It is in the West quite popular to declare that evil is relative. Yet, often missing from such discussions is any effort to address how problematic such a statement might be.
I am neither endorsing nor criticizing the above view. I'm just laying it out for discussion in order to show one of the many ways in which the notion that good and evil are relative is problematic.
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For instance, consider this: If evil is purely relative, then it is possible that the Holocaust was not evil for everyone, but was instead good for some people. But if the Holocaust was good for some people, then we must consider the Holocaust in some circumstances morally justified. However, considering the Holocaust morally justified in some circumstances, but not in other circumstances, implies that good and evil can be decided by circumstances. Yet, if good and evil can be decided by circumstances, then can it not be said that good and evil have an "objective" foundation in so far as circumstances are "objectively" real? And if that is the case, then is not the proposition that "good and evil are relative" little more than a very trivial point of almost no ethical significance, while the proposition that "good and evil are securely grounded in circumstances" of much greater moral consequence, for then we could say "In circumstances X, Y is always evil (or not evil)"? But if we can say that, how can evil be relative?
I am neither endorsing nor criticizing the above view. I'm just laying it out for discussion in order to show one of the many ways in which the notion that good and evil are relative is problematic.
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