First is a "lack of evidence," which itself isn't evidence at all.
Oh, that depends.
Let's talk, for a second, about the general case, okay? Not about a/theism, but the general case. I maintain that there are cases in which absence of evidence is evidence of absence, while in other cases it's not.
Say you are looking for a hard-boiled egg in your fridge. You open the fridge, you don't see an egg. I'm fairly certain you'd count that as evidence.
Of course, the egg could be invisible. It could be in "another dimension". You could be under hypnosis to not see the egg. Any number of possible (if hilariously implausible) scenarios could apply.
So, under some circumstances, you'd count absence of evidence as evidence of absence, right? Namely, *when positive evidence should be expected*.
So... how come one would not count it in the case of god? Would you say that evidence of god is not to be expected in a universe that was created by god?
The other is simply "prove otherwise," but physicalism is not a default position, and it's specifically physicalism being put forth, the asker is not making some claim.
There are only four worldviews that are possible:
1. Nothing exists
2. Everything is essentially spirit, and physical bodies are just an epiphenomenon
3. Everything is essentially physical, and spirit is an epiphenomenon
4. Both spirit and physical bodies exist
(Okay, I lied. You could make up any number of hypothetical substances and attach a worldview to all of them, but I maintain that that would be massively superfluous and impractical.)
So... which one of the four, would you say, should be the default position?