Although they praise neuroscientists for their accomplishments (Bennett is a neuroscientist) and express confidence that neuroscientists will elucidate the brain activity that makes learning, thinking, remembering, imagining, perceiving, and so forth, possible, they state clearly what neuroscience
cannot do:
What it cannot do is replace the wide range of ordinary psychological explanations of human activities in terms of reasons, intentions, purposes, goals, values, rules and conventions by neurological explanations . . . . And it cannot explain how an animal perceives or thinks by reference to the brain's, or some parts of the brain's, perceiving or thinking. For it makes no sense to ascribe such psychological attributes to anything less than the animal as a whole. It is the animal that perceives, not parts of its brain, and it is human beings who think and reason, not their brains. The brain and its activities make it possible for us—not for it—to perceive and think, to feel emotions, and to form and pursue projects. (p. 3)
This quotation expresses the theme of the book, that it is usually nonsense to ascribe to the brain psychological concepts that make sense when ascribed to whole humans (and often other animals). This explanatory tendency of neuroscientists (and cognitive psychologists) is called the
mereological fallacy. Although occasionally it leads the authors to say things about psychology that behavior analysts would not generally agree with, the arguments against the mereological fallacy in theories of memory, perception, thinking, imagery, belief, and other psychological processes upon which the methods of neuroscience have been brought to bear will be music to the skeptical ears of most behavior analysts.