So you think that when a person hears a claim that they understand, the necessarily either believe that it's false or that it's true? This is nonsense.
Good grief.
You still don't get it after all this time? This is what I was referring to when you were busy making snide remarks and facepalms about other people not getting the point. You keep missing the point as this statement unequivocally demonstrates. More than one person has explained this to you before, but you either don't read it, don't understand it. The last post you replied to that contains the answer to this question was only a few pages ago. I'm pretty sure there is more than one post on the same page which answers it but were met with snide remarks only.
Try reading this
You can't not believe everything you read
It is a peer-reviewed scientific article, so perhaps you will pay more attention and be more open minded regarding it. I can't be bothered any more.
[The Cartesian view states that] First people comprehend a message, and then later they may accept it.
Understanding and believing are today taken to be the separate and sequential operations that
Descartes(1644/1984) described.
However, Descartes's (1644/1984) contemporary, Benedict Spinoza (1677/1982) , did not
accept this doctrine, and he argued that understanding and believing are merely two
words for the same mental operation. Spinoza suggested that people believe every
assertion they understand but quickly "unbelieve" those assertions that are found to be at
odds with other established facts. For Spinoza, "mere understanding" was a psychological
fiction–a non sequitur that grew out of a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of
mental representation (see Gilbert, 1993 ). The details surrounding this misunderstanding
are somewhat afield of the present concerns, but Spinoza's bottom line is not: According
to Spinoza, the act of understanding is the act of believing. As such, people are incapable
of withholding their acceptance of that which they understand. They may indeed change
their minds after accepting the assertions they comprehend, but they cannot stop their
minds from being changed by contact with those assertions.
Acceptance, then, may be a passive and inevitable act, whereas rejection may be an
active operation that undoes the initial passive acceptance. The most basic prediction of
this model is that when some event prevents a person from "undoing" his or her initial
acceptance, then he or she should continue to believe the assertion, even when it is
patently false. For example, if a person is told that lead pencils are a health hazard, he or
she must immediately believe that assertion and only then may take active measures to
unbelieve it. These active measures require cognitive work (i.e., the search for or
generation of contravening evidence), and if some event impairs the person's ability to
perform such work, then the person should continue to believe in the danger of lead
pencils until such time as the cognitive work can be done. The Cartesian hypothesis, on
the other hand, makes no such prediction. That hypothesis suggests that both acceptance
and rejection of an assertion are the results of cognitive work that follows comprehension
of the assertion. As such, interruption should make both of these options impossible and
thus leave the person in a state of nonbelief rather than one of belief or disbelief