Stephenw argues that your beliefs about religion don't matter because, regardless what your particular religious beliefs are, you can always experience a kind of oneness with things. By contrast, the comfort (he uses the word "satisfaction", which I think probably comes to the same thing) his beliefs brings to his consciousness is secondary because "what passes for my consciousness is just the surface of the mind ocean and is only of any importance to itself." By contrast, what's important are "my longings and in my dreams." Beliefs are only the surface. What we do -- our behavior -- is rooted in "the depths", and I take it that means that they are not rooted in beliefs.
I find this either confusing or mistaken in several ways. First, why are beliefs considered to be "surface" but my "longings and dreams" from "the depths"? Couldn't it be the other way around? If not, why not?
Second, does stephenw's beliefs about this order affect his behavior, for example, the way he interacts with the world? It seems so. Because he believes beliefs are surface level only, he tries to interact with the world on a more intuitive level. But what if he believed otherwise, that beliefs are fundamental and from the depths? Would that affect the way he tries to understand the world, that is, his epistemological behavior (just to start there, but the point could easily be extended). But then it would seem that at least one belief is fundamental and not surface: the belief about the role of beliefs.
Third, don't longings and dreams have a belief set as an essential component? If I dream of being or doing X, or of something being X, that means I think that X is desirable, and that desireableness is rooted in my beliefs about X, that it has certain features. To put it another way, if you tell me that you dream of X, it makes perfect sense for me to ask why. It would be very strange if you couldn't provide any answer whatsoever to the question, and the answer would inevitably involve beliefs about how the world would be better if X were true (or something of that sort). And if you didn't believe that the world would be better if X were true, you wouldn't dream X.
So it seems that we can't get around the idea that beliefs are essential to our actions, and hence they matter immeasurably. Examples abound, but I'll settle on one. The early Christians in Egypt traveled up and down the byways of Alexandria, scooping up abandoned children, almost all of whom were girls or physically imperfect boys, and handing them over to wet nurses, who would raise them. They did this because of certain beliefs they held about the inherent dignity of every life. The culture of the day abandoned those same babies to death or temple prostitution because they had different beliefs about the dignity of individual lives.
All this leads me to wonder what stephenw must have actually had in mind when he said that beliefs "don't matter". Surely he couldn't have meant that it doesn't matter what we think about the dignity of people and hence whether we abandon them to death or take care of them. He says explicitly that beliefs don't matter because we can feel oneness with things regardless what we believe. And I agree that beliefs don't seem to affect our capacity for that. But even if we agree that that feeling is very important and that our beliefs aren't particularly relevant to our having that feeling, it still seems that beliefs matter a lot. I hope stephenw responds to this, explaining where I've misunderstood him or where my understanding is a bit off. If it matters.