His ability to predict your choices perfectly every time means that your choices aren't free.
The problem is that you are making a big and unjustified leap……………..if you know a person you can predict his future choices / but this person still has the ability to choose between more than 1 option. These are not mutually exclusive or at least you haven shown them to be.
I don't know what you mean by "if you know a person you can predict his future choices." Does that mean what it appears to mean - that if I am familiar with somebody, I can predict what he'll say or do better than I could before I knew him based on his previous actions? If so, that's not relevant. I'm talking about determinacy, not statistical likelihood based on extrapolation of prior events.
And no, if one can predict apparent choices in advanced, they were compelled by the present. These are not choices in the sense that free will implies - choices that could have been otherwise under identical circumstances. I don't know how to explain that any better. It seems self-evident to me. What does it look like when we know that an apparent choice was compelled?
I tried an analogy with an inanimate object a few days ago that was confusing, but I'll try again. The traffic light just turned green. We know that no mind or free will in the traffic light was involved there. Was a choice made in the sense of free will, or was that change at that time in that manner specified and thus not really a choice if it couldn't have gone any other way? No.
Now we add consciousness and the sense of free will to the light. It's aware of its electronic instructions, and it experiences them as desires. The mechanism trips to change the light, the light experiences the urge to change, then does. From it's perspective, it had free will. From ours, it is only the illusion of free will. We know this because the change was accurately predicted, as will all of the other changes as it predictably changed from red to green for thirty seconds, then amber for four, then red for thirty seconds, then repeat the cycle. The happy light thanks it's maker for free will as it goes on having intuitions of wanting to change and then doing so according to an algorithm. The choices are all determined, not freely made, and we know this because they are predictable. Do I need to elaborate on that? Can you imagine such a thought experiment, and how it might produce a light given consciousness and desires that believes it has free will when it does not, and why it is necessary that its behavior be recognized as determinate if one can determine it?
Now let's give it bona fide free will. Remove the computer that determines the light's color at any given moment, and give the bulbs free will. They still have a power source, but nothing determining when they would change or to what other color. They have free will. Whatever they choose, it could have been otherwise. This will yield an unpredictable light pattern, and not just unpredictable because the technology doesn't yet exist to predict it, but because the choices were not constrained by anything.
This is the argument that determinacy, or the ability to predict the future, rules out indeterminate processes, since these are by definition not predictable. To rebut it, I believe you need to do more than just say that God can do this anyway
I can read thankyou. Do you want me to reply to every single word???
"To restore coherence to the faith-based position"..
It's not about faith .. it's about illogical argument.
it either has to jettison free will or a deity that can know all.
No, it doesn't
It is logically possible that one has no free will - just the illusion of free will.
Meaningless .. either one can do what they want or they can't.
that the future is entirely determined by physical processes, and is thus calculable before it occurs
I'm not discussing about electrons in brains.
etc. etc.
No, I wanted you to rebut it.
Yes, it is an illogical proposition, and it is believed by faith. That's not rebuttal. "No it doesn't" is also not a rebuttal. The third comment is correct, not meaningless even if you claim it, and doesn't address the issue of whether free will and omniscience are compatible - much less rebut it. Of course it's logically possible that the illusion of free will exists but not free will. Nor was I talking about electrons in brains. None of your response explained why it is possible to have a perfect knowledge of the future in a world with free will. You just keep asserting it without rebutting the rebuttal to the claim. That's not debate. That's being stuck in a discussion in which we don't have both member attempting rebuttal, but instead relying on simple disagreement and repetition of points already rebutted.
My argument, if valid, makes yours wrong. If mine is right, yours must be wrong. You don't have a valid argument that makes mine wrong, just dissent and a repeat of assertions already rebutted by valid arguments themselves not rebutted.
An agent that knows something about the future is not CAUSING those events
Not always, correct. But of course, I didn't claim otherwise.
You've said this before. I still fail to see the relevance. My argument doesn't depend on that being the case or not, just that if the future is knowable, it is determined by physical reality. Whether the cause is a god or the laws of physics or something else, the fact remains that if it is predictable, then the future is determined and free will, or the sense that the choice could have been otherwise, is an illusion.
Now you are philosophising about whether what a law court would determine as being free-will is not free-will.
No, I'm not. I have no idea why you think so.
But since you broached the subject, let's say a few words about free will in the legal system. The interest there is similar to religion's interest there. Both systems are punitive in nature. To put someone in prison as a punishment and to consider that a just reason to do so is to buy into the Abrahamic principle of retribution for sin. Enlightened penal system don't think in those terms. They think in terms of removing a danger from the street, of providing incentive to obey the law for everybody, and maybe someday, to rehabilitate. It's exactly the same attitude as one would take to a alligator in the lake. You attempt to remove a public danger and prevent future alligators from appearing there, but even if one kills the beast, it is not retributional. It's not an act motivated by moral outrage as it is in the religious model.
If you want to claim that free-will does not exist, regardless of whether an agent knows the future, then just say so.
No. I didn't say that and didn't want to. What I said is that if the future is perfectly knowable in advance, then there is no free will, just the illusion of free will. I have had to repeat this a half dozen times to two of you now. Can we just focus on those words and not what you'd like to change them to? You seem to want to comment on what I don't say. I don't say that an agent that knows the future is necessarily the cause of that future, and I don't say that free will does not exist, just that it is incompatible with omniscience, and that if one exists, the other doesn't. I'm losing hope that you will ever address that with a rebuttal - a specific explanation of what is the logical error you see (hopefully you see one if you're rejecting the claim), and why you consider it a fallacy.
Do you feel that the perception of time in our universe is somehow universal, as to regards what we consider to be "now".
Can you imagine a scenario in which our "now" was another's yesterday?
I understand that time is relative, that "now" can mean different things to different observers in different frames of reference. I suspect that your interest in this is to somehow restore free will to a determinate universe with this. If so, please explain how that fact can translate to free will and omniscience being compatible. I'm already granting a god the freedom to move from past to future and back, and to see all of time past and future laid out. It doesn't resolve the issue.
Do you also say that if I know something that you did yesterday, then you could not have had free-will when you did it?
No. If free will exists and I have it rather than just the illusion of free will, then I could have made a free will choice yesterday that I remember today.
The way that you want free-will to mean, the whole argument becomes nonsensical and pointless.
No, it doesn't, certainly not before you demonstrate that convincingly. Your
ad lapidem fallacy is what is nonsensical and pointless, as are all logical fallacies.
The suggestion that we are forced to choose something because it is known is wrong. It is our perception of time which makes us think that. We say "it hasn't happened yet". That is what confuses the mind into thinking that something sinister is going on.
Still not a rebuttal. My argument is not wrong because you declare it so. If it wrong, you'll need to show where and how. Your comment about the perception of time doesn't explain how I am wrong or how you are correct. Once again, if you want to be believed, you'll need to show I am wrong and that you are correct. I can't say this often enough that merely disagreeing is not rebutting, even if other words follow making more unsupported claims or flawed arguments. None of that has any persuasive power in dialectic, which is why we haven't got past the point we started - you making unsupported claims or logical errors followed by a valid argument in rebuttal, and that's the end of it except to repeat the cycle. There is no breaking out of it until we BOTH rebut one another.
I've come to this point with several RF theists in the past few months in various discussions where I end up begging the theist to address the arguments made, and it not only never happens, in many cases, there is no evidence that the request was even read much less understood. It happened on this thread recently with a poster who likes to demean atheists. I rebutted him and got another round of insults, but not an answer to my rebuttal, or even a mention of it. Then he disappeared from the discussion.
What I'm dying to know, but can't know without his cooperation and input, which as you see is not forthcoming, is whether he just doesn't understand what is being asked of him, whether he understands but lacks the skills to cooperate and doesn't want to say so or demonstrate so, or that he understands what is requested, could give it, but choses not to. It seems like it has to be one of those three in his case and any other case where the request is not just denied, but ignored. It's not nearly that bad here with you, but you and I make no more forward progress than I did with the other poster.
I see you and Leroy as trying to cooperate with what is asked for, but being unable to give it. I think that neither of you knows what a rebuttal looks like, so you give what you have instead. It's a good faith effort, but won't permit dialectic.
And how did sinister get into this discussion?