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Is it that incomprehensible to some that we theists may come to theism by way of evidence & reason?

Vouthon

Dominus Deus tuus ignis consumens est
Premium Member
I would think "atheists" are as psychologically diverse a grouping as any other, running the full gambit from narrow-minded to open-minded. My personal dealings and friendships with atheists leads me to conclude, anecdotally, that this is indeed the case.

People embrace theism for all manner of reasons, depending on their personal circumstances and life experiences. For some - especially deists, who deny any kind of divine interventions within the temporal world order and base their belief in an Intelligent Designer on a largely naturalistic foundation - critical thinking guided by empirical or measurable evidence will have been of paramount, or even sole, importance in their conversion to a theistic system of thought.

For others, it will perhaps be more a case of cultural belonging (perhaps conditioning) or else an intuitive sense that theism gives the requisite meaning one is searching for in life. Or a combination of each.

In other words, it just depends on the individual.
 

9-10ths_Penguin

1/10 Subway Stalinist
Premium Member
People embrace theism for all manner of reasons, depending on their personal circumstances and life experiences. For some - especially deists, who deny any kind of divine interventions within the temporal world order and base their belief in an Intelligent Designer on a largely naturalistic foundation - critical thinking guided by empirical or measurable evidence will have been of paramount, or even sole, importance in their conversion to a theistic system of thought.
We have very different impressions of deism.

When it comes to some versions of theism, even though I may not accept their premises, I can appreciate how a theist who accepts them could start from them and arrive at belief in a god or gods.

Deism, OTOH, is fundamentally invalid, IMO. It denies any evidence that could be used as a rational justification for a god-belief. IMO, deism isn't based on a foundation of reason and critical thinking; it's based on a rejection of these things.
 

Vouthon

Dominus Deus tuus ignis consumens est
Premium Member
We have very different impressions of deism.

When it comes to some versions of theism, even though I may not accept their premises, I can appreciate how a theist who accepts them could start from them and arrive at belief in a god or gods.

Deism, OTOH, is fundamentally invalid, IMO. It denies any evidence that could be used as a rational justification for a god-belief. IMO, deism isn't based on a foundation of reason and critical thinking; it's based on a rejection of these things.

Thank you for the reply!

I'm interested in learning more about your perspective on deism, if you could perhaps elaborate a little more? Namely, the extent to which it "denies any evidence that could be used as a rational justification for a god-belief." What evidence might that be?

As you will no doubt be aware, "deism" was the pre-eminent belief - in its various manifestations - amongst the thinkers of the European enlightenment. Voltaire, for instance, was highly critical of the "revealed" religions (especially Catholicism and Islam) but adhered to a deistic God-concept himself.

I must admit, if I were not Catholic - that is, if I were ever to become convinced that the orthodox Christian dogmas comprising the revealed "deposit of Faith" somehow lacked the validity I once found in them (and that's not the case, I'm merely hypothesizing here with a complete counterfactual) - I would likely pivot towards a sort of "Christian Deism" myself: believing in a Creator based upon arguments such as, say, the fine tuning of the constants while still adhering to the ethical framework of the New Testament but bereft of any belief in the supernatural elements which rely on faith in an interventionist Deity. That would be no great step for me, really, in that eventuality.

Certainly, I am not averse to the "Jefferson Bible" form of Jesusism - which is essentially Deism with a cultural Christian overlay in terms of received morals. The truth of the Christian moral code in the Gospels is not absolutely contingent for me upon Christianity being a genuine revelation directly from God (I would still regard it, in the main, as an excellent code for secular living)- even though I do believe this to be the case; since I'm not (of course) a Deist, even if I do sympathise with it intellectually. So yes, you're right: we have very different perceptions of deism. I would like to learn more regarding your own.

I see something of value in the Deist position, even if I don't advocate it myself.
 
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9-10ths_Penguin

1/10 Subway Stalinist
Premium Member
Thank you for the reply!

I'm interested in learning more about your perspective on deism, if you could perhaps elaborate a little more? Namely, the extent to which it "denies any evidence that could be used as a rational justification for a god-belief." What evidence might that be?
Miracles, divine revelation, gods literally interacting with people, etc.

As you will no doubt be aware, "deism" was the pre-eminent belief - in its various manifestations - amongst the thinkers of the European enlightenment. Voltaire, for instance, was highly critical of the "revealed" religions (especially Catholicism and Islam) but adhered to a deistic theism himself.
That's right: deism arose in an environment where classical monotheism was the majority view and the existence of "God" in some form was taken as a given.

Deism sort of works as a conclusion if you start as a typical theist and strip away from your theism the aspects of your belief that aren't supported. What's left - an immeasurable, imperceptible God whose existence has no testable implications - is unfalsifiable, so there's nothing about the assumption of a deistic God that's going to conflict with anything you see in the real world.

But while this approach addresses many of the conflicts between the implications of interventionist gods and real-world evidence, it's ultimately irrational, because it's irrational to assume unfalsifiable things exist. Instead of a top-down approach where we start with belief in a traditional interventionist, monotheistic God and strip away the absurd parts, we should be starting without assuming any gods exist and only accepting the gods that are demonstrated... which an unfalsifiable deistic God will never qualify as.

Edit: also, keep in mind that even in the Enlightenment, outright atheism could often get a person ostracized if not imprisoned or executed. My assumption is that a lot of the "deists" of the Enlightenment were actually atheists trying to avoid being thrown in jail or killed.
I must admit, if I were not Catholic - that is, if I were ever to become convinced that the orthodox Christian dogmas comprising the revealed "deposit of Faith" somehow lacked the validity I once found in them (and that's not the case, I'm merely hypothesizing here with a complete counterfactual) - I would likely pivot towards a sort of "Christian Deism" myself: believing in a Creator based upon arguments such as, say, the fine tuning of the constants while still adhering to the ethical framework of the New Testament but bereft of any belief in the supernatural elements which rely on faith in an interventionist Deity. That would be no great step for me, really, in that eventuality.
Because your starting point includes God.

BTW: "Christian deism" never made much sense to me: if the Bible is genuine, wouldn't it be exactly the sort of intervention that a non-interventionist deistic God wouldn't do?

Certainly, I am not averse to the "Jefferson Bible" form of Jesusism - which is essentially Deism with a cultural Christian overlay in terms of received morals.
Where's the deism in the Jefferson Bible?

I mean, as I alluded to, deism is compatible with just about anything, so in that sense it's compatible with the Jefferson Bible, but I don't see why it would be considered especially deistic as opposed to, say, atheistic.

The truth of the Christian moral code in the Gospels is not absolutely contingent for me upon Christianity being a genuine revelation directly from God (I would still regard it, in the main, as an excellent code for secular living)- even though I do believe this to be the case; since I'm not (of course) a Deist, even if I do sympathise with it intellectually.
Really? IMO, quite a bit of the Gospels depend on them being literally true in order for them to be moral. For instance, take Jesus's advice in the Sermon on the Mount (and elsewhere) not to resist evil because divine justice will take care of the evil and people who suffer evil will be rewarded in Heaven. If that's not literally true, then Jesus is just setting things up so that injustice goes unopposed and uncorrected.

So yes, you're right: we have very different perceptions of deism. I would like to learn more regarding your own.

I see something of value in the Deist position, even if I don't advocate it myself.
And I see no value in it at all.

With most theists, there's common ground for dialogue: we can both agree that if (insert evidence claim) is true, then (insert religious belief) is reasonable and from there have reasonable discussions about why we should or shouldn't accept the claim as true.

When it comes to desists, though, we don't even have that much. When someone accepts the existence of the unfalsifiable, they've basically given up on reason.

How do I even start a discussion with someone who's concluded that an unfalsifiable God exists? I can't examine the logic of a conclusion that had no logic behind it.
 
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Looncall

Well-Known Member
So if you find evidence unconvincing we should accept it as objectively unsound?

If the premises cannot be regarded as accurate, no logical structure can rescue an argument.

Parties to a debate should agree (or not) about premises before bothering with logic.
 

Vouthon

Dominus Deus tuus ignis consumens est
Premium Member
Hello Penguin,

Thank you! I found your response to be informative and thought-provoking. (Note: I'm by profession a corporate lawyer. I am at home in the business world rather than the schools of philosophy, so if my logic massively slips up at any points please don't hesitate to flag it up, every little helps. This is not my 'forte', so to speak but I'm making a stab at it to the best of my understanding anyway, which I hope you appreciate).

This has turned into a longer reply than I initially anticipated, apologies in advance...I've had to split it into three posts due to the word limit....

Before I dive into this, I would just like to note that there are prominent atheist intellectuals who have a more charitable view of the merits of Deism, for instance Professor Richard Dawkins:

Richard Dawkins Reveals Best Argument for God He's Ever Heard

Dawkins said, however, that the best argument he has heard of concerns a "deistic God, who had something to do with the fine tuning of the universe."

"It's still a very, very bad argument, but it's the best one going," he added, noting that a major problem with the argument is that it leaves unexplained where the fine tuner came from.


Deism sort of works as a conclusion if you start as a typical theist and strip away from your theism the aspects of your belief that aren't supported. What's left - an immeasurable, imperceptible God whose existence has no testable implications - is unfalsifiable, so there's nothing about the assumption of a deistic God that's going to conflict with anything you see in the real world.


I respect your rationale for declaring the God of the deists to be an unfalsifiable notion, or rather one not subject to testable predictions in the real world, given that He is posited not to break his mechanistic, fine-tuned laws by intervening and sporadically revealing His Nature and Existence within the lineaments of the physical order He has created, like the God of the Abrahamics does. Yet cannot the argument from design, as opposed to revelation courtesy of an interfering Deity, often used to substantiate the probable existence of such a being, be subjected to empiricism and testability? For instance, if a Deist were to rely on some variant of the "fine tuning" argument i.e.

The values of the numbers behind the cosmological constants of physics (including the extremely low entropy of the Big Bang; the strength of the Higgs Field; the ratio of dark matter to normal matter; the masses of electron, proton and neutron etc.) appear to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of a complex, life permitting universe - such that, had they been even the slightest bit different, our Universe would have been so fundamentally hostile that matter could not have formed together, stars could not have formed, etc. After considering naturalistic explanations based upon physical necessity, chance or with recourse to a speculative multiverse of possible worlds in space-time (emerging from some interpretations of cosmic inflation and string theory), I have found them wanting for xyz reasons and so conclude that by far the most rational explanation for the apparent design of the universe is the simplest one: it is actually designed by some kind of super-intelligent being.
If our hypothetical Deist were to argue this, in tandem with the argument that no evidence backing a divine revelation to any given people or persons has ever exhibited even a slither of plausible corroboration so as to be taken seriously, would you really say their Deistic worldview is irrational (mind, I'm not asking whether it is right, just if you could discern rational intent behind it)? Cannot one theoretically falsify their understanding of the allegedly 'designed' parameters of the physical constants and thereby in theory undermine the rationale that has led them to embrace an Intelligent Fine-Tuner? Why is this idea a dead-end for productive debate?

As I understand it, in your view the issue boils down to clarifying one question: what potential observational or experimental evidence is there that would persuade me (imagining I'm a Deist) that the theory in question, a Deistic Intelligent Fine-Tuner God, is wrong and lead me to abandoning it? If nothing would suffice, then it's unfalsifiable.

Well, a wholly naturalistic and logically coherent explanation free of 'big loopholes' in which Mr God-of-Gaps can weigh in to account for the apparent fine tuning of the cosmological constants - thereby excluding the need for, or perhaps even the plausibility of an intelligent designer as a viable possibility to explain the finely tuned parameters - would probably fit the bill if my belief in God is prefixed solely on the perceived 'design' foundations of the natural world rather than on a revealed book like the Qur'an or the self-revelation of a deity through incarnation (as with Christianity) or manifestation (as with the Baha'i Faith or the Jewish prophets with their oracles from Yahweh).

Could a Deist not be induced to question his/her belief in God if you were to achieve the above desired outcome, since that belief is ultimately derived from the perception (rightly or wrongly) of a "design" inherent within the parameters under-girding the natural order, as opposed to some kind of divine revelation?

To me that cuts to the chase by opening up avenues for fruitful discussion, because the design argument from fine tuning 'plays by the rules' as the atheist cosmologist Sean Carroll once noted (unlike nonsensical anti-evolutionist intelligent design pseudoscience): you have actual phenomena to discuss, you have parameters of particle physics and cosmology and then you have two different models with which to critique (or falsify) it - the God hypothesis and atheistic naturalism, such that you can compare both to discern which model is the best fit for the data.

Now, you may very well conclude that this is still a terrible argument for a deist or theist to rely on but it is "rational" to the extent that it is a position that can be meaningfully disputed based upon interpretation of actual physical phenomena; rather than getting needlessly bogged down in discussion of theistic miracles and other supernatural suppositions of the "interventionist deity" paradigm; like arcane (from a skeptical, rationalist viewpoint) entirely unsubstantiated theological fantasies about God and his miraculous resurrected Son for which there is no proof, or at least of the kind liable to convince a free-thinking, skeptical atheist to grant such premises even a modicum of thoughtful consideration.

That's the kind of argument I imagine a Deist would rely on.

(continued.....)
 
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Vouthon

Dominus Deus tuus ignis consumens est
Premium Member
But while this approach addresses many of the conflicts between the implications of interventionist gods and real-world evidence, it's ultimately irrational, because it's irrational to assume unfalsifiable things exist.


To my mind, there are certain things science in principle cannot comprehend. To quote the poet St. John of the Cross (1542 - 1591), "It is of such true excellence this highest understanding: no science, no human sense, has it in its grasping. He who reaches there in truth, his knowledge increases so that knowledge has an ending, all knowledge there transcending". But I don't even mean this in the strictly religious, mysterian sense per se.

I would argue that the purported design of nature itself cannot be investigated by science for reasons both logical and observational in nature - in the latter instance due to the particle horizon and our inability to observe anything beyond the Big Bang, other than by means of hypothetical calculations: which are without any possibility of accompanying empirical data that could substantiate whatever putative explanatory entities one believes fit the math. This does not mean that reasonable "hypothetical calculations" are "irrational", does it? But hypotheses which arise from such logic, including some big hitters like 'string theory' and the 'multiverse,' fall into that category. They are not technically 'falsifiable,' limited as they are by the boundary imposed by the observable universe on account of the particle horizon; even though they do make sense (including mathematical sense) and have true elegance and 'explanatory power,' if I might steal that term oft-used among string/multiverse theorists.

It may well be irrational to posit belief in 'unfalsifiable' things if one is touting the idea under discussion as a viable scientific theory on a par with evolution, general relativity or the Newtonian paradigm of classical mechanics (given that science has to do with testable observations rather than metaphysical speculations detached from empirical data about the world we live in). That's why 'Intelligent Design' applied to biology is pseudo-science. But I am not automatically persuaded by your contention here i.e. that all unfalsifiable beliefs are "irrational" to hold and are of equal implausibility in, say, the philosophical sense.

If this were true as a blanket statement - 'it's simply irrational to believe unfalsifiable things exist', ipso facto because they can't be falsified using the Karl Popper understanding of the scientific method - then the concept of the 'multiverse' and 'string theory' - which a number of prominent theoretical physicists regard as the most promising framework within which to account for the apparent fine tuning of the universe on wholly naturalistic grounds and to unite gravity, quantum mechanics and the standard (Lambda-CDM) model in a grand "theory of everything" (mainly due to its alleged elegance, explanatory power and mathematical plausibility) - would have to be considered as being on the same footing as Santa Claus, the tooth fairy and Big Foot.

Why? Because String theory and the multiverse have not made any testable predictions, such that one could legitimately argue that string theorists have, like Einstein in his later years, strayed too far from physical reality in their obsession with beautiful mathematics and abstract unifying ideas. The theoretical supertiny loops of energy known as superstrings and the superhuge collection of parallel universes known as the multiverse, cannot be directly observed and empirically validated.

Professor Sean Caroll, a renowned American cosmologist, science communicator, avowed atheist and naturalist/materialist (who contends in his 2016 bestselling book, 'The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself' that theism and spiritual beliefs are irreconcilable with the unimpeachable march of scientific understanding, indeed redundant) also happens to be a very firm believer in both the multiverse and string theory: the explanatory use of entities that are unobservable in principle and have failed to demonstrate any testable predictions. To this end, he published an article in 2014 in Edge magazine where he takes aim at those whom he deems "the Popperazi" (a neologism comprised of 'Popper,' as in Karl Popper the science philosopher who pioneered the theory of falsifiability that you yourself are utilizing and 'Nazi') and their inconvenient demands for falsifiable scientific predictions (or as he puts it himself: "somber pronouncements about non-falsifiability from fuddy-duddies"):


Edge.org



2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT?

Sean Carroll

Theoretical Physicist, Caltech; Author, The Big Picture

Falsifiability


"...Modern physics stretches into realms far removed from everyday experience, and sometimes the connection to experiment becomes tenuous at best. String theory and other approaches to quantum gravity involve phenomena that are likely to manifest themselves only at energies enormously higher than anything we have access to here on Earth. The cosmological multiverse and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics posit other realms that are impossible for us to access directly. Some scientists, leaning on Popper, have suggested that these theories are non-scientific because they are not falsifiable.

The truth is the opposite. Whether or not we can observe them directly, the entities involved in these theories are either real or they are not. Refusing to contemplate their possible existence on the grounds of some a priori principle, even though they might play a crucial role in how the world works, is as non-scientific as it gets.

The falsifiability criterion gestures toward something true and important about science, but it is a blunt instrument in a situation that calls for subtlety and precision...String theory says that, in certain regions of parameter space, ordinary particles behave as loops or segments of one-dimensional strings. The relevant parameter space might be inaccessible to us, but it is part of the theory that cannot be avoided. In the cosmological multiverse, regions unlike our own are unambiguously there, even if we can't reach them. This is what distinguishes these theories from the approaches Popper was trying to classify as non-scientific.

It's the "empirical" criterion that requires some care. At face value it might be mistaken for "makes falsifiable predictions." But in the real world, the interplay between theory and experiment isn't so cut and dried. A scientific theory is ultimately judged by its ability to account for the data—but the steps along the way to that accounting can be quite indirect.


Consider the multiverse. It is often invoked as a potential solution to some of the fine-tuning problems of contemporary cosmology. For example, we believe there is a small but nonzero vacuum energy inherent in empty space itself. This is the leading theory to explain the observed acceleration of the universe, for which the 2011 Nobel Prize was awarded. The problem for theorists is not that vacuum energy is hard to explain; it's that the predicted value is enormously larger than what we observe.

If the universe we see around us is the only one there is, the vacuum energy is a unique constant of nature, and we are faced with the problem of explaining it. If, on the other hand, we live in a multiverse, the vacuum energy could be completely different in different regions, and an explanation suggests itself immediately...


In complicated situations, fortune-cookie-sized mottos like "theories should be falsifiable" are no substitute for careful thinking about how science works. Fortunately, science marches on, largely heedless of amateur philosophizing..."

Here’s his 2nd paragraph above with only a few point modifications, to illustrate how a Deist might argue using similar logic to Professor Carroll:



Some scientists, leaning on Popper, have suggested that these theories [about a Deistic Fine-Tuning God] are non-scientific because they are not falsifiable.

The truth is the opposite. Whether or not we can observe Him directly, the Creator involved in this theory is either real or He is not. Refusing to contemplate His possible existence on the grounds of some a priori principle, even though He might play a crucial role in how the world works, is as non-scientific as it gets.


It's the "empirical" criterion that requires some care. At face value it might be mistaken for "makes falsifiable predictions." But in the real world, the interplay between theory and experiment isn't so cut and dried. A scientific theory is ultimately judged by its ability to account for the data—but the steps along the way to that accounting can be quite indirect.

The Creator might be inaccessible to us, but He is part of the theory that cannot be avoided



(continued...)
 

Vouthon

Dominus Deus tuus ignis consumens est
Premium Member
So if I understand the logical ramifications of your position correctly Penguin: since Professor Carroll accepts the existence of the unfalsifiable (multiverse and string theory), he has "basically given up on reason", such that you could not even start a discussion with him because you "can't examine the logic of a conclusion that has no logic behind it"? Have I got that right? ;)


I personally believe, contrary to Professor Carroll, that rigorous science should involve falsifiable hypotheses—ones that can be confirmed or disproved by data. That is the reason why Professor George Ellis, a greatly respected cosmologist and mathematician, has long been a strident opponent of the multiverse and string theory being touted as 'science', for instance in this peer-reviewed article from 2008:



Opposing the multiverse | Astronomy & Geophysics | Oxford Academic




Opposing the multiverse

George Ellis


Astronomy & Geophysics, Volume 49, Issue 2, 1 April 2008


The very nature of the scientific enterprise is at stake in the multiverse debate. Its advocates propose weakening the nature of scientific proof in order to claim that the multiverse hypothesis provides a scientific explanation. This is a dangerous tactic. Two central scientific virtues are testability and explanatory power. In the cosmological context, these are often in conflict with each other and there has been an increasing tendency in theoretical physics and cosmology to say it does not matter whether a proposal is testable: if it fits into our other theories in a convincing way, with great explanatory power, then testing is superfluous. The extreme case is the multiverse proposal, where no direct observational test of the hypothesis is possible...

In this context one must re-evaluate what the core of science is: can one maintain one has a genuine scientific theory when direct and indeed indirect tests of the theory are impossible? If one claims this, one is altering the meaning of science.

The key observational point is that the domains considered are beyond the visual horizon and are therefore unobservable. You cannot receive signals of any kind from beyond the horizon, as there has not been time for messages to reach us from there since the universe began. Hence no object out there is detectable by any kind of astronomical observation...

The multiverse idea is provable neither by observation, nor as an implication of well established physics. It may be true, but it cannot be shown to be true. It does have great explanatory power — it provides an empirically based rationalization for fine tuning, developed from known physical principles — but one must distinguish between explanation and prediction. Successful scientific theories make predictions that can be tested. The multiverse theory cannot make any testable predictions because it can explain anything at all.

Even though multiverse proposals are good empirically based philosophical proposals for the nature of what exists, they are not strictly within the domain of science. There is nothing wrong with empirically based philosophical explanation — indeed it is of great value provided it is labelled for what it is — but I suggest that cosmologists should be very careful not to make methodological proposals that erode the essential nature of science in their enthusiasm to support specific theories



However Carroll is right in what he says above, in some key respects: its just that he's taken the wrong conclusion. Its not that the scientific method should 'dump' falsifiability because the only way to explain the most vexing cosmological problems like "fine tuning" and account for the data is to speculate with concepts beyond the observable reality that we can never falsify; rather its that science has its "limits" and that these hypotheses - multiverse, string theory, God - have real value and promise in giving us satisfying explanations by deducing these "hypothesis" from science but without actually touting them as scientific theories, since science itself is limited and always should be limited to what is observable, testable and falsifiable. As even Professor Ellis notes in his above critique: The multiverse idea (like the Deist God) is provable neither by observation, nor as an implication of well established physics and does not make testable predictions, so it cannot be considered strictly within the domain of science but It does have great explanatory power — by providing an empirically based rationalization for fine tuning, developed from known physical principles — such that it can be labelled as an "empirically based philosophical explanation" derived from science and still be seen to possess "great value".

I believe the same about God.

God is put forward by theists and deists as the reason for nature, the explanation of why things are the way they are (why we have something rather than nothing, to reference Leibniz); as such God is outside what the realm of science can viably investigate and test - because science has physical and principal limits contingent upon what we are physically able to observe, whether directly or indirectly. But that doesn't make the notion of such a God utterly irrational and implausible IMHO, anymore than is the case for string theory or the multiverse.

As Professor Ellis has himself noted elsewhere:


Well, science does have its limitations...

Cosmology deals with all that was, is and ever will be, but as a science, he says, it has limitations.

"The universe has only been existing for 14bn years. Light can only travel a certain distance in that time and we can't see anything further out. So there is a whole mass of stuff ... in the universe we know nothing about and we never will know anything about, because the light will never get to us in time for us to know anything about it."

https://blogs.scientificamerican.co...-knocking-philosophy-falsification-free-will/


Ellis: Many of the possible high-energy physics experiments and astronomy observations relevant to cosmology are now in essence nearly complete. Physics experiments are approaching the highest energies it will ever be possible to test by any collider experiment, both for financial and technical reasons. We can’t build a collider bigger than the surface of the Earth. Thus our ability to test high energy physics – and hence structures on the smallest physical scales – is approaching its limits...

The belief that all of reality can be fully comprehended in terms of physics and the equations of physics is a fantasy...I make strenuous efforts to consider what aspects of reality can be comprehended by a strict scientific approach, and what lie outside the limits of mathematically based efforts to encapsulate aspects of the nature of what exists.

Many key aspects of life (such as ethics: what is good and what is bad, and aesthetics: what is beautiful and what is ugly) lie outside the domain of scientific inquiry


Yet this lack of testable predictions does present a dilemma for a good number of contemporary cosmologists. During a recent Ted Talk, Harry Cliff, a particle physicist at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), warned: “The next few years may tell us whether we'll be able to continue to increase our understanding of nature or whether maybe, for the first time in the history of science, we could be facing questions that we cannot answer.” He added that scientists are approaching this limit as “the laws of physics forbid” further understanding of the Universe. Mr Cliff says that his theory is based on two numbers - the finely tuned strength of the Higgs Boson Field and the cosmological constant that I've already referred to in the above - which account for everything that the Universe is made up of, and if these numbers are slightly off, then “there would be no physical structure in the Universe.” Mr Cliff concluded his Ted Talk by saying: “We may be entering a new era in physics. An era where there are weird features in the universe that we cannot explain. An era where we have hints that we live in a multiverse that lies frustratingly beyond our [scientific] reach. An era where we will never be able to answer the question why is there something rather than nothing.”

As the American theoretical physicist Lee Smolin writes in Life of the Cosmos, p. 78 with reference to predictions that our observable universe is part of a larger multiverse:



"A fantastic consequence of general relativity theory [is] that the part of the universe that we will ever be able to see does not include the whole of it. The part of reality we can in principle ever see has boundaries. And there are necessarily regions of space and time beyond those boundaries."



Unlike what I can gauge of your standpoint, I think it is perfectly valid and rational to deduce such a "hypothesis" from science (i.e. a multiverse beyond the observable boundaries of our universe, or a Deist God), that does not itself pass the bar (i.e. for 'falsifiability') to qualify as a scientific theory but which still has genuine merit: something that shouldn't be tartly dismissed, IMHO, like the tooth fairy or leprechauns as a stringent application of your falsifiabality principle might entail. The multiverse and string theory are both examples of such hypotheses (to me they are both compelling, fit and elucidate the data, fill in the 'gaps' and are at least worthy of serious intellectual consideration even if they can't technically be falsified). I would add the non-revelatory 'Deistic' God, or at least the Intelligent Fine-Tuner hypothesis most Deists believe in, as another viable candidate. I don't view either of these three options as comparable to the Flying Spaghetti Monster or Dawkins' Magic Teapot floating around Venus. These have zero explanatory power, fit no conceivable data and lack intellectual elegance.
 
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Milton Platt

Well-Known Member
In my experience, I feel I've met a good many atheists who don't seem to believe theism can be come to rationally. For example, when I've previously pointed out I'm a former atheist, I've been told I probably wasn't a real atheist at all because I changed my position. I've been told I'm just my birth religion (I'm not), or that it's just my culture, or that I need a crutch to lean on to. But rarely does it seem recognized by non-theists that some of us were in the same spot as them, just as rational as they are, and we were convinced through proper means. I don't understand why this is. I myself am a theist but I also recognize that people can differ from my views, including being an atheist, through rational means.

So do you think theism can be reached through reason/evidence? Does being a theist equate with a failure of either/both? What is the thought process behind the idea that a different view simply cannot be plausable?

Thanks and Xeper.

I don't view theists as unreasonable or irrational generally. I just see them as people who do not understand science, and/or have a very low bar for evidence set for accepting a rather wild claim,
or simply have been indoctrinated from early childhood and have no interest in objectively looking at evidence. Well, that last one could be considered unreasonable, I suppose.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Well if it's logically necessary it exists, for one thing.
Other way round. The lumeniferous ether was necessary for many decades until it was found not to exist. The Higgs boson was necessary for several decades, but it didn't exist until its existence was demonstrated.

Meanwhile if as you imply the 'immaterial' is an aspect of reality and not simply of imagination, then there must be a real test that distinguishes it from the imaginary.

After all, if there's no such real test, then there's no such distinction.

What's the test?
 

1137

Here until I storm off again
Premium Member
Other way round. The lumeniferous ether was necessary for many decades until it was found not to exist. The Higgs boson was necessary for several decades, but it didn't exist until its existence was demonstrated.

Meanwhile if as you imply the 'immaterial' is an aspect of reality and not simply of imagination, then there must be a real test that distinguishes it from the imaginary.

After all, if there's no such real test, then there's no such distinction.

What's the test?

Oh that's all you're asking? That's easy. Can you physically show me mathematical ontology, logic, or even your inner experience?
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Oh that's all you're asking? That's easy. Can you physically show me mathematical ontology, logic, or even your inner experience?
If you mean, Are all brain entities and functions physical? yes, of course. Concepts exist in physical form as particular functions of the neurons of the brain, as 100% of modern brain research shows. Thus the concepts of 'god', 'God' and 'deity' are all material, even if the content of the concept has no counterpart in reality.

If you've ever watched a baby acquiring language, you'll observe that they reach the stage of abstraction and generalization very early. Words like 'car', 'plane', 'dog', don't (necessarily) denote a specific car, plane, dog, but the general idea, the abstraction, of the thing (whereas proper nouns like 'mummy', 'daddy', 'gran', are indeed understood to be specific. So a small child, and thus all of us, grasp from a young age the difference between eg 'a chair' (abstraction) and 'this chair' (specific). In all these cases, the abstraction has no counterpart in objective reality, any more than (returning to your example) an uninstantiated two does.

You could perhaps think of concepts as roughly like blank sheets of paper: wholly physical, but you can draw on them a unicorn, justice, chairness, twoness, Harry Potter, Sherlock Holmes, God, whatever idea you may come across (as well as 'this car', 'my spouse', 'Geraldine', and so on).

Thus the concept of 'God' exists physically, as a dynamic process of the neurons of the particular brain that holds this concept ─ physical all the way through, no Platonist need apply.

But as for the contents of the concept, the drawing on the paper if you (loosely) like, it can be of something real ─ something with a specific counterpart in reality; or it can exist only as part of a particular brain's mentation (call it 'imaginary' for short) and denotes nothing real.

That's why the existence or non-existence in objective reality of things that start out as conceptual entities ─ the Great South Land, the lumeniferous ether, the Higgs boson, telepathy, any particular God, Eldorado, dark matter, Sasquatch ─ isn't established as real until demonstrated to be so.

Which, since you say God is real, is all I'm asking you for ─ a satisfactory demonstration.
 
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1137

Here until I storm off again
Premium Member
If you mean, Are all brain entities and functions physical? yes, of course. Concepts exist in physical form as particular functions of the neurons of the brain, as 100% of modern brain research shows. Thus the concepts of 'god', 'God' and 'deity' are all material, even if the content of the concept has no counterpart in reality.

If you've ever watched a baby acquiring language, you'll observe that they reach the stage of abstraction and generalization very early. Words like 'car', 'plane', 'dog', don't (necessarily) denote a specific car, plane, dog, but the general idea, the abstraction, of the thing (whereas proper nouns like 'mummy', 'daddy', 'gran', are indeed understood to be specific. So a small child, and thus all of us, grasp from a young age the difference between eg 'a chair' (abstraction) and 'this chair' (specific). In all these cases, the abstraction has no counterpart in objective reality, any more than (returning to your example) an uninstantiated two does.

You could perhaps think of concepts as roughly like blank sheets of paper: wholly physical, but you can draw on them a unicorn, justice, chairness, twoness, Harry Potter, Sherlock Holmes, God, whatever idea you may come across (as well as 'this car', 'my spouse', 'Geraldine', and so on).

Thus the concept of 'God' exists physically, as a dynamic process of the neurons of the particular brain that holds this concept ─ physical all the way through, no Platonist need apply.

But as for the contents of the concept, the drawing on the paper if you (loosely) like, it can be of something real ─ something with a specific counterpart in reality; or it can exist only as part of a particular brain's mentation (call it 'imaginary' for short) and denotes nothing real.

That's why the existence or non-existence in objective reality of things that start out as conceptual entities ─ the Great South Land, the lumeniferous ether, the Higgs boson, telepathy, any particular God, Eldorado, dark matter, Sasquatch ─ isn't established as real until demonstrated to be so.

Which, since you say God is real, is all I'm asking you for ─ a satisfactory demonstration.

A "no" would have sufficed!
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
A "no" would have sufficed!
I sought to make it clear to you that abstractions like 'two' are concepts, and that concepts exist in material form in brains.

The point is that if you wish to maintain your argument that it's reasonable to conclude there's a god, then you'll still need to know how to distinguish the immaterial from the imaginary.

Because if there's no distinction in reality, then they're the same.
 

1137

Here until I storm off again
Premium Member
I sought to make it clear to you that abstractions like 'two' are concepts, and that concepts exist in material form in brains.

The point is that if you wish to maintain your argument that it's reasonable to conclude there's a god, then you'll still need to know how to distinguish the immaterial from the imaginary.

Because if there's no distinction in reality, then they're the same.

Nah, math is a good stopping point. Once people starting thinking mathematical ontology relies on the human mind it's obvious the conversation will go nowhere. I'm guessing logic is made up too right?
 
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