Monism and Buddhism

[Kirran]

I'm curious about people's views on this. I've read that monism can exist within Buddhism, but haven't found much information about it. I wonder if you could answer some questions for me:

How common are monistic views among Buddhists? Is monism vs. dualism something addressed by many Buddhist schools, or is it largely considered irrelevant or unknowable? Are there are any particular schools which do generally espouse monistic views? Are any of the Buddhists here on RF monists?

Thankyou all

 

[Twilight Hue]

Buddhism isn't typically considered a religion by which any particular view defines it's doctrines and practices. It's a religion of engagement.

Monism seems more in tune with other dharmic religions like Hinduism by which the notion of Brahmin, imo, lies closer in line with monism than that found in Buddhists where "original face" wouldn't be a form of monism as it's being put. .

Zen would be such a school where monism would no more apply than is duality by way practices are engauged and regarded via insight.

 

[von bek]

I do not consider myself a monist.

 

[JRMcC]

I'm curious about people's views on this. I've read that monism can exist within Buddhism, but haven't found much information about it. I wonder if you could answer some questions for me:

How common are monistic views among Buddhists? Is monism vs. dualism something addressed by many Buddhist schools, or is it largely considered irrelevant or unknowable? Are there are any particular schools which do generally espouse monistic views? Are any of the Buddhists here on RF monists?

Thankyou all

I'm not so sure what the point of speculating about this is. I might just have to start a thread....

 

[Poeticus]

On the monist question:

"...Buddhism in general has shown a marked tendency to deny the validity of the existential or ontological funciton of language, de-constructing many of the "entities" believed to be ultimately existing, linguistic referents. In the "process-dynamism" of the Abhidharma, dharmas cannot strictly speaking be said to "exist" in the usual ontological/existential and "common-sense" meaning of the term, that is, in the conventional sense of the "existence" of tables and chairs etc. For the Abhidharmist, all such "entities" are conglomerations (sanghAta) of various evanescent dharmas, which, appearing and then disappearing in quick succession, create the illusion of a permanent and singular entity. Such existence is secondary, being based upon conceptual and linguistic forms (prajnAptisat). The "existential" function of language is a subtle confutation of meaning, showing, as the Buddhists argue, that language is bound up within an "ontologically-affirming" frame of reference. The Buddhist sees this as the false-attribution of svabhAva to an empty (SUnya) and ego-less (anAtma) "entity". It is this that Venkata Ramanan aptly calls the "fallacy of misplace absolutism" (sasvabhAva-vAda).

As a result of the confusion of existential and predicative uses of the verb "to be," terms such as "yathAbhUta" ("things as they are"), are often misconstrued as evidence of Buddhist "realism," or, to put it anothery way, such terms are often taken to show that Buddhism affirms the existence of some "ultimate reality" or absolute behind appearances. This is a misleading approach, since Buddhist philosophy is grounded in the conception of process without a processed or a processor..." ~~Q.E.D.~~

-Richard King in Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism; 1995; pg. 96
​

 

[Kirran]

Buddhism isn't typically considered a religion by which any particular view defines it's doctrines and practices. It's a religion of engagement.

Yes, this makes sense, and was kind of what I expected. Thankyou.

I'm not so sure what the point of speculating about this is. I might just have to start a thread....

A thread speculating about it? Or a thread about why there's no point speculating?

On the monist question:

"...Buddhism in general has shown a marked tendency to deny the validity of the existential or ontological funciton of language, de-constructing many of the "entities" believed to be ultimately existing, linguistic referents. In the "process-dynamism" of the Abhidharma, dharmas cannot strictly speaking be said to "exist" in the usual ontological/existential and "common-sense" meaning of the term, that is, in the conventional sense of the "existence" of tables and chairs etc. For the Abhidharmist, all such "entities" are conglomerations (sanghAta) of various evanescent dharmas, which, appearing and then disappearing in quick succession, create the illusion of a permanent and singular entity. Such existence is secondary, being based upon conceptual and linguistic forms (prajnAptisat). The "existential" function of language is a subtle confutation of meaning, showing, as the Buddhists argue, that language is bound up within an "ontologically-affirming" frame of reference. The Buddhist sees this as the false-attribution of svabhAva to an empty (SUnya) and ego-less (anAtma) "entity". It is this that Venkata Ramanan aptly calls the "fallacy of misplace absolutism" (sasvabhAva-vAda).

As a result of the confusion of existential and predicative uses of the verb "to be," terms such as "yathAbhUta" ("things as they are"), are often misconstrued as evidence of Buddhist "realism," or, to put it anothery way, such terms are often taken to show that Buddhism affirms the existence of some "ultimate reality" or absolute behind appearances. This is a misleading approach, since Buddhist philosophy is grounded in the conception of process without a processed or a processor..." ~~Q.E.D.~~

-Richard King in Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism; 1995; pg. 96
​

Well, thanks Bidala A fine return.

Advaita and Buddhism have so much in common. Many Advaitins are probably more similar in belief to Buddhists in many respects than to many other Hindu philosophies.

 

[Poeticus]

Well, thanks Bidala A fine return.

Advaita and Buddhism have so much in common. Many Advaitins are probably more similar in belief to Buddhists in many respects than to many other Hindu philosophies.

Thank you for your warm reception. What I was getting at, or rather what the quote I cited was pointing towards, is the obvious difference in doctrine, making both early Advaita and Buddhism more different from each other than similar. What validates Indian monism is the belief in the existence of the self; most variants of Indian Buddhism, if not all of them, on the other hand, discount, and dialectically deny, the very existence of the self. In order to illustrate this more clearly and more pertinently, I would like to invite @von bek so he may provide the traditional, Theravadin Buddhist view to highlight the sublimity of this stark distinction. This will give justice, and the opportunity, for traditional Buddhists to provide their input, understandably so since this thread was made in the Buddhism DIR, and it will also be of considerable merit to your OP. Blessed be.

 

[crossfire]

Speculation regarding the origin of the world is said to lead to "madness and vexation" (literally going out of ones mind,) and does not lead to liberation.
Acintita Sutta: Unconjecturable

 

[crossfire]

"Nonduality means "not two," but "not two" also means "not one." That is why we say "nondual" instead of "one." Because if there is one, there are two. If you want to avoid two, you have to avoid one also."

~Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace Chapter 3, pg 45.

 

[von bek]

Thank you for your warm reception. What I was getting at, or rather what the quote I cited was pointing towards, is the obvious difference in doctrine, making both early Advaita and Buddhism more different from each other than similar. What validates Indian monism is the belief in the existence of the self; most variants of Indian Buddhism, if not all of them, on the other hand, discount, and dialectically deny, the very existence of the self. In order to illustrate this more clearly and more pertinently, I would like to invite @von bek so he may provide the traditional, Theravadin Buddhist view to highlight the sublimity of this stark distinction. This will give justice, and the opportunity, for traditional Buddhists to provide their input, understandably so since this thread was made in the Buddhism DIR, and it will also be of considerable merit to your OP. Blessed be.

Yes. Monism, to my thinking, violates the idea that there is no First Cause. I say that because every possible physical and mental phenomena would be grounded ultimately in a singular entity or substance if monism is true. For the same reason materialism is denied, as in that system, everything ultimately is derived from matter. So, in materialism, matter itself is the root of all existence. In Advaita, Brahman is the root of all things and is itself uncaused.

What @Poeticus says is really important in regards to the view of a Self. The conception of Brahman necessitates not only a universal self or soul, it forces an interpretation of the universe as being illusory because that is the only way to preserve the idea that the only thing unchanging and eternal lies as the source of everything we experience in this world, which constantly changes and is impermanent.

Dependent origination is not reconcilable with monism, in my view. I say that because dependent origination is an analysis of all experience and is to be applied to every level of reality. This means that we cannot except even entities such as Shiva or Vishnu from its implications. If they have compound attributes, that means we can break them down into constituent parts, showing how each part is dependently originated. Nothing in the conditioned realm of samsara can escape this "breaking down" process. No element or aggregate qualifies as a root source that would enable you to posit monism. For a discourse where the Buddha addresses this idea of a "root cause" being an invalid concept, and maybe one of the most explicit rejections of the idea of monism, check out this sutta from the Majjhima Nikaya: Mulapariyaya Sutta: The Root Sequence

 

[von bek]

"Nonduality means "not two," but "not two" also means "not one." That is why we say "nondual" instead of "one." Because if there is one, there are two. If you want to avoid two, you have to avoid one also."

~Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace Chapter 3, pg 45.

If by non-dualism all we are saying is that there is no experiencer separate from experience, then I would call myself a non-dualist. However, if you are using non-dualism in a way to give an ontological description of the universe, then I would probably part ways with you... (On this subject.)

 

[von bek]

The main point I would like to make is the Buddha frequently steers us away from grappling with ontological questions and speculations. The emphasis is always returned to experience. Arguing about existence/non-existence can be fruitless. Does Darth Vader exist? Answer the question either way, yes or no, then test it out by seeing how that answer falls short when it is pursued too far...

 

[crossfire]

If by non-dualism all we are saying is that there is no experiencer separate from experience, then I would call myself a non-dualist. However, if you are using non-dualism in a way to give an ontological description of the universe, then I would probably part ways with you... (On this subject.)

Isn't that what Thay is saying? (Avoiding "one" in an ontological sense, because that will always lead to "two." {See the Hsin Hsin Ming})

 

[von bek]

Isn't that what Thay is saying? (Avoiding "one" in an ontological sense, because that will always lead to "two." {See the Hsin Hsin Ming})

That's how I understand him, and agree. I was simply speaking in a general sense of the concept, "non-dualism". I think you and I agree on this.

 

[von bek]

What @Poeticus says is really important in regards to the view of a Self. The conception of Brahman necessitates not only a universal self or soul, it forces an interpretation of the universe as being illusory because that is the only way to preserve the idea that the only thing unchanging and eternal lies as the source of everything we experience in this world, which constantly changes and is impermanent.

I am wrong when I say above that the conception of Brahman forces an interpretation of the universe as illusory. There are ideations of it that do posit the universe as "real". (However one chooses to define the word.) I know there are some Shaiva traditions that believe the universe is as real as Shiva. I would not be surprised to find Vaishnavas who believe the same.

 

[Vishvavajra]

People are liable to mistake the Cittamatra (often translated "Mind-Only") approach for a kind of monism, but it's not really. In asserting that all is mind, it refers to mind-as-process rather than mind-as-substance. The gist is that there is no means of apprehending anything apart from mental impressions, since even the "external" world is only experienced as subjective mental impressions. Rather than positing an inherently-existent mind, it's actually a kind of radical skepticism or epistemological reductionism. In reducing all perceptible phenomena to impressions of the mind—which do not exist so much as they occur—it pretty much precludes any coherent theory of a monistic essence underlying all things.

The Chan tradition, despite being influenced by the Yogacara/Cittamatra approach, is realist in the sense that it is thought to be possible to experience reality-as-such directly through meditation, in the absence of conceptual thinking. But even then there is a hesitancy to define it, since to do so would only obscure it behind more conceptual thinking. It is conventionally described as "seeing one's true nature." The idea of a true nature might sound essentialist, but again, it's not really. At that level one's true nature has nothing to do with one's individual concept of self: it is undifferentiated, undefiled, not experiencing birth and death. It is Buddha (i.e. Awake).

But of course Chan is also influenced by Madhyamaka, a sublime doctrine according to which it is possible for one's mind to grasp the ultimate reality, which is that there is no ultimate reality to grasp.

 

[crossfire]

With madhyamaka, you can only refute that which your mind can grasp, so it doesn't mean that there is nothing there. This would make a distinction between that which is external to the mind and that which is internal to the mind. (This is the stance of the Madhyamaka-Prasangika school of philosophy.)

 

[Vishvavajra]

With madhyamaka, you can only refute that which your mind can grasp, so it doesn't mean that there is nothing there. This would make a distinction between that which is external to the mind and that which is internal to the mind. (This is the stance of the Madhyamaka-Prasangika school of philosophy.)

It's true that it doesn't mean there is nothing there, but that's not because there is something there, but rather because "something" and "nothing" are relative concepts constructed by the mind. "External" and "internal" are as well, and it's not clear what "external to the mind" means in practical terms. In any case, insofar as there can be said to be an ultimate reality, there is nothing that can be said about it that is not a construct of conventional thinking. Even the idea of "ultimate reality" is rooted in the realm of discursive thought. Hence the Madhyamaka assertion that even Nirvana is empty.

 

[crossfire]

It's true that it doesn't mean there is nothing there, but that's not because there is something there, but rather because "something" and "nothing" are relative concepts constructed by the mind. "External" and "internal" are as well, and it's not clear what "external to the mind" means in practical terms. In any case, insofar as there can be said to be an ultimate reality, there is nothing that can be said about it that is not a construct of conventional thinking. Even the idea of "ultimate reality" is rooted in the realm of discursive thought. Hence the Madhyamaka assertion that even Nirvana is empty.

Well, being unable to discern between products of your subjective mind and objective reality is called delusion, and has been referred to as one of the three poisons by Buddha.

 

[Kirran]

Well, thankyou all, a fine array of information and perspective.