Is metaphysical naturalism a worldview that is ultimately based on faith?

[prometheus11]

Obviously, NOBODY is saying that "all things that exist are perceptible to humans senses". How stupid.

 

[Nous]

Obviously, NOBODY is saying that "all things that exist are perceptible to humans senses". How stupid.

What does this say:

The nature of the inference is perception, and it's as valid as inference is. The world is as we perceive it.

?

 

[prometheus11]

Ummmm. What do those two statements have in common? Not a thing. Lol

 

[prometheus11]

Nevertheless, many (seemingly most) self-identifying materialist philosophers do not outright reject the existence of consciousness or subjective experience, though I am unaware that anyone has ever explained the process by which either subjective experience or volition supposedly is produced by whatever it is the materialist asserts to .

Da bwain?!!?

 

[prometheus11]

Nous wants people to believe in undetectable stuff but he can't state a reason why we should.

 

[Nous]

Nous wants people to believe in undetectable stuff but he can't state a reason why we should.

Quote where I said any such thing.

 

[prometheus11]

Quote where I said any such thing.

Too many to repost.

 

[Willamena]

To have a perception is not to draw an inference.

That's very anti-phenomenalist of you.

Inference is the act of “deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true. . . . The laws of valid inference are studied in the field of logic.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inference

A valid inference that concludes that nothing exists but that which a human can perceive with his senses would go like this:

P1: [. . . ]
P2: [. . . ]
C: Therefore, all things that exist are perceptible to humans senses.

Can you fill in those blanks, and show that there is a valid inference by which to deduce that conclusion? I know of no premises that lead to the stated conclusion.

Even a grade-schooler could devise premises to fill those blanks.

Why you'd want to use logic to plug premises into a conclusion is the real mystery. Even more so, the conclusion you chose to be filled. It has nothing to do with naturalism, a theory that everything arises from natural causes.

Rather, "natural" means what is perceptible to the senses. Inference is a conclusion drawn from repeated exposures (evidence). And naturalism finds a home in those propositions that never fail our perceptions.

Obviously, if that conclusion were true, i.e., if there were true premises by which to conclude that proposition, then it would rule out the possibility of energy existing.

?! That's obvious? How so? I'm baffled.

If that conclusion were true, then it would rule out the possibility that the quantum vacuum exists--even though (like energy) it produces effects on matter. If that conclusion were true, it would rule out the possibility that gravity exists. That conclusion is anti-scientific nonsense.

If you say so...

 

[Nous]

To have a perception is not to draw an inference.

That's very anti-phenomenalist of you.

A sensation or perception is “the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perception Again, inference is the act of “deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true. . . . The laws of valid inference are studied in the field of logic.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inference The two words are not even vaguely synonyms.

A valid inference that concludes that nothing exists but that which a human can perceive with his senses would go like this:

P1: [. . . ]
P2: [. . . ]
C: Therefore, all things that exist are perceptible to humans senses.

Can you fill in those blanks, and show that there is a valid inference by which to deduce that conclusion? I know of no premises that lead to the stated conclusion.

Even a grade-schooler could devise premises to fill those blanks.

That's why I asked you to do so. Do you now contend that some things that exist are not perceptible to human senses? If not (i.e., if you contend that all things that exist are perceptible to human senses), then please fill in the blanks to show that we can make such a valid deduction to that effect.

Why you'd want to use logic to plug premises into a conclusion is the real mystery. Even more so, the conclusion you chose to be filled. It has nothing to do with naturalism, a theory that everything arises from natural causes.

Your claim that I was responding to obviously made a claim about perception. That’s why I stated that conclusion to reflect the commonplace definitions of materialism (several of which have been quoted on this thread), which holds that “All that exists is [X].” There have been various proposals on this thread for what X is.

So why don’t you show that you can deduce a metaphysical thesis where the nature of reality (which is what metaphysics is about) is characterized by “natural causes”? Define “natural causes” so that we can distinguish them from non-natural causes, then state a deduction such as this:

P1: [. . .]
P2: [. . .]
C: Therefore, all causes are natural causes.


BTW: are you familiar with the scholarly literature on causation? Bertrand Russell (et al.) argued that causation is not a useful concept in modern physics and that physicists do not discover causes. He famously said that causation is “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” He noted that there is really nowhere to insert a cause in the partial differential equations that physicists use to describe phenomena. Needless to say, causation is not an uncomplicated matter in physics.

What is the cause of the differing outcomes one obtains when performing Wheeler’s Delayed Choice experiment? See Figure 2 for an easy-under-understand diagram of the interferometer version of this experiment: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0101077v1.pdf In one case, all the photons are detected in a single detector, and in the other case, half the photons are detected in one detector and half in the other detector. The latter case indicates that the photons moved through the interferometer as waves, rather than as particles which must take one or the other route through the interferometer. Yet, the experimenter’s decision to leave the half-silvered mirror at “second-base” in place or remove it can be made even after the photons have traveled through the interferometer for some distance. Thus, it seems that the experimenter’s decision affects how the photons behaved prior to his making the decision and performing the act of removing (or leaving in place) the second half-silvered mirror. So what is the cause of the result where all the photons are detected in one detector vs. both detectors?

Rather, "natural" means what is perceptible to the senses.

Can you quote a dictionary that defines "natural" as "what is perceptible to the senses"? I've never seen "natural" defined in such a way.

Obviously, if that conclusion were true, i.e., if there were true premises by which to conclude that proposition, then it would rule out the possibility of energy existing.

?! That's obvious? How so? I'm baffled.

Energy is a quantity--it is a conserved quantity in closed systems. No one has ever had a perception (definition above) of energy. The quantity energy is the product to two other quantities: the mass of a system multiplied by the speed of light in a vacuum squared. Performing such a calculation is the only method we have to measure energy.

No one has ever has ever had a perception of the quantum vacuum--it emits no sensory information. No one has ever had any sensory information of a virtual particle, yet such particles are an essential element of quantum field theory, and can produce effects on perceptible phenomena such as real particles. No one has ever had a perception of dark energy. No one has ever had a perception of dark matter, even though we assume that we can perceive its gravitational effects on the orbits of stars.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

I readily disagree. The theses of atheism, Nazism and communism neither say nor imply anything about subjective experience, as far as I am aware. The traditional thesis of materialism--the oldest of which is atomism--only implies something about consciousness or subjective experience (as well as volition). Nevertheless, many (seemingly most) self-identifying materialist philosophers do not outright reject the existence of consciousness or subjective experience, though I am unaware that anyone has ever explained the process by which either subjective experience or volition supposedly is produced by whatever it is the materialist asserts to be real.

I don't have a clue as to why anyone would say that. I disagree.

You first have to understand how subjectivity works. I already explained it. Agency does the job of making a decision turn out the way it does, and agency can only be identified by choosing what it is, resulting in an opinion.

This is why it is is equally logically valid to say the painting is beautiful, as it is to say the painting is ugly. Saying it is beautiful is choosing to identify love as agency, and saying it is ugly is choosing to identify hate as agency. The existence of the love or hate in the heart, which in expression of emotion with free will, chooses the word ugly or beautiful, is therefore also a matter of opinion. It is equally valid to say the love is real, as it is to say it is not real, as it is equally valid to say the painting is beautiful, as it is to say the painting is ugly.

That's how it works. And reasonably when you look at atheism, naturalism, communism, nazism, they all do their best to reject subjectivity.

I can give a plethora of examples of how that works. For example generally all well known atheist intellectuals deny freedom in the sense of having alternative futures available, one of which is made the present. I checked all the well known atheists, it is simply true. I can search the list again if you want. That is because subjectivity operates by choosing, that they reject choosing is real. Atheists also identify gods as fantasy figures, in stead of as subjective persona's. They also say they can measure emotions like love and hate, as Shad said a few posts previous, making love objective, rather than subjective.

A nazi will assert the spiritual qualities of the race as scientific fact, rather than opinion. Replacing subjectivity with objectivity.

Communism, well it's based on materialism, so there is no place for opinion there.

It is completely obvious that there is room for facts in materialism. The existence of material things is a fact. No problem with facts. The room for opinion in materialism is at least not obvious, you have to admit, and by that you can already see that there is no room for opinion at all. It is outside of materialism to reach the conclusion love is real by choosing the answer that it is real. Materialism only accommodates for evidence forcing to produce a fact, which fact is a model of what is evidenced. There is no accommodation for expression of emotion, with free will.

 

[Nous]

Thank you for your clarification, Mohammad.

I just want to note, first, that Marx’s political theory--usually called socialism--was premised on what might be called “historical dialectical materialism,” otherwise known as “class struggle”. Even though Marx and others may have been “under the influence” of metaphysical materialism, I don’t see that group of political theories (socialism, communism, Nazism--whatever that is or was) as making overt statements about the nature of reality (metaphysics). Certainly it seems to me entirely possible that a socialist method of government can be implemented in a society that is full of, say, metaphysical pluralists.

I especially object to the idea that atheism entails materialism. One need only look to various expounders on of Eastern religions, especially Buddhism, to find examples of atheistic philosophies that are not materialist.

I’m unsure of your point with your second paragraph. I understand the term “valid” as it is used on logic. A modus tollens argument (If P, then Q. Not Q. Therefore, not P.) provides a valid argument, that is, makes a correct deduction; draws a valid conclusion. The proposition P does not have to be a true statement in order for it to be a valid conclusion. But if the premises are true statements, then a valid conclusion is a true statement, which is called a sound argument. There is a valid and true conclusion that a work of art is “beautiful” or “ugly” only if there are true premises by which to draw a valid and true conclusion. If “beautiful” means “not-ugly,” then, if there were a true and valid conclusion that a work of art is “beautiful,” it would not likewise be true that the work of art is “ugly”.

But I don’t like dichotomizing assessments of works of art or other stuff into opposing categories of “beautiful” and “ugly,” just as I don’t like dichotomizing human emotions or psychological motivations into categories of “love” and “hate”. My assessments and psychological motivations seem to be more complex than such simple opposing binaries. And I’m unsure how such dichotomizing is supposed to relate to metaphysics. I don’t think the nature of reality abides by such dichotomies.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

Thank you for your clarification, Mohammad.

I just want to note, first,

What you write is just about nuances, and doesn't really address the mainstay of the argumentation. It's too much effort to write about all the nuances.

You can see how subjectivity works, and you can see how these philosphies and ideologies work, so then it is quite obvious that overall and in practise, these ideas generally run counter to subjectivity, undermininig it.

It's really a commonly human failing to reject subjectivity. A commonly felt temptation to make what is good and evil into a matter of fact, which failing then becomes manifest in some philosophy, ideology, or religion.

 

[Nous]

One thing I do know is that in the 150 posts of this thread no one has defended any thesis of metaphysical materialism or naturalism as either coherent or consistent with scientific findings and theories. Indeed, there doesn’t seem to be much agreement on what the thesis is about--i.e., what “X” is that there supposedly exists nothing but.

 

[Sapiens]

One thing I do know is that in the 150 posts of this thread no one has defended any thesis of metaphysical materialism or naturalism as either coherent or consistent with scientific findings and theories. Indeed, there doesn’t seem to be much agreement on what the thesis is about--i.e., what “X” is that there supposedly exists nothing but.

I suppose I should repeat:

Metaphysical naturalism is an oxymoron, scientific naturalism is based on uniformitarianism which can only be inferred but never proven in absolute terms, is that faith? I say no. ”Faith is believing what you know ain't so." - Mark Twain.

 

[Willamena]

A sensation or perception is “the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perception Again, inference is the act of “deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true. . . . The laws of valid inference are studied in the field of logic.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inference The two words are not even vaguely synonyms.

Perception is that, yes. The nature of the inference of naturalism is that information that we have organized, identified and structured that affirms the world. In the context of naturalism, it is a conclusion of inference, that is reasoning, to invest in the certainty of that information.

Regardless that their are "laws of valid inference," I used the word in the more familiar context.

I did not use the terms synonymously.

Do you now contend that some things that exist are not perceptible to human senses? If not (i.e., if you contend that all things that exist are perceptible to human senses), then please fill in the blanks to show that we can make such a valid deduction to that effect.

Your statements do not resemble anything I said.

Your claim that I was responding to obviously made a claim about perception.

On the contrary, the claim was about naturalism. I claimed perception to be the inference of naturalism.

That’s why I stated that conclusion to reflect the commonplace definitions of materialism (several of which have been quoted on this thread), which holds that “All that exists is [X].” There have been various proposals on this thread for what X is.

So why don’t you show that you can deduce a metaphysical thesis where the nature of reality (which is what metaphysics is about) is characterized by “natural causes”? Define “natural causes” so that we can distinguish them from non-natural causes, then state a deduction such as this:

P1: [. . .]
P2: [. . .]
C: Therefore, all causes are natural causes.

The premise of naturalism is that everything arises from precedent causes. The inference I referred to is that the information about the world that we have sorted, organized and structured accurately resembles the world.

I don't know what premises would arrive at the conclusion, "all causes are natural causes." As I pointed out earlier, it is extremely easy to start with a conclusion and plug premises into it. But that doesn't make it right (and certainly doesn't make it logic).

BTW: are you familiar with the scholarly literature on causation? Bertrand Russell (et al.) argued that causation is not a useful concept in modern physics and that physicists do not discover causes. He famously said that causation is “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” He noted that there is really nowhere to insert a cause in the partial differential equations that physicists use to describe phenomena. Needless to say, causation is not an uncomplicated matter in physics.

What is the cause of the differing outcomes one obtains when performing Wheeler’s Delayed Choice experiment? See Figure 2 for an easy-under-understand diagram of the interferometer version of this experiment: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0101077v1.pdf In one case, all the photons are detected in a single detector, and in the other case, half the photons are detected in one detector and half in the other detector. The latter case indicates that the photons moved through the interferometer as waves, rather than as particles which must take one or the other route through the interferometer. Yet, the experimenter’s decision to leave the half-silvered mirror at “second-base” in place or remove it can be made even after the photons have traveled through the interferometer for some distance. Thus, it seems that the experimenter’s decision affects how the photons behaved prior to his making the decision and performing the act of removing (or leaving in place) the second half-silvered mirror. So what is the cause of the result where all the photons are detected in one detector vs. both detectors?

Not familiar with that, sorry.

Can you quote a dictionary that defines "natural" as "what is perceptible to the senses"? I've never seen "natural" defined in such a way.

Sure. The Oxford Dictionary, natural is what is derived from nature. Nature is world phenomena that specifically excludes "human creations" (such as "inference") which would leave one with only empirical information, which is information derived through the senses.

Energy is a quantity--it is a conserved quantity in closed systems. No one has ever had a perception (definition above) of energy. The quantity energy is the product to two other quantities: the mass of a system multiplied by the speed of light in a vacuum squared. Performing such a calculation is the only method we have to measure energy.

No one has ever has ever had a perception of the quantum vacuum--it emits no sensory information. No one has ever had any sensory information of a virtual particle, yet such particles are an essential element of quantum field theory, and can produce effects on perceptible phenomena such as real particles. No one has ever had a perception of dark energy. No one has ever had a perception of dark matter, even though we assume that we can perceive its gravitational effects on the orbits of stars.

From reading earlier posts, I see that you somehow confused what I said with, "all things that exist are perceptible to humans senses." I said no such thing.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

One thing I do know is that in the 150 posts of this thread no one has defended any thesis of metaphysical materialism or naturalism as either coherent or consistent with scientific findings and theories. Indeed, there doesn’t seem to be much agreement on what the thesis is about--i.e., what “X” is that there supposedly exists nothing but.

One can say science is limited to facts, in that sense science is based on "materialism". Opinions, about what is good, loving and beautiful are outside of science. One can then say opinions are based on "spiritualism".

2 subsets of creationism:

-spiritual domain
creator
about agency of decisions
subjectivity, opinion
religion

- material domain
creation
about which way decisions turn out
objectivity, fact
science

 

[leibowde84]

One can say science is limited to facts, in that sense science is based on "materialism". Opinions, about what is good, loving and beautiful are outside of science. One can then say opinions are based on "spiritualism".

2 subsets of creationism:

-spiritual domain
creator
about agency of decisions
subjectivity, opinion
religion

- material domain
creation
about which way decisions turn out
objectivity, fact
science

How do you explain the fact that "materialists" hold opinions just like everyone else?

 

[Nous]

Metaphysical naturalism is an oxymoron, scientific naturalism is based on uniformitarianism which can only be inferred.

Every dictionary definition and scholarly article (SEP, IEP) on “naturalism” that I’ve found refers to naturalism as a metaphysical thesis. None suggest that there is anything oxymoronic about naturalism as a metaphysical or ontological assertion.

The Wikipedia defines uniformitarianism as “the principle or assumption that the same natural laws and processes that operate in the universe now have always operated in the universe in the past and apply everywhere in the universe.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniformitarianism

Actually it seems that cosmological inflation or the exponentially accelerated expansion of the universe, assuming such occurred in the first minute fraction of a second, is contrary to uniformitarianism as defined. Inflation--or the era of huge vacuum energy--as well as the halting of inflation, were apparently one-time events or processes.

Indeed, a “multiverse” is commonly invoked to explain the occurrence of our particular set of laws of nature, with other portions of the “multiverse” operating according to other sets of all possible laws. Short of that, one might be embarrassed to have to appeal to something beyond the laws of nature in order to explain the source or cause of the known laws of nature and the fundamental constants that are not explained by the known laws (e.g., the velocity of light in a vacuum; the value or magnitude of Planck’s constant).

The interior of a black hole--unless one claims that the interiors of black holes are not “in” our universe--seems to refute uniformitarianism. The laws by which our universe operate break down inside a black hole.

Uniformitarianism is entirely reasonable and supported by a great deal of evidence, except for those scientific theories, hypotheses or facts that contradict it. (I’d say the existence of black holes, and their interiors, is a fact.)

Insofar as uniformitarianism is a metaphysical or ontological thesis (which apparently it is--it definitely isn’t an epistemological or axiological thesis), and is predicated on the laws of nature, I’d say that it implies mathematical realism, given that the laws of nature are just mathematical relations.

 

[Nous]

I don't know what premises would arrive at the conclusion, "all causes are natural causes."

So you're saying that you cannot articulate an argument by which to conclude your thesis of naturalism is in some way true?

As already pointed out, no one has ever had a perception of energy, yet the transfer of energy certainly causes observable effects. No one has ever had a perception of the quantum vacuum or zero-point energy, yet the quantum vacuum causes measurable and observable effects. (“The vacuum state is associated with a zero-point energy, and this zero-point energy has measurable effects. In the laboratory, it may be detected as the Casimir effect. In physical cosmology, the energy of the cosmological vacuum appears as the cosmological constant.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vacuum_state ) By it’s very nature, dark matter is unable to be perceived, but we assume that we can observe its gravitational effects on the orbits of stars.

You’ve mentioned “information” several times in your posts here. Information is the negative logarithm of the probability distribution of events. Information is measurable, but is not a perceptible entity. I think most people would agree that information is causal. Shannon entropy is unquestionably causal.

So, again, all of these real, measurable but imperceptible phenomena that cause effects refute the thesis that “all causes are perceptible phenomena”. Right?

As I pointed out earlier, it is extremely easy to start with a conclusion and plug premises into it. But that doesn't make it right (and certainly doesn't make it logic).

To make a deduction is to use logic. To deduce a proposition from propositions that are true statements is to deduce a true statement.

The premise of naturalism is that everything arises from precedent causes.

So the results of Wheeler's Delayed Choice Experiment, where the experimenter's decision to remove or leave in place the second ("second base") beamsplitter determines whether the photons traveled through the interferometer as waves or particles, demonstrates the falsehood or failure of "the premise of naturalism" as you have stated here.

 

[Sapiens]

Every dictionary definition and scholarly article (SEP, IEP) on “naturalism” that I’ve found refers to naturalism as a metaphysical thesis. None suggest that there is anything oxymoronic about naturalism as a metaphysical or ontological assertion.

I would not expect them to, it is the juxtaposition of the terms "naturalism" and "metaphysical" that creates the irony that morphs into oxymoronicism.