Nature of Self

[Meow Mix]

(NOTE -- Earlier there were disclaimers asking people not to post because I was still finishing this ridiculously long diatribe. Well, I'm satisfied with it now, so post away!)

Imagine for a moment that Erin exists in the Star Trek universe and she steps onto a teleporter pad, which is a device that provides apparent teleportation between two locations. For the sake of argument, let's assume that this device works by:

1) Scanning my body down to the submolecular level
2) Transmitting that data to the receiving teleporter pad
3) Annihilating all of my original structure
4) Using raw materials to reconfigure a new me on the other side

Let us call this "Type 1a" teleportation. Now, this post is entirely about what a "self" is, so I think you can see where I'm going with this. Let's say that the original teleporter pad is called TPA (for "teleporter pad A") and that the target pad is called TPB.

After going through this device, is the Erin that appears at TPB "me?" Does she have all the properties of "me" such that I can be assured that I'm appearing on the other side rather than some clone? I think this profound question has some dubious issues involved with it. For instance, consider the following type of teleportation, which I shall call "Type 1b" teleportation, which works by:

1) Scanning my body down to the submolecular level
2) Transmitting that data to the receiving teleporter pad
3) Using raw materials to reconfigure a new me on the other side

Notice that with Type 1b teleportation, the original version of me is not destroyed. For some reason, it seems obvious prima facie that the Erin at TPB is not me -- because "I" am at TPA. It appears that TPB-Erin is a perfect clone of TPA-Erin, of course (and TPB-Erin would have my memories, let's say); but it appears to TPA-Erin -- what I call "me" -- that "I" am not at TPB, but rather that some imposter of me is.

For some reason, it seems intuitively false to me that the only difference between Type 1a teleportation and Type 1b teleportation -- (3), the destruction of TPA-Erin -- would be sufficient to make the difference such that what I call "my" consciousness would be at TPB. It would still seem prima facie -- to me at least -- that even with Type 1a teleportation, TPB-Erin is still just a clone.

If that's the case, then why? There are some possibilities; but all of the ones I can think of are somewhat problematic. For instance:

i) Perhaps the difference is that TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin have a spatiotemporal gap between them; so they are different people.

ii) Perhaps there is an infinitesimal moment where TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin are the same person (are both "me") but that this instantaneous co-location decoheres immediately because TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin are subject to different environmental influences; making them different people from the very first quantum event.

iii) TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin are never the same person because of some fundamental difference that's always inherent in them each from one another, making true Type 1a or Type 1b teleportation impossible.

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Examining (i)
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If the difference between TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin is only spatiotemporal, then that raises a lot of issues with my notion of "self," for instance, in my notion of past self.

Consider a picture of me: when I look at Picture-Erin, I still think "that was me." Picture-Erin -- the person, not the image, still seems perfectly intuitive to think of as me. There was a period of time when I was self-aware in Picture-Erin's body such that it seems acceptable for me to call Picture-Erin "me," or at least "past-me" -- in other words, that Picture-Erin is related to me in terms of self-identity*.

(* -- by "self-identity," I don't mean logical self-identity [e.g., A = A]. I mean psychological identification of what the "self" is.)

However, Picture-Erin -- the person, not the image -- is spatiotemporally separated from me. It's fair to say that I am not Picture-Erin, such that it might be fair to say "Picture-Erin is not TPA-Erin;" but the salient point is that there still seems to be a relation between Picture-Erin and TPA-Erin such that both share some aspect of an identity. I can also imagine a Future-Erin, such as the one who will eventually hit "Submit New Thread," such that it's intuitive and reasonable prima facie to say that Future-Erin has some relation with TPA-Erin in terms of identity -- and that in fact, in some respect, I am actually Future-Erin to Picture-Erin.

Despite this spatiotemporal difference (keep in mind I'm not in the same location as Picture-Erin or Future-Erin, even if I stay on this chair: the Earth will have moved beneath me!), there still appears to be a difference between Picture-Erin/Future-Erin and TPB-Erin such that Picture-Erin/Future-Erin are somehow directly related to my identity whereas it seems that TPB-Erin has never been and never will be directly related to my identity.

So, it appears that (i) by itself can't explain the perceived problem here.

(Actually, I'd like to return to (i) in a later post because I just had a revelation as I typed this: were Future-Me to travel back in time to myself now, Future-Me would seem like a different person than me in some small respect -- that I'm not looking out at the world from behind her eyes, for instance. Let's examine that later though!)

 

[Meow Mix]

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Exploring (ii)
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(NOTE -- there is some symbolic logic and mathematics ahead. It is NOT necessary to understand to grasp my point, it's only there for added flavor. Please skip over the equations and images if that sort of thing isn't down your alley and you'll still be able to understand this post!)

If there is an infinitesimal moment (when TPB-Erin first appears) where we are in fact the same person -- and that our immediately different circumstances causes this instantaneous co-location to decohere -- then I think there may still be some issues with an intuitive concept of "self" here.

Let's ignore the physical implications of an actual bilocation here and examine the logical ones. Is it a contradiction for TPA-Erin to, even for an instant, be exactly the same object (not just a copied object in different locations of space, but the same object occupying two perceived locations in space)? I'm not fully decided on this (though I lean towards it being a contradiction for reasons explained later); but consider the following.

We normally consider things to be unique if and only if they are the same object rather than multiple objects. In set theory, we call this the axiom of extension (image from wikipedia:

This translates into English as, "Given any set A and any set B, if for any set C such that C is an element of set A if and only if it is also an element of set B, then set A is the same set as set B."

In even plainer English, this is something like the set theory equivalent of the easier-to-digest truth that "If A = B and B = C, then A = C." If two things are exactly the same in all of their properties (not just most, all) then they are the same object.

As an example, consider the empty set, { }, which is the set that contains no elements at all -- which I shall write here, more conveniently, as Ø. If I were to examine the set which contains no elements as members, then I'm examining Ø because { } = Ø.

However, suppose that I now consider the set that is the product of the intersection of the set of all even numbers and the set of all odd numbers. By this I mean taking the intersection of the following two sets:

S(Even) = {2,3,4,6,8,...}
S(Odd) = {1,3,5,7,9,...}

(The following quote box is a further explanation of what intersection means for sets -- you can skip the entire quote box if you're already familiar with intersection.)

The intersection of these sets is an operation (like addition or subtraction are operations) which basically asks, "What set is formed by common elements of both of these sets?"

For instance, the intersection of the set {1,2,3} and the set {2,3,4} would form the set {2,3} because those are where those sets "intersect," it's what their common elements are. Here's a diagram from wikipedia:

If the left circle is set A and the right circle is set B, then the things they have in common with one another -- the red section -- is their intersection, written as:

If we take the intersection of S(Even) and S(Odd), such that we do:

S(Even) ∩ S(Odd)

Then we find that they have NO elements in common; so the set produced by their intersection is an empty set, Ø (because Ø is another way of writing { }). S(Even) ∩ S(Odd) = Ø.

Now suppose we intersect these sets:

S(1) = {1,2,3,4,5}
S(2) = {44,55,66}

Such that we do:

S(1) ∩ S(2)

Again, we find that there are no common elements, so it must be the case that S(1) ∩ S(2) = Ø.

But if the intersection of two entirely different sets both yield a set without any elements at all -- { } -- are both of them yielding the same set (not just an identical clone of a set, but the same thing in all respects whatsoever)? Yes! It is the case that:

S(Even) ∩ S(Odd) = Ø = S(1) ∩ S(2)

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So, returning to the problems with (ii) and whether it's logical for TPA-Erin to be the same object as TPB-Erin, I think this is logical only if we assume that there is no spatiotemporal difference between TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin at that instant -- not because of some relatively shallower reason such as "Spacetime has never been known or understood to appear bilocated such that it allows an object within spacetime to appear bilocated," which I think would be a weak objection.

Rather, I'd say (ii) can't work because of the stronger reason that TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin necessarily must have different spatiotemporal properties from the get-go in order for TPB-Erin to decohere from TPA-Erin at all such that she "becomes a different person" after that first instance -- which contradicts the possibility of any instantaneous bi-location of TPA-Erin. The reason why they must have different properties from the start will be examined when we examine (iii).

 

[Meow Mix]

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Examining (iii)
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(iii) is, I think, one of the best answers to the question, "Is TPB-Erin the same 'self' as TPA-Erin with Type 1a or Type 2b teleportation?" That is, I'm proposing that TPB-Erin is not the same "self" as TPA-Erin, and can't be, because TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin have inherently different properties from the start -- such that there can't even be an instantaneous moment where they are the same person.

My train of thought goes thusly. Suppose that I have some object, let's call it X, such that in the future X will become a Y. It seems that in order for X to become a Y, X must have some capacity to become a Y. By this I simply mean that it's perfectly reasonable to suppose that a live horse has the capacity to become a dead horse; and that a live horse lacks the capacity (without the help of some divine intervention or some ridiculously advanced technology) to become, say, a planet.

This is because X has some nature that includes some property which provides the capacity to become a Y: to continue the horse analogy, the live horse's relevant nature here is that it has the property of being mortal, thus providing the capacity to at some point become a dead horse -- and that the horse's nature lacks any sort of obvious property (I think it's safe to say the horse LACKS the property, but playing it safe here) to at some point become a planet.

So, a thing's nature means that it has properties which provide the capacity for some future state of affairs to take place -- and if some state of affairs Z is a necessary precondition for some thing Q to happen, then any object which doesn't have Z as a property in its nature can never be considered the same object as one which does have Z as a property. Put more concisely (this is not a syllogism):

1) Q if and only if Z
2) A has Z
3) Possibly, A --> Q
4) B does not have Z
5) B --> Q is necessarily false
6) So, since A can lead to Q and B can't lead to Q, then A ≠ B

Thus, we can narrow this argument down a little to something like:

Premise 1) X will become some specific (but arbitrary) ¬X (let's call "some specific but arbitrary ¬X" a Y for brevity), after some arbitrary amount of time passes.

Premise 2) In order for X to become a Y, X must have the capacity to become a Y.

Conclusion 1) Therefore, X must have some nature such that it has properties that allows it to become a Y.

And:

Definition 1) For something to be the same object, they must share all of the same properties (for sets: must share all of the same elements) exactly such that if A = B, then A has no less and no more than the exact same properties as B.

Definition 2) For something to be the same object, they must have the same nature such that all of the same properties are held -- no more and no less -- by the perceived two objects.

Premise 1a) Some arbitrary X and some arbitrary P have different natures (and therefore properties) if X has the capacity to become a Z; but P does not have the capacity to become a Z (Or vice versa. From the conclusion of the previous syllogism)

Premise 2a) TPB-Erin does not have the capacity to become any specific arbitrary future state that TPA-Erin has the capacity to become.

Conclusion 2) Necessarily, TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin have different natures. (From P1a + 2a + Def. 2)

Conclusion 2a) Necessarily, TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin have different properties. (From Def. 1)

Conclusion 3a) Necessarily, TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin are not the same object. (From plain freakin' common sense from the above conclusions )

-----------------------------------------

If any of this is correct (it might not be -- maybe I just have incoherent intuitions!), then we should all be very wary of using teleportion of types 1a and 1b. It seems to me that it wouldn't be "ourselves" on the other side at all!

 

[idav]

If any of this is correct (it might not be -- maybe I just have incoherent intuitions!), then we should all be very wary of using teleportion of types 1a and 1b. It seems to me that it wouldn't be "ourselves" on the other side at all!

To avoid clone discrimination, I count a clone as a real person especially if they have the exact same memories. I am, You are, a sum of memories. Same memories then same person which goes far beyond just having the same exact dna sequence.

What if someone was cloned and the original got in a car accident and the original lost most important brain functions for memories. The copy would be more so real person than the original.

edit: Another note, which touches on something else you said in you posts. The me changes the instant an exact copy experiencing something different from the original but at the same time the me is the same me as the one that transported to Paris. However the original me never got to go to paris and experience it so it would be two of the exact same me's having two different experiences so divergence is inevitable.

 

[bobhikes]

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Examining (iii)

-----------------------------------------

If any of this is correct (it might not be -- maybe I just have incoherent intuitions!), then we should all be very wary of using teleportion of types 1a and 1b. It seems to me that it wouldn't be "ourselves" on the other side at all!

I would submit that you are not just a combination of biodiversity but a continuation of your experiences.

In my opinion even your atoms experiences are important to you. So if you did not use the same atoms you could not be the same.

No 2 things can ever be the same. The you who wrote this article is different then the you who reads this. The only thing that makes you believe you are the same are your experiences. The differences are within the limits of human preception so you accept them.

Once you stop experiencing things the link is broken and you are no longer you.

Experience for my responce is All sense's, memory, thought ...etc.

 

[Meow Mix]

To avoid clone discrimination, I count a clone as a real person especially if they have the exact same memories. I am, You are, a sum of memories. Same memories then same person which goes far beyond just having the same exact dna sequence.

What if someone was cloned and the original got in a car accident and the original lost most important brain functions for memories. The copy would be more so real person than the original.

I agree that both TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin are real people, both deserving full rights and full ethical recognition as sapient beings by individual people and by the full letter of the law.

The question I'm asking is whether, regardless of TPB-Erin being a person who has all the memories of TPA-Erin, is TPB-Erin in fact "me?" It seems to me that having the same genetic code and memories doesn't intuitively make a person "me."

A good way to put this in less concise terms is that I will never look out from behind TPB-Erin's eyes -- so how can she be "me?"

edit: Another note, which touches on something else you said in you posts. The me changes the instant an exact copy experiencing something different from the original but at the same time the me is the same me as the one that transported to Paris. However the original me never got to go to paris and experience it so it would be two of the exact same me's having two different experiences so divergence is inevitable.

Yes, I agree that divergence is inevitable even if you only teleported a foot to the left. However, I argue that if divergence is inevitable, then TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin must have different natures; since it's inevitable that they have different capacities solely by being under different circumstances. If they have different natures then they have different properties; and therefore can't ever -- not even for an instant -- be the same person -- though they would have the same physical makeup at first, the same memories, etc.

I'm interested in this because if it isn't the physical makeup and memories -- if ontological capacities have something to do with it, as I believe they do -- then some coherent notion of what "self" means may be very convoluted; but ultimately maybe feasible.

However, I haven't even touched on teleportation type 1c or type 2 yet! :help:

 

[Meow Mix]

I would submit that you are not just a combination of biodiversity but a continuation of your experiences.

In my opinion even your atoms experiences are important to you. So if you did not use the same atoms you could not be the same.

No 2 things can ever be the same. The you who wrote this article is different then the you who reads this. The only thing that makes you believe you are the same are your experiences. The differences are within the limits of human preception so you accept them.

Once you stop experiencing things the link is broken and you are no longer you.

Experience for my responce is All sense's, memory, thought ...etc.

This is a salient point which I'm glad you brought up. For instance, you mention physical continuity of our bodies and presumably our brains. As it turns out, every so many years it seems that most of the cells in your body are probably younger than 10 years old.

If this is the case, then maybe Picture-Erin and Future-Erin don't have an identity relation to me; and that they might as well be teleportation clones (over time, rather than space).

However, I'm not sure that this is the case -- though I can't rule that out, of course. It seems intuitive to me that it's meaningful to say that even if Picture-Erin and Future-Erin aren't me in the present tense that they still have some dependent identity relation between them: Picture-Erin was me, and Future-Erin will be me.

"Having been me" and "will be me" still seem, somehow, different from the situation with TPB-Erin because it seems that the statements, "TPB-Erin never was me, isn't me, and never will be me" are true. It seems like there is still some difference in there somewhere: but where? That's why I offered (iii) as a possible explanation: it allows Picture-Erin and Future-Erin to have a meaningful identity dependency on me even if they "aren't" me right now -- such that they're distinguished metaphysically, somehow, from TPB-Erin.

So it seems that there is a relevant aspect here in dependency relationships for identity (where, by dependency, I mean x depends on y iff y's existence is a necessary precondition of x's existence) that is present in Picture-Erin and Future-Erin, yet utterly absent from TPB-Erin. They must be fundamentally different somehow which, if elucidated in some way, should shed light on what a "self" is supposed to be.

-------------------------------

Also, consider the notion of consciousness continuity -- the same question can be raised with our consciousness as with our cells replacing itself over time. Our consciousness seems to fundamentally change, for instance, when we sleep such that there is a discontinuity.

Perhaps it's indeed fair to say that, possibly, this is the first day that "I" have been alive, and that some distinct person, Yesterday-Erin, was alive yesterday; and that some distinct person, Tomorrow-Erin, will be alive tomorrow in this body.

Again, I leave that open as a possibility; but ultimately find it unlikely to be practical, and possibly it might even be incoherent. If (iii) is on the right track, and it is meaningful to note identity dependency relations between past-states and future-states of some object or state of affairs, then I think both the physical continuity problem and the consciousness continuity problem fade away.

However, teleportation type 1c does involve continuity issues in order to explore them in more detail -- I shall at some point add to this thread by discussing what I mean by teleportation type 1c.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

My first thought:

When it comes right down to it, I think that "self" is a mental construct or social convention. As you touched on already a bit, everyone is a Ship of Theseus.

Since I think the notion of "self" is a fabrication, we're free to adjust its definition. I know it kinda shortcuts all your arguments and explorations, but I think either Erin is as much the "original" as we think she is.

 

[idav]

I agree that both TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin are real people, both deserving full rights and full ethical recognition as sapient beings by individual people and by the full letter of the law.

With that I wouldn't recommend annihilating the original copy during transfer. Or is that just what will happen to do the process? We would just be afraid to cause the ethical issue of their being copies of you running around.

The question I'm asking is whether, regardless of TPB-Erin being a person who has all the memories of TPA-Erin, is TPB-Erin in fact "me?" It seems to me that having the same genetic code and memories doesn't intuitively make a person "me."

I don't see why not. If a "soul" were transferable what would we need? Memory and experiences I'm sure are a big part of it.

A good way to put this in less concise terms is that I will never look out from behind TPB-Erin's eyes -- so how can she be "me?"

But you are the person from the original who experienced a transfer into another body. A brain transfer without the brain but a harvested version of a brain.

Yes, I agree that divergence is inevitable even if you only teleported a foot to the left. However, I argue that if divergence is inevitable, then TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin must have different natures; since it's inevitable that they have different capacities solely by being under different circumstances. If they have different natures then they have different properties; and therefore can't ever -- not even for an instant -- be the same person -- though they would have the same physical makeup at first, the same memories, etc.

It would be much like having a person that is in a parallel reality. One person went left and the other went right. They both exist but they came from the exact same place.

I'm interested in this because if it isn't the physical makeup and memories -- if ontological capacities have something to do with it, as I believe they do -- then some coherent notion of what "self" means may be very convoluted; but ultimately maybe feasible.

It is an interesting subject. I wonder if I wouldn't mind being a copy of myself.

However, I haven't even touched on teleportation type 1c or type 2 yet! :help:

Good thread I hope I can contribute something worth while.

 

[bobhikes]

This is a salient point which I'm glad you brought up. For instance, you mention physical continuity of our bodies and presumably our brains. As it turns out, every so many years it seems that most of the cells in your body are probably younger than 10 years old.

If this is the case, then maybe Picture-Erin and Future-Erin don't have an identity relation to me; and that they might as well be teleportation clones (over time, rather than space).

However, I'm not sure that this is the case -- though I can't rule that out, of course. It seems intuitive to me that it's meaningful to say that even if Picture-Erin and Future-Erin aren't me in the present tense that they still have some dependent identity relation between them: Picture-Erin was me, and Future-Erin will be me.

"Having been me" and "will be me" still seem, somehow, different from the situation with TPB-Erin because it seems that the statements, "TPB-Erin never was me, isn't me, and never will be me" are true. It seems like there is still some difference in there somewhere: but where? That's why I offered (iii) as a possible explanation: it allows Picture-Erin and Future-Erin to have a meaningful identity dependency on me even if they "aren't" me right now -- such that they're distinguished metaphysically, somehow, from TPB-Erin.

So it seems that there is a relevant aspect here in dependency relationships for identity (where, by dependency, I mean x depends on y iff y's existence is a necessary precondition of x's existence) that is present in Picture-Erin and Future-Erin, yet utterly absent from TPB-Erin. They must be fundamentally different somehow which, if elucidated in some way, should shed light on what a "self" is supposed to be.

-------------------------------

Also, consider the notion of consciousness continuity -- the same question can be raised with our consciousness as with our cells replacing itself over time. Our consciousness seems to fundamentally change, for instance, when we sleep such that there is a discontinuity.

Perhaps it's indeed fair to say that, possibly, this is the first day that "I" have been alive, and that some distinct person, Yesterday-Erin, was alive yesterday; and that some distinct person, Tomorrow-Erin, will be alive tomorrow in this body.

Again, I leave that open as a possibility; but ultimately find it unlikely to be practical, and possibly it might even be incoherent. If (iii) is on the right track, and it is meaningful to note identity dependency relations between past-states and future-states of some object or state of affairs, then I think both the physical continuity problem and the consciousness continuity problem fade away.

However, teleportation type 1c does involve continuity issues in order to explore them in more detail -- I shall at some point add to this thread by discussing what I mean by teleportation type 1c.

Not quite what I was aiming for

Erin A is you because up until dissemination you share the experiences of all of you. Erin B can never be you because she will never share your experiences. Upon dissemination you cease to exist yet Erin B will exist as a copy of you.

If I have a picture I painted using toner from a copier. I then use that copier to copy my picture. Same reem of paper, same toner, same image are they both the same. If I destroy the original does that make the copy the original.

Its in the way the picture was made that makes the picture unique. No matter how great the copier is, it will always produce a copy.

 

[Meow Mix]

My first thought:

When it comes right down to it, I think that "self" is a mental construct or social convention. As you touched on already a bit, everyone is a Ship of Theseus.

Since I think the notion of "self" is a fabrication, we're free to adjust its definition. I know it kinda shortcuts all your arguments and explorations, but I think either Erin is as much the "original" as we think she is.

Then what accounts for the fact that there seems to be some metaphysical difference: why am I not looking at the universe from behind TPB-Erin's eyes as well as my own? Why does it seem I'd still be here rather than there? Why doesn't that feel like it's me, or could ever BE me (even if it is someone almost identical to me)?

 

[Penumbra]

I don't think this will be put to rest unless the nature of consciousness becomes more fully understood.

That being said, I don't think that the second person has continuity of consciousness with the first person. It's a copy, rather than "me".

1) Scanning my body down to the submolecular level
2) Transmitting that data to the receiving teleporter pad
3) Annihilating all of my original structure
4) Using raw materials to reconfigure a new me on the other side

1) Scanning my body down to the submolecular level
2) Transmitting that data to the receiving teleporter pad
3) Using raw materials to reconfigure a new me on the other side

Like you, I see little reason to believe that the continuity of consciousness of the reconfigured version of me depends on whether the original is destroyed or not. Therefore the default seems to be that this reconfigured version is a different but identical person.

But it can be brought further:

1) Scanning my body down to the submolecular level
2) Transmitting that data to the receiving teleporter pad
3) Using raw materials to reconfigure a new me on the other side
4) Using raw materials to reconfigure another new me on the other side (considering there's no reason to assume data loss)
5) Using raw materials to reconfigure countless more me's on the other side.

I don't really see how *all* of the copies can still be "me". They'll likely be humans that have separate consciousnesses.

So it seems to me that whatever the details are, it's likely that anything that is built on the other side is a copy of me, rather than a continuous consciousness of myself.

If any of this is correct (it might not be -- maybe I just have incoherent intuitions!), then we should all be very wary of using teleportion of types 1a and 1b. It seems to me that it wouldn't be "ourselves" on the other side at all!

I'm not sure that follows.

I don't have any qualms against personally using a transporter (at least with respect to this particular problem), despite agreeing that whatever is on the other side is likely a copy. Mainly because, I don't think the transporter example is necessarily different than anything in real life- it just provides a more concrete basis for discussion. Maybe there's a fundamental difference related to everything moving at the same time rather than piece by piece, but maybe not.

As pointed out so far in the thread, our body cells refresh themselves over time (except for a few in the brain). In addition, we go to sleep, and apparently consciousness is disrupted. Plus, on the quantum level, it seems to me from science research on the topic that all sorts of things are popping in, moving around, and doing all sorts of crazy things, even if the appearance of a biological cell looks pretty static.

So I'm not even sure that, from split second to split second, there is really continuity of consciousness anyway. Let alone using a transporter to disrupt continuity of consciousness- that seems somewhat redundant, but more concrete for discussion.

It "feels" like consciousness is continuous from moment to moment, but it may or may not be a feeling that depicts reality.

Considering that memories can be erased, and the future is speculative and perhaps not even me, I find that it just makes sense to live in the present moment. But I might as well plan for the future anyway, considering that perhaps this is wrong and the future "me" really is a continuous consciousness, or at least some other seemingly conscious person, so at least I can set her up with a pleasant experience.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Then what accounts for the fact that there seems to be some metaphysical difference: why am I not looking at the universe from behind TPB-Erin's eyes as well as my own? Why does it seem I'd still be here rather than there? Why doesn't that feel like it's me, or could ever BE me (even if it is someone almost identical to me)?

So "me" is rooted in consciousness? Perception? How do we define where "me" stops and everything else begins?

 

[Willamena]

I don't understand--and I appreciate that you've put a lot of thought and effort into the outline, but... Two sets of neural networks, and two physical brains. Why would Erin A and Erin B not have unique perspectives on the world?

So, returning to the problems with (ii) and whether it's logical for TPA-Erin to be the same object as TPB-Erin...

I don't even understand why you would allow that they could be the same object, if you distinguish between them. Distinguishing is enough to make them different objects.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

(iii) is, I think, one of the best answers to the question, "Is TPB-Erin the same 'self' as TPA-Erin with Type 1a or Type 2b teleportation?"

I think the way you phrased this may indicate a potential flaw in your question, and perhaps other things as well. You state "is the same self" rather than "has the same self." The question of whether and how your "clone" relates to "you" is still an interesting one (as is the relationship between the "transported" you and the non-transported you), but the "self" (or consciousness, or self-awareness) is inherently a personalized experience. It is the "I/me" through which an individual conceptualizes all conscious experiences as a cognitively unified "whole". If the "transported/cloned" you is identical to you in every respect (at least at the moment of creation), she nonetheless necessarily possesses a different self. Her frame of reference is such that YOU are conceived of as independent, seperate, apart from her experiences as a unified, conscious, self-aware entity.

The "you" who is broken down, destroyed, and re-created can perhaps be said to be "you" in that your memories, experiences, frame of reference, etc. are uniquely yours. However, a transported version of you, as soon as she is rebuilt, immediately has an independent consciousness and frame of reference apart from you. There is no continuity with your frame of reference, your experience of "I/me" as a "self" from which others are distinguished and through which you experience, interpret, react, etc., to your environment.

 

[Meow Mix]

With that I wouldn't recommend annihilating the original copy during transfer. Or is that just what will happen to do the process? We would just be afraid to cause the ethical issue of their being copies of you running around.

Well, that's somewhat my point Seems to me the original, TPA-Erin, would be dead; even if TPB-Erin is created.

I don't see why not. If a "soul" were transferable what would we need? Memory and experiences I'm sure are a big part of it.

Perhaps, but the conundrum I'm elucidating here is that something still seems missing if I'm still standing on TPA rather than TPB, even if someone exactly similar to me in almost all respects is standing on TPB.

But you are the person from the original who experienced a transfer into another body. A brain transfer without the brain but a harvested version of a brain.

Well, that's the thing; though -- if I use type 1b teleportation then I'll find myself still standing on TPA. It will seem like a different person, to me -- though similar, almost exactly -- that appears over on TPB.

Why, if type 1b teleportation just clones me, would assuming that the original me being destroyed in type 1a teleportation have a different outcome? What causal relation is there between destroying the original and appearing for real on the other side? I can't see how they're related. Seems like in type 1a, the original me would simply be dead while a clone of me (but not ME) appears at TPB.

It would be much like having a person that is in a parallel reality. One person went left and the other went right. They both exist but they came from the exact same place.

Interesting, such that one person splits into two by stepping through some intersecting dimension(s) or something?

 

[Meow Mix]

Not quite what I was aiming for

Erin A is you because up until dissemination you share the experiences of all of you. Erin B can never be you because she will never share your experiences. Upon dissemination you cease to exist yet Erin B will exist as a copy of you.

If I have a picture I painted using toner from a copier. I then use that copier to copy my picture. Same reem of paper, same toner, same image are they both the same. If I destroy the original does that make the copy the original.

Its in the way the picture was made that makes the picture unique. No matter how great the copier is, it will always produce a copy.

I agree with this though

 

[Meow Mix]

So I'm not even sure that, from split second to split second, there is really continuity of consciousness anyway. Let alone using a transporter to disrupt continuity of consciousness- that seems somewhat redundant, but more concrete for discussion.

It "feels" like consciousness is continuous from moment to moment, but it may or may not be a feeling that depicts reality.

Snipped a bunch that I simply agreed with, so wouldn't have said much other than "Good point, I agree" anyway!

Well, do you think there is something to the intuition, though, that there is some kind of identity-connection between you and past-you/future-you which seems different, in principle, than TPB-you?

 

[Meow Mix]

So "me" is rooted in consciousness? Perception? How do we define where "me" stops and everything else begins?

Well that's sort of what I'm asking (what is "self?") and saying ("there appear to be discrepancies in KIND, rather than quantity, between the intuitive notions of "self" and these different scenarios.")

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Two sets of neural networks, and two physical brains. Why would Erin A and Erin B not have unique perspectives on the world?

The issue then becomes whether the transported version can be said to be the same "self." After all, it is a spatiotemporally different physical brain.