more precisely -- a state of affairs. Just as one can say that the truth of a proposition lies in its correspondence to a state of affairs, one can say that the accuracy of a map lies in its correspondence to a terrain.

I got as far as this:

"The person’s belief that p needs to be true. If it is incorrect instead, then — no matter what else is good or useful about it — it is not knowledge. It would only be something else, something lesser. Admittedly, even when a belief is mistaken it can feel to the believer as if it is true. But in that circumstance the feeling would be mistaken; and so the belief would not be knowledge, no matter how much it might feel to the believer like knowledge."​

And I thought, that can't be right: it's wholly possible to be mistaken in what you know, yet that doesn't stop you knowing it.

It seems to me you are saying that a false belief can be considered knowledge. e.g. Even though my belief there is snow on the ground is false, I can be considered to know whether or not there is snow on the ground. If that's what you think, then of course that's your prerogative. Yet, I myself would not say a false belief was knowledge.

Not only that, but the statement above assumes that there is some wholly objective test of what is 'true' ─ in my terms, whether a statement about reality is exactly accurate or not. But 'truth' changes. It's simply our best opinion from time to time.

I would agree with you that truth changes in the sense that propositions once thought to be true are sometimes later found to be false, etc. I think it's a bit of a leap to interpret the statement you referred to as "assuming there is some wholly objective test of what is true". After all, they could be assuming, say, reliable inter-subjective verification, and they would get the same results as they did.

(Then I got to the Gettier cases, and thought, how on earth does the observation 'ten coins in Jones' pocket' justify the conclusion 'reason why Jones gets the job'? I see no 'justification' there. So I backed off.)

The Gettier cases seem quite logical to me, but then not everyone agrees on what's logical.

Thanks for an interesting discussion so far.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Just as one can say that the truth of a proposition lies in its correspondence to a state of affairs, one can say that the accuracy of a map lies in its correspondence to a terrain.
Not a bad analogy.
It seems to me you are saying that a false belief can be considered knowledge. e.g. Even though my belief there is snow on the ground is false, I can be considered to know whether or not there is snow on the ground.
What if there's no one around to see whether there's snow on the ground or not? What if everyone in the room thinks there's snow on the ground but there isn't? What if everyone knows there's a leprechaun lives in the hollow, and that you can't see it? Who's this Uber-Arbiter who knows about snow and leprechauns?

And even for the Uber-Arbiter, once it was true that the earth was flat. That the sun went round it. That atoms were, as their name says, indivisible. That phlogiston explained fire. That light was a wave in the lumeniferous aether. That the earth's crust was fixed. And it stayed true until it no longer was.

An erroneous belief about reality is still as much knowledge about reality to its owner as an accurate one. I don't see any way that knowledge can be purified with anything like sufficient precision to make it only right or wrong. It's a spectrum from black through all the shades to white, and if someone moves the lamp of best opinion, all the shades change.
I would agree with you that truth changes in the sense that propositions once thought to be true are sometimes later found to be false, etc. I think it's a bit of a leap to interpret the statement you referred to as "assuming there is some wholly objective test of what is true".
But if you don't do that, I can't see how your view of knowledge could work. Either it's black or white, right or wrong, knowledge or not-knowledge; or, as it seems to me, a spectrum of shades of grey. And if genuinely believed, knowledge.

That's to say, knowledge may be right or wrong. Knowledge is not the same thing as fact.
 
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Willamena

Just me
Premium Member
You're dog paddling here. If you say, "I can run through that brick wall", then, to you, that's the truth. When you find out that you cannot run through that brick you have discovered fact. If you still believe that you can run through that brick wall while being presented with irrefutable fact then your truth hasn't changed. If you run into that brick wall enough times that it finally collapses and you run "through" it, then you have validated your truth without changing fact.
The subjective "your truth" or "my truth" is euphemism for belief. You are talking about belief.
 

Sunstone

De Diablo Del Fora
Premium Member
Objective truth requires that you accept a couple of axioms before you can take it further. Firstly, that a world exists independent of one's perception of it. Secondly, that other people also exist and can observe the objective world in a roughly similar manner to oneself. That might sound like a lot of waffling for little gain but I feel it's important when discussing objective truth to accept a couple of basic axioms lest we turn out to be a brain in a jar ;)

I'm fascinated with your thoughts here, Erebus! I don't have any proper objections to them, but I'm quite curious about how you would address certain related issues.

To illustrate, let's take the proposition, "There is a cat in my house." Purely for the sake of convenience, let's momentarily adopt the Correspondence Theory of Truth and say that "The proposition, 'There's a cat in my house', is true if it corresponds to a state of affairs such that there is indeed a cat in my house."

Now, I can say I have subjectively verified there is indeed a cat in my house if I see the cat. In this case, verification is performed through empirical observation. However, as you point out elsewhere subjective verification is not always reliable. For instance, it's possible I could be drunk and hallucinating when I see a cat in my house.

Let's suppose, however, that you visit me and also see the cat. Now we have inter-subjectively verified the cat, and arguably our inter-subjective verification for a variety of reasons is more reliable than my subjective verification alone.

Suppose further we bring in other people, all of whom verify there is a cat in my house. At some point, couldn't we say that our inter-subjective verifications were so reproductable that we had arrived at a point where we could safely assert, "It can be inter-subjectively verified with a high degree of reliability that there is a cat in Sunstone's house"? And wouldn't that mean -- again, assuming the Correspondence Theory -- that the proposition, "There is a cat in Sunstone's house", reliably corresponded to the state of affairs of there indeed being a cat in Sunstone's house, and was therefor a true proposition?

Please note, however, that at no point in this exercise have we needed to assert the existence of an "objective reality". That is, we have arrived at a reliably inter-subjectively verified state of affairs without needing to indulge ourselves in any metaphysical speculations about that state of affairs being "objectively real". We can even make truth claims about that state of affairs with a high degree of confidence that our claims will correspond to that state of affairs.

All of which brings us to the issue that I am most curious to hear your opinion on. Given the above, can you see any reason that we need to postulate the existence of an "objective reality" before we can arrive at reliable truths, assuming "truth" is defined according to the Correspondence Theory? I would love to hear your thoughts on that!
 
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