Knowledge and Belief

[Enai de a lukal]

1) Knowledge is not something that is known for certain.

Right- certainty is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowledge. One can know and be uncertain, or be certain and not know.

We have our best guess and thats okay.

Well, but not really. This is the false dichotomy we've seen already; either we have some infallible direct access to the truth, or we have "guesses" and no more. This is not an either-or scenario. Part of our (best, really only tenable) metaphysical model of the world is that things are the case- there are facts- that is, things are located in certain positions, with certain properties, stand in various relations to one another and so on. And we can express these facts via language. Truth, and by the same token knowledge, enters the picture when we compare these linguistic items (propositions, claims, beliefs) to the world, and see whether they "match up", as it were. Now, the tricky part is this comparison, seeing as we don't have any direct or infallible access to how things are, but have only our senses, which are fallible, and are limited to what evidence is available to us. But the possibility for error, while always theoretically present, can be trimmed down ever further by additional evidence and additional information- I may be deceived as to the shape of the stick by glancing at it while its in the water (where it will look crooked), but if I take it out and feel it, measure it, hand to you and see what you think, and so on, we further eliminate the possibility for doubt and for error. (also, skeptical scenarios such as the brain in the vat, the argument from hallucination, and so on, either can be identified by evidentiary consistency and if not, they are differences which make no difference, and can be effectively bracketed)

In any case, that there is a difference between what is true and what is considered true should be fairly obvious- being considered true, by any particular number of people, is again neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth, or for knowledge.

My example of newton still stands.

Well no, it doesn't. While I can understand that sometimes responding piecemeal can distract from a larger point you wish to make, but you can't simply ignore my response to your example in favor of making a different point, and then go on to claim that your example still stands. At the moment it does not, because you've yet to respond to my point RE your example.

And your example doesn't really offer any counter-argument so much as you're just suggesting a different usage of the term "knowledge", and one which apparently just conflates knowledge with belief. There seems to be no good reason to adopt this usage, it seems needless confusing. There's no reason to say that Newton did know, even though what he knew was false, when we can more accurately describe the situation as one in which Newton believed, and believed he knew, but did not in fact know. Being regarded as knowledge and actually being knowledge are not the same thing, even if the difference between the two is never given in a moment.

Knowledge isn't a thing that stands outside judgement.

Of course. Knowledge is a judgment, one which is dependent upon the resources at hand. And it is a judgment that is prone to error. But error also implies correctness, which implies that it is not subjective- there actually are genuine cases of knowledge, and genuine cases of error, it is not simply a matter of being "regarded" or "considered" as knowledge. We can just never identify them as such with absolute infallibility.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

When we determine something incorrect, false, or wrong, we haven't eliminated truth. We have affirmed the truth of the negated proposition and replaced it with another true proposition. We've pushed "the truth" back a little, we've pushed the world back a little (poetically to "uncover a greater truth").

It just looks like you're introducing new and peculiar ways of using key terms here, such as "truth" and "proposition". Without stating your new definitions, and giving some reason why anyone would want to adopt them, what you're saying here just looks false at best, nonsense at worst, such as this-

The proposition is the true world. Nothing "mere" about it.

Um, what? A proposition is a linguistic item making a claim about the world. It is not the world any more than a picture of the Eiffel Tower is the Eiffel Tower.

 

[Willamena]

It just looks like you're introducing new and peculiar ways of using key terms here, such as "truth" and "proposition".

Not new or peculiar at all.

It is not the world any more than a picture of the Eiffel Tower is the Eiffel Tower.

Silly. Both the Eiffel Tower and a picture of the Eiffel Tower are pictures of the world.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Not new or peculiar at all.

Maybe not "new" (maybe you've read these bizarre usages elsewhere), but clearly peculiar. When you use words other than how they are typically used in accepted discourse, we call that "peculiar". And when someone says "the proposition is the true world", either they are using "proposition" (or "world") in a novel way, or they are giving a metaphor, or something else (perhaps the claim is just nonsense through and through)- because clearly, calling a proposition (a linguistic item) "the true world" (and a world is NOT a linguistic item, whether true or not) is, if taken at face-value, simply false.

Silly. Both the Eiffel Tower and a picture of the Eiffel Tower are pictures of the world.

Um, no... The Eiffel Tower is a building in Paris.

A picture of the Eiffel Tower is a picture of the world, the actual Eiffel Tower is not. Similarly, a proposition about the Eiffel tower is, in a sense, a "picture of the world", i.e. a representation of it being thus-and-such, and again, the actual Eiffel Tower is not.

 

[Monk Of Reason]

Right- certainty is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowledge. One can know and be uncertain, or be certain and not know.

Good to know

Well, but not really. This is the false dichotomy we've seen already; either we have some infallible direct access to the truth, or we have "guesses" and no more. This is not an either-or scenario. Part of our (best, really only tenable) metaphysical model of the world is that things are the case- there are facts- that is, things are located in certain positions, with certain properties, stand in various relations to one another and so on. And we can express these facts via language. Truth, and by the same token knowledge, enters the picture when we compare these linguistic items (propositions, claims, beliefs) to the world, and see whether they "match up", as it were. Now, the tricky part is this comparison, seeing as we don't have any direct or infallible access to how things are, but have only our senses, which are fallible, and are limited to what evidence is available to us. But the possibility for error, while always theoretically present, can be trimmed down ever further by additional evidence and additional information- I may be deceived as to the shape of the stick by glancing at it while its in the water (where it will look crooked), but if I take it out and feel it, measure it, hand to you and see what you think, and so on, we further eliminate the possibility for doubt and for error. (also, skeptical scenarios such as the brain in the vat, the argument from hallucination, and so on, either can be identified by evidentiary consistency and if not, they are differences which make no difference, and can be effectively bracketed)

In any case, that there is a difference between what is true and what is considered true should be fairly obvious- being considered true, by any particular number of people, is again neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth, or for knowledge.

Your the one that has provided this situation where you must have god like powers. Not me.

There is only what is considered "knowledge" at any given point in time. I don't know how to get any clearer than that. The 'knowledge" we have today is no different than the "knowledge" anyone had yesterday. We claim that what they had was not 'knoweldge" because we now know that it was incorrect.

From our perspective it is not knowledge. From theirs it was knoweldge. Do you disagree with this?

Well no, it doesn't.

IT does. You are trying to drag this into another battle that isn't what my original piont was nor is it even what the point of this thread is. If you want to take a semantics battle on a different issue then we can go to a different thread.

While I can understand that sometimes responding piecemeal can distract from a larger point you wish to make, but you can't simply ignore my response to your example in favor of making a different point, and then go on to claim that your example still stands. At the moment it does not, because you've yet to respond to my point RE your example.

I can ignore your response as it doesn't couter or even bring up my original point.

And your example doesn't really offer any counter-argument so much as you're just suggesting a different usage of the term "knowledge", and one which apparently just conflates knowledge with belief. There seems to be no good reason to adopt this usage, it seems needless confusing. There's no reason to say that Newton did know, even though what he knew was false, when we can more accurately describe the situation as one in which Newton believed, and believed he knew, but did not in fact know. Being regarded as knowledge and actually being knowledge are not the same thing, even if the difference between the two is never given in a moment.

Then you have to throw out all "knoweledge"
We merely believe we know something. No one can say they truely "know" something. If thats the case then you have redefined knowledge.

Of course. Knowledge is a judgment, one which is dependent upon the resources at hand. And it is a judgment that is prone to error. But error also implies correctness, which implies that it is not subjective- there actually are genuine cases of knowledge, and genuine cases of error, it is not simply a matter of being "regarded" or "considered" as knowledge. We can just never identify them as such with absolute infallibility.

Except we do.

 

[Willamena]

Maybe not "new" (maybe you've read these bizarre usages elsewhere), but clearly peculiar. When you use words other than how they are typically used in accepted discourse, we call that "peculiar". And when someone says "the proposition is the true world", either they are using "proposition" (or "world") in a novel way, or they are giving a metaphor, or something else (perhaps the claim is just nonsense through and through)- because clearly, calling a proposition (a linguistic item) "the true world" (and a world is NOT a linguistic item, whether true or not) is, if taken at face-value, simply false.

Nope, not new or peculiar at all.

Um, no... The Eiffel Tower is a building in Paris.

A picture of the Eiffel Tower is a picture of the world, the actual Eiffel Tower is not. Similarly, a proposition about the Eiffel tower is, in a sense, a "picture of the world", i.e. a representation of it being thus-and-such, and again, the actual Eiffel Tower is not.

A building in Paris is a picture. Silly.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Your the one that has provided this situation where you must have god like powers. Not me.

No, I didn't provide it- you've said, basically, that since we aren't infallible and don't have godlike powers, all we have are guesses. This is a false dichotomy.

There is only what is considered "knowledge" at any given point in time. I don't know how to get any clearer than that.

The problem isn't that your claim isn't clear, its that you haven't really argued for it, merely asserted it, and have responded to my arguments with "nuh-uh!". This is not a productive way to carry out a discussion.

From our perspective it is not knowledge. From theirs it was knoweldge. Do you disagree with this?

No. That knowledge can only be identified from a perspective, rather than from a direct "bird's-eye-view" is certainly true. But it does not mean that there is no difference between knowledge and something that is called knowledge. On the on hand, this is guilty of the same false dichotomy as above, as it ignores any middle ground, and for another, it still does not follow from this consideration that actual, genuine knowledge does not exist- simply that it cannot be infallibly identified as such.

IT does.

No, and stamping your foot and shrilly insisting it does surely won't help.

You are trying to drag this into another battle that isn't what my original piont was nor is it even what the point of this thread is. If you want to take a semantics battle on a different issue then we can go to a different thread.

If you don't wish to respond to my point RE your example, that's fine- you're under no compulsion here. But if you don't wish to respond, you can't keep insisting the example stands. And besides, you've simply given an example in which you offer a case which, according to the definition of knowledge under discussion, is not knowledge, and then act as if this is supposed to carry some weight. But you haven't done anything here, you've simply offered a new definition, essentially- or implicitly rejected mine. This is not really a counter-argument.

Then you have to throw out all "knoweledge"

No, that doesn't follow.

We merely believe we know something. No one can say they truely "know" something.

As I note above, even if this were true, it wouldn't follow that there is no such thing as genuine knowledge. We could just never say "I know X" or "Susie knows Y". But as it happens, this doesn't follow from anything we've said either. What are the rules for when its appropriate to call something knowledge? Must we be absolutely certain and infallible? Why? This seems like an unreasonable and unwarranted criteria. It also would have the side-effect of rendering any scientific or inductive knowledge impossible. Which renders this statement all the more ironic-

If thats the case then you have redefined knowledge.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Nope, not new or peculiar at all.

Ah, I get it... "I know you are but what am I". Now your turn, right?

If you want to claim, without any argument or explanation, that its not peculiar to refer to things like sentences and assertions as "the true world" (an obvious category mistake), then clearly you're not really interested in a serious discussion. Gotcha.

A building in Paris is a picture. Silly.

Right, clearly.

And toasters are applesauce. Derp!

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Its funny how you're more than willing to post your intentionally vague, superficially profound, pseudo-intellectualistic nonsense until someone actually asks you to explain yourself, then you turn conveniently silent. All smoke no fire, methinks...

 

[Willamena]

Ah, I get it... "I know you are but what am I". Now your turn, right?

If you want to claim, without any argument or explanation, that its not peculiar to refer to things like sentences and assertions as "the true world" (an obvious category mistake), then clearly you're not really interested in a serious discussion. Gotcha.

I know I am, but what are you?

Right, clearly.

And toasters are applesauce. Derp!

I love applesauce! I'm off to make toast--thanks.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Exactly.

 

[Willamena]

Its funny how you're more than willing to post your intentionally vague, superficially profound, pseudo-intellectualistic nonsense until someone actually asks you to explain yourself, then you turn conveniently silent. All smoke no fire, methinks...

It's your belief that will determine you, not mine.

 

[Monk Of Reason]

No, I didn't provide it- you've said, basically, that since we aren't infallible and don't have godlike powers, all we have are guesses. This is a false dichotomy.

Its not a false dichotomy. Your misrepresenting it from either an honest mistake or a dishonest intentional misdirection.

If we cannot know for certain then we must take our best educated guess. Its not a random "oh I guess this is what it is" guess but its a rational process of deduction. her shirt looks red. Others seem to think it looks red. When compaired to other things considered red then we can assume her shirt is red. That is our best guess. IN that way we "know" her shirt is red.

The problem isn't that your claim isn't clear, its that you haven't really argued for it, merely asserted it, and have responded to my arguments with "nuh-uh!". This is not a productive way to carry out a discussion.

Normally I have found you both logical and easy to speak with. Today its like i'm
:banghead3

I don't know how to more clearly explain my arguments. You are claiming that knowledge has to be correct. That there is an undeniable truth to knowledge. In that case no one has knoweldge. We have no way to absolutly know what is or isn't. We have only our best educated guess to determien what we believe to be true. That is knoweldge.

No. That knowledge can only be identified from a perspective, rather than from a direct "bird's-eye-view" is certainly true. But it does not mean that there is no difference between knowledge and something that is called knowledge. On the on hand, this is guilty of the same false dichotomy as above, as it ignores any middle ground, and for another, it still does not follow from this consideration that actual, genuine knowledge does not exist- simply that it cannot be infallibly identified as such.

And you say that it is possible to attain such? If that is the case then it is impossible to "know" anything.

No, and stamping your foot and shrilly insisting it does surely won't help.

Then by all means explain to me in detail exactly how it does not apply.

If you don't wish to respond to my point RE your example, that's fine- you're under no compulsion here. But if you don't wish to respond, you can't keep insisting the example stands. And besides, you've simply given an example in which you offer a case which, according to the definition of knowledge under discussion, is not knowledge, and then act as if this is supposed to carry some weight. But you haven't done anything here, you've simply offered a new definition, essentially- or implicitly rejected mine. This is not really a counter-argument.

You have stated a few different things. They contradict. So you are confusing me.

1) True knoweldge exists.
2) It is impossible to knowi t
3) But knowledge is somehow obtainable

Please clear that up for me before we go any further.

No, that doesn't follow.

Explain in detail why it does not.

As I note above, even if this were true, it wouldn't follow that there is no such thing as genuine knowledge. We could just never say "I know X" or "Susie knows Y". But as it happens, this doesn't follow from anything we've said either. What are the rules for when its appropriate to call something knowledge? Must we be absolutely certain and infallible? Why? This seems like an unreasonable and unwarranted criteria. It also would have the side-effect of rendering any scientific or inductive knowledge impossible. Which renders this statement all the more ironic-

And now you sate another contradiction to yourself.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

If we cannot know for certain then we must take our best educated guess. Its not a random "oh I guess this is what it is" guess but its a rational process of deduction.

But a rational process of deduction (even if deduction, as opposed to inductive/defeasible reasoning, WERE our primary mode of reasoning- it probably isn't all considered) is not really a "guess", in any sense of the word. I suppose one could loosely characterize inductive knowledge as a "guess", in contrast to deductive knowledge, but now you've got a problem- deductive knowledge certainly appears to be certain, and not a guess at all. Thus, these do not appear to be features of knowledge as such, seeing as both inductive and deductive knowledge are, after all, knowledge.

I don't know how to more clearly explain my arguments. You are claiming that knowledge has to be correct. That there is an undeniable truth to knowledge. In that case no one has knoweldge. We have no way to absolutly know what is or isn't.

But that doesn't follow- knowledge has to be correct, by definition; a falsehood cannot be knowledge, OK. And we have no absolute, infallible way to identify what is or isn't correct- all that follows from this is that we cannot diagnose knowledge as knowledge with 100% certainty; not that knowledge doesn't exist at all.

1) True knoweldge exists.
2) It is impossible to knowi t
3) But knowledge is somehow obtainable

Must we need to be able to identify, say, a white-tail deer in order for white-tail deer to exist? Suppose humans died off and there was nobody around to say "Yep, that's a white-tail deer"- would there not be any white-tail deer any more? Of course there would! Similarly, even if we couldn't identify knowledge as such at all (and we haven't even established that, because identifying knowledge and identifying knowledge with certainty or infallibility are NOT the same thing), it wouldn't follow that there was no knowledge.

And in order to see that being knowledge, and being considered knowledge, are not identical, consider the last man on Earth- everyone else has died. This man is like you and I in most every respect except, he never reflects on what he believes or knows. He just goes about his business. Now, suppose he believes that he left his water jug by the pond because that's what he remembers doing, and that he DID leave it there- in other words, he has a justified true belief, but one that is NOT considered knowledge, simply because there's nobody around to consider it knowledge and, as I said, he never reflects upon his own beliefs. Now, intuitively, we would have no problem calling this an instance of knowledge, and one where the knowledge is not "considered knowledge" by ANYONE.

Perhaps this illustrates the difference more clearly.

In any case, to take a step back- one of the purposes of a theory of knowledge is to give an account of what these cases which people tend to refer to as "knowledge" have in common (if anything). In a sense, philosophers are like linguists- we need to see what all the cases in which people use this word "know" consist in, and compare them. And for virtually every case we can come up with, the JTB definition can account for and classify it as knowledge. That's a good sign.

But another requirement we should have- one NOT satisfied by many theories of truth or knowledge- is that it cohere with the rest of our best and most tenable pictures of the world, in particular that of the sciences, but also importantly, that of our day-to-day lives. Given this, any theory of knowledge which comes back with the verdict that there is no such thing as knowledge is basically worthless- even if it adduces compeling arguments for this claim, there isn't much we can do with it. It doesn't help explain our scientific picture of the world, or what it is we are doing when in our day-to-day lives we know who is calling on the phone, or know the color of the drapes in our living room. Skepticism about truth in these sorts of contexts makes no sense whatsoever- it has no part in the language-game. Is there any sense in doubting whether I know I'm using a computer right now? Or that I'm wearing a shirt? (and there is a deeper issue here- Wittgenstein's private language argument, in which doubt presupposes something being the case, and something being true- but thats "a whole nother story", as they say)

 

[Willamena]

Must we need to be able to identify, say, a white-tail deer in order for white-tail deer to exist? Suppose humans died off and there was nobody around to say "Yep, that's a white-tail deer"- would there not be any white-tail deer any more? Of course there would! Similarly, even if we couldn't identify knowledge as such at all (and we haven't even established that, because identifying knowledge and identifying knowledge with certainty or infallibility are NOT the same thing), it wouldn't follow that there was no knowledge.

Now substitute "God" for the white-tailed deer.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Ok, and? A little off the point of the example, wouldn't you say? (and in any case, this would simply mean that being God and being identified as God are not the same thing- which is a pretty obvious logical point, so far as it goes, and hardly one anyone will object to)

 

[Willamena]

Ok, and? A little off the point of the example, wouldn't you say? (and in any case, this would simply mean that being God and being identified as God are not the same thing- which is a pretty obvious logical point, so far as it goes, and hardly one anyone will object to)

Your reasoning allows us to say that God exists without knowing that God exists.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Your reasoning allows us to say that God exists without knowing that God exists.

No, it allows us to say that God's existence and our acknowledgement or identification thereof are logically distinct. As I said, you appear to have missed the point of the example. Reading carefully is always advisable.

 

[Willamena]

No, it allows us to say that God's existence and our acknowledgement or identification thereof are logically distinct.

That allows us to say that God exists without knowing that God exists.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

That allows us to say that God exists without knowing that God exists.

No, that doesn't follow. It allows us to say that is logically possible that God could exist without anyone recognizing that God exists- which is hardly controversial. That something can exist without being recognized as existing is a trivial point, one you seem determined to misconstrue/misunderstand, for whatever reason (perhaps you'er bitter about my comment before, idk).

(Or do we suppose that, say, this new species of giant Amazonian fish they recently discovered did not exist prior to our discovery/recognition of them? That they had just sprung into existence the moment we identified them?)

The point is that arguing that we can never reliably identify knowledge does not entail that knowledge itself doesn't exist. Once again, a pretty trivial point, and one which is discouraging to have to explain. Thought better of our posters here than that.