If you believe in free will, respond to these two objections

[CarlinKnew]

Everyone knows that humans make decisions; that is a red herring in the debate on free will. The only real controversy here is Libertarian free will.

"Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All “free will theists” hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise."

The objections are (quotes are from theopedia.com):

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

\2) Responsibility —Rather than salvage human responsibility, some maintain that libertarian freedom destroys it. If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices? Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didn’t cause than to hold them responsible for choices that were caused and thus determined?"

Just as a reminder, this thread is about the above two objections. No one disputes the red herring of compatibilism; it is self evident:

"In compatibilism, free will is affected by human nature and man will never choose contrary to his nature and desires. Man will always do what he desires most at any particular moment - even when there are competing desires."

If you believe in free will, respond to the above two objections under the bolded headings.

 

[Thief]

Free will could be best demonstrated in your own self denial.

 

[CarlinKnew]

Free will could be best demonstrated in your own self denial.

Thanks for the laugh. No, seriously though, are you able to specifically respond to the two objections in the original post? Is anyone? For once let's hear some free will supporters defending against the real objections to free will. For once let's bring some clarity to this issue. Or will the concept of free will crumble under attempts to understand it clearly?

 

[bobhikes]

Everyone knows that humans make decisions; that is a red herring in the debate on free will. The only real controversy here is Libertarian free will.

"Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All “free will theists” hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise."

The objections are (quotes are from theopedia.com):

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

\2) Responsibility —Rather than salvage human responsibility, some maintain that libertarian freedom destroys it. If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices? Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didn’t cause than to hold them responsible for choices that were caused and thus determined?"

Just as a reminder, this thread is about the above two objections. No one disputes the red herring of compatibilism; it is self evident:

"In compatibilism, free will is affected by human nature and man will never choose contrary to his nature and desires. Man will always do what he desires most at any particular moment - even when there are competing desires."

If you believe in free will, respond to the above two objections under the bolded headings.

According to Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman Humans see causality where there is no causality, it is an evolutionary benefit.

What if the choice is between two outcomes say for instance emotions and logic. Is it still not a choice. It is not random and not determined.

You do not have to have infinite choice to have free will you just need 2. Humans have both emotions and logic both are bound to the mind. What if you make the decision to go with logic or emotion is that not free will.

 

[CarlinKnew]

According to Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman Humans see causality where there is no causality, it is an evolutionary benefit.

What if the choice is between two outcomes say for instance emotions and logic. Is it still not a choice. It is not random and not determined.

You do not have to have infinite choice to have free will you just need 2. Humans have both emotions and logic both are bound to the mind. What if you make the decision to go with logic or emotion is that not free will.

If I understand you correctly you are saying that we can make choices based on either logic or emotion, and this choice is neither random nor determined, so it equates to free will.

What makes it neither random nor determined? Does it have no cause? If it has no cause, how are we responsible for it? I refer you back to the two objections in the original post, because you have not addressed them.

 

[Quintessence]

If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices?

Huh? I was following your post up until I hit this. I don't understand this at all. If choices are not determined by causes outside the self (be they natural or "supernatural"), aren't they by default self-caused? Isn't the postulation of free will that our behaviors are entirely self-caused?

 

[CarlinKnew]

Huh? I was following your post up until I hit this. I don't understand this at all. If choices are not determined by causes outside the self (be they natural or "supernatural"), aren't they by default self-caused? Isn't the postulation of free will that our behaviors are entirely self-caused?

The objection doesn't say "...If our choices have no causes outside the self..." You added the bolded part. The postulation of free will is presented in the original post in the quote that begins with "Libertarian free will..." Remember that compatibilistic free will is self evident; no one disputes it. It means nothing that are behaviors are "self-caused" if the self is caused. I ask that you reread the original post so that it might make more sense now.

 

[Quintessence]

You'll have to forgive my lack of grasping some of the terminology you're using. "Libertarian free will" and "compatibilistic free will" are not familiar terms to me. "Contracausal free will" is familiar to me, so that was the approach I was assuming here but I think you're coming at free will from a different angle. I re-read your post, but the definition of "Liberterian free will" begs more questions that are probably impeding my understanding of it. Notably, what is "human nature" and how is this determined by this philosophy? Also, how is "God" being understood by this philosophy?

 

[CarlinKnew]

You'll have to forgive my lack of grasping some of the terminology you're using. "Libertarian free will" and "compatibilistic free will" are not familiar terms to me. "Contracausal free will" is familiar to me, so that was the approach I was assuming here but I think you're coming at free will from a different angle. I re-read your post, but the definition of "Liberterian free will" begs more questions that are probably impeding my understanding of it. Notably, what is "human nature" and how is this determined by this philosophy? Also, how is "God" being understood by this philosophy?

Ahm, well "God" would be a deity, although this debate would do just fine without mentioning any deities, and "human nature" is the way that humans are, including the way we think, feel, behave, and so on.

 

[froggerlover]

Everyone knows that humans make decisions; that is a red herring in the debate on free will. The only real controversy here is Libertarian free will.

"Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All “free will theists” hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise."

The objections are (quotes are from theopedia.com):

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

\2) Responsibility —Rather than salvage human responsibility, some maintain that libertarian freedom destroys it. If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices? Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didn’t cause than to hold them responsible for choices that were caused and thus determined?"

Just as a reminder, this thread is about the above two objections. No one disputes the red herring of compatibilism; it is self evident:

"In compatibilism, free will is affected by human nature and man will never choose contrary to his nature and desires. Man will always do what he desires most at any particular moment - even when there are competing desires."

If you believe in free will, respond to the above two objections under the bolded headings.

I want to believe in free will and I did for a long time, but as i got older, it seems like everything happens for a reason. i do not believe in god, I do however believe that something is creating our path. so freewill is out of the picture. I concur with your ideas.

 

[idea]

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

\2) Responsibility —Rather than salvage human responsibility, some maintain that libertarian freedom destroys it. If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices? Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didn’t cause than to hold them responsible for choices that were caused and thus determined?"

both of these can be addressed with an understanding of our origin. Due to the causation net, true free will only exists for entities that are self-created - or eternal entities who have no beginning. The ultimate cause comes down to the ultimate beginning. If there is no ultimate beginning, no ultimate first cause to trace everything back to - if we are self-existent, independent, uncreated beings - then we have a true independent will.

As it turns out, our spirits are eternal, and have no beginning. Conservation principles of thermo - there is no ultimate beginning to any of it. You cannot get something from nothing. Everything that now is, always has been, and always will be (changing form, but without beginning). Because there is no ultimate beginning - infinity on either side of us - true free will exists.

Responsibility? Causality? We are our own cause - we are our own beginning.

from Mormon scriptures:
29 Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be.
30 All truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it, to act for itself, as all intelligence also; otherwise there is no existence.
31 Behold, here is the agency of man (here is the free will of man)...
(Doctrine and Covenants | Section 93:29 - 31)

ex-Nihlo creationism is not in the Bible. The Bible actually teaches us that we are all eternal, with no beginning, like God Himself (I can provide a long spiel of scriptural support for this if anyone is interested)

 

[Levite]

"Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All “free will theists” hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise."

While I certainly believe in free will, and I would readily concur that the definition of free will chiefly includes no predetermination or compulsion from God or any other supernatural forces, I am having trouble with this above-stated idea that it also means freedom from "constraints of human nature."

I think that in having free will, we are not bound and compelled to act either by our own animal instincts or the constructions of our society or the philosophical constructions of our upbringing. But we may well be influenced by those things. People can act without any regard to either the norms of society or the norms of their upbringing: you might have had a "normal" childhood in a society with typical Western nudity and sexuality taboos, say, and decide from your own thoughts, feelings, studies, etc. that it behooves you for some reason to strip naked and masturbate in Times Square (as, apparently, happens with some folks). And yet, though all of us have the capacity to make such a choice, most of us will not do so, not because we are compelled or literally bound by an outside force, but because we have been influenced by social norms, and have consented to conform our behavior to certain parameters.

Free will means the ability to make, in theory, any choices we wish. It doesn't mean that we must always make actions without influence from anything external to ourselves in order to prove we still have the ability. It's the difference between having the power to make any choice we wish versus being literally unable to make certain decisions.

For example, in Jewish theology, angels have no free will. We don't believe in "fallen angels," because to our understanding, angels are literally incapable of rebellion. They utterly lack the capacity to desire anything but the fulfillment of their purposes in serving God. They cannot fall because they are inherently unable to do so.

Whereas we always have choices, whether they are the average range of choices most of us encounter in our societies and lifetimes, or whether they are extraordinary in some way. For example, the norms of Nazi Germany dictated that untermenschen ("sub-humans," like Jews and Romany and gay people) be given no aid or comfort, and that they be turned over to the State for "relocation" (read: killing); and yet there were a number of Germans, Austrians, Poles, and whatnot who risked much to save such people, though it was profoundly anti-social of them. They might have remained safer by ignoring their conscience and doing what their society claimed was the right thing, but they ignored the influences of their environment and acted as they thought best. By the same token, I've read a couple of interesting accounts of men who, knowing that they were sexually compulsive, nonetheless entered the Catholic priesthood. They inevitably had various inappropriate sexual encounters amongst their parishoners, and violated their trust as spiritual leaders. They knew their own proclivities. They knew that a position of trust that required celibacy would surely work out poorly for them. They knew that priests who violate their congregational trusts with sexual inappropriateness are seldom viewed with much compassion by the average congregant. Yet they chose to go ahead and be priests, and unfortunate actions ensued. Those were their choices, despite the influence of their environment.

It works both for the good and for the bad: it's free will. But it doesn't mean "entirely free of influence from external forces," it means "free of compulsion by external forces." It's a subtle, but important difference.

If this isn't "libertarian free will," then I guess I'm just not a Libertarian.

 

[Zoe Doidge]

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

This is along the lines that I've been thinking of lately, and makes perfect sense to me. We are after all a combination of particles, which obey defined laws (even if we don't totally understand those laws, it's clear that they exist).

I don't see any reason to believe that a particular configuration of particles would result in free will, but given that we can't know all the factors that influence our decisions at any given time, it creates an illusion of free will.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Everyone knows that humans make decisions

This is probably nitpicking but that particularly view has its opponents. How can you know that you are making a decision? How can you differentiate between a self-awareness and consciousness that enables you to "decide" and a bunch of neurons interacting in a manner determined completely by external forces which nonetheless creates the illusion of decision?

The objections are (quotes are from theopedia.com):

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

There is a possible flaw in the logic here:
1) Events have causes
2) causes are conditions which guarentee effects
3) those effects are events, which are therefore inevitable

However, if we allow for the existence of choice, or the ability of at least humans to weigh various factors and act accordingly, then the conditions which preceded many events did not determine them.

In other words, imagine that I come across a wallet or purse in the road which is filled with hundred dollars bills and an I.D. If I have the capacity to make decisions, then the conditions here do not determine the outcome. I do. I can choose to return the money or keep it. True, I'm heavily influenced by any number of conditions, but once one allows for choice, then we are no longer dealing with a deterministic universe.

If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices?

We make them. They are influenced by external factors, but the ability to consider these factors and then act makes the agent responsible.

 

[Just Another]

" Man will always do what he desires most at any particular moment - even when there are competing desires."

I respectfully disagree.

A man might break in my car, and at the time my utmost desire might be to beat/kill that fellow. Doesnt mean Id do it. Saying that absolute desire is what man will ultimately choose takes away free will altogether. It also circumvents things like values or morals, much less personal thought.

Everyone has free will. Not everyone exercises it.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

This is along the lines that I've been thinking of lately, and makes perfect sense to me. We are after all a combination of particles, which obey defined laws (even if we don't totally understand those laws, it's clear that they exist).

I don't see any reason to believe that a particular configuration of particles would result in free will, but given that we can't know all the factors that influence our decisions at any given time, it creates an illusion of free will.

That's one possibility. However, the fact that particles obey laws doesn't necessitate determinism. After all, the observation of particles changes their path. It isn't just a matter of not totally understanding the laws. Rather, the mind that Laplace envisioned which could, if it knew all the starting conditions, predict any future state of the universe, is outdated. There is an absolute limit to knowledge of future states not because we do not understand the laws but because we can't observe any given current state in its entirety without changing it.

Of course, this doesn't mean that consciousness and free will are likewise unconstrained. But I think that interactions within complex systems may be so chaotic that they are self-determining.

 

[Zoe Doidge]

That's one possibility. However, the fact that particles obey laws doesn't necessitate determinism. After all, the observation of particles changes their path.

But even then, they are still obeying those laws. Observation means using particles to interact with other particles, so it makes sense that the observed particles would be affected by that.

It isn't just a matter of not totally understanding the laws. Rather, the mind that Laplace envisioned which could, if it knew all the starting conditions, predict any future state of the universe, is outdated. There is an absolute limit to knowledge of future states not because we do not understand the laws but because we can't observe any given current state in its entirety without changing it.

Well obviously, in order to store all the information in the universe you’d need a storage device with at least the mass of the universe itself! Even if you had that it would have a gravitational effect on the universe, and even if you could get around that you’d have to process the information faster than it happens in real time, which is impossible. The idea of it is just a concept, but a useful one. In any event, just because the future is unpredictable, doesn’t mean it isn’t determined.

Of course, this doesn't mean that consciousness and free will are likewise unconstrained. But I think that interactions within complex systems may be so chaotic that they are self-determining.

For the sake of simplicity I see it as something like this:

Imagine a very small universe, filled with only 50 identical large particles. There are only two laws of physics in this universe, that particles are attracted to each other with force X, but on actual contact with each other repel each other with force Y (the exact value is irrelevant, but assume Y > X by a considerable amount). From our point of view, if we knew the starting conditions and the forces involved we could easily predict the locations and velocities of all of the particles at any given time in the future.

But change the amount of particles to something like the number of atoms in our universe, and suddenly it becomes an impossible task. Not because any of the particles or combinations of them have acquired free will, but simply because it has become too complex to store and/or process. Even so, they’re still utterly bound by the simple laws that they interact by.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

But even then, they are still obeying those laws. Observation means using particles to interact with other particles, so it makes sense that the observed particles would be affected by that.

One result from the uncertainty principle is simply a limit of knowledge. However, extending that notion to human experience, one could argue that human perception alters the state of particles which are responsible for thought. If the mere act of observation can alter a system in completely unpredictable ways, then isn't it possible that an integrated, dynamic, and "ordered" system like the human brain is not completely constrained by intitial conditions?

Well obviously, in order to store all the information in the universe you’d need a storage device with at least the mass of the universe itself! Even if you had that it would have a gravitational effect on the universe, and even if you could get around that you’d have to process the information faster than it happens in real time, which is impossible. The idea of it is just a concept, but a useful one. In any event, just because the future is unpredictable, doesn’t mean it isn’t determined.

It's true that an inability to predict does not equal a non-deterministic system. One question, however, is how the system can be deterministic? Determinism implies that, given particular initial conditions and a knowledge of all the relevant laws, all future states can be known. However, if the interaction of particles results in states which cannot be determined because any attempt to determine them changes them, is the system really deterministic?

For the sake of simplicity I see it as something like this:

Imagine a very small universe, filled with only 50 identical large particles...From our point of view, if we knew the starting conditions and the forces involved we could easily predict the locations and velocities of all of the particles at any given time in the future.

... Not because any of the particles or combinations of them have acquired free will, but simply because it has become too complex to store and/or process. Even so, they’re still utterly bound by the simple laws that they interact by.

That's one view, certainly. For the most part, complex or chaotic systems are thought of as those systems whose future behavior are extremely sensitive to initial conditions, and therefore close to impossible to predict. However, one reason for this approach is simply that work in nonlinear dynamics has focused on increasing our ability to predict and understand complex systems, not determine if (and under what conditions) this is impossible.

To go back to your example, in a fairly simple, completely constrained system, we could predict any future state. But this doesn't answer the question of whether a system can reach a qualitatively different level of complexity. The capacity for human thought is a good counter to a completely deterministic view. Some systems appear to reach a level of complexity which enables self-ordering independent of (but still subject to) physical laws. I'll stick with neural dynamics as this is my field. Independently, neurons are subject to predictable laws of physics. They fire under certain circumstances and at particular rates. However, the patterns which emerge from the vast complexity may very well not be determined by physics. Rather, the system begins to organize itself.

 

[bobhikes]

If I understand you correctly you are saying that we can make choices based on either logic or emotion, and this choice is neither random nor determined, so it equates to free will.

What makes it neither random nor determined? Does it have no cause? If it has no cause, how are we responsible for it? I refer you back to the two objections in the original post, because you have not addressed them.

If you read my quote properly you would see, My scientist has said there is no causality in life. It is an illusion you are programed to see because it is beneficial to your survival. So in effect there is no causality for anything.

As to responsibility you don't define it. What is resposibility to you or as you want your thread defined.

For me responsibility can only be defined by the self and can not be defined by anything objectively. You can only have responsiblity with free will. It won't exist with determinism.

 

[Falvlun]

Everyone knows that humans make decisions; that is a red herring in the debate on free will. The only real controversy here is Libertarian free will.

"Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God. All “free will theists” hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called a free choice. Libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition and greatest desires. Responsibility, in this view, always means that one could have done otherwise."

Levite voiced my own objections quite well. I think it would be silly to claim that humans are completely free from various cause-effect relationships. It is quite evident that we are influenced by our environment and genetic make-up. But influences, pre-dispositions, are not the same as complete determinism.

The objections are (quotes are from theopedia.com):

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

I do not think that causes guarantee effects. They predispose, or make an effect more likely to occur. So, while every effect does indeed have a cause, the cause is not guaranteed to produce a specific effect.

In addition, I personally believe that self-awareness throws a wrench into the whole cause-and-effect relationship, making it much less predictable than purely mechanical, physical processes. Self-awareness allows awareness of causes and how they predispose one towards a specific action, and also allows one to decide how they wish to respond to that cause. This is something that rocks, for instance, cannot do.

\2) Responsibility —Rather than salvage human responsibility, some maintain that libertarian freedom destroys it. If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices? Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didn’t cause than to hold them responsible for choices that were caused and thus determined?"

Here's the crux of the problem in this line of thought: Our choices do indeed have causes. However, the cause did not force the specific choice.

So, for instance: I chose to have cereal for breakfast. I could have had waffles, but I didn't. My choice to have cereal was caused by my knowledge that I had milk to use up, that the waffles (frozen) would keep for a longer time than an open box of cereal, and my general preference this morning for the flavor and texture of cinnamon toast crunch over syrupy waffles. My choice had a cause. However, none of those causes forced me to choose the cereal over the waffles. They predisposed me towards choosing the cereal, they caused me to choose the cereal, but my choice of the cereal was not determined by them. Does that difference make sense?