Metaphysics in Vedanta

[Terese]

Pranam everyone, I am quite unskilled in the language of metaphysics and the philosophies it entails, but after a recent conversation, I must ask, are objects (anything that in normal waking would be considered separate from the "I") real? Why are they real/not real? Does maya play a role?

Thank you

 

[George-ananda]

Pranam everyone, I am quite unskilled in the language of metaphysics and the philosophies it entails, but after a recent conversation, I must ask, are objects (anything that in normal waking would be considered separate from the "I") real? Why are they real/not real? Does maya play a role?

Thank you

I am unskilled in the language of metaphysics myself also, but here is my lay language understanding.

Brahman/God/Consciousness is the 'I' and the only thing that ultimately exists and called real. It is the immaterial mystery. Maya is a play/drama of Brahman where He separates Himself from Himself and then returns Himself to Himself. So objects as you asked about are only relatively real to individuals immersed in Maya.

 

[Aupmanyav]

I must ask, are objects (anything that in normal waking would be considered separate from the "I") real?

What is 'real'? For whom are we defining this word - 'real'? Is existence real or just a phase of non-existence? Terese, even the enlightened do not know it. 'Maya' is greater than all enlightenment. Let us seek the comforting refuge of our dear Lord Krishna and Srimati Radha Rani.

 

[sayak83]

Pranam everyone, I am quite unskilled in the language of metaphysics and the philosophies it entails, but after a recent conversation, I must ask, are objects (anything that in normal waking would be considered separate from the "I") real? Why are they real/not real? Does maya play a role?

Thank you

Sankara believes that objects are not real. This view is not universally shared across vedanta and is not very prominent in either the Upanisads or the Gita. However Brahma Sutras probably supports this to some extent. Upanisads deal with the idea that all objects ultimate essence is the one Brahman. That does not make objects illusions however.

 

[sayak83]

Pranam everyone, I am quite unskilled in the language of metaphysics and the philosophies it entails, but after a recent conversation, I must ask, are objects (anything that in normal waking would be considered separate from the "I") real? Why are they real/not real? Does maya play a role?

Thank you

According to Yajnavalkya (of BHU and my favorite rishi) Brahman is the ultimate substratum or base of both the external material world and the internal world of consciousness. It's the Unified trunk out of which all phenomena and all experiences branch out.

So regarding the ultimate substratum of person where self is equated with Brahman he states, (BHU 4.3)

21
"Now, this is the aspect of his that is beyond what appears to be good, freedfrom what is bad, and without fear.
"It is like this. As a man embraced by a woman he loves is oblivious to every-thing within or without, so this person embraced by the self (atman) consisting of knowledge is oblivious to everything within or without."Clearly, this is the aspect of his where all desires are fulfilled, where the self is the only desire, and which is free from desires and far from sorrows.

22
"Here a father is not a father, a mother is not a mother, worlds are not worlds, gods are not gods, and Vedas are not Vedas. Here a thief is not a thief, an abortion- ist is not an abortionist, an outcaste is not an outcaste, a pariah is not a pariah, a recluse is not a recluse, and an ascetic is not an ascetic. Neither the good nor the bad follows him, for he has now passed beyond all sorrows of the heart.
23
"Now, he does not see anything here; but although he does not see, he is quite capable of seeing, for it is impossible for the seer to lose his capacity to see, for it is indestructible. But there isn't a second reality here that he could see as something distinct and separate from himself.
..................
30 "Nor does he perceive anything here; but although he does not perceive, he is quite capable of perceiving, for it is impossible for the perceiver to lose his capacity to perceive, for it is indestructible. But there isn't a second reality here that he could perceive as something distinct and separate from himself.
31
"When there is some other thing, then the one can see the other, the one can smell the other, the one can taste the other, the one can speak to the other, the one can hear the other, the one can think of the other, the one can touch the other, and the one can perceive the other.

32"He becomes the one ocean, he becomes the sole seer! This, Your Majesty, is the world of brahman." So did Yajnavalkya instruct him. "This is his highest goal! This is his highest attainment! This is his highest world! This is his highest bliss! On just a fraction of this bliss do other creatures live.


With regards to the universe, this what he says (BHU 3.8)

"Ask, Gargi."
6
She said: "The things above the sky, the things below the earth, and the things between the earth and the sky, as well as all those things people here refer to as past, present, and future—on what, Yajnavalkya, are all these woven back and forth?"
7
He replied: "The things above the sky, the things below the earth, and the things between the earth and the sky, as well as all those things people here refer to as past, present, and future—on space, Gargi, are all these woven back and forth."

"On what, then, is space woven back and forth?"
8
He replied: "That, Gargi, is the imperishable, and Brahmins refer to it like this—it is neither coarse nor fine; it is neither short nor long; it has neither blood nor fat; it is without shadow or darkness; it is without air or space; it is without contact; it has no taste or smell; it is without sight or hearing; it is without speech or mind; it is without energy, breath, or mouth; it is beyond measure; it has nothing within it or outside of it; it does not eat anything; and no one eats it. 9
"This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command the sun and the moon stand apart. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command the earth and the sky stand apart. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command seconds and hours, days and nights, fortnights and months, seasons and years stand apart. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command rivers flow from the snowy mountains in their respective directions, some to the east and others to the west. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command people flatter donors, and gods are dependent on patrons of sacrifices, and forefathers on ancestral offerings.
10
"Without knowing this imperishable, Gargi, even if a man were to make offerings, to offer sacrifices, and to perform austerities in this world for many thousands of years, all that would come to naught. Pitiful is the man, Gargi, who departs from this world without knowing this imperishable. But a man who departs from this world after he has come to know this imperishable (Brahman) —he, Gargi, is a Brah- min.
11
"This is the imperishable, Gargi, which sees but can't be seen; which hears but can't be heard; which thinks but can't be thought of; which perceives but can't be perceived. Besides this imperishable, there is no one that sees, no one that hears, no one that thinks, and no one that perceives."On this very imperishable, Gargi, space is woven back and forth."
12
"Distinguished Brahmins!" said Gargi. "You should consider yourself lucky if you escape from this man by merely paying him your respects. None of you will ever defeat him in a theological debate."
Thereupon, Vacaknavi fell silent.


Thus Brahman is the foundation of both the world and the individual self. I do not see anything here that make it seem that these are illusions. Indeed the arguments presented here would not make sense if they were illusions.

 

[Aupmanyav]

But Sayak, no one knows 'Brahman'. 'Neti-neti', that is all that has been said confidently about it. Is it existence or non-existence or both, at various times, or even simultaneously? Wave, particle or void. Only science can provide us a clue, not philosophy.

नासदासीन नो सदासीत तदानीं नासीद रजो नो व्योमापरो यत् l
न मर्त्युरासीदम्र्तं न तर्हि न रात्र्या अह्न आसीत्प्रकेतः l
तम आसीत तमसा गूळमग्रे.अप्रकेतं सलिलं सर्वमिदम् l
सतो बन्धुमसति निरविन्दन हृदि प्रतीष्याकवयो मनीषा ll
तिरश्चीनो विततो रश्मिरेषामधः स्विदासी.अ.अ.अत l
को अद्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत कुत आजाता कुत इयंविस्र्ष्टिः l
अर्वाग देवा अस्य विसर्जनेनाथा को वेद यताबभूव ll

nāsadāsīna no sadāsīta tadānīṃ nāsīda rajo no vyomāparo yat l
na mṛtyurāsīdamṛtaṃ na tarhi na rātryā ahna āsītpraketaḥ l
tama āsīta tamasā ghūḷamagre.apraketaṃ salilaṃ sarvamāidam l
sato bandhumasati niravindana hṛdi pratīṣyākavayo manīṣā ll
tiraścīno vitato raśmireṣāmadhaḥ svidāsī.a.a.at l
ko addhā veda ka iha pravocat kuta ājātā kuta iyaṃvisṛṣṭiḥ l
arvāg devā asya visarjanenāthā ko veda yatābabhūva ll

Then was not non-existent nor existent, there was no realm of air, no sky beyond it.
Death was not then, nor was there aught immortal, no sign was there, the day's and night's divider.
Darkness there was, at first concealed in darkness, this all was indiscriminate chaos.
Sages who searched with their heart's thought discovered the existent's kinship in the non-existent.
Transversely was their severing line extended, what was above it then, and what below it?
Who verily knows and who can here declare it, whence it was born and whence comes this creation?
The Gods are later than this world's production. Who knows then whence it first came into being?
Rig Veda: Rig-Veda, Book 10: HYMN CXXIX. Creation. (Nasadiya Sukta, not the whole of it but selection)

 

[Terese]

According to Yajnavalkya (of BHU and my favorite rishi) Brahman is the ultimate substratum or base of both the external material world and the internal world of consciousness. It's the Unified trunk out of which all phenomena and all experiences branch out.

So regarding the ultimate substratum of person where self is equated with Brahman he states, (BHU 4.3)

21
"Now, this is the aspect of his that is beyond what appears to be good, freedfrom what is bad, and without fear.
"It is like this. As a man embraced by a woman he loves is oblivious to every-thing within or without, so this person embraced by the self (atman) consisting of knowledge is oblivious to everything within or without."Clearly, this is the aspect of his where all desires are fulfilled, where the self is the only desire, and which is free from desires and far from sorrows.

22
"Here a father is not a father, a mother is not a mother, worlds are not worlds, gods are not gods, and Vedas are not Vedas. Here a thief is not a thief, an abortion- ist is not an abortionist, an outcaste is not an outcaste, a pariah is not a pariah, a recluse is not a recluse, and an ascetic is not an ascetic. Neither the good nor the bad follows him, for he has now passed beyond all sorrows of the heart.
23
"Now, he does not see anything here; but although he does not see, he is quite capable of seeing, for it is impossible for the seer to lose his capacity to see, for it is indestructible. But there isn't a second reality here that he could see as something distinct and separate from himself.
..................
30 "Nor does he perceive anything here; but although he does not perceive, he is quite capable of perceiving, for it is impossible for the perceiver to lose his capacity to perceive, for it is indestructible. But there isn't a second reality here that he could perceive as something distinct and separate from himself.
31
"When there is some other thing, then the one can see the other, the one can smell the other, the one can taste the other, the one can speak to the other, the one can hear the other, the one can think of the other, the one can touch the other, and the one can perceive the other.

32"He becomes the one ocean, he becomes the sole seer! This, Your Majesty, is the world of brahman." So did Yajnavalkya instruct him. "This is his highest goal! This is his highest attainment! This is his highest world! This is his highest bliss! On just a fraction of this bliss do other creatures live.


With regards to the universe, this what he says (BHU 3.8)

"Ask, Gargi."
6
She said: "The things above the sky, the things below the earth, and the things between the earth and the sky, as well as all those things people here refer to as past, present, and future—on what, Yajnavalkya, are all these woven back and forth?"
7
He replied: "The things above the sky, the things below the earth, and the things between the earth and the sky, as well as all those things people here refer to as past, present, and future—on space, Gargi, are all these woven back and forth."

"On what, then, is space woven back and forth?"
8
He replied: "That, Gargi, is the imperishable, and Brahmins refer to it like this—it is neither coarse nor fine; it is neither short nor long; it has neither blood nor fat; it is without shadow or darkness; it is without air or space; it is without contact; it has no taste or smell; it is without sight or hearing; it is without speech or mind; it is without energy, breath, or mouth; it is beyond measure; it has nothing within it or outside of it; it does not eat anything; and no one eats it. 9
"This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command the sun and the moon stand apart. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command the earth and the sky stand apart. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command seconds and hours, days and nights, fortnights and months, seasons and years stand apart. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command rivers flow from the snowy mountains in their respective directions, some to the east and others to the west. This is the imperishable, Gargi, at whose command people flatter donors, and gods are dependent on patrons of sacrifices, and forefathers on ancestral offerings.
10
"Without knowing this imperishable, Gargi, even if a man were to make offerings, to offer sacrifices, and to perform austerities in this world for many thousands of years, all that would come to naught. Pitiful is the man, Gargi, who departs from this world without knowing this imperishable. But a man who departs from this world after he has come to know this imperishable (Brahman) —he, Gargi, is a Brah- min.
11
"This is the imperishable, Gargi, which sees but can't be seen; which hears but can't be heard; which thinks but can't be thought of; which perceives but can't be perceived. Besides this imperishable, there is no one that sees, no one that hears, no one that thinks, and no one that perceives."On this very imperishable, Gargi, space is woven back and forth."
12
"Distinguished Brahmins!" said Gargi. "You should consider yourself lucky if you escape from this man by merely paying him your respects. None of you will ever defeat him in a theological debate."
Thereupon, Vacaknavi fell silent.


Thus Brahman is the foundation of both the world and the individual self. I do not see anything here that make it seem that these are illusions. Indeed the arguments presented here would not make sense if they were illusions.

Thank you Sayak! Are there any quotes in the Upanishads or any Vaidika scriptures that mention and/or talk about the nature of objects?

 

[निताइ dasa]

Vedanta is interesting but the metaphysics really are diverse depending on which school you follow. It doesn't follow an atomic metaphysics like Nyaya, but leans more towards the Samkhya concept of Purush-Prakriti (where the world is a tranformation of Prakriti consisting of the three gunas). Obviously Adwaita says that world is ultimately not real (only Brahman is real), Ramanujacharya says world (and He comments greatly on the distinctions) and variety is real and so does Madhavacharya (the world is Maya, or energy of Vishnu and there is something called Pancha-bheda, or 5 distinctions between Maya, Jiva and Narayana). Us Gaudiyas also say the same (we relate this using the Dasha Mula, which are the 10 principles that Madhavacharya presented) except we divide everything into Brahman, Paramatma and Bhagavan, where the Jivas are part and parcels of Brahman, Maya (i.e the world) is the energy of Bhagavan, and the Paramatma is His localized portion. Srila Baladeva Vidyubhushana, in His Prameya Ratnavali (which is basically a defense of Gaudiya metaphysics) defends the view that the world is real. He gives various quotes, I'll present a few:

ekadesha-sthitastagner
jyotsna vistarini yatha
parasya brahmanah shaktis
tathedam akhilam jagat

"Whatever we see in this world is simply an expansion of different energies of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who is exactly like a fire which spreads illumination for a long distance, although it is situated in one place." (Vishnu Purana)

brahma satyam tapah satyam
satyam caiva prajapatih
satyad bhutani jatani
satyam bhutam ayam jagat

The Mahabharata explains: "Brahman (Vishnu), is real. Austerities are real, and Lord Brahma is also real. Because the living entities and the material world have taken birth from the supreme reality, they are also real." (MBh. -14.35.34. 58)

atma va idam ity adau
vana-lina-vihangavat
sattvam vishvasya mahtavyam
ity uktam veda-vedibhih

When the Vedas explain that in the beginning only the supreme exists, it may be understood that at that time the material world rests within the supreme in it's dormant state and remains invisible, just as a bird which has disappeared into a forest. In this way the knowers of the Vedas assert the reality of the material world. (Baladeva Vidyabhushana)


When the Vedas describe the world is unreal usually a better translation of that word is temporary (i.e in the beginning the world comes from Narayana and at the end it dissolves back into Narayana)


Srimad Bhagavatam also talks alot about this. Jaya Nitai!

 

[Terese]

Vedanta is interesting but the metaphysics really are diverse depending on which school you follow. It doesn't follow an atomic metaphysics like Nyaya, but leans more towards the Samkhya concept of Purush-Prakriti (where the world is a tranformation of Prakriti consisting of the three gunas). Obviously Adwaita says that world is ultimately not real (only Brahman is real), Ramanujacharya says world (and He comments greatly on the distinctions) and variety is real and so does Madhavacharya (the world is Maya, or energy of Vishnu and there is something called Pancha-bheda, or 5 distinctions between Maya, Jiva and Narayana). Us Gaudiyas also say the same (we relate this using the Dasha Mula, which are the 10 principles that Madhavacharya presented) except we divide everything into Brahman, Paramatma and Bhagavan, where the Jivas are part and parcels of Brahman, Maya (i.e the world) is the energy of Bhagavan, and the Paramatma is His localized portion. Srila Baladeva Vidyubhushana, in His Prameya Ratnavali (which is basically a defense of Gaudiya metaphysics) defends the view that the world is real. He gives various quotes, I'll present a few:

ekadesha-sthitastagner
jyotsna vistarini yatha
parasya brahmanah shaktis
tathedam akhilam jagat

"Whatever we see in this world is simply an expansion of different energies of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, who is exactly like a fire which spreads illumination for a long distance, although it is situated in one place." (Vishnu Purana)

brahma satyam tapah satyam
satyam caiva prajapatih
satyad bhutani jatani
satyam bhutam ayam jagat

The Mahabharata explains: "Brahman (Vishnu), is real. Austerities are real, and Lord Brahma is also real. Because the living entities and the material world have taken birth from the supreme reality, they are also real." (MBh. -14.35.34. 58)

atma va idam ity adau
vana-lina-vihangavat
sattvam vishvasya mahtavyam
ity uktam veda-vedibhih

When the Vedas explain that in the beginning only the supreme exists, it may be understood that at that time the material world rests within the supreme in it's dormant state and remains invisible, just as a bird which has disappeared into a forest. In this way the knowers of the Vedas assert the reality of the material world. (Baladeva Vidyabhushana)


When the Vedas describe the world is unreal usually a better translation of that word is temporary (i.e in the beginning the world comes from Narayana and at the end it dissolves back into Narayana)


Srimad Bhagavatam also talks alot about this. Jaya Nitai!

What of the concept of an object? All things are made of atoms and interconnect like a fabric, what makes something separate and non-separate?

 

[निताइ dasa]

What of the concept of an object? All things are made of atoms and interconnect like a fabric, what makes something separate and non-separate?

Its a little difficult to explain, everything is made of Maya which is a unified energy consisting of the three gunas, sattva, tamo and raja (sorta like clay), but that clay differentiates into matter during manifestation of the world, i.e the clay differentiates into the pancha bhutas, or element (air, , fire, , water, earth, feeling, ether, sound). These panchabhutas then form the world. When the jiva enters and becomes covered by Maya, the Jiva also experiences these 5 elements (more specifically the sense objects) through senses (which are also differentiation of Maya). So fundamentally everything is energy (Maya) in a differentiated form, but the subject of this is the jivas.

What makes objects the same is that they are all manifestations of Maya, but what makes them different is the variety within that manifestation that is experienced subjectivley by the Jivas (like a Mango and an Apple are both formed from Maya, but we know they are different because when we Jivas interact with them, the 5 sensory experiences, i.e the look, taste,feel,scent,sound, of the fruit are different). In Vedanta, everything is very subjective, and the jiva lies in the center of it all.

Please see the passage below from Bhagavatam where Lord Kapila is explaning this:

Srimad Bhagavatam: Canto 3 - Chapter 26

 

[Terese]

Its a little difficult to explain, everything is made of Maya which is a unified energy consisting of the three gunas, sattva, tamo and raja (sorta like clay), but that clay differentiates into matter during manifestation of the world, i.e the clay differentiates into the pancha bhutas, or element (air, , fire, , water, earth, feeling, ether, sound). These panchabhutas then form the world. When the jiva enters and becomes covered by Maya, the Jiva also experiences these 5 elements (more specifically the sense objects) through senses (which are also differentiation of Maya). So fundamentally everything is energy (Maya) in a differentiated form, but the subject of this is the jivas.

What makes objects the same is that they are all manifestations of Maya, but what makes them different is the variety within that manifestation that is experienced subjectivley by the Jivas (like a Mango and an Apple are both formed from Maya, but we know they are different because when we Jivas interact with them, the 5 sensory experiences, i.e the look, taste,feel,scent,sound, of the fruit are different). In Vedanta, everything is very subjective, and the jiva lies in the center of it all.

Please see the passage below from Bhagavatam where Lord Kapila is explaning this:

Srimad Bhagavatam: Canto 3 - Chapter 26

Thanks Nitai Daas! Is maya both illusion and Narayana's energy? And of the gunas, what makes them the clay that manifests the material world? How is Vedanta subjective?

 

[निताइ dasa]

Thanks Nitai Daas! Is maya both illusion and Narayana's energy? And of the gunas, what makes them the clay that manifests the material world? How is Vedanta subjective?

Yes Maya is called the illusionary energy, not because it itself is false, but rather because when the Jivas make contact with Maya, they are put under illusion.

So, the clay is the energy or prakriti (which is Maya) but in order for Maya to be directed, will is required, and that is supplied by The Purusha, or Lord Vishnu. Krsna says in the Gita, that is is under His direction that Maya operates and differentiates. What happens is actually a little complex.

When everything is unmanifest, the Lord, as Maya Vishnu desires or wills to create. Then what happens is Lord Vishnu appears as Shabhu (i.e the primeval form of Lord Shiva) and under His direction Maya Devi (Durga) is manifest. The sum total of the universe is then contained in a huge undifferentiated lump called the Marat-tattva. Then Lord Vishnu glances and through His glance, the Jivas enter into that Mahatattva. Then the Lord incarnates again as Kala (time) and under the time, Maya begins to differentiate. Then Lord Brahma appears and so on...

Vedanta is subjective in the sense that it is almost a form of idealism as opposed to realism. Everything is defined in accordance with the atma.

 

[Terese]

When everything is unmanifest, the Lord, as Maya Vishnu desires or wills to create. Then what happens is Lord Vishnu appears as Shabhu (i.e the primeval form of Lord Shiva) and under His direction Maya Devi (Durga) is manifest. The sum total of the universe is then contained in a huge undifferentiated lump called the Marat-tattva. Then Lord Vishnu glances and through His glance, the Jivas enter into that Mahatattva. Then the Lord incarnates again as Kala (time) and under the time, Maya begins to differentiate. Then Lord Brahma appears and so on...

May I ask where this information is from? Never heard of "maya" Vasudeva appear as Lord Siva and direct Durga.

 

[sayak83]

Thank you Sayak! Are there any quotes in the Upanishads or any Vaidika scriptures that mention and/or talk about the nature of objects?

Usually nature of objects is dealt with vaisesika and nyaya. Will that work? I can check what the Upanishads say about it. I do not think it goes much beyond the five elements idea explored in the Chandayoga. So in CYU 6 (svetaketu and uddalaka aruni dialogue), we have a somewhat speculative exposition on how diversity of matter came to be and how they constitute the material aspects of body and mind.

Holy Upanishads: Chhandogya Upanishad: Part 6


In the beginning, my dear, this universe was Being (Sat) alone, one only without a second. Some say that in the beginning this was non-being (asat) alone, one only without a second; and from that non-being, being was born."

2
Aruni said: "But how, indeed, could it be thus, my dear? How could Being be born from non-being? No, my dear, it was Being alone that existed in the beginning, one only without a second.

3
"It (Being, or Brahman) thought: ‘May I be many; may I grow forth.’ It created fire. That fire thought: ‘May I be many; may I grow forth.’ It created water. That is why, whenever a person is hot and perspires, water is produced from fire (heat) alone.

4
"That water thought: ‘May I be many; may I grow forth.’ It created food (i.e. earth). That is why, whenever it rains anywhere, abundant food is produced. From water alone is edible food produced.


......

"The red colour of gross fire is the colour of the original fire; the white colour of gross fire is the colour of the original water; the black colour of gross fire is the colour of the original earth. Thus vanishes from fire what is commonly called fire, the modification being only a name, arising from speech, while the three colours (forms) alone are true.

2
"The red colour of the sun is the colour of fire, the white the colour of water, the black the colour of earth. Thus vanishes from the sun what is commonly called the sun, the modification being only a name, arising from speech, while the three colours alone are true.

3
"The red colour of the moon is the colour of fire, the white the colour of water, the black the colour of earth. Thus vanishes from the moon what is commonly called the moon, the modification being only a name, arising from speech, while the three colours alone are true.

4
"The red colour of lightning is the colour of fire, the white the colour of water, the black the colour of earth. Thus vanishes from lightning what is commonly called lighting, the modification being only a name, arising from speech, while the three colours alone are true.

5
"It was just through this knowledge that the great householders and great Vedic scholars of olden times declared: ‘No one can now mention to us anything which we have not heard, thought of, or known.’ They knew all from these three forms.

6-7
"Whatever, appeared red they knew to be the colour of fire; whatever appeared white they knew to be the colour of water; whatever appeared black they knew to be the colour of earth.

.....


Food when eaten becomes threefold. What is coarsest in it becomes faeces, what is medium becomes flesh and what is subtlest becomes mind.

2
"Water when drunk becomes threefold. What is coarsest in it becomes urine, what is medium becomes blood and what is subtlest becomes prana.

3
"Fire when eaten becomes threefold. What is coarsest in it becomes bone, what is medium becomes marrow and what is subtlest becomes speech.

4
"The mind, my dear, consists of food, the prana of water and speech of heat."

1
"That, my dear, which is the subtlest part of curds rises, when they are churned and becomes butter.

2
"In the same manner, my dear, that which is the subtlest part of the food that is eaten rises and becomes mind.

3
"The subtlest part of the water that is drunk rises and becomes prana.

4
"The subtlest part of the fire that is eaten rises and becomes speech.

5
"Thus, my dear, the mind consists of food, the prana consists of water and speech consists of fire."
"Please, venerable Sir, instruct me further."
"So be it, my dear"

 

[तत्त्वप्रह्व]

Namaste,

are objects (anything that in normal waking would be considered separate from the "I") real? Why are they real/not real?

I think, one should start with 1) how does one know 2) how to ascertain the validity of the process of knowing 3) what is (right) knowledge 4) what is erroneous knowledge? The questions relating to reality of objects of perception as well as those that are not available to immediate perception are not problematic once the above are fully understood. If you can share your understanding on the above 4 questions, it would be a good starting point.

Does maya play a role?

Well, yes, but for now, i would start with considering it as merely an ontological category which is one of the causes of eight-fold activities pertaining to the world. Also note that māyā as only illusion is a post-buddhist interpretation, and is only one among the many different possible contextual interpretations.

श्रीभारतीरमणान्तर्गतश्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।

 

[Terese]

Namaste,


I think, one should start with 1) how does one know 2) how to ascertain the validity of the process of knowing 3) what is (right) knowledge 4) what is erroneous knowledge? The questions relating to reality of objects of perception as well as those that are not available to immediate perception are not problematic once the above are fully understood. If you can share your understanding on the above 4 questions, it would be a good starting point.


Well, yes, but for now, i would start with considering it as merely an ontological category which is one of the causes of eight-fold activities pertaining to the world. Also note that māyā as only illusion is a post-buddhist interpretation, and is only one among the many different possible contextual interpretations.

श्रीभारतीरमणान्तर्गतश्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।

Well, I don't know the answers to all 1, 2, 3 and 4. I'm barely a novice when it comes to philosophical questions like these.

Well, yes, but for now, i would start with considering it as merely an ontological category which is one of the causes of eight-fold activities pertaining to the world. Also note that māyā as only illusion is a post-buddhist interpretation, and is only one among the many different possible contextual interpretations.

What are these eight fold activities? And what are the different possible contextual interpretations? I hope these questions aren't too hefty.

 

[तत्त्वप्रह्व]

I'm barely a novice when it comes to philosophical questions like these.

The purpose of seeking knowledge and its efficacy has been elucidated by different philosophers in different terms. Within vedānta, jñāna (~knowledge) has been generally accepted as one of the, if not the only, efficacious means to mokṣa by all schools of thought. Śāstrīya testimonies abound, so i'm not venturing into this.

For a quick overview of the (historical) development of indian epistemology refer the following:

1] Indian Epistemology
2] Plato Standford
After having studied the above:
The siddhānta (~viewpoint) i follow (tattvavāda) considers all of the above as pūrvapakṣa (~prevalent opinions). Thenceforth:
The term pramāṇa grammatically allows for two meanings: pramā (~knowledge) and pramākaraṇa (~instruments of knowledge). The former is termed as kevalapramāṇa and the latter anupramāṇa. The definition of pramāṇa is given as yathārtha ~ that which does not go beyond the object of knowledge. The pramāta (~cognizer/knower) and the prameya (~cognized/known) are causes of knowledge and not instruments. Thus pramāṇa is that which is primarily, distinctively responsible and instrumental for knowledge, not merely a cause. Kevalapramāṇa is yathārtha-jñāna i.e., that knowledge which does not go beyond its object and yathārthajñāna-sādhana i.e., instruments of valid knowledge is anupramāṇa.

Now based on the prior readings, one can assimilate that knowledge can be classified into three groups:
1) valid knowledge, 2) error, & 3) doubt.
The prābhākara definition of knowledge as all experience is overpervasive since it includes error and doubt. The bhāṭṭa definition of knowledge as prakāśa-viśeṣa (~luminous specialty) abiding in the objects is obviously imaginative in addition to being non-pervasive (ignores means of knowledge, cannot be applied for past and future objects like broken pot or an uncreated pot). While the naiyāyika view as instrument of valid knowledge has limited application, udayana's improvement as whatever is pervaded by valid knowledge, while being a sādhana or āśraya is contrived including āśraya in the definition only to accommodate īśvara who is not a sādhana yet is pramāṇa according to naiyāyikas. The advaitins define pramāṇa as anadhigata-abādhitārtha-jñāna - the cognition which has for content an entity that is not already known (novel) and is not sublated. This would make every subsequent cognition invalid in addition to ignoring the status of memory and anupramāṇas.

Whereas, kevalapramāṇa is self-intuitive knowledge and is decreasingly graded starting with īśvara being sarvajña (~omniscient) lakṣmī, brahma & ṛjus, ṛṣi and yogi-s etc, anupramāṇa would be of broadly three types (most other types held by other schools can be subsumed by one of these three) - pratyakṣa (~perception), anumāna (~inference), and śabda i.e., veda-s (~reliable testimony).
Sense perception is nirdoṣārthendriya-sannikarṣa-jñānaṁ i.e., knowledge produced by right type of contact between flawless sense organs and their appropriate objects. Many schools (naiyāyika-s & mīmānsaka-s) also preclude memory as a valid means of knowledge. Memory can be considered as the direct perception by the mind. The importance of memory as a valid means of knowledge becomes evident when one sees that all inferences based on the remembrance of vyāpti b/w hetu (~probans) & sādhya (prabandum) would cease to be valid. Note: memory is generally considered as the saṁskāras (~impressions) residing in the mind owing to previous experiences. A question here arises as to how are the experience/s remembered as that of the past? Because, the experiences do not represent themselves as such. (the solution perhaps later in the thread).
Inference can be defined as defect-less probans and can be held as resulting from the cognition of vyāpti (~pervasion?) and of the presence of the probans in a place, time, etc. The modified definition of naiyāyikas definition of vyāpti as existence of probandum and probans in the same locus is evidently inappropriate - a flying bird's shadow cast on the ground where probandum and probans are in the sky and ground respectively is a case in point. Different schools posit varying numbers of principles essential for determining vyāpti, but it can be seen that it essentially boils down to concomitance being the only relation on which all inferences rest. Syllogisms too are an important aspect of inference, but for now i think this can wait.
Śabda pramāṇa-s can be classified as pauruṣeya and apauruṣeya, smriti-s & purāṇa-s belong to the former and śruti-s (vedas) to the latter. The Veda-s are svataḥ-prāmāṇya (~self-valid). The concept of apauruṣeyatva (~roughly infallibility) of the Vedas can be illustrated very simply: all our ethics, religion, morality and extrasensory values judgements of dharma and adharma will have to be established on some textual authority which is not a composition of a particular individual and does not derive its validity solely because of such one person for evident reasons. There can be no worthwhile philosophy that does not admit to such values as dharma for in such an event, the whole world will fall into disorder and resort to violence. Since there are really no aparuṣeya (~impersonal) alternatives to the Veda-s, it has to be accepted for in any other case one would have to accept the omniscience of an individual whose authority is being accepted, in addition to establishing the individual's credibility as not being deceiving, and accuracy of those statements so on so forth. [The current generation's credulity in following any and many gurus is really appalling!] The acceptance of aparuṣeyatva is relatively a more elegant solution. There are also tests of validity for verbal testimonies (have listed it elsewhere in this forum, will try to find them again).

Validity of Knowledge
The criteria of truth by which validity of pramāṇas can be evaluated before being accepted by us. The sāṁkhyas hold that this is intrinsic to knowledge, whereas the naiyāyikas hold that both are extrinsic i.e., caused by factors other than those which give rise to or make known the knowledge. The sāṁkhya theory is a roundabout one while the nyāya view would make validity depend on eternal tests, and the validity of the results of the tests depend on another set of test, leading to infinite regress. Attempt to limit the number of tests would lead to acceptance of intrinsic validity. The buddhists consider validity as extrinsic and invalidity intrinsic since knowledge is a form of mental construction. The prābhākaras do not accept invalid knowledge at all and the bhāṭṭas hold that validity is intrinsic while invalidity as being inferential.
It is seen that flawless senses can produce correct knowledge with right contact, thus there is no need for assuming a special characteristic for the purpose. Since knowledge is jaḍa and a modification of the antaḥkaraṇa it cannot be self-validating. Thus a cetana principle is necessary for intuiting the validity of knowledge. This principle is the sākṣi which grasps both knowledge and its validity.

[… … To be contd. … …]

श्रीमध्वेशकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।

 

[Terese]

The purpose of seeking knowledge and its efficacy has been elucidated by different philosophers in different terms. Within vedānta, jñāna (~knowledge) has been generally accepted as one of the, if not the only, efficacious means to mokṣa by all schools of thought. Śāstrīya testimonies abound, so i'm not venturing into this.

For a quick overview of the (historical) development of indian epistemology refer the following:

1] Indian Epistemology
2] Plato Standford
After having studied the above:
The siddhānta (~viewpoint) i follow (tattvavāda) considers all of the above as pūrvapakṣa (~prevalent opinions). Thenceforth:
The term pramāṇa grammatically allows for two meanings: pramā (~knowledge) and pramākaraṇa (~instruments of knowledge). The former is termed as kevalapramāṇa and the latter anupramāṇa. The definition of pramāṇa is given as yathārtha ~ that which does not go beyond the object of knowledge. The pramāta (~cognizer/knower) and the prameya (~cognized/known) are causes of knowledge and not instruments. Thus pramāṇa is that which is primarily, distinctively responsible and instrumental for knowledge, not merely a cause. Kevalapramāṇa is yathārtha-jñāna i.e., that knowledge which does not go beyond its object and yathārthajñāna-sādhana i.e., instruments of valid knowledge is anupramāṇa.

Now based on the prior readings, one can assimilate that knowledge can be classified into three groups:
1) valid knowledge, 2) error, & 3) doubt.
The prābhākara definition of knowledge as all experience is overpervasive since it includes error and doubt. The bhāṭṭa definition of knowledge as prakāśa-viśeṣa (~luminous specialty) abiding in the objects is obviously imaginative in addition to being non-pervasive (ignores means of knowledge, cannot be applied for past and future objects like broken pot or an uncreated pot). While the naiyāyika view as instrument of valid knowledge has limited application, udayana's improvement as whatever is pervaded by valid knowledge, while being a sādhana or āśraya is contrived including āśraya in the definition only to accommodate īśvara who is not a sādhana yet is pramāṇa according to naiyāyikas. The advaitins define pramāṇa as anadhigata-abādhitārtha-jñāna - the cognition which has for content an entity that is not already known (novel) and is not sublated. This would make every subsequent cognition invalid in addition to ignoring the status of memory and anupramāṇas.

Whereas, kevalapramāṇa is self-intuitive knowledge and is decreasingly graded starting with īśvara being sarvajña (~omniscient) lakṣmī, brahma & ṛjus, ṛṣi and yogi-s etc, anupramāṇa would be of broadly three types (most other types held by other schools can be subsumed by one of these three) - pratyakṣa (~perception), anumāna (~inference), and śabda i.e., veda-s (~reliable testimony).
Sense perception is nirdoṣārthendriya-sannikarṣa-jñānaṁ i.e., knowledge produced by right type of contact between flawless sense organs and their appropriate objects. Many schools (naiyāyika-s & mīmānsaka-s) also preclude memory as a valid means of knowledge. Memory can be considered as the direct perception by the mind. The importance of memory as a valid means of knowledge becomes evident when one sees that all inferences based on the remembrance of vyāpti b/w hetu (~probans) & sādhya (prabandum) would cease to be valid. Note: memory is generally considered as the saṁskāras (~impressions) residing in the mind owing to previous experiences. A question here arises as to how are the experience/s remembered as that of the past? Because, the experiences do not represent themselves as such. (the solution perhaps later in the thread).
Inference can be defined as defect-less probans and can be held as resulting from the cognition of vyāpti (~pervasion?) and of the presence of the probans in a place, time, etc. The modified definition of naiyāyikas definition of vyāpti as existence of probandum and probans in the same locus is evidently inappropriate - a flying bird's shadow cast on the ground where probandum and probans are in the sky and ground respectively is a case in point. Different schools posit varying numbers of principles essential for determining vyāpti, but it can be seen that it essentially boils down to concomitance being the only relation on which all inferences rest. Syllogisms too are an important aspect of inference, but for now i think this can wait.
Śabda pramāṇa-s can be classified as pauruṣeya and apauruṣeya, smriti-s & purāṇa-s belong to the former and śruti-s (vedas) to the latter. The Veda-s are svataḥ-prāmāṇya (~self-valid). The concept of apauruṣeyatva (~roughly infallibility) of the Vedas can be illustrated very simply: all our ethics, religion, morality and extrasensory values judgements of dharma and adharma will have to be established on some textual authority which is not a composition of a particular individual and does not derive its validity solely because of such one person for evident reasons. There can be no worthwhile philosophy that does not admit to such values as dharma for in such an event, the whole world will fall into disorder and resort to violence. Since there are really no aparuṣeya (~impersonal) alternatives to the Veda-s, it has to be accepted for in any other case one would have to accept the omniscience of an individual whose authority is being accepted, in addition to establishing the individual's credibility as not being deceiving, and accuracy of those statements so on so forth. [The current generation's credulity in following any and many gurus is really appalling!] The acceptance of aparuṣeyatva is relatively a more elegant solution. There are also tests of validity for verbal testimonies (have listed it elsewhere in this forum, will try to find them again).

Validity of Knowledge
The criteria of truth by which validity of pramāṇas can be evaluated before being accepted by us. The sāṁkhyas hold that this is intrinsic to knowledge, whereas the naiyāyikas hold that both are extrinsic i.e., caused by factors other than those which give rise to or make known the knowledge. The sāṁkhya theory is a roundabout one while the nyāya view would make validity depend on eternal tests, and the validity of the results of the tests depend on another set of test, leading to infinite regress. Attempt to limit the number of tests would lead to acceptance of intrinsic validity. The buddhists consider validity as extrinsic and invalidity intrinsic since knowledge is a form of mental construction. The prābhākaras do not accept invalid knowledge at all and the bhāṭṭas hold that validity is intrinsic while invalidity as being inferential.
It is seen that flawless senses can produce correct knowledge with right contact, thus there is no need for assuming a special characteristic for the purpose. Since knowledge is jaḍa and a modification of the antaḥkaraṇa it cannot be self-validating. Thus a cetana principle is necessary for intuiting the validity of knowledge. This principle is the sākṣi which grasps both knowledge and its validity.

[… … To be contd. … …]

श्रीमध्वेशकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ।

Thank you for those links! And i'm grateful you've taken the time to type all this down. I highly appreciate it.

 

[sayak83]

Thank you for those links! And i'm grateful you've taken the time to type all this down. I highly appreciate it.

Also check out this post and the posts following them. They describe the Nyaya view of the material world. It's quite sophisticated.

Place of Rational Inquiry in Dharmic Worldviews

 

[Terese]

Also check out this post and the posts following them. They describe the Nyaya view of the material world. It's quite sophisticated.

Place of Rational Inquiry in Dharmic Worldviews

Thanks Sayak! Any links about Vedanta?