Behaviorism notwithstanding, rewards and pleasure have a combination set that doesn't include all rewards and pleasures. A robot isn't introspective or instictual so abstract/intuitive concepts will only mean something to us, not to the robot "watching the sunset"
Yes, that was the behavioristic argument. It fits some observations, but lacks in others.
I differ substantially from behaviorists in that I do think there are such things as states of mind. I just find them to be the same as brain states.
We are instinctual and abstract because of the way our brains work. Intuition is one of the ways our brains process information. Rewards and pleasures are also, fundamentally, brain states.
Yes an observer might think it's a reward. I can make a loop that stores happiness as an object and have various values stored in it that drop by time and increase by events. That doesn't make the program feel any reward though. Our object is imaginary. The real execution inside the CPU doesn't "feel" anything. Sure we can increase voltage or amperage but the chip running it won't work like a brain. It all depends on us creating abstract concepts and nodding to ourselves about it. Once the robot develops instincts or introspective capabilities we'll notice anything worth considering "reward" for it.
I strongly disagree here. We *feel* because of how our brains process information. No neuron actually 'feels' in this sense. But the neural circuitry does. I see no reason why a robot of sufficient sophistication cannot have essentially the same processing as our brains do and thereby feel, intuit, and have a perspective.
I think one of the issues is determining what it is that 'feels' and what it actually means to 'feel'. Like I said, no individual nerve feels. The 'feeling' is a product of many neurons interacting in quite complicated ways. But it is ultimately a physical process and that process can be mimicked by a robot sufficiently well constructed.
Let me put it this way: what do you see the brain doing that is substantially different than what can be programmed? At the molecular level, I see nothing. But that means that the higher levels can all be done, at least in theory (actual construction would be very delicate, I agree).