Is There An Absolute Truth?

[Truth101]

I've been avoiding the topic primarily because most discussions about "absolute truth" suffer from definitional issues - 'truth' is a problematic term. Nevertheless, it should be obvious that the claim "there is no absolute truth" is kin to the liars's paradox.

Well said. Honestly, I just stumbled onto it and thought I'd add to the confusion :thud:

 

[Willamena]

Although conditional truth (i.e. a property of the relationship between a descriptor and the thing described) is fairly well defined in philosophy and science, the notion of unconditional, or absolute, truth seems to me to be much less investigated and defined.

For instance, if it is claimed that such a thing as absolute truth exists, then how do we know of it? How is it even possible to know an unconditional truth or whether one exists? I have never found positive answers to those questions. Have you?

Absolute truth is an ideal.

In another context, all truth is absolute: something either is true or it is not.

 

[sahra-t]

Absolute truth is an ideal.

In another context, all truth is absolute: something either is true or it is not.

What about propositions about the future?

"It will rain tomorrow". At this moment, is that true or not?

 

[stemann]

What about propositions about the future?

"It will rain tomorrow". At this moment, is that true or not?

Truth cannot be bound temporally, so outside of time, it is either true or not.

That is, if one can "step out" of time and view it all, then it will be fixed as to whether or not it rains on [specified date]. So objectively, it is either true or false. Or drizzle.

 

[Willamena]

What about propositions about the future?

"It will rain tomorrow". At this moment, is that true or not?

The truth of a prediction is not determined unless or until the event happens, or fails to.

On the other hand, it is true that that is a prediction.

 

[PureX]

Absolute truth is an ideal.

In another context, all truth is absolute: something either is true or it is not.

Yes. But for us to establish it's truthfulness, we have to apply some criteria to the question. "X" is true or false compared to what? The moment "X's" truthfulness becomes dependent upon this external criteria, it can no longer be an absolute truth. It's become a relative truth (it's true relative to the external criteria).

And when we try to remove the relative comparison, the result tends to become a meaningless tautology. "This is a true statement" is a true statement within itself. But it doesn't mean anything to us because it's not relatable to anything that matters to us.

 

[Willamena]

Yes. But for us to establish it's truthfulness, we have to apply some criteria to the question. "X" is true or false compared to what? The moment "X's" truthfulness becomes dependent upon this external criteria, it can no longer be an absolute truth. It's become a relative truth (it's true relative to the external criteria).

X is true or false compared to the ideal that is reality. For us to establish its truthfulness is us comparing what we know of reality to what we observe of reality. That is not truth, that is understanding. Understanding is relative to the external criteria.

"X is true or false" is a statement of understanding, a statement about truth. "X is or is not" is truth.

And when we try to remove the relative comparison, the result tends to become a meaningless tautology. "This is a true statement" is a true statement within itself. But it doesn't mean anything to us because it's not relatable to anything that matters to us.

A statement about truth is not truth.

 

[PureX]

X is true or false compared to the ideal that is reality. For us to establish its truthfulness is us comparing what we know of reality to what we observe of reality. That is not truth, that is understanding. Understanding is relative to the external criteria.

I think we're falling into semantics, here. We use the process of reasoning to try and determine the relative truthfulness of a given proposition. I say the relative truthfulness of the proposition because we're only able to establish the probable truthfulness of a proposition by comparing it (relating it) to other information that we think we know to be true.

As far as I know, we have no way of determining that a proposition is absolutely true, as we are limited and finite creatures and a state "absoluteness" would be beyond the scope of our limited experience.

"X is true or false" is a statement of understanding, a statement about truth. "X is or is not" is truth.

"X is true or false", and "X is or is not", are empty statements. They don't contain enough information to present us with a coherent proposition.

My example: "This is a true statement" is at least a complete proposition, even though it's a meaningless tautology. But it's not a statement about truth, as you are implying, it's a statement about itself, that is apparently true.

A statement about truth is not truth.

I agree, "truth" is a quality assessment, not a proposition. And as with any quality assessment, it requires a criteria of some kind. And that's why "truth" is always relative (relative to the criteria being used to assess it's quality).

 

[Willamena]

I think we're falling into semantics, here. We use the process of reasoning to try and determine the relative truthfulness of a given proposition. I say the relative truthfulness of the proposition because we're only able to establish the probable truthfulness of a proposition by comparing it (relating it) to other information that we think we know to be true.

As far as I know, we have no way of determining that a proposition is absolutely true, as we are limited and finite creatures and a state "absoluteness" would be beyond the scope of our limited experience.
"X is true or false", and "X is or is not", are empty statements. They don't contain enough information to present us with a coherent proposition.

My example: "This is a true statement" is at least a complete proposition, even though it's a meaningless tautology. But it's not a statement about truth, as you are implying, it's a statement about itself, that is apparently true.
I agree, "truth" is a quality assessment, not a proposition. And as with any quality assessment, it requires a criteria of some kind. And that's why "truth" is always relative (relative to the criteria being used to assess it's quality).

In truth, truth isn't something I've thought through yet. I'll have to consider what you've said.

 

[PureX]

In truth, truth isn't something I've thought through yet. I'll have to consider what you've said.

I'm enjoying the conversation, but 'truth' is one of those ideas that's very difficult to discuss without it imploding into meaningless confusion. In part, that's why I like discussing it. It's sort of the same thing as happens when people try to define 'art', which I also enjoy discussing. But we do need to know when to take a breath, smile, and eat a marshmallow, instead.

*smile*

 

[Willamena]

(from post #30) "The definition of an absolute truth requires that it not be dependent upon or conditioned by an external criteria (ie: not relative). In the case of "2+2=4", un-applied, it's a meaningless presumption. But the moment we apply it to something real, it's truthfulness becomes dependent upon the criteria of the application. Two 20 pound sheep do not equal two 30 pound sheep. Two adult sheep don't equal two newborn sheep. Two sheared sheep don't equal two unsheared sheep. In fact, depending upon how refined the criteria, no sheep has ever or will ever equal any other sheep. So the truthfulness of "2 sheep + 2 sheep = 4 sheep" is relative to the criteria being applied to the sheep. If no criteria but that they are "sheep" is applied, then the equation remains true. But if almost any other criteria is added, the equation is no longer true. A proposition that's truthfulness depends upon such external criteria can't by definition be absolutely true."

The mathmatical equasion "1+1=2" is a meaningless proposition until it's been applied to something. But the moment it's applied, it's truthfulness becomes relative to the criteria of the application. Since an absolute truth cannot also be relative, this mathmatical proposition is not an absolute truth.

PureX, I am considering a reply to your posts, but I need to clarify one thing first.

2 + 2 = 4
2 sheep + 2 sheep = 4 sheep
2 newborn sheep + 2 newborn sheep = 4 newborn sheep
2 adult sheep + 2 adult sheep = 4 adult sheep
2 20-pound sheep + 2 20-pound sheep = 4 20-pound sheep
etc.

To me, it seems the relativity is imposed only because of misapplication of the equation. Can you explain further?

The designant "male" is an idea defined by it's not being female, and likewise, the designant "female" is an idea defined by it's not being male. Both concepts are being defined relative to each other, and relative to other concepts of sexuality, and thus they can't be absolute.

The definitions of the things --what is being compared here --are relative to each other only when taken in the context of each other (a comparison). Can you explain further what you meant?

 

[PureX]

PureX, I am considering a reply to your posts, but I need to clarify one thing first.

2 + 2 = 4
2 sheep + 2 sheep = 4 sheep
2 newborn sheep + 2 newborn sheep = 4 newborn sheep
2 adult sheep + 2 adult sheep = 4 adult sheep
2 20-pound sheep + 2 20-pound sheep = 4 20-pound sheep
etc.

To me, it seems the relativity is imposed only because of misapplication of the equation. Can you explain further?


The definitions of the things --what is being compared here --are relative to each other only when taken in the context of each other (a comparison). Can you explain further what you meant?

Notice that in the above examples, the reality of the sheep's uniqueness has to be ignored for the formula to be true. The formula is only true as long as the application of it remains an abstracted idea of "sheep", rather than an actual representation of them. But the moment the unique actuality of the sheep is considered, the formula's truthfulness becomes relatively suspect. And this is true of all applications of such mathematical equations. They're perfect (absolute) as abstract ideas, but the moment we try to apply them to actuality, their truthfulness becomes relative to how willing we are to overlook the endless individual details that make everything unequal, and the equasion untrue.

Equality doesn't exist in reality. No matter how similar two phenomena may be, they can't be the same and still remain two separate and individual phenomena. Absolute equality would make them the same phenomena. The proposition of absolute equality thus contradicts itself. Equality can only represent conditions in the real world if we're willing to overlook all the ways in which things are not equal. Thus, the "equality" of a proposition is only true relative to the degree of vagueness we are willing to accept in our application of it.

Any two sheep are "equal" only as long as we're willing to overlook all the ways in which they aren't really equal.

 

[Willamena]

Notice that in the above examples, the reality of the sheep's uniqueness has to be ignored for the formula to be true. The formula is only true as long as the application of it remains an abstracted idea of "sheep", rather than an actual representation of them. But the moment the unique actuality of the sheep is considered, the formula's truthfulness becomes relatively suspect. And this is true of all applications of such mathematical equations. They're perfect (absolute) as abstract ideas, but the moment we try to apply them to actuality, their truthfulness becomes relative to how willing we are to overlook the endless individual details that make everything unequal, and the equasion untrue.

But, the uniqueness of the sheep is irrelevant to the mathematical forumla. If it is to be kept in its context as a mathematical formula applied to a characteristic or trait, following the rules of mathematics, then that characteristic or trait that is evaluated must appear on both sides of the equation.

The unique sheep is not evaluated in relation to other sheep in any forumula context to determine truthfulness.

I think that you are trying to state something important to our discussion, here, but that your mathematical example is inadequate to demonstrate it. So, I don't get it.

As far as I can see, there is still only one "kind" of truth, and it is absolute.

Equality doesn't exist in reality. No matter how similar two phenomena may be, they can't be the same and still remain two separate and individual phenomena. Absolute equality would make them the same phenomena.

I am totally with you.

The proposition of absolute equality thus contradicts itself. Equality can only represent conditions in the real world if we're willing to overlook all the ways in which things are not equal. Thus, the "equality" of a proposition is only true relative to the degree of vagueness we are willing to accept in our application of it.

Any two sheep are "equal" only as long as we're willing to overlook all the ways in which they aren't really equal.

Ah! A glimmer of hope! I think I see what you are getting at, but... equality, such as in the equation for sheep above, does not apply to the sum of all the properties of a unique individual --it does not apply to identity.

One identity cannot be equated to another. This says nothing about truth (except in that it is true).

 

[BruceDLimber]

Hi!

The Baha'i scriptures are quite explicit that EVERYTHING in creation is relative, and that the only absolute is God Himself!

So yes, there is an absolute truth, and this is God and only God!

Best,

Bruce

 

[PureX]

But, the uniqueness of the sheep is irrelevant to the mathematical formula.

I don't agree. I would submit that a mathematical formula is only a proposition of truthfulness until it's applied to something.

If it is to be kept in its context as a mathematical formula applied to a characteristic or trait, following the rules of mathematics, then that characteristic or trait that is evaluated must appear on both sides of the equation.

Exactly, and therein lies the external qualifier that disqualifies the equation as an absolute. The formula proposes to be equal, but can't remain equal when applied to any actual phenomena unless the criteria for it's truthfulness becomes relative.

I think I see what you are getting at, but... equality, such as in the equation for sheep above, does not apply to the sum of all the properties of a unique individual

Why not? What logical reason would there be for excluding the properties of the phenomena being equated?

... it does not apply to identity.

I disagree with Aristotle on this, somewhat, but that's another discussion. In this discussion, I'm not referring to the identity of a given phenomena, but to actual phenomena. A sheep (or any other "identity" that exists) is a collection of actual phenomena. No matter how we choose to define and identify that collection of phenomena, it remains unique, and cannot be absolutely equal to any other collection of phenomena. We can identify two separate collections of phenomena as equal, by being deliberately vague, but in actuality they will not be equal. Thus, any proposal of equality as an absolute truth is false, because in actuality there is no such state as "absolutely equal".

What's happening ,here, is that we're identifying sets of phenomena vaguely enough so as to consider them equal. But they aren't actually equal. And the equality of the equation is then dependent upon the vagueness of our identification (two "sheep" rather than these two specific sets of phenomena that we are vaguely identifying as "two sheep"). That makes the truthfulness of this (and any) equation relative to that vagueness, and relative truthfulness is not absolute truth.

 

[Willamena]

I don't agree. I would submit that a mathematical formula is only a proposition of truthfulness until it's applied to something.

But why do you disagree? Unequatable things are not equatable; to try to squeeze them into the mathematical formula of equation is to take both them and the formula out of context.

If it is to be kept in its context as a mathematical formula applied to a characteristic or trait, following the rules of mathematics, then that characteristic or trait that is evaluated must appear on both sides of the equation.

Exactly, and therein lies the external qualifier that disqualifies the equation as an absolute. The formula proposes to be equal, but can't remain equal when applied to any actual phenomena unless the criteria for it's truthfulness becomes relative.

I don't understand this at all. Why does the unique identity, which is unequatable, invalidate the absoluteness of the truth of the equation, which applies to equatable things? The formula's proposition of truth is not independent of things being on both sides of the equation --that is the requirement, a "condition", for the equation to be evaluated. That there is something that cannot be equated is irrelevant.

I don't understand how you bring "relativity" into it, either --relative to what? How is its relativity to any else in the universe significant, and what does that have to do with the truth of the equation?

Why not? What logical reason would there be for excluding the properties of the phenomena being equated?

Not the properties, the sum of all the properties, i.e. the thing that makes it unique: the identity. You said it yourself, I believe, earlier: two things cannot have the same identity or they would be indistinguishable. That means that identity is not equatable --there is nothing to put on the other side of the equation in order to evaluate the equation.

I disagree with Aristotle on this, somewhat, but that's another discussion. In this discussion, I'm not referring to the identity of a given phenomena, but to actual phenomena. A sheep (or any other "identity" that exists) is a collection of actual phenomena. No matter how we choose to define and identify that collection of phenomena, it remains unique, and cannot be absolutely equal to any other collection of phenomena. We can identify two separate collections of phenomena as equal, by being deliberately vague, but in actuality they will not be equal. Thus, any proposal of equality as an absolute truth is false, because in actuality there is no such state as "absolutely equal".

What's happening ,here, is that we're identifying sets of phenomena vaguely enough so as to consider them equal. But they aren't actually equal. And the equality of the equation is then dependent upon the vagueness of our identification (two "sheep" rather than these two specific sets of phenomena that we are vaguely identifying as "two sheep"). That makes the truthfulness of this (and any) equation relative to that vagueness, and relative truthfulness is not absolute truth.

It is not the proposition of equality that is false, but the attempt to take it out of context that is inappropriate. Anything taken of out context in such a way cannot help but be false.

In other words, you're saying "the formula of equality doesn't work when you apply it to things that are not equatable." D'uh. It does work when you use it properly.

You've not demonstrated that it is false, you've demonstrated what false itself is.

 

[PureX]

But why do you disagree? Unequatable things are not equatable; to try to squeeze them into the mathematical formula of equation is to take both them and the formula out of context.

A mathematical formula has no context but itself until it's been applied to something actual. Even if a mathematical equation were an absolute truth, what significance would it have if it remains un-applied? And as you are admitting, yourself, the moment we try to apply it, it becomes only relatively true.

I don't understand this at all. Why does the unique identity, which is unequatable, invalidate the absoluteness of the truth of the equation, which applies to equatable things?

But there are no absolutely equatable things. Two absolutely equatable things would be the same thing. It's self contradictory. There are only relatively equatable things.

The formula's proposition of truth is not independent of things being on both sides of the equation --that is the requirement, a "condition", for the equation to be true. That there is something that cannot be equated is irrelevant.

Nothing is equatable, or everything is equatable, depending on how specifically we "identify" the things in question. The point is that the truthfulness of the equation depends upon some degree of lack of specificity of the identity of the things being equated. That means that any mathematical equasion's truthfulness is dependent upon (relative to) the degree of vagueness of the identity of the things being equated. A relatively true mathematical equation cannot be absolutely true, as the concepts of relative and absolute are opposites.

How is its relativity to any else in the universe significant, and what does that have to do with the truth of the equation?

A proposition that's true only relative to itself would basically be a meaningless tautology. It may be ABSOLUTELY TRUE, but it's still a meaningless tautology.

You said it yourself, I believe, earlier: two things cannot have the same identity or they would be indistinguishable. That means that identity is not equitable --there is nothing to put on the other side of the equation in order to evaluate the equation.

Actual phenomena is not equatable. "identities" are only equatable as long as we ignore some degree of specificity. Two apples can be very alike in many overt respects, and unalike only in the more subtle details. So that if we identify them only by their most overt characteristics, and ignore their subtle details, they will be viewed as "equal". Under such conditions, the process of mathematically equating them will "work" (be shown true). Yet the truthfulness of the process is dependent upon (relative to) our being somewhat vague in identifying the two apples. And a relative truth can't be absolute.

It is not the proposition of equality that is false, but the attempt to take it out of context that is inappropriate. Anything taken of out context in such a way cannot help but be false.

But what you're calling "out of context", I'm calling actual application. My point is that the proposition can't really be true until it's been applied to something real.

In other words, you're saying "the formula of equality doesn't work when you apply it to things that are not equitable." D'uh. It does work when you use it properly.

There are no actual phenomena that are absolutely equitable, so as an absolute, the formula of equality is both pointless and useless. The only reason it works for us is that we ignore the details of actual reality in favor of vague abstract "identities" that allow us to treat things as equal even though they aren't. And it works because the flaws in the results are also subtle, and are also ignored.

 

[Willamena]

I disagree with Aristotle on this, somewhat, but that's another discussion. In this discussion, I'm not referring to the identity of a given phenomena, but to actual phenomena. A sheep (or any other "identity" that exists) is a collection of actual phenomena. No matter how we choose to define and identify that collection of phenomena, it remains unique, and cannot be absolutely equal to any other collection of phenomena. We can identify two separate collections of phenomena as equal, by being deliberately vague, but in actuality they will not be equal. Thus, any proposal of equality as an absolute truth is false, because in actuality there is no such state as "absolutely equal".

What's happening ,here, is that we're identifying sets of phenomena vaguely enough so as to consider them equal. But they aren't actually equal. And the equality of the equation is then dependent upon the vagueness of our identification (two "sheep" rather than these two specific sets of phenomena that we are vaguely identifying as "two sheep"). That makes the truthfulness of this (and any) equation relative to that vagueness, and relative truthfulness is not absolute truth.

I have given this more thought.

First off, perhaps it is my inability to broaden my mind enough to see concepts outside of my own philosophy, but I don't see induction as moving from a more specific thing to a more vague thing; just the opposite, in fact. The focus on one particular characteristic or trait to the exclusion of the details of the whole is more precision, and, as you say, that is what allows for an equation to be made. But that's irrelevent to truth, too... That the more detailed, unique "collection of phenomena" still exists apart from the particular charactertics we are evaluating is, as I said, not really relevant, because the equation is evaluated as true or false for the charactertisic or trait, not for the unique thing (for "adult sheep", not for "this sheep").

The "sets of phenomena" we do evaluate are equatable.

I've pondered on your concept of "relative truth", and although I can see the relativity inherent in the act of equation itself, I cannot see where the truth is effected by that relativity at all, as we are not evaluating the "specific set of phenomena" relative to the "sets of vague phenomena," but two sets of latter to each other. The truth exists apart from that, apart from the act of equation: the truth is the positive result of the evaluation of these two sets.

 

[PureX]

I have given this more thought.

First off, perhaps it is my inability to broaden my mind enough to see concepts outside of my own philosophy, but I don't see induction as moving from a more specific thing to a more vague thing; just the opposite, in fact. The focus on one particular characteristic or trait to the exclusion of the details of the whole is more precision, and, as you say, that is what allows for an equation to be made. But that's irrelevant to truth, too... That the more detailed, unique "collection of phenomena" still exists apart from the particular characteristics we are evaluating is, as I said, not really relevant, because the equation is evaluated as true or false for the charactertisic or trait, not for the unique thing (for "adult sheep", not for "this sheep").

The "sets of phenomena" we do evaluate are equatable.

I've pondered on your concept of "relative truth", and although I can see the relativity inherent in the act of equation itself, I cannot see where the truth is effected by that relativity at all, as we are not evaluating the "specific set of phenomena" relative to the "sets of vague phenomena," but two sets of latter to each other. The truth exists apart from that, apart from the act of equation: the truth is the positive result of the evaluation of these two sets.

I'm as puzzled as you are.

I don't see how you can claim that relativism is "irrelevant to truth". Isn't the truth, 'what is'? If 'what is' cannot be equated absolutely, then it cannot be an absolute truth that one or more of any part of 'what is' equates to one or more of any other part of 'what is'.

Imagine that the entire universe is made up of dots in space. And each of these dots is in turn made up of smaller dots in smaller spaces. Our view of the universe is limited so that we can't see if there are "biggest dots", or "smallest dots", so the universe looks like an infinite progression of macro and micro dots, but in truth we have no idea if it is or not. All of these dots are inter-related in a huge network of cause and effect, each dot effecting others, but some of those effects matter to us a lot while other effects don't matter to us so much, so we tend to identify groups of dots as "good environments" and "bad environments". And we often compare these groupings of dots (that we have identified and defined as "environments") to each other.

Question: Can these groups of dots ever be equal?

Answer: Given the apparently infinite complexity of ANY identified grouping of dots, it will not be possible for us to conclude with certainty that any dot really equals any other dot, or that any group of dots equals any other group of dots. However, if we are equating these dot environments according to their value to us, rather than their actual similarity to each other, then it is possible for two different groups, though dissimilar to each other, to be of equal value to us.

So is the answer to the question 'yes' or 'no'? Well, the answer is that it depends. It depends upon whether or not we're equating the grouped dot's value to us or their actual content to each other.

And this is why the process of equating, and the various mathematical formulations of that process, are relative, and not absolute. They are viable relative to our intent. Equal only exists as an idea, and it only applies to reality when and how we say it does, and then only by the exclusion of facts to the contrary.

 

[Booko]

Although conditional truth (i.e. a property of the relationship between a descriptor and the thing described) is fairly well defined in philosophy and science, the notion of unconditional, or absolute, truth seems to me to be much less investigated and defined.

For instance, if it is claimed that such a thing as absolute truth exists, then how do we know of it? How is it even possible to know an unconditional truth or whether one exists? I have never found positive answers to those questions. Have you?

I voted for yes to absolute truth. But that in no way implies I believe that humans are capable of perceiving it. That sort of things would be left to an omniscient being, which none of us is.

We just get all the fun of searching for as much of it as we can grasp.