Methodological Naturalism: What it is (and how to make it a vital part of your love life)!

[Sunstone]

DIRE WARNING: Grab hold of some nearby sturdy object because you are about to be subjected to the wild and frolicsome views of Sunstone, and those views DO NOT always represent the consensus opinion of scholars working in the field. So exercise due caution! Be skeptical! Dare to think for yourself! On the other hand, only an insufferable perkle-squatting snooksome Turklefench would disagree with me.

EVEN MORE DIRE WARNING: This OP is in the process of being updated.​

Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace (1749 – 1827) was one the world's great mathematical physicists. In 1802, he presented his definitive work on the properties of the solar system to Napoleon. Napoleon asked Laplace if it was true that there was no mention of the solar system’s Creator (i.e. God) in Laplace's work. Laplace simply replied, “I had no need of that hypothesis.”​

DEFINITION OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Now and then someone asks, "Why can't the sciences study the supernatural or metaphysical?" That's a good question, and there is more than one way of answering it. For instance, one can simply say, as Laplace did, that supernatural or metaphysical entities are unnecessary hypotheses. That is, that nature can be explained without reference to them.

An idea that is very similar to the notion that "supernatural or metaphysical entities are unnecessary hypotheses" is the notion of metaphysical naturalism.

There are several different ways of defining "methodological naturalism", and some of those definitions contradict each other. However, the preliminary definition I will be using in this thread is, "the notion that scientific methods of inquiry confine science to the study of what is empirically detectable."

It is important to note that methodological naturalism neither affirms nor denies the existence of supernatural or metaphysical things. It merely recognizes that they are (at least currently) outside the scope of any scientific methods of inquiry.

Methodological naturalism differs from metaphysical naturalism (also called, "philosophical naturalism" or "ontological naturalism"). Metaphysical naturalism, unlike methodological naturalism, speculates that nothing beyond the natural exists.


LOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

The logical structure of the sciences crucially rests on the principle of reliable inter-subjective verification (RISV). RISV means that something, such as a fact, is capable of being reliably verified by two or more persons.

If we ask why scientific methods of inquiry confine the sciences to the study of what is empirically detectable, then the answer is the principle of RISV. Only things that are empirically detectable can be RISVed, and the sciences deal only in things that can be RISVed. If it cannot be -- at least in principle -- RISVed, then it ain't science.

Or put differently, since the scientific methods of inquiry crucially rest on the principle of RISV, they presuppose methodological naturalism - at least currently. .


ALL TOO BRIEF HISTORY OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Sometime during the 1960s, Paul de Vries, a professor of philosophy at Wheaton College in Illinois[2], began using the term in conversations with his colleagues and students. It was not until 1986, however, that he first used the term in print.

Among other things, de Vries wanted to provide people with a way of thinking about the foundation of the sciences that did not require them to assume metaphysical naturalism -- which, as we have seen, denies the existence of a transcendent god or gods.


IMPORTANCE TO THE SCIENCES.

Methodological naturalism is often called "key to the sciences as practiced today", a "cornerstone of the sciences", and other such terms. But this does not mean that any given scientist is required to subscribe to methodological naturalism in order to do science. In fact, only the more philosophically inclined scientists are likely to be concerned with it.

Having said that, methodological naturalism can be viewed as to some significant extent, a description of what scientists actually do. That is, a scientist need not even know of the concept itself in order to do his or her job in a manner consistent with the concept -- and that in fact is what most scientists do. They do, in fact, behave in manners consistent with the concept of methodological naturalism.

Methodological naturalism also challenges scientism. That is, methodological naturalism can be seen as an argument that -- logically speaking -- science can be done without assuming metaphysical naturalism, which is a necessary assumption of scientism.


KINDS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Absolute Methodological Naturalism is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural or metaphysical facts, even if there are some.

Contingent Methodological Naturalism is the view that, based on experience, it is most likely a waste of time and resources to look for empirically confirmable supernatural or metaphysical facts. Nevertheless, such things are not actually impossible.​

CRITICISMS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

The most vocal critics of methodological naturalism are proponents of creationism or intelligent design. A frequent argument is that methodological naturalism somehow does not apply to sciences that rely even in part on historical evidence -- such as the fossil record. But that claim is merely made and not at all adequately defended. There appear to be no logical or evidential reasons for saying methodological naturalism cannot be applied to sciences that rely on historical evidence.

Metaphysical naturalists often criticize methodological naturalism on the grounds that it falls short of recognizing that nature is all there is. To the metaphysical naturalist, the amazing success of the sciences strongly suggests that metaphysical naturalism is a fully warranted assumption. However, while such an argument might address what we should believe, it cannot adequately serve to address what we actually know.

Comments? Observations? Distress Calls? Nude Selfies?


___________________________
[1]
[2] Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois is one of America's leading Evangelical institutes of higher learning.

 

[Mock Turtle]

Napoleon asked Laplace if it was true that there was no mention of the solar system’s Creator (i.e. God) in Laplace's work. Laplace simply replied, “I had no need of that hypothesis.”

... he should have added - we have enough problems as humans without adding complications.

 

[ADigitalArtist]

Wonder what a person who believes the term 'supernatural' is a misnomer, and that things commonly thought of as supernatural are just extensions of nature that are unknown might call themselves. Like someone who might be a metaphyscal naturalist but also believes in ghosts?

I'm not one of them but I could see 'supernatural' being a challenging term in esablishing categories here at times.

 

[Subduction Zone]

DIRE WARNING: Grab hold of some nearby sturdy object because you are about to be subjected to the wild and frolicsome views of Sunstone, and those views DO NOT always represent the consensus opinion of scholars working in the field. So exercise due caution! Be skeptical! Dare to think for yourself! On the other hand, only an insufferable perkle-squatting snooksome Turklefench would disagree with me. ​

Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace (1749 – 1827) was one the world's great mathematical physicists. In 1802, he presented his definitive work on the properties of the solar system to Napoleon. Napoleon asked Laplace if it was true that there was no mention of the solar system’s Creator (i.e. God) in Laplace's work. Laplace simply replied, “I had no need of that hypothesis.”


DEFINITION OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Now and then someone asks, "Why can't the sciences study the supernatural?" There is more than one way of answering that question, but one of those ways is to point to methodological naturalism.

Methodological naturalism is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the sciences, and it is essentially the recognition that the methods of the sciences do not logically require any references to supernatural or metaphysical things in order to produce reliable knowledge.

Put roughly, methodological naturalism holds that "god is an unnecessary hypothesis". It does not deny the existence of supernatural or metaphysical things. Instead, it treats them as irrelevant to the scientific methods of inquiry. In that respect, methodological naturalism differs from metaphysical naturalism (also called, "philosophical naturalism" and "ontological naturalism"). Metaphysical naturalism, unlike methodological naturalism, speculates that nothing beyond the natural exists.


ALL TOO BRIEF HISTORY OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

The core notion expressed by metaphysical naturalism -- the notion that any and all metaphysical hypotheses are logically unnecessary to the conduct of the sciences -- has precursors in the history of Western thought dating all the way back to Thales, 2,600 years ago. By the 1100s, several scholars are demanding that metaphysical explanations of natural events be as few as possible. Perhaps more significantly, Francis Bacon is calling for a science free of metaphysical assumptions by the early 1600s. However, the term "methodological naturalism" itself is of much more recent coinage.

Sometime during the 1960s, Paul de Vries, a professor of philosophy at Wheaton College in Illinois*, began using the term in conversations with his colleagues and students. It was not until 1986, however, that he first used the term in print.

Among other things, de Vries wanted to provide people with a way of thinking about the foundation of the sciences that did not require them to assume metaphysical naturalism -- which, as we have seen, denies the existence of a transcendent god or gods.


IMPORTANCE TO THE SCIENCES.

Methodological naturalism is often called "key to the sciences as practiced today", a "cornerstone of the sciences", and other such terms. But this does not mean that any given scientist is required to subscribe to methodological naturalism in order to do science. In fact, only the more philosophically inclined scientists are likely to be concerned with it.

Having said that, methodological naturalism can be viewed as to some significant extent, a description of what scientists actually do. That is, a scientist need not even know of the concept itself in order to do his or her job in a manner consistent with the concept -- and that in fact is what most scientists do. The do, in fact, behave in manners consistent with the concept of methodological naturalism.

Methodological naturalism also challenges scientism. That is, methodological naturalism can be seen as an argument that -- logically speaking -- science can be done without assuming metaphysical naturalism, which is a necessary assumption of scientism.


LOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Most treatments of methodological naturalism describe it as an "assumption" or even an "axiom" of the sciences. However, I think it is merely derivative of the notion of reliable inter-subjective verification (RISV).

RISV is a core principle of the sciences. Most other foundational principles of the sciences follow logically from it. The principle of methodological naturalism is no exception. Put simply, you cannot reliably inter-subjectively verify the existence of supernatural and metaphysical entities. But if the sciences crucially depend on reliably inter-subjective verification, then that means they cannot depend on knowledge of supernatural or metaphysical entities.

Thus, in my view, methodological naturalism is neither an assumption nor axiom of the sciences so much as it is to be logically derived from a foundational principle of the sciences. The principle of RISV.


KINDS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Absolute Methodological Naturalism is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural or metaphysical facts, even if there are some.

Contingent Methodological Naturalism is the view that, based on experience, it is most likely a waste of time and resources to look for empirically confirmable supernatural or metaphysical facts. Nevertheless, such things are not actually impossible.​

CRITICISMS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

The most vocal critics of methodological naturalism are proponents of creationism or intelligent design. A frequent argument is that methodological naturalism somehow does not apply to sciences that rely even in part on historical evidence -- such as the fossil record. But that claim is merely made and not at all adequately defended. There appear to be no logical or evidential reasons for saying methodological naturalism cannot be applied to sciences that rely on historical evidence.

Metaphysical naturalists often criticize methodological naturalism on the grounds that it falls short of recognizing that nature is all there is. To the metaphysical naturalist, the amazing success of the sciences strongly suggests that metaphysical naturalism is a fully warranted assumption. However, while such an argument might address what we should believe, it cannot adequately serve to address what we actually know.

Comments? Observations? Distress Calls?


___________________________
*Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois is one of America's leading Evangelical institutes of higher learning.

One point that needs to be emphasized for our theists members it hat Methodological Naturalism does not refute God. It merely points out that no use has been found for one in explaining our universe. Some creationists act as if refuting the stories of Genesis somehow refutes God when it only refutes their personal version of God. But then to take it one step further the beliefs of Flat Earthers are regularly refuted by Methodological Naturalism. Most creationists will understand how refuting the Flat Earth God does not refute God. Too bad they can't see that when it comes to their own beliefs.

 

[sayak83]

DIRE WARNING: Grab hold of some nearby sturdy object because you are about to be subjected to the wild and frolicsome views of Sunstone, and those views DO NOT always represent the consensus opinion of scholars working in the field. So exercise due caution! Be skeptical! Dare to think for yourself! On the other hand, only an insufferable perkle-squatting snooksome Turklefench would disagree with me. ​

Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace (1749 – 1827) was one the world's great mathematical physicists. In 1802, he presented his definitive work on the properties of the solar system to Napoleon. Napoleon asked Laplace if it was true that there was no mention of the solar system’s Creator (i.e. God) in Laplace's work. Laplace simply replied, “I had no need of that hypothesis.”


DEFINITION OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Now and then someone asks, "Why can't the sciences study the supernatural?" There is more than one way of answering that question, but one of those ways is to point to methodological naturalism.

Methodological naturalism is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the sciences, and it is essentially the recognition that the methods of the sciences do not logically require any references to supernatural or metaphysical things in order to produce reliable knowledge.

Put roughly, methodological naturalism holds that "god is an unnecessary hypothesis". It does not deny the existence of supernatural or metaphysical things. Instead, it treats them as irrelevant to the scientific methods of inquiry. In that respect, methodological naturalism differs from metaphysical naturalism (also called, "philosophical naturalism" and "ontological naturalism"). Metaphysical naturalism, unlike methodological naturalism, speculates that nothing beyond the natural exists.


ALL TOO BRIEF HISTORY OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

The core notion expressed by metaphysical naturalism -- the notion that any and all metaphysical hypotheses are logically unnecessary to the conduct of the sciences -- has precursors in the history of Western thought dating all the way back to Thales, 2,600 years ago. By the 1100s, several scholars are demanding that metaphysical explanations of natural events be as few as possible. Perhaps more significantly, Francis Bacon is calling for a science free of metaphysical assumptions by the early 1600s. However, the term "methodological naturalism" itself is of much more recent coinage.

Sometime during the 1960s, Paul de Vries, a professor of philosophy at Wheaton College in Illinois*, began using the term in conversations with his colleagues and students. It was not until 1986, however, that he first used the term in print.

Among other things, de Vries wanted to provide people with a way of thinking about the foundation of the sciences that did not require them to assume metaphysical naturalism -- which, as we have seen, denies the existence of a transcendent god or gods.


IMPORTANCE TO THE SCIENCES.

Methodological naturalism is often called "key to the sciences as practiced today", a "cornerstone of the sciences", and other such terms. But this does not mean that any given scientist is required to subscribe to methodological naturalism in order to do science. In fact, only the more philosophically inclined scientists are likely to be concerned with it.

Having said that, methodological naturalism can be viewed as to some significant extent, a description of what scientists actually do. That is, a scientist need not even know of the concept itself in order to do his or her job in a manner consistent with the concept -- and that in fact is what most scientists do. The do, in fact, behave in manners consistent with the concept of methodological naturalism.

Methodological naturalism also challenges scientism. That is, methodological naturalism can be seen as an argument that -- logically speaking -- science can be done without assuming metaphysical naturalism, which is a necessary assumption of scientism.


LOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Most treatments of methodological naturalism describe it as an "assumption" or even an "axiom" of the sciences. However, I think it is merely derivative of the notion of reliable inter-subjective verification (RISV).

RISV is a core principle of the sciences. Most other foundational principles of the sciences follow logically from it. The principle of methodological naturalism is no exception. Put simply, you cannot reliably inter-subjectively verify the existence of supernatural and metaphysical entities. But if the sciences crucially depend on reliably inter-subjective verification, then that means they cannot depend on knowledge of supernatural or metaphysical entities.

Thus, in my view, methodological naturalism is neither an assumption nor axiom of the sciences so much as it is to be logically derived from a foundational principle of the sciences. The principle of RISV.


KINDS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

Absolute Methodological Naturalism is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural or metaphysical facts, even if there are some.

Contingent Methodological Naturalism is the view that, based on experience, it is most likely a waste of time and resources to look for empirically confirmable supernatural or metaphysical facts. Nevertheless, such things are not actually impossible.​

CRITICISMS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM.

The most vocal critics of methodological naturalism are proponents of creationism or intelligent design. A frequent argument is that methodological naturalism somehow does not apply to sciences that rely even in part on historical evidence -- such as the fossil record. But that claim is merely made and not at all adequately defended. There appear to be no logical or evidential reasons for saying methodological naturalism cannot be applied to sciences that rely on historical evidence.

Metaphysical naturalists often criticize methodological naturalism on the grounds that it falls short of recognizing that nature is all there is. To the metaphysical naturalist, the amazing success of the sciences strongly suggests that metaphysical naturalism is a fully warranted assumption. However, while such an argument might address what we should believe, it cannot adequately serve to address what we actually know.

Comments? Observations? Distress Calls?


___________________________
*Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois is one of America's leading Evangelical institutes of higher learning.

If God can be inter-subjectively verified, then it would become a part of the subject matter of Methodological Naturalism?

I continue to remain confused as to why people, despite the unanimous intersubjective evidence for free will, neuroscientists say there isn't any.

 

[Sunstone]

If God can be inter-subjectively verified, then it would become a part of the subject matter of Methodological Naturalism

Yes, if reliably inter-subjectively verified. At least in my opinion, it would.

 

[Sunstone]

I continue to remain confused as to why people, despite the unanimous intersubjective evidence for free will, neuroscientists say there isn't any.

When I speak of reliable inter-subjective verification (RISV) being a core or foundational principle of the sciences, I almost always neglect to mention that RISV in practice takes place within the context of ones peers in knowledge. Not mentioning it is a habit of mine intended to streamline the conversation. However, it does have the negative effect of misleading people now and then.

In the ancient world, around 400 BC, a small group of people knew the world was spherical while most people thought it was flat. Those who knew the world was spherical were a bit analogous to today's neuroscientists in that their beliefs were in all likelihood based on information that most people at the time were not privy to.

Please note: I am not trying to argue here for the notion that free will does not exist. I'm just saying that the neuroscientists could be right about free will even thought they are in the minority when it comes to inter-subjective verification because their knowledge base is significantly different from that of the majority's.

 

[Sunstone]

Wonder what a person who believes the term 'supernatural' is a misnomer, and that things commonly thought of as supernatural are just extensions of nature that are unknown might call themselves. Like someone who might be a metaphyscal naturalist but also believes in ghosts?

I'm not one of them but I could see 'supernatural' being a challenging term in esablishing categories here at times.

Interesting point. I'm of the opinion that if such things as ghosts, etc have any reality at all, they are natural phenomena. I think it's possible for that to be true and for our sciences to be decades or even centuries away from explaining them.

 

[Terese]

On the other hand, only an insufferable perkle-squatting snooksome Turklefench would disagree with me.

I disagree vehemently!...Just joking Great thread Phil! Fully deserves a "winner" rating! I don't know much about scienctism, i'll have to look that up. And i'm still trying to remember the differences of metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism when i see the words. Don't worry, it'll come to me!

 

[Sunstone]

I disagree vehemently!...Just joking Great thread Phil! Fully deserves a "winner" rating! I don't know much about scienctism, i'll have to look that up. And i'm still trying to remember the differences of metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism when i see the words. Don't worry, it'll come to me!

If you come up with any questions or comments, I'd be interested to hear them.

 

[PureX]

Science is nothing more than a method for determining the physical functionality of an ideological proposition. And the main problem with this endeavor is that it cannot address ideological propositions that do not directly result in some expression of physical functionality. By that I mean it cannot address the VALUE of that functionality. Only it's presence or lack of.

In the 1940s and 50s many scientists were diligently working to attain the ability to cause an explosion so great that it could threaten the extinction of all life on Earth. I am sure that the nihilistic absurdity of this quest must have crossed their minds, as they were intelligent men and women, yet not one of them had the courage or the intellectual capability needed to effectively question or even quantify the value of their own scientific quest. Not one. Because they were scientists, and science cannot address the phenomenology of value. It can only address the functionality of a given physical proposition.

As a tool, science has been a great asset for humanity. But unfortunately it's a tool with no mind or morality of it's own, and no means of addressing it, built in. And therefor it only increases our physical effectiveness, while ignoring the value of our application of that effectiveness. A chimp with a loaded pistol is not a reasonable value increase over a chimp without one. And yet all science has been able to provide humanity with are more powerful and effective tools. It has done NOTHING to increase our understanding of the relative value of that increased effectiveness. And so sooner or later the chimp is going to blow it's own head off. It's inevitable. Unless we recognize that increased functionality, in and of itself, is not a value. And that functionality is not 'truth', nor the be-all and end-all of our reality.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

Methodological naturalism is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the sciences, and it is essentially the recognition that the methods of the sciences do not logically require any references to supernatural or metaphysical things in order to produce reliable knowledge. Put roughly, methodological naturalism holds that "god is an unnecessary hypothesis". It does not deny the existence of supernatural or metaphysical things. Instead, it treats them as irrelevant to the scientific methods of inquiry.

That's a little different than the way I have come to understand methodological naturalism, which is that whether there is more to reality that what we can detect or not, only that which is detectable and therefore observable can be subject to the scientific method (hence methodological). I don't see a reference to gods in that.

As worded above, it seems like a philosophical position similar to the principle of parsimony in Occam's Razor. Gods don't find their way into science not just because they cannot be found, but even if found, that is, could be subjected to the scientific method, they woulds still add nothing to the explanatory and predictive power of any scientific theory. We could know for a fact that gods exist and still leave them out of our science except as another matter to study.

Methodological naturalism, to me, is a statement of the what the limits of scientific inquiry are

methodological naturalism can be viewed as to some significant extent, a description of what scientists actually do. That is, a scientist need not even know of the concept itself in order to do his or her job in a manner consistent with the concept -- and that in fact is what most scientists do. The do, in fact, behave in manners consistent with the concept of methodological naturalism.

This is more like my understanding of methodological naturalism.

Thus, in my view, methodological naturalism is neither an assumption nor axiom of the sciences so much as it is to be logically derived from a foundational principle of the sciences. The principle of RISV.

What if you and I were the last survivors on earth, and did science. There could be no more intersubjective verification. Would that change the fact that our subject is necessarily physical reality? That is, wouldn't methodological materialism still be imposed on us perforce even without the RISV?

I continue to remain confused as to why people, despite the unanimous intersubjective evidence for free will, neuroscientists say there isn't any.

Neuroscientists are essentially saying that what people are agreeing about is not necessarily free will, but an illusion of free will. What people are agreeing about is that they experience and urge or desire to commit some act, and that when possible, perform it. If that is what one means by free will, it self-evidently exists, and through intersubjective verification, can discover that others agree.

The neuroscientists are suggesting is that this may be an illusion - that the self is not the author of these urges and desires, but a passive observer of them being delivered from extramental (unconscious) neural circuits both to consciousness and the neuromuscular system, and not necessarily in that order.

One might argue that he often overrides such impulses, and that that is the free will, or what some call free won't. But that doesn't eliminate the problem. Both sets of desires - perhaps the urge to smoke a cigarette and the simultaneous will to quit - are each the product of extramental elements playing tog-of-war in the view of the self seated in the center of its theater of parading conscious phenomena. The fact that the self doesn't know which will win in any given case suggest that that might be what is happening - two opposing desires do battle before the self with the self not being involved in determining the outcome.

Is the self an actor, or merely a voyeur? It might be difficult to determine without studying brains (Libet experiment) if they feel the same.

And i'm still trying to remember the differences of metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism when i see the words.

As I understand it, the former is a philosophical option and opinion more or less synonymous with what is often called materialism, and the latter a brute force fact of life.

 

[sayak83]

That's a little different than the way I have come to understand methodological naturalism, which is that whether there is more to reality that what we can detect or not, only that which is detectable and therefore observable can be subject to the scientific method (hence methodological). I don't see a reference to gods in that.

As worded above, it seems like a philosophical position similar to the principle of parsimony in Occam's Razor. Gods don't find their way into science not just because they cannot be found, but even if found, that is, could be subjected to the scientific method, they woulds still add nothing to the explanatory and predictive power of any scientific theory. We could know for a fact that gods exist and still leave them out of our science except as another matter to study.

Methodological naturalism, to me, is a statement of the what the limits of scientific inquiry are



This is more like my understanding of methodological naturalism.



What if you and I were the last survivors on earth, and did science. There could be no more intersubjective verification. Would that change the fact that our subject is necessarily physical reality? That is, wouldn't methodological materialism still be imposed on us perforce even without the RISV?



Neuroscientists are essentially saying that what people are agreeing about is not necessarily free will, but an illusion of free will. What people are agreeing about is that they experience and urge or desire to commit some act, and that when possible, perform it. If that is what one means by free will, it self-evidently exists, and through intersubjective verification, can discover that others agree.

The neuroscientists are suggesting is that this may be an illusion - that the self is not the author of these urges and desires, but a passive observer of them being delivered from extramental (unconscious) neural circuits both to consciousness and the neuromuscular system, and not necessarily in that order.

One might argue that he often overrides such impulses, and that that is the free will, or what some call free won't. But that doesn't eliminate the problem. Both sets of desires - perhaps the urge to smoke a cigarette and the simultaneous will to quit - are each the product of extramental elements playing tog-of-war in the view of the self seated in the center of its theater of parading conscious phenomena. The fact that the self doesn't know which will win in any given case suggest that that might be what is happening - two opposing desires do battle before the self with the self not being involved in determining the outcome.

Is the self an actor, or merely a voyeur? It might be difficult to determine without studying brains (Libet experiment) if they feel the same.



As I understand it, the former is a philosophical option and opinion more or less synonymous with what is often called materialism, and the latter a brute force fact of life.

Why exclude my unconscious from the self?

 

[sun rise]

On the other hand, only an insufferable perkle-squatting snooksome Turklefench would disagree with me.

Get thee behind me, @Sunstone, for tempting me so well.

"god is an unnecessary hypothesis".

That's basically my thought.

Absolute Methodological Naturalism is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural or metaphysical facts, even if there are some.

Contingent Methodological Naturalism is the view that, based on experience, it is most likely a waste of time and resources to look for empirically confirmable supernatural or metaphysical facts. Nevertheless, such things are not actually impossible.

This is an area where people need to be really careful. I basically have no issue with the "contingent" view but discrimination is useful. Take, to use one of my favorite points, reincarnation. There are many others.

Many if not most would assert this is a supernatural/metaphysical idea and thus not testable and falsifiable. It can make people uncomfortable to consider an idea that might indeed be testable even if the mechanism is at least currently beyond the grasp of experimentation.

But as this Scientific American Blog post argued, it might be a mistake to put such research into the "woo woo" category Ian Stevenson’s Case for the Afterlife: Are We ‘Skeptics’ Really Just Cynics?

The neuroscientists are suggesting is that this may be an illusion - that the self is not the author of these urges and desires, but a passive observer of them being delivered from extramental (unconscious) neural circuits both to consciousness and the neuromuscular system, and not necessarily in that order.

This is a very interesting area for me. Mystics have been saying forever that the world is an illusion of the senses and that reality is quite something quite different. This view by neuroscientists is very close to that proposition.

 

[Sunstone]

That's a little different than the way I have come to understand methodological naturalism, which is that whether there is more to reality that what we can detect or not, only that which is detectable and therefore observable can be subject to the scientific method (hence methodological). I don't see a reference to gods in that.

As worded above, it seems like a philosophical position similar to the principle of parsimony in Occam's Razor. Gods don't find their way into science not just because they cannot be found, but even if found, that is, could be subjected to the scientific method, they woulds still add nothing to the explanatory and predictive power of any scientific theory. We could know for a fact that gods exist and still leave them out of our science except as another matter to study.

Methodological naturalism, to me, is a statement of the what the limits of scientific inquiry are

Good points! I need to mull over what you've said here and perhaps re-word the OP a bit to reflect some of the issues you've raised. Thanks so much for the critique.

What if you and I were the last survivors on earth, and did science. There could be no more intersubjective verification.

I'm not sure what you mean there. Inter-subjective verification by definition is the verification of something by two or more subjects or persons. If you and I were the last survivors on earth, we could indeed inter-subjectively verify things. Perhaps you meant to say, "If one of us was the last survivor on earth, and hence, inter-subjective verification was impossible...."

Would that change the fact that our subject is necessarily physical reality? That is, wouldn't methodological materialism still be imposed on us perforce even without the RISV?

That's a good question.

In my opinion, there would be no logical reason why methodological materialism would be imposed on a sole survivor. The survivor might choose to impose it on themselves, but that decision would not be logically forced upon them. As the sole survivor, he or she could simply redefine science as "Anything I myself can verify". That is, as based on subjective verification alone. Redefining science in that manner would be permitted because the only person he or she would need to convince of something would be themselves, and that would not necessarily require them to restrict their inquiry to methodological materialism.

 

[Sunstone]

Science is nothing more than a method for determining the physical functionality of an ideological proposition. And the main problem with this endeavor is that it cannot address ideological propositions that do not directly result in some expression of physical functionality. By that I mean it cannot address the VALUE of that functionality. Only it's presence or lack of.

In the 1940s and 50s many scientists were diligently working to attain the ability to cause an explosion so great that it could threaten the extinction of all life on Earth. I am sure that the nihilistic absurdity of this quest must have crossed their minds, as they were intelligent men and women, yet not one of them had the courage or the intellectual capability needed to effectively question or even quantify the value of their own scientific quest. Not one. Because they were scientists, and science cannot address the phenomenology of value. It can only address the functionality of a given physical proposition.

As a tool, science has been a great asset for humanity. But unfortunately it's a tool with no mind or morality of it's own, and no means of addressing it, built in. And therefor it only increases our physical effectiveness, while ignoring the value of our application of that effectiveness. A chimp with a loaded pistol is not a reasonable value increase over a chimp without one. And yet all science has been able to provide humanity with are more powerful and effective tools. It has done NOTHING to increase our understanding of the relative value of that increased effectiveness. And so sooner or later the chimp is going to blow it's own head off. It's inevitable. Unless we recognize that increased functionality, in and of itself, is not a value. And that functionality is not 'truth', nor the be-all and end-all of our reality.

As you know, your rant is wholly irrelevant in this thread. The OP has nothing to do with what you've chosen to rant about. If you wish a soapbox for your views, then you are free to start a thread on them. But please don't attempt to derail this thread.

 

[PureX]

As you know, your rant is wholly irrelevant in this thread. The OP has nothing to do with what you've chosen to rant about. If you wish a soapbox for your views, then you are free to start a thread on them. But please don't attempt to derail this thread.

Well, then you're going to have be more clear about what you thought this thread was about. Because I was responding to what I understood you to be trying to illuminate. That is the innate and often unacknowledged limitations of the scientific method. And that's what science is: a limited methodology for ascertaining relative functionality.

 

[Sunstone]

Well, then you're going to have be more clear about what you thought this thread was about. Because I was responding to what I understood you to be trying to illuminate. That is the innate and often unacknowledged limitations of the scientific method. And that's what science is: a limited methodology for ascertaining relative functionality.

Start a thread on it.

 

[PureX]

I used to do an experiment while riding the bus when I was living in Chicago. As the bus would pass through a particularly busy part of the city, with a lot of people walking along the sidewalks, I would pick one person out at random, that was walking the same direction as the bus was traveling, and I'd stare at them for a second to two, to see if I could get them to intuit my watching them, and turn around. And I was surprised by the frequency by which people appeared to sense they were being watched, and turned around to see if or who was watching them. It's been may years, so I don't recall the exact ratio, but I think it was something like one in three or four. Which seemed like a lot, to me. Far more than would ever have turned to look behind them as a natural course of their walk just as I was passing by on a bus.

But science cannot do anything with such an experimental result/observation, because it can't detect or quantify the possible medium through which a relationship between my mental focus on someone and their detection of it might have occurred. Science cannot look for or study what it does not already recognize as a physical phenomena. The term "natural" in this instance is a major bias. And a significant limitation. This is the point I was trying to make. And it's an issue that causes we humans great problems in terms of the quality of our life experience.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

Why exclude my unconscious from the self?

Spoiler: off topic digression

I make a distinction between the self, which is the observer of the phenomena of consciousness, and their source. Which of the phenomena of consciousness are put there by the self? Possibly none. Where does thirst come from. I feel thirsty and using my will, go get a drink. That message came from outside of consciousness - unconscious and invisible circuits in the hypothalamic osmostat. Isn't that a different thing from the self?

When I refer to the self, I am referring to the thing experiencing the mind, and experiencing itself experiencing the mind (self-awarenesss). This excludes not only the material sources of these phenomena including brain centers whose actions are invisible to us (we are unconscious of them) until they are phenomenologically reported to the self (as when we remember something, which can be described as something from the unconscious memory circuits bubbling up into consciousness again) but also conscious phenomena, which are the object of the self's (the subject's) apprehension.

The self and the unconscious activities of the mind are not disconnected, but they seem like distinct things to me.

And it is from this perspective that we can conceive of separating the will from the self. The illusion, according to those who suggest that there may be one, is that the self is the author of its desires. We know that it didn't make itself thirsty or want a drink. This urge definitely comes from outside of the theater of consciousness, the unconscious (extra-conscious), and there is nothing free about having that desire. One is free to obey it, and if another part of the unconscious informs the self that this would be an inopportune time to do so, one instruction may supersede the other with neither being freely.

This may be what is happening, and what is being called the illusion of free will as if it is the self making the decisions when it is not.