Is abortion homicide?

[निताइ dasa]

I'm going to interpret your argument in a way that's consistent with what you say, not what you ought to have said if you were presenting Kant properly. If you want your argument to be more "Kantian", that's your problem to solve.

I'm not talking to Immanuel Kant; I'm talking to you. I'll respond to the arguments YOU make.

This is ridiculous and I think now you are trying to backpedal. Let us examine my actual original statement regarding this:

"Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law"

Universal Law here, extends to past, present and future, and hence encapsulates current rational agents, future rational agents, and past rational agents. I mean, heck if we directly apply the principle to abortion , it contradicts itself.

(Basically according to this law, if abortion is moral, then it is a universal law and must be moral for all past, present and future agents. However if this was a universal law, and everyone acted upon it, then your parent's would have aborted you, and hence you are unable to get an abortion since you would not exist. Therefore the principle cannot be acted upon and willed into a universal law at the same time. Therefore abortion is wrong in all cases).

Now, nowhere in this excerpt have I discussed rights. I quoted the words of Kant himself (his universal law) then I applied to universal law to the action of abortion and showed you how it would lead to a logical contradiction. When in your next post, you gave the example of organ donation, I replied to it explaining why interpretation is both not a proper interpretation of both my explanation nor is it an proper interpretation of Kant's position. Why? Because in our original debate, (like post #63) you brought up the same argument, and I clarified it with statements such as:

It is of a greater imperative to protect already present rights from violation than to restore already violated rights. You cannot restore a right in order by violating an already intact one.

ts than to restore violated ones. I cannot restore my rights by disrupting someone else. When this principle is taken into account, the organ donation example weakens your argument. There is also a moral difference between doing harm and allowing harm. In the bone marrow example, the mother is allowing harm to happen (but since she is not responsible for the leukemia she has no obligation here to assist). In the act of abortion, the mother (or rather the doctor) is doing harm, by killing the fetus.

owever the mother cannot restore her right of autonomy if it means violating another's right (i.e the fetus' right to life). The government has a much stronger mandate to protect intact rights than to restore violated ones. I cannot restore my rights by disrupting someone else.

In the bone marrow example, the mother is allowing harm to happen (but since she is not responsible for the leukemia she has no obligation here to assist). In the act of abortion, the mother (or rather the doctor) is doing harm, by killing the fetus.

You however didn't reply to that post, so the debate ended there.

Now you tell me, are you really interpreting my arguments in a way that is consistent with what I've said? Especially when I have specifically clarified multiple times why the organ donation and abortion are two different principles. Because neither of these perceptive (Kantian interpretation, or my interpretations) support what you are saying.

 

[Nous]

It seems that we are going in circles. I have put forth my conclusions and given sufficient explanation for them. I also have tried to reply to your refutation. I will briefly add a few closing comments, but this is prob me my final post in this matter.

[. . .]

As a thanks offering, I offer you one of my favorite pieces of classical music, the famous liebestraum (love dream) by Franz Liszt, played by one of his direct pupils, Frederic Lamond.

Thank you very much for your offering and your comments. I appreciate them.

I will just add that I stand by each of my points, namely that you haven't articulated any sound argument by which to conclude that either pre-viable fetuses or zygotes are “persons” for which it would be homicide to kill them, and, further, there is no logical justification to recognize a “right to life” for either pre-viable fetuses or zygotes on the basis of any capacity that any of them might eventually have, for the same reason that there is no logical justification to recognize a right to marry for toddlers. The fact that infants are more likely than not to eventually be able to reason about moral issues or act morally or immorally is not a logical reason to not kill them, as the fact that constitutes the premise of such an argument can easily be made false by killing them before they become infants.

If the capacity or the eventual capacity to learn, to reason or to aware of one's self-agency were adequate criteria for recognizing a “right to life,” then such a right to life should unquestionably be recognized for chimpanzees (and probably other animals).

Moreover, if it were true that there were some valid and sound reason to consider fertilized eggs to be “persons” for which it would be homicide to kill them, then there would be no justification for taking hormonal contraceptives, whose normal birth control mechanism includes preventing fertilized from implanting. There is neither any moral or legal principle that excuses intentionally taking a drug for which one knows the consequences are likely to be the death of a person. If the “double-effect” doctrine absolved one of repeatedly and knowingly killing persons, then it would absolve people of intentionally becoming inebriated and driving, and accidentally killing someone.

(I dare say, no philosopher or scholar who proposes that it is morally wrong to kill fertilized eggs has ever argued that the “double-effect” doctrine justifies the repeated and intentional taking of any drug that is known to have an abortifacient effect. To suggest such is a gross mischaracterization of that doctrine: https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/5222-khatchadourianis-principle-of-double-effect )

Neither the high courts of the US nor Australia have held that pre-viable fetuses or fertilized eggs qualify as persons. There is simply no logical basis for doing so, and no compelling governmental interest in forcing the birth of millions (more) unwanted children. Anyone who wishes to prevent women from exercising their legally recognized rights to terminate their pregnancies should have a house full of adopted children. Given that this is not what one sees, it is more than obvious that those people most adamantly opposed to women exercising their legally recognized right to terminate their pregnancies are not motivated by considerations of the welfare of children.

Humans are just one of millions of taxa who must share the earth. There is definitely no moral justification for the continued aberrant overpopulation of humans at the expense of all other species and the very planet. No pre-viable fetus or fertilized egg is sacred by virtue of it being human. Humans need to do everything possible that does not violate any actual person's rights in order to drastically reduce the human population. Women exercising their legally recognized rights to terminate their pregnancies does not violate any person's rights.

 

[निताइ dasa]

Thank you very much for your offering and your comments. I appreciate them.

I will just add that I stand by each of my points, namely that you haven't articulated any sound argument by which to conclude that either pre-viable fetuses or zygotes are “persons” for which it would be homicide to kill them, and, further, there is no logical justification to recognize a “right to life” for either pre-viable fetuses or zygotes on the basis of any capacity that any of them might eventually have, for the same reason that there is no logical justification to recognize a right to marry for toddlers. The fact that infants are more likely than not to eventually be able to reason about moral issues or act morally or immorally is not a logical reason to not kill them, as the fact that constitutes the premise of such an argument can easily be made false by killing them before they become infants.

If the capacity or the eventual capacity to learn, to reason or to aware of one's self-agency were adequate criteria for recognizing a “right to life,” then such a right to life should unquestionably be recognized for chimpanzees (and probably other animals).

Moreover, if it were true that there were some valid and sound reason to consider fertilized eggs to be “persons” for which it would be homicide to kill them, then there would be no justification for taking hormonal contraceptives, whose normal birth control mechanism includes preventing fertilized from implanting. There is neither any moral or legal principle that excuses intentionally taking a drug for which one knows the consequences are likely to be the death of a person. If the “double-effect” doctrine absolved one of repeatedly and knowingly killing persons, then it would absolve people of intentionally becoming inebriated and driving, and accidentally killing someone.

(I dare say, no philosopher or scholar who proposes that it is morally wrong to kill fertilized eggs has ever argued that the “double-effect” doctrine justifies the repeated and intentional taking of any drug that is known to have an abortifacient effect. To suggest such is a gross mischaracterization of that doctrine: https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/5222-khatchadourianis-principle-of-double-effect )

Neither the high courts of the US nor Australia have held that pre-viable fetuses or fertilized eggs qualify as persons. There is simply no logical basis for doing so, and no compelling governmental interest in forcing the birth of millions (more) unwanted children. Anyone who wishes to prevent women from exercising their legally recognized rights to terminate their pregnancies should have a house full of adopted children. Given that this is not what one sees, it is more than obvious that those people most adamantly opposed to women exercising their legally recognized right to terminate their pregnancies are not motivated by considerations of the welfare of children.

Humans are just one of millions of taxa who must share the earth. There is definitely no moral justification for the continued aberrant overpopulation of humans at the expense of all other species and the very planet. No pre-viable fetus or fertilized egg is sacred by virtue of it being human. Humans need to do everything possible that does not violate any actual person's rights in order to drastically reduce the human population. Women exercising their legally recognized rights to terminate their pregnancies does not violate any person's rights.

I while I disagree with the most of your conclusions here (I believe I have given you more then sound justification of my premises, and the refutations you have presented attack a misrepresented view of my claims, such as for example you claim that self agency is my criteria for right to life, when I never made such a claim ). Furthermore I believe that doctrine of double effect explains the difference between contraception and abortion (as discussed by philosopher Phillipa Foot in her paper which I linked). Thirdly I hold their is a very logical and pragmatic argument that can be made for why the government has an interest in protecting the rights of fetus and infant (namely they are eventual citizens). Lastly, while I am a HIndu (I believe in the preciousness of all life), I hold human life above all 2 reason, firstly human's ability and eventuality to understand moral truths and secondly (a more religious reason), only human beings can understand God. It is for this reason I hold the act of abortion as immoral and hence the government must strive to restrict and minimize it where possible.

I thank you for the debate also.

 

[columbus]

Edit: does an actual child who needs, say, a kidney or bone marrow have any less of a right to life than a fetus? Do you - assuming you would be a matching donor - have any more right to refuse to go through what's needed to preserve someone else's life?

I go over and over this. It's like talking to creationists. "If humans evolved from monkeys, why are there still monkeys?"

Your hypothetical isn't relevant to the abortion issue. Because everybody knows where babies come from.
A comparable hypothetical would be, "Suppose Bob put poison in Mary's food. He chose to do that. Mary suffers catastrophic kidney failure as a result. Bob is the only possible kidney donor, nobody else is possible.
Would Bob owe Mary a kidney? "
I say absolutely Yes he does. He made a choice that resulted in Mary's dire need, and only he can fix the results of his Choice. So Yeah! No questions whatsoever, I will strap him to the gurney.

Similarly, a parent who made a choice that results in a human being in dire need now has an obligation to that human being. They had bodily autonomy before the Choice, but now they don't. They chose responsibility for someone else's life.
Tom

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Now, nowhere in this excerpt have I discussed rights.

This whole thread has been about rights.

I quoted the words of Kant himself (his universal law) then I applied to universal law to the action of abortion and showed you how it would lead to a logical contradiction.

You tried to do this. I'd say you failed.

When in your next post, you gave the example of organ donation, I replied to it explaining why interpretation is both not a proper interpretation of both my explanation nor is it an proper interpretation of Kant's position. Why? Because in our original debate, (like post #63) you brought up the same argument, and I clarified it with statements such as:

You however didn't reply to that post, so the debate ended there.

I got busy with RL stuff and the thread moved on.

Now you tell me, are you really interpreting my arguments in a way that is consistent with what I've said?

Your arguments aren't consistent with themselves, but yes: to the extent that it's possible, my interpretation of your argumentis consistentbwoth what you've said.

I can paraphrase the principle that you've argued as this: when violating a pregnant woman's bodily autonomy would save a "life", her bodily autonomy should be forfeit.

Apply this principle universally - as you say we should - and you get this: when violating a person's bodily autonomy would save a "life", his or her bodily autonomy should be forfeit.

This implies all sorts of things like forced organ donation. Your attempts to argue away this implication have all been special pleading or based on unsupported premises.

Especially when I have specifically clarified multiple times why the organ donation and abortion are two different principles. Because neither of these perceptive (Kantian interpretation, or my interpretations) do not support what you are saying.

Again: I'm not arguing with Kant; I'm arguing with you. I don't accept Kant's word as any sort of Gospel, and in any case, I recognize that he never wrote directly on the subject of abortion, and there are Kantian pro-choice arguments to go along with your anti-choice arguments. Which one is more "authentically" Kantian? I really don't care.

Make your arguments and defend them on their own merits... and merely tracing an argument back to Kant isn't a defense.

 

[निताइ dasa]

This whole thread has been about rights.

You quoted my excerpt, and my excerpt (about the formula of universal law) was not about rights.

You tried to do this. I'd say you failed.

Because I believe you don't understand it, hence your objections are trying to backpedal way from Kant.

I can paraphrase the principle that you've argued as this: when violating a pregnant woman's bodily autonomy would save a "life", her bodily autonomy should be forfeit.

Apply this principle universally - as you say we should - and you get this: when violating a person's bodily autonomy would save a "life", his or her bodily autonomy should be forfeit.

This implies all sorts of things like forced organ donation. Your attempts to argue away this implication have all been special pleading or based on unsupported premises.

I can't believe I'm repeating this yet again. I've clarified multiple times that there is a difference between not violating a right and not restoring a violated right. Hence why the principle I put forth for abortion is a different principle from forced organ donation. I have argued the principle that you cannot violate a right even as means to restore another right. This principle explains why abortion is wrong (because you cannot violate a fetus' right of life in order to restore the autonomy of the women). This principle also explains organ donation (we cannot violate the autonomy of the organ donar, by forcing them to donate to restore the discrupted right of life of the ill child.).

Il put this principle in terms of another right, the right to property. Generally we ought not steal from others and doing so is a violation of the victims right of property. However what this doesn't mean is that we are obligated to go out and give money to everyone who has had their money stolen for them. We don't have an obligation to restore the already violated rights of others. That is why if we have to choose between restoring a violated right, or not disrupting an intact right, the latter always wins.

If I steal money from someone simply because I need to restore the money that someone else stole from me, that the stealing is still not justified. You know, I gave this example before in our last debate.

and merely tracing an argument back to Kant isn't a defense.

It is a defense when you quote an excerpt that is specifically an application of Kant's universal Law and then tell me that my principle cannot be applied universally in accordance with such a law. If you want to deal with universalization of the principles then we are dealing the Kantian laws, if you don't want to deal with Kantian ethics then don't bring universalization into it.

my interpretation of your argumentis consistentbwoth what you've said.

Even when I have present multiple quotes form myself in the previous post (before your accusations) clarifying that my position is specifically not the one you are implying?

In any case, I have no interest to continue this argument, unless of course you reply to my actual clarifications.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

I go over and over this. It's like talking to creationists. "If humans evolved from monkeys, why are there still monkeys?"

I feel the same way talking with anti-choicers.

Your hypothetical isn't relevant to the abortion issue. Because everybody knows where babies come from.

Consent to sex isn't consent to pregnancy, and consent to pregnancy at one point doesn't imply consent can't be withdrawn.

A comparable hypothetical would be, "Suppose Bob put poison in Mary's food. He chose to do that. Mary suffers catastrophic kidney failure as a result. Bob is the only possible kidney donor, nobody else is possible.
Would Bob owe Mary a kidney? "
I say absolutely Yes he does. He made a choice that resulted in Mary's dire need, and only he can fix the results of his Choice. So Yeah! No questions whatsoever, I will strap him to the gurney.

And yet even in that case, we don't require the perpetrator to give up his bodily autonomy. Your analogy supports a pro-choice position.

Similarly, a parent who made a choice that results in a human being in dire need now has an obligation to that human being. They had bodily autonomy before the Choice, but now they don't. They chose responsibility for someone else's life.
Tom

Yet we don't deny parents' bodily autonomy to protect their children's lives. As I touched on before, a parent isn't obliged to give up an organ, tissue, blood, or even a single hair on their head to save their own child's life. Requiring this for pregnant women doesn't require us to consider fetuses people; it requires us to give fetuses a superhuman status that no actual person enjoys.

What is it about passing through the birth canal that you think strips a fetus of its rights down to those of a mere human?

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

I can't believe I'm repeating this yet again. I've clarified multiple times that there is a difference between not violating a right and not restoring a violated right. Hence why the principle I put forth for abortion is a different principle from forced organ donation. I have argued the principle that you cannot violate a right even as means to restore another right.

The woman's right to bodily autonomy isn't violated until you - or someone like you - denies her bodily autonomy. You're the one arguing for the violation of another's rights.

 

[निताइ dasa]

The woman's right to bodily autonomy isn't violated until you - or someone like you - denies her bodily autonomy. You're the one arguing for the violation of another's rights.

Violation of her autonomy occurs when she gets pregnant and she doesn't want the child. If the sex was done without her consent, then that violation of autonomy is called rape and the rapist should be punished (not the fetus).

For example the government punishes someone if they choose to physically assault someone (using their body). It would be absurd to claim that the government is "violating someone's bodily autonomy" when they issue such a law . Similarly, when we issue the claim, "you ought not to harm unborn children" and if the unborn child has rights, it would also be absurd to claim that I am violating someone's bodily autonomy when I prevent you from harming that child. The true violation of autonomy occurs when the child enters the women without her consent. However, i believe that death is not suitable punishment of such a violation (which is not the fault of the fetus anyway). (actually I don't think death sentences are ever justified generally).

Let me give you an example. Let says I am living peacefully in my house. Now some evil person releases an innocent human into my house. That innocent human is trespassing in my house (though she is not at fault), yet she does not pose a harm to my own life. Is it acceptable for me to pull out my gun and shoot the trespasser (i.e punishes trespassers with death), simply for entering into my property? I would argue no, such an action is not justified, especially if the trespasser is not posing a threat to my life. Now apply this scenario to abortion and you get my point.

Consent to sex isn't consent to pregnancy, and consent to pregnancy at one point doesn't imply consent can't be withdrawn.

When we perform an action, and we are aware of the possible consequences of such an action, consent to the action means to take responsibility for the consequences that may occur as result. When I consent to get into a car and drive, and I run someone over someone, I hold responsibility for that incident. It is absurd to claim that I consented to drive, but I didn't consent for any accidents I occurred during my drive. If I have a gun and I load it with 5 blanks and 1 bullet and proceed to shoot someone and the actual bullet happens to fire and injure them, one cannot claim "I consented to only shooting the blank bullets not the actual one, and therefore I am not responsible for the injury"/

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

It is a defense when you quote an excerpt that is specifically an application of Kant's universal Law and then tell me that my principle cannot be applied universally in accordance with such a law. If you want to deal with universalization of the principles then we are dealing the Kantian laws, if you don't want to deal with Kantian ethics then don't bring universalization into it.

I can argue that your position violates its own premises - and therefore can be disregarded - without ever accepting that any of your premises are correct.

I think you need to remember something: you're the one trying to impose your position on others. If we're only talking about your own position on your own pregnancy, base your position on whatever you want; part of my pro-choice position is that I uphold your right not to have an abortion if you don't want one.

However, when you go beyond that and decide to impose your views on others, you need to meet a much higher standard. So far, you haven't even shown your own position to be internally consistent, to say nothing of it being so inescspably true that anyone else would be rationally compelled to accept it as necessarily correct... which is the bar you need to clear.

 

[निताइ dasa]

I can argue that your position violates its own premises - and therefore can be disregarded - without ever accepting that any of your premises are correct.

Sure you can argue it which is the point of this discussion, but you would need to demonstrate this. My clarification passage explains why forced organ donation and abortion are both wrong.

I think you need to remember something: you're the one trying to impose your position on others. If we're only talking about your own position on your own pregnancy, base your position on whatever you want; part of my pro-choice position is that I uphold your right not to have an abortion if you don't want one.

I've heard this rhetoric quite often, but what it mean? I am not allowed to stand up for the rights of a minority group who cannot speak for themselves? If I spoke out for the rights of slaves, even though I myself am not one, would you argue that I am trying to "Impose my position on others"? If I believe there is something evil going on in the world, I will actively speak against it, even though it doesn't apply to me. Especially if I deem a position that is contradictory (which I believe yours is). I have no problem with people who argue for the permissibly of abortion because they believe that the fetus doesn't have a right to life. Of course as Hindu, even if the law doesn't punish, then the Law of Karma will.

So far, you haven't even shown your own position to be internally consistent,

Every refutation that you have brought forward, I have attempted to clarify. Perhaps my explanations were not accepted, however that does not mean my argument is not valid (it is, I could put it in premise form very easily and show its validity).

 

[Nous]

I believe I have given you more then sound justification of my premises

You haven't cited any evidence whatsoever by which to conclude that either pre-viable fetuses or fertilized eggs are "persons," even according to your own definition. You haven't shown that either pre-viable fetuses or fertilized eggs "are more likely than not to eventually develop the capacity for X" (at least, any more likely to develop the capacity for X than the average chimp is).

and the refutations you have presented attack a misrepresented view of my claims, such as for example you claim that self agency is my criteria for right to life, when I never made such a claim

Quote what you are referring to. I don't recall saying that self-agency is your criteria for a right to life. I believe you did say that you were just using Kant's idea of "moral agent" or "person". And as far as I recall he made it clear that the sine qua non of "moral agent," "rational being" or "person" was will.

Furthermore I believe that doctrine of double effect explains the difference between contraception and abortion (as discussed by philosopher Phillipa Foot in her paper which I linked).

Again, there is neither a moral nor legal principle that excuses intentionally performing an act for which one knows the consequences are likely to be the death of another person. There is nothing unforeseeable about the abortifacient effects of hormonal contraceptives, therefore, if fertilized eggs were actually persons, there would be no exculpatory factor in the person's intentional act of taking the contraceptive.

And, again, I dare say that no philosopher or scholar who proposes that it is morally wrong to kill fertilized eggs has ever argued that the “double-effect” doctrine justifies the repeated and intentional taking of any drug that is known to have an abortifacient effect. Ms. Foot did not argue any such thing. Indeed, the examples of moral dilemmas that she used were essentially common examples of choosing the lesser unavoidable evil (such as intentionally steering a train to hit one person rather than doing nothing, which will kill 5 people).

If the “double-effect” doctrine absolved one of repeatedly and knowingly killing persons as a mere consequence of doing something else, then it would absolve people of intentionally driving drunk and accidentally killing someone. That is a gross mischaracterization of that doctrine, as Haig Khatchadourian explains in his article. There is nothing unintended in the abortifacient effects when intentionally taking a drug that one knows (sometimes) has abortifacient effects.

Thirdly I hold their is a very logical and pragmatic argument that can be made for why the government has an interest in protecting the rights of fetus and infant (namely they are eventual citizens).

(1) Infants are already citizens. (2) The government does not have a compelling interest in causing unwanted children to be citizens. That does not benefit society or the state in any way whatsoever. If it did benefit society or the state to have more unwanted children as citizens, then there would be a compelling governmental interest in outlawing all abortions and contraceptives.

Lastly, while I am a HIndu (I believe in the preciousness of all life), I hold human life above all 2 reason, firstly human's ability and eventuality to understand moral truths and secondly (a more religious reason), only human beings can understand God. It is for this reason I hold the act of abortion as immoral and hence the government must strive to restrict and minimize it where possible.

Few Australians share your views about the immorality of abortion, and, in fact, at least several states in Australia, at least in recent years, have had more liberal laws and policies on abortion than does the US (e.g., the US does not any mental health exception to abortion after viability). So, in what tangible ways has Australia supposedly been harmed by its more liberal abortion laws?

 

[Nous]

Consent to sex isn't consent to pregnancy, and consent to pregnancy at one point doesn't imply consent can't be withdrawn.


And yet even in that case, we don't require the perpetrator to give up his bodily autonomy. Your analogy supports a pro-choice position.


Yet we don't deny parents' bodily autonomy to protect their children's lives. As I touched on before, a parent isn't obliged to give up an organ, tissue, blood, or even a single hair on their head to save their own child's life. Requiring this for pregnant women doesn't require us to consider fetuses people; it requires us to give fetuses a superhuman status that no actual person enjoys.

What is it about passing through the birth canal that you think strips a fetus of its rights down to those of a mere human?

Good points.

 

[निताइ dasa]

You haven't cited any evidence whatsoever by which to conclude that either pre-viable fetuses or fertilized eggs are "persons," even according to your own definition.

I've used the very evidence you presented to show that when abortion is needed, (after implantation) the individual survival chance of such a fetus is over 50%. In-fact you have failed to provide I believe sufficient counter evidence.

I believe you did say that you were just using Kant's idea of "moral agent" or "person". And as far as I recall he made it clear that the sine qua non of "moral agent," "rational being" or "person" was will.

Yes, but Kantian will is not self-agency. Rather it is the ability to act on principle. I have demonstrated,through evidences of cranial capacity and cultural evolution that only humans have this will, because only humans have higher emotions like empathy and a complex culture that allows of the development of moral principles.

And, again, I dare say that no philosopher or scholar who proposes that it is morally wrong to kill fertilized eggs has ever argued that the “double-effect” doctrine justifies the repeated and intentional taking of any drug that is known to have an abortifacient effect. Ms. Foot did not argue any such thing. Indeed, the examples of moral dilemmas that she used were essentially common examples of choosing the lesser unavoidable evil (such as intentionally steering a train to hit one person rather than doing nothing, which will kill 5 people)

Again you misunderstand the doctrine. The doctrine doesn't justify the taking of a drug that directly has a harmful effect. Abortive drugs however do not directly kill the fetus however. They simply thin the endometrium walls. It is the lack of implantation which kills the fetus.

Foot uses the example of surgery to illustrate my point. If a doctor performs surgery in order the save the life of the mother and the surgery does not involve directly harming the fetus, but it ultimately leads to its death by a secondary non-intended effect, then such an action is not morally responsible for the ending of the fetus' life. Quoting from her argument another example:

"Suppose, for instance, that there are five patients in a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom for some reason we are unable to move. His death, being of no use to us, is clearly a side effect, and not directly intended."

Applying this principle to contraceptive pills. When a women takes contraceptive pills, the pills themselves to not directly harm the fetus (while in abortion the act directly harms her). However due to a secondary effect of the pills (thinning of endometrium walls) there exists two secondary effects. 1) the fetus is unable to implant and dies 2) the women does not become pregnant. Since the women using the contraceptive pill only intends consequence 2, the doctrine of double effect applies to show that she is not morally responsible for such an action, while in the act of abortion she is (as the very means, and hence the intent is to kill the child).

If the “double-effect” doctrine absolved one of repeatedly and knowingly killing persons as a mere consequence of doing something else, then it would absolve people of intentionally driving drunk and accidentally killing someone. That is a gross mischaracterization of that doctrine, as Haig Khatchadourian explains in his article.

This shows your misunderstanding of the doctrine. Intent means the desired ends and the means for such an intent. When a drunk person is driving, while the end itself is not clear (because the person is drunk), the means of an action (running over the person, and ending their life) is wrong, and hence the intent is the killing of the person. If we were to make this scenario for analagous to contraceptives, what needs to happen is the person is driving and someone jumps in front of their car and dies. Here, there is no means (from the perceptive of the driver) that led to the death, because the burden of the death lies with the victim.

(1) Infants are already citizens. (2) The government does not have a compelling interest in causing unwanted children to be citizens. That does not benefit society or the state in any way whatsoever. If it did benefit society or the state to have more unwanted children as citizens, then there would be a compelling governmental interest in outlawing all abortions and contraceptives.

(1) is arbitrary and the basis of such definition can be extended on principle back to fetus'. I would argue that infants are not citizens because (a) they don't pay taxes and (b) they don't support society in anyway way. However society protects them on the basis that they are future citizens. (2) of course it does. Those future citizens will pay taxes, which is a good thing for the government. They are a compelling interest to the government similiar to how infants are an interest.

Few Australians share your views about the immorality of abortion,

Actually, alot of friends hold a view that is equal or of a much more stern nature to mine.

Few Australians share your views about the immorality of abortion, and, in fact, at least several states in Australia, at least in recent years, have had more liberal laws and policies on abortion than does the US (e.g., the US does not any mental health exception to abortion after viability). So, in what tangible ways has Australia supposedly been harmed by its more liberal abortion laws?

I don't see how this it relevant so....

 

[Nous]

I've used the very evidence you presented to show that when abortion is needed, (after implantation) the individual survival chance of such a fetus is over 50%.

I definitely have not cited any evidence about about "survival chance" of a fetus "when abortion is needed."

Again, you haven't cited any evidence whatsoever by which to conclude that either pre-viable fetuses or fertilized eggs are "persons," even according to your own definition. Millions or billions of animals every day have live births. If a live birth is the only condition needed in order to constitute a "person," then all animals are "persons".

Yes, but Kantian will is not self-agency.

Quote where Kant says any such thing.

only humans have this will, because only humans have higher emotions like empathy and a complex culture

Cite your evidence.

Again you misunderstand the doctrine. The doctrine doesn't justify the taking of a drug that directly has a harmful effect. Abortive drugs however do not directly kill the fetus however. They simply thin the endometrium walls. It is the lack of implantation which kills the fetus.

I wish you could step back and see and reflect upon the absurdity of what you have said here.

Opioids do not "directly kill" people. They merely inhibit the release of certain neurotransmitters that regulate respiration. It's the repressed respiration that kills a person, not the opioid drug.

I shall repeat what I have already pointed out several times now, in order to give you the opportunity to respond with a comment that isn't laughably absurd:

Again, there is neither a moral nor legal principle that excuses intentionally performing an act for which one knows the consequences are likely to be the death of another person. There is nothing unforeseeable about the abortifacient effects of hormonal contraceptives, therefore, if fertilized eggs were actually persons, there would be no exculpatory factor in the person's intentional act of taking the contraceptive.

And, again, I dare say that no philosopher or scholar who proposes that it is morally wrong to kill fertilized eggs has ever argued that the “double-effect” doctrine justifies the repeated and intentional taking of any drug that is known to have an abortifacient effect. Ms. Foot did not argue any such thing. Indeed, the examples of moral dilemmas that she used were essentially common examples of choosing the lesser unavoidable evil (such as intentionally steering a train to hit one person rather than doing nothing, which will kill 5 people).

If the “double-effect” doctrine absolved one of repeatedly and knowingly killing persons as a mere consequence of doing something else, then it would absolve people of intentionally driving drunk and accidentally killing someone. That is a gross mischaracterization of that doctrine, as Haig Khatchadourian explains in his article. There is nothing unintended in the abortifacient effects when intentionally taking a drug that one knows (sometimes) has abortifacient effects.

(1) Infants are already citizens. (2) The government does not have a compelling interest in causing unwanted children to be citizens. That does not benefit society or the state in any way whatsoever. If it did benefit society or the state to have more unwanted children as citizens, then there would be a compelling governmental interest in outlawing all abortions and contraceptives.

(1) is arbitrary and the basis of such definition can be extended on principle back to fetus'.

There is nothing at all "arbitrary" about infants, but not fetuses, being citizens. All infants have had a birth day by which they are no longer encased in a woman's body. No fetuses have that characteristic.

I would argue that infants are not citizens because (a) they don't pay taxes and (b) they don't support society in anyway way.

There is no society or government in the world that agrees with you.

However society protects them on the basis that they are future citizens.

No, the law equally protects children within its borders regardless of whether they are citizens of that country. A murder of a child who isn't a citizen of the US is no different in the law than the murder of a child who is a citizen of the US.

(2) of course it does. Those future citizens will pay taxes, which is a good thing for the government. They are a compelling interest to the government similiar to how infants are an interest.

You just admitted that infants don't pay taxes. Neither do fetuses or zygotes. There isn't a compelling governmental interest in having as more unwanted children in the country--such unwanted children are a drain on society.

I don't see how this it relevant so....

Perhaps you need to answer the question before you are able to "see" its relevance. In what tangible ways has Australia supposedly been harmed by its more liberal abortion laws?

We can easily discern the detriment to society in having millions more unwanted children that the state has to feed and clothe.

 

[निताइ dasa]

Again, you haven't cited any evidence whatsoever by which to conclude that either pre-viable fetuses or fertilized eggs are "persons," even according to your own definition. Millions or billions of animals every day have live births. If a live birth is the only condition needed in order to constitute a "person," then all animals are "persons".

Again, I never said live births are persons. I said eventuality to be rational is what gives a person a right to life. Then I said that for a fetus that has implanted, she is more likley then not to develop into a rational agent (in the natural state of things).

Quote where Kant says any such thing.

"Only a rational being has a will—which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle"

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf (pg 18) (maybe read that whole page too)

Cite your evidence.

http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0038.xml

Opioids do not "directly kill" people. They merely inhibit the release of certain neurotransmitters that regulate respiration. It's the repressed respiration that kills a person, not the opioid drug.

When dealing with causality, we always draw the initiation of an action to the rational agent making such an action, or a state of nature. I actually would happily argue that if someone gives a person opium for another means (they wish to for example ease their suffering into death) then the person should morally only be held responsible for that intent (not murder). It is only the intended consequence that matters. When we deal with drunk people (in you car accident issue) we enter into a whole new field (i.e if someone is not aware of moral principles, on what basis do we punishs them?).

And, again, I dare say that no philosopher or scholar who proposes that it is morally wrong to kill fertilized eggs has ever argued that the “double-effect” doctrine justifies the repeated and intentional taking of any drug that is known to have an abortifacient effect. Ms. Foot did not argue any such thing

See the direct quote I posted from her. Look, alot of philosophers mirror my views on this topic. While they may differ between where right to life begins, many agree that their is a moral difference between contraceptive drugs and the act of abortion. I see contraceptive drugs as simply an action that is similar to surgery (which is the example that foot discusses).

Foot gives two examples. Firstly she gives the example that the mother has a right threatening pregnancy, and the doctors perform an operation that is intended to remove the uterus. This action doesn't directly harm the fetus, but when the uterus is removed the fetus dies as a result. However the intent of the action was not to kill the fetus, but to save the mother. In the question of abortion, the doctors end the life of the fetus, and there is no secondary intent. They wish intentionally to kill the fetus for the ends to occur. Foot then admits, that the former action is permissible, but the latter is not according to the doctrine.


Now lets look at contraception. I argue that when a women takes a contraceptive , the will is not intended at killing the fetus. Rather the pill is intented to prevent implantation to stop pregnancy from occurring in the first place.

I will give an analogous example. Let us say, that I am walking on the street, and I see an apple. I am hungry so I eat the apple in order to satisfy my hunger. However, once I eat the apple, there happens to be another person who also wanted the apple, but didn't get it (because I ate it). Due to this, they get so hungry that they died. I do not believe that I am morally responsible for the other person's death. I may have allowed her to die, but my actions did not intently cause death. The distinction between doing harm and allowing harm is very important for the doctrine of double effect to work. This apple scenario is analogous to contraceptive pills. (the apple is the endometrium).


In the same way, the success of contraceptive pills is not dependent on the death of the fetus but rather preventing of implantation to prevent pregnancy (rather the fetus' death is an unintended consequence). I could take contraceptives pills, and the fetus doesn't have to die (because either the fetus is never brought into creation or transplantation to another womb). The success of abortion however depends on the death of the fetus (it is the ends, because you need to kill the fetus for abortion to be successful). Every successful act of abortion is dependent on the need for the fetus to die (either her skull is crushed and she is removed)

Now consider the same scenario but the other person already had the apple and they are about to eat it. I go up to that person and snatch that apple from her and she dies as a result. In such a case, I am responsible for her death (because my intended actions led to a circumstance which otherwise would not have occurred, while in the former scenario my inactions led to that circumstance). This scenario is analogous to abortion.

If the “double-effect” doctrine absolved one of repeatedly and knowingly killing persons as a mere consequence of doing something else, then it would absolve people of intentionally driving drunk and accidentally killing someone.

But the doctrine of double effect doesn't "absolved one of repeatedly and knowingly killing persons as a mere consequence of doing something else". It deals with intended consequence. Intended consequence means the of the nature of the action (i.e the means) and the intended ends of such an action.

There is nothing at all "arbitrary" about infants, but not fetuses, being citizens. All infants have had a birth day by which they are no longer encased in a woman's body.

This definition (whether the fetus is within the mother or not) does not explain citizen qualification (and if you argue that it does, then citizen qualification is no way related to the government then). It lacks explanatory power, and hence can be rejected as arbitrary.

There is no society or government in the world that agrees with you.

Of course there is. Please refrain from making sweeping statements.

"Fetal right to life is envisaged in the Constitution of Chile,[51] Dominican Republic,[52] Ecuador,[53] El Salvador,[54] Guatemala,[55] Hungary,[56] Ireland, Philippines[57] and Slovakia.[58] The Constitution of Honduras grants the unborn all rights accorded by country's law.[59] The Constitution of Peru similarly declares fetus "a rights-bearing subject in all cases that benefit him".[60] The Constitution of Madagascar grants the unborn the right to the health protection through free public health care."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fetal_rights

You just admitted that infants don't pay taxes. Neither do fetuses or zygotes.

You didnt get my point. Infant's don't pay taxes either. If you are going to argue that tax paying is what makes you a citizen, then infants aren't citizens. However if you argue that citizen rights extend not only to tax payers, but also future tax papers then infants (and fetuses) become citizens.

Perhaps you need to answer the question before you are able to "see" its relevance. In what tangible ways has Australia supposedly been harmed by its more liberal abortion laws?

The mass genocide of unborn children is a great harm to that oppressed class, both in terms of deprivation and also I believe spiritual wellbeing.

 

[निताइ dasa]

But in all honesty I'll stop now. I have a tendency to always want to get the last word in (sorry haah), but I'll stop otherwise we can go on forever. I stand by my conclusions I made in post 174. Good day to you.

 

[Nous]

I said eventuality to be rational is what gives a person a right to life.

Obviously you haven't cited any evidence by which to conclude that human fetuses and zygotes have any greater quantity of "eventuality to be rational" than chimpanzee fetuses and zygotes have. Indeed, given that chimps do not kill their fetuses and zygotes with abortions, abortifacients such as hormonal contraceptives, drinking alcohol and drug-taking, we can reasonably conclude that they are more likely to possess such an attribute.

All you have done here is demonstrate your willingness to begin with your belief that humans are somehow special and sacred, and make assertions to try to justify that belief. I say it's more scientific to begin with the facts, and draw one's conclusions from those.

"Only a rational being has a will—which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle"

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf (pg 18) (maybe read that whole page too)

That sentence doesn't even vaguely suggest any sort of distinction between “self-agency” and “will”. Indeed, the sentence only implies that chimpanzees who are aware of their own agency in the actions that they will are “rational beings”.

http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0038.xml

That article doesn't even vaguely suggest the absurdity that the culture of chimpanzees does not evolve. At one time, the ancestors of current chimpanzees did not fashion tools from twigs in order to fish termites from logs. But chimpanzees today often perform such acts and teach their offspring this skill.

When dealing with causality, we always draw the initiation of an action to the rational agent making such an action, or a state of nature. I actually would happily argue that if someone gives a person opium for another means (they wish to for example ease their suffering into death) then the person should morally only be held responsible for that intent (not murder).

If zygotes were persons, then a woman who intentionally takes a drug that is known to cause the death of the zygote, such as hormonal contraceptives are known to cause, would have committed murder. This is no different that intentionally taking a drug that is known to cause the death of fetuses in circumstances where that would be illegal.

Again, there is neither a moral nor legal principle that excuses intentionally performing an act for which one knows the consequences are likely to be the death of another person. There is nothing unforeseeable about the abortifacient effects of hormonal contraceptives, therefore, if fertilized eggs were actually persons, there would be no exculpatory factor in the person's intentional act of taking the contraceptive.

See the direct quote I posted from her.

You haven't quoted anything from Foot where she argues that the “double-effect” doctrine justifies the repeated and intentional taking of a drug that is known to have an abortifacient effect.

Look, alot of philosophers mirror my views on this topic.

Then you should quote them rather than misrepresenting what someone has actually said.

Foot gives two examples. Firstly she gives the example that the mother has a right threatening pregnancy, and the doctors perform an operation that is intended to remove the uterus. This action doesn't directly harm the fetus, but when the uterus is removed the fetus dies as a result. However the intent of the action was not to kill the fetus, but to save the mother.

Taking a hormonal contraceptive is not an act of self-defense, or in any way analogous to an act of self-defense. Foot does not argue that taking a drug with a known abortifacient effect is analogous to an act of self-defense.

I will give an analogous example. Let us say, that I am walking on the street, and I see an apple. I am hungry so I eat the apple in order to satisfy my hunger. However, once I eat the apple, there happens to be another person who also wanted the apple, but didn't get it (because I ate it). Due to this, they get so hungry that they died.

That isn't even remotely analogous to intentionally taking a drug that is known to have abortifacient effects.

There is no society or government in the world that agrees with you.

Of course there is. Please refrain from making sweeping statements.

"Fetal right to life is envisaged in the Constitution of Chile,[51] Dominican Republic,[52] Ecuador,[53] El Salvador,[54] Guatemala,[55] Hungary,[56] Ireland, Philippines[57] and Slovakia.[58] The Constitution of Honduras grants the unborn all rights accorded by country's law.[59] The Constitution of Peru similarly declares fetus "a rights-bearing subject in all cases that benefit him".[60] The Constitution of Madagascar grants the unborn the right to the health protection through free public health care."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fetal_rights

This was your statement to which I replied that there is no society or government in the world that agrees with you: "I would argue that infants are not citizens because (a) they don't pay taxes and (b) they don't support society in anyway way."

There is no society or government in the world in which infants are not citizens. Every country recognizes infants as citizens. No country waits until a person pays taxes to recognize him/her as a citizen. (And paying taxes has nothing to do with citizenship. E.g., persons who are not citizens of the US pay taxes to the US government.)

The mass genocide of unborn children is a great harm to that oppressed class, both in terms of deprivation and also I believe spiritual wellbeing.

My question was: In what tangible ways has Australia supposedly been harmed by its more liberal abortion laws?

Again, an aborted fetus is no more “deprived” of anything than are the uncountable eggs that are never fertilized. I was not deprived of an inheritance of $10 billion from my grandfather--but I didn't get such an inheritance.

 

[columbus]

Obviously you haven't cited any evidence by which to conclude that human fetuses and zygotes have any greater quantity of "eventuality to be rational" than chimpanzee fetuses and zygotes have.

Do you really need someone to explain to you the difference between humans and chimps?

Seriously?

I am often stunned by the inability of abortionists to grasp the basics.
Tom

 

[Nous]

Obviously you haven't cited any evidence by which to conclude that human fetuses and zygotes have any greater quantity of "eventuality to be rational" than chimpanzee fetuses and zygotes have.

Do you really need someone to explain to you the difference between humans and chimps?

I am well aware of a variety of differences between humans and chimpanzees.

Cite all of the evidence you know of that human fetuses and zygotes have a greater quantity of “eventuality to be rational” than chimpanzee fetuses and zygotes.

I am often stunned by the inability of abortionists to grasp the basics.

I have grasped the fact that you have never wanted to provide food, shelter, clothing, medical care and a loving home to any of the unwanted children you want to force women to give birth to. Right?