Maydole's Ontological Argument

[Meow Mix]

I'll give Maydole's argument without my objections so that everyone can absorb it undisturbed by my objections and see what everyone thinks of it before I cut in.

I mentioned Maydole's argument for perfection in one of the other threads in the sense of providing his definition for what qualifies as a "perfection" (when it comes to attributes.)

Maydole says essentially that a perfection entails:

1) That a property is a perfection iff (if and only if) its negation is not a perfection.
2) That perfections entail only perfections.

By this Maydole means that something is perfect in a context if and only if the negation of that perfection is not a perfection. Example: A perfect meterstick is a meterstick long. A non-meterstick is clearly not a meterstick long. It's still a subjective term, it still depends on what the context is: but clearly a property is perfect only if its negation isn't perfect. This is obviously true.

Perfections only entail perfections: let's say that we have a property A which is perfect (in whatever subjective context that we declare it's perfect), and property A relies on property B to be perfect. Clearly, if property A is perfect than property B also has to be perfect. This is also obviously true. Example: If A is a perfect Euclidean square, then it relies on property B of its angles which must be perfectly 90 degrees. A perfect property can only be contingent on other perfect properties, or else it isn't perfect.

In this sense, Maydole uses "perfection" as a property that is better to have than to not have.

So Maydole starts with:

1) A property is a perfection if and only if its negation is not a perfection.
2) Perfections entail only perfections.
3) Supremity is a perfection.

Maydole defines "supremity" essentially as that if X is supreme, then that means that it's not possible that there exists a Y such that Y is greater than X and it's not possible that there exists a Y such that X is not Y (and X is not greater than Y).

∀X : (¬∃Y : [Y > X])
∀X : (¬∃Y : [X ≠ Y] & [X ≤ Y])

Maydole says:

1) It's possible that a supreme being exists.
2) A supreme being exists.
3) Exactly ONE supreme being exists.

Pretty much, therefore God exists. This is because in modal logic (particularly this law is called S5):

• Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p [
  
  ]
• Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p [
  
  ]

If possibly P, then necessarily P.
If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P.

Maydole says it's possible that a supreme being exists because existence is a perfection (it's better to have than not-have), therefore it's possibly necessary that a supreme being (a being with perfections) exists because it would have existence as an attribute, since it's more perfect to exist than not exist. If possibly existent, then existent. Right?

 

[Skwim]

If I understand any of this correctly why should one assert the possible necessity of p rather than the possible necessity of not p? Not that this negates the possible necessity of p, but that the contrary seems just as reasonable. It looks like a wash to me.

 

[Willamena]

By this Maydole means that something is perfect in a context if and only if the negation of that perfection is not a perfection. Example: A perfect meterstick is a meterstick long. A non-meterstick is clearly not a meterstick long.

That's not a good example. A non-meterstick is not a meterstick, at all, so it's not the negation of a meterstick. It's just not a meterstick. It's a perfect non-meterstick. Do you see?

A meterstick is also not a property, and the argument hinges on properties. A property (such as "length") is perfect because it cannot be other than what it is, for the meterstick or the non-meterstick. It's negation would be a non-property(?), which literally describes "nothing". I'd have to read Maydole, though, to see his justification for that.

Perfections only entail perfections

Right. Having properties entails perfection in all things.

In this sense, Maydole uses "perfection" as a property that is better to have than to not have.

Hm, that's not a conclusion I come to, but okay.

So Maydole starts with:

1) A property is a perfection if and only if its negation is not a perfection.
2) Perfections entail only perfections.
3) Supremity is a perfection.

The thing that is "supreme" of all others has the supremest supremeness. Alight.

Maydole says:

1) It's possible that a supreme being exists.
2) A supreme being exists.
3) Exactly ONE supreme being exists.

Pretty much, therefore God exists.

Edit: Okay, I read about it. Fascinating stuff, but it all hinges on holding an image of God as supremity.

Maydole says it's possible that a supreme being exists because existence is a perfection (it's better to have than not-have), therefore it's possibly necessary that a supreme being (a being with perfections) exists because it would have existence as an attribute, since it's more perfect to exist than not exist. If possibly existent, then existent. Right?

The conclusion would be better worded: if possibly supreme, then necessarily supreme. It makes sense only for the property "supremeness", not for existence.

Edit: "Existence" isn't a property. This is demonstrated by the fact that properties exist.

 

[Meow Mix]

If I understand any of this correctly why should one assert the possible necessity of p rather than the possible necessity of not p? Not that this negates the possible necessity of p, but that the contrary seems just as reasonable. It looks like a wash to me.

You've found one of the serious flaws in axiom S5, but you'd still need to go a step further and offer an argument for possibly necessarily not-p.

 

[Meow Mix]

That's not a good example. A non-meterstick is not a meterstick, at all, so it's not the negation of a meterstick. It's just not a meterstick. It's a perfect non-meterstick. Do you see?

Yes you're right, I was writing this post when a little intoxicated. What I meant to say is that a near-perfect meterstick is nearly a meter long.

I get what you're saying in that everything is perfectly itself, but I think perfection is a meaningful context as a comparison to a standard. A perfect meterstick is one which is exactly a meter long, and metersticks which are imperfect are varying degrees away from a meter long. A 1.1 meter long meterstick is "more perfect" than a 1.2 meter long meterstick.

A meterstick is also not a property, and the argument hinges on properties. A property (such as "length") is perfect because it cannot be other than what it is, for the meterstick or the non-meterstick. It's negation would be a non-property(?), which literally describes "nothing". I'd have to read Maydole, though, to see his justification for that.

Maydole is essentially saying that if we define 1 meter as perfection in a context, then 1 > X < 1 is not perfect. He's basically saying that perfection is exact and not continuous.

Edit: Okay, I read about it. Fascinating stuff, but it all hinges on holding an image of God as supremity.

Right, because it's an ontological argument -- that's what they do.

The conclusion would be better worded: if possibly supreme, then necessarily supreme. It makes sense only for the property "supremeness", not for existence.

Edit: "Existence" isn't a property. This is demonstrated by the fact that properties exist.

I think this is one of the best objection to Maydole's argument: that existence isn't a property.

He sort of "gets that far" by saying that a perfection is something which is better to have than not have, and it's "better" to exist than not exist -- according to Maydole. But as you've noted I don't think that really "works."

 

[Skwim]

You've found one of the serious flaws in axiom S5, but you'd still need to go a step further and offer an argument for possibly necessarily not-p.

I think I'll pass, I'm all thunk out right now. But interesting problem.

 

[Willamena]

Right, because it's an ontological argument -- that's what they do.

If it's not a problem and detract from the thread too much, I'm curious what you meant. How do you understand the ontological argument?

He sort of "gets that far" by saying that a perfection is something which is better to have than not have, and it's "better" to exist than not exist -- according to Maydole.

One thing that attracts me about Dharmic philosophies: it's better to be and not be (yin and yang).

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

• Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p [
  
  ]
• Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p [
  
  ]

Pretty much, therefore God exists. This is because in modal logic (particularly this law is called S5):

If possibly P, then necessarily P.
If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P.

It is possible that Alvin Plantinga is pulling this stuff out of his butt.

 

[Meow Mix]

If it's not a problem and detract from the thread too much, I'm curious what you meant. How do you understand the ontological argument?

Ontological arguments either define God as ontologically necessary and then derive a contradiction somehow from assuming the negation of that argument or by arguing that there must exist one thing which is greater than all other things and must exist in all possible worlds... basically the same thing, just starting in different directions.

 

[Meow Mix]

It is possible that Alvin Plantinga is pulling this stuff out of his butt.

No, S5 is a legitimate axiom in most modal logics but it can be abused... I only quoted Plantinga because I couldn't figure out how to make the little necessarily and possibly signs.

 

[Skwim]

No, S5 is a legitimate axiom in most modal logics but it can be abused... I only quoted Plantinga because I couldn't figure out how to make the little necessarily and possibly signs.

Try these unicodes:

Necessary: & #9633; for &#9633;
Possibly:&#8195; & #9671; for &#9671;

​

But don't include the space between the & and the # ( I also enlarged the two symbols here.)

 

[logician]

So is Maydole's goal a roundabout way to prove that a god must exist?

Otherwise, it seems mostly a manipulation of words.

 

[Meow Mix]

So is Maydole's goal a roundabout way to prove that a god must exist?

Otherwise, it seems mostly a manipulation of words.

Most ontological arguments are just a manipulation of words and twisting obscure axioms to prove something to be ontologically necessary even if it isn't incorrigible.

Maydole and Plantinga both have arguments that rely on abusing axiom S5 in mainstream modal logic. Aquinas just tried to basically define God into necessary existence by defining Him as the greatest imaginable being.

 

[logician]

But the greatest imaginable being could also be an alien of immense power, if one assumes creator gods cannot exist.

 

[Meow Mix]

But the greatest imaginable being could also be an alien of immense power, if one assumes creator gods cannot exist.

Yep, one of the earliest objections to Aquinas was that it also worked to "prove" the existence of the "greatest imaginable island." Which is absurd.

 

[Reptillian]

Yep, one of the earliest objections to Aquinas was that it also worked to "prove" the existence of the "greatest imaginable island." Which is absurd.

Dude, have you even been to New Zealand? :areyoucra

 

[Meow Mix]

Dude, have you even been to New Zealand? :areyoucra

I was born in Ireland. Careful with your implications. My island is the best.

It's MY island.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

It is possible that Alvin Plantinga is pulling this stuff out of his butt.

No, S5 is a legitimate axiom in most modal logics but it can be abused... I only quoted Plantinga because I couldn't figure out how to make the little necessarily and possibly signs.

I do disagree with the way the axiom is used here, but I was actually making a joke.

You said "If possibly P, then necessarily P." Evaluate this statement for the case where P is the premise "Alvin Plantinga is pulling this stuff out of his butt".

 

[Meow Mix]

I do disagree with the way the axiom is used here, but I was actually making a joke.

You said "If possibly P, then necessarily P." Evaluate this statement for the case where P is the premise "Alvin Plantinga is pulling this stuff out of his butt".

Oops, it was supposed to be "If possibly P, then necessarily possibly P"

I missed the second "possibly"

S5 is:

If possibly P, then necessarily possibly P
If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P

But I get what you're saying now

 

[Reptillian]

I was born in Ireland. Careful with your implications. My island is the best.

It's MY island.

I've never been to Ireland, but I can imagine that it is the greatest, the only way it could be possibly greater is if it existed in reality...which it totally does!

Therefore god exists, QED ipso fatso. (wait, thats not right)

(I'd say Ireland comes in a close second after New Zealand...I mean come on, its got bizarre wildlife, fewer people, clear water, unspoiled natural beauty, and southern hemisphere stars...whats Ireland got? shamrocks and pubs? )