You said in your first post that you "staunchly defend" naturalism and physicalism.
Actually I said - well - again let me quote in context:
In discussion I will staunchly defend 'naturalism', 'physicalism', and 'scientific realism' because, although I cannot dogmatically assert that any, or all, are actually correct - they have the best track records so far and they are the best hope (IMO) for casting further metaphysical light on the nature of reality.
I don't know how one defends such metaphysical theses if one can't define those terms so that one can distinguish what is "natural" from what is not natural, and what is "physical" from what is not.
OK - so help me out - you said earlier
How do you define and defend "physicalism"? What does one do with "spooky action at a distance"? I think that's supernatural.
So you define "supernatural" - that will help me either to see that everything is supernatural or at least that not all things are "natural".
I know that elsewhere you have defined the adjective "physical" as "matter/energy,"...
...and the effects of matter/energy - did you read my previous comment?
...which just means that nonlocal collapse of the wavefunction is not accounted for as a "physical" effect.
"Not accounted for as..." is not the same as saying "not a...". Non-locality might be outside the limits of relativity, but it does not necessarily mean it is a non-physical effect. In any case, we don't really know that there is a real "wavefunction" or a real "collapse" do we? There's nothing in Quantum Theory
per se that demands it - only in one (preferred) interpretation in order to make QM accord with relativity so that classical 'particles' can be 'real'. The very experimental evidence that "proves" non-locality casts considerable doubt on the "truth" of that interpretation regardless of its astonishing success in making 'real-world' predictions on which a huge part of our modern world is based.
I'm not sure whether you would include dark matter and/or dark energy, if such exist, as "matter/energy".
What's this - a smokescreen? What does dark matter/dark energy have to do with the current discussion? And in any case, if they do turn out to be real, then yes I would classify them as physical - i.e. part of the real world of matter/energy and their effects.
I suspect that, if you ever get around to doing something more than begging the question, you will have great difficulty deducing from the evidence obtained by the scientific method that either the thesis of "naturalism" or "physicalism" is true. As already noted several times on this thread, as early as in the OP, the scientific method simply can't be used to test hypotheses about "everything that exists".
The scientific method "begs the question" by deliberately discounting supernatural causes - this is called "methodological naturalism" - if you are arguing about metaphysics that's a different thing - that is "ontological naturalism". A practicing scientist has to assume naturalism in her work but she doesn't have to believe it as a metaphysical thesis. The scientific method is not used to discount metaphysical theses since it deliberately avoids saying anything that does not correspond to a naturalistic worldview. But that is not the same as saying the naturalistic worldview is true. If you are (as you are) defending supernatural causation, then you have abandoned the scientific method. That's fine with me - science may not be the only way to arrive at "truth" - speculative metaphysics may be another appropriate way of approaching "truth" - but you can't have your cake and ha'penny - you can't say (as you did) that it's supernatural and then claim that its also science. And that is the problem I have with this comment that you made earlier - and that is admittedly believed by many really smart science people today...
But mainly I defend scientific realism because it implies mathematical realism
Scientific realism is not the same as the scientific method - scientific realism is also assumed methodologically in order to practice science - but that again is not the same as saying that it is true. Scientific realism being true (or untrue) has nothing to do with whether mathematical realism is true (or untrue). Physical things can be fundamentally real (i.e. importantly to the current discussion, have determined mathematical properties) without the mathematical properties themselves being fundamentally real (or even
vice versa). Scientific realism is by definition naturalistic, mathematical realism is by definition supernaturalistic unless one says that the reality of the mathematical objects is established by the reality of the physical realities they describe.