I obviously haven't denied using the word "objective". I have used it many, many times in the phrase "objective moral facts". I haven't used the term "objective morality," and I don't know what anyone means by that term.
You don't know what "objective morality" means, but do know what:
"objective moral facts" are
"objectively wrong" is
"objectively immoral" is
??
Is post #329, you quoted the words "objective morality" used in a question and said, "I think I understand your question."
In #241 you quoted part of a paragraph from the IEP article, which begins and ends with a number of conditionals ("If . . ., then . . ."), which obviously do not demonstrate that any premise of the realist argument to be erroneous.
But it does. It provides rationale against the premise: Moral sentences are sometimes true. It does this by noting how "objectivity" works with regards to morality, by asserting:
"Objectivity is to be found within the world. If moral judgments are not about accurately describing the world —for example, if moral judgments are about us —then moral objectivity will not be found within the world.
If moral objectivity is to be found within us, then it is not the same objectivity with which we began, or, so had been the old antirealist’s way."
You also haven't shown either premise of my deduction to be false. That argument deduces that a particular act (rape of a 4-year-old child) is an immoral act.
Going with the above, this assertion: rape of a 4-year old child is an an immoral act, is not found / observable in our world. It's found within us, by first observing mental constructs around rape/consent and then escalating those constructs to mean immoral/moral actions.
Here, from the article, would be another way of refuting the moral assertion: rape of a child is an objectively immoral act
Language allows us to communicate with one another, typically using sentences and utterances. A large part of language involves, among many other things, influencing others and us. Normative language, in contrast with descriptive language, includes moral language (that is, moral language is part of evaluative or normative language). It is even more important not to be swayed by moral language because moral reality grips us. It is bad that others try to deceive us, but it is worse that we deceive ourselves into accepting moral facts simply because of the language that we use. That is, moral language — if it is not to describe the world —must not be mistaken as descriptive. Moral language binds us in a certain manner, and the manner in which it binds us is important.
This saying, among many things, "moral language must not be mistaken as descriptive."
Me, being what you might call a nondescriptivist, would concur with the following as it relates to your prescription of immorality regarding 4-year olds:
Rather, the non-descriptivist believes that moral judgments are expressed by commands or prescriptions. Neither commands nor prescriptions are truth-apt, and as a result they typically are not meant to describe the world. Moral language does not describe the world, according to the non-descriptivist. That is, it represents our wishes, preferences, emotions, and so on, but it represents nothing over and above them.
And this:
Non-descriptivists agree, nonetheless, that moral language is the tool of choice when we are panting for help, recommending a course of actions, passing judgments on what others do, and so on, but it is never the tool for describing the world.
And let's throw this in for good measure:
Error theorists maintain that moral judgments systematically err by positing moral facts. (For instance, Mackie says that “[t]he assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgments presuppose is, I hold it not meaningless but false” 1977, 40.) That is, moral language aims to get the world right, but it always misses the mark.
So when you say:
In contrast, you haven't shown that any of your assertions about moral facts (or any other assertions) can be deduced from any true propositions. That's the crucial difference between moral realism and moral anti-realism--or one of the crucial differences. The other big difference exhibited on this thread is most everyone here who as asserted any form of moral anti-realism has gotten tangled up in the logical inconsistency of saying "[X] is not objectively immoral [thus making an assertion about an objective moral fact], but I believe it is."
You are referencing that people are stating their understandings of morality are subjective, not objective. They are admitting to the idea that their moral prescriptions may not accurately describe the world in an objective way (that all would clearly agree upon, because of the descriptive language of the moral assertion). They are instead saying it works for them, because it is how they feel (emphasis on feel) their world ought to be described. Essentially overlaying an idealism upon what exists in judgments, or projections, of us observers.
It really is expressions that don't readily explain an individual's worldview, nor do I think it is expected to. When another comes along and shares in that, it shows how morality (judgment of right and wrong) is relative to not just individual subjective assertions, but to groups of people, or at least 2+ people.
Therefore, based on the existence of relative morality, we all appear to agree that "rape of a child is immoral." But taking that to the arena of 'objective fact,' and I observe no one, including you, has shown why the judgment is an accurate description of the way things work in our world. Just a prescription, or command, that is best followed for emotional reasons and to avoid getting in legal trouble with local law enforcement.