Nature of Self

[Meow Mix]

I don't understand--and I appreciate that you've put a lot of thought and effort into the outline, but... Two sets of neural networks, and two physical brains. Why would Erin A and Erin B not have unique perspectives on the world?

I agree they would; but that's what sparks the whole soliloquy about what "self" might be. I'm not sure what it is, if it's even coherent -- I only pointed out some things which I think it's not defined by. Sort of just eliminating some possibilities that seem at first to be obvious.

I don't even understand why you would allow that they could be the same object, if you distinguish between them. Distinguishing is enough to make them different objects.

Well, I tried to raise an analogy to account for that apparent semantic paradox. I refer to seemingly different things when I refer to S(Even) ∩ S(Odd) and then refer to S(1) ∩ S(2), but despite my original choice to distinguish them with different symbols, they are in fact the same object -- Ø.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I refer to seemingly different things when I refer to S(Even) ∩ S(Odd) and then refer to S(1) ∩ S(2), but despite my original choice to distinguish them with different symbols, they are in fact the same object -- Ø.

But are they the same object? You are using numbers in your example. Yet although 1=1, 1 apple does not equal 1 orange. What ontological status does the empty set have such that this result is meaningful in relation to you question? I could equally well say "If I have 4 books, and someone takes them away, I have 0 books" and "If I have 4 apples, and someone takes them away, I have 0 apples" and represent both by 4-4=0. But is this zero the same in reality? One is referring to the absence of books, the other to apples.

 

[Meow Mix]

I think the way you phrased this may indicate a potential flaw in your question, and perhaps other things as well. You state "is the same self" rather than "has the same self." The question of whether and how your "clone" relates to "you" is still an interesting one (as is the relationship between the "transported" you and the non-transported you), but the "self" (or consciousness, or self-awareness) is inherently a personalized experience. It is the "I/me" through which an individual conceptualizes all conscious experiences as a cognitively unified "whole". If the "transported/cloned" you is identical to you in every respect (at least at the moment of creation), she nonetheless necessarily possesses a different self. Her frame of reference is such that YOU are conceived of as independent, seperate, apart from her experiences as a unified, conscious, self-aware entity.

The "you" who is broken down, destroyed, and re-created can perhaps be said to be "you" in that your memories, experiences, frame of reference, etc. are uniquely yours. However, a transported version of you, as soon as she is rebuilt, immediately has an independent consciousness and frame of reference apart from you. There is no continuity with your frame of reference, your experience of "I/me" as a "self" from which others are distinguished and through which you experience, interpret, react, etc., to your environment.

See my response to Penumbra: is this intuition that there is a qualitative difference between past/future-mes and TPB-Erin onto something, or is it an incoherent intuition?

 

[Meow Mix]

But are they the same object? You are using numbers in your example. Yet although 1=1, 1 apple does not equal 1 orange. What ontological status does the empty set have such that this result is meaningful in relation to you question? I could equally well say "If I have 4 books, and someone takes them away, I have 0 books" and "If I have 4 apples, and someone takes them away, I have 0 apples" and represent both by 4-4=0. But is this zero the same in reality? One is referring to the absence of books, the other to apples.

Well, in my thoughts on (ii) I indeed eventually determined that no, they aren't the same object (which became the basis for (iii).

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

See my response to Penumbra: is this intuition that there is a qualitative difference between past/future-mes and TPB-Erin onto something, or is it an incoherent intuition?

Well, do you think there is something to the intuition, though, that there is some kind of identity-connection between you and past-you/future-you which seems different, in principle, than TPB-you?

I read this but I'm not sure I understand what you mean. There seems to me to certainly be a quite different connection between past/future me compared to a TPB-me. That is, I continually experience and recall things in relation to a sense of "I/me"-ness. I have episodic memory. I can recall doing things and recall experiencing them through a "self" or "I/me" from which I differentiated even parts of my own body (thus I can speak of "my hand" or "my foot" as components of a body which is somehow not "me", as "I/me" is a sense of cohesion applied to memories and consciousness). However, as soon as TDB-me exists, that entity may be connected in the same way to all past experiences, but by being conscious he is immediately interpreting reality through a seperate frame of reference, a unique "I/me"-ness that I do not have. We are both connected to my past "self" but now with unique reference frames.

 

[InformedIgnorance]

Personally I do not believe in a soul or in vitalism or any similar concept... I believe that a person is their body and their mind.

TPA-Erin may be slightly different from TPB-Erin because of limitations within the teleportion mechanism used (Type1a,Type21b,...TypeNX) such as errors in identifing the submolecular structure at a sufficient level of detail within an instant (any time involved involves submolecular alterations and therefore inconsistencies), the transmission of that information, reconstruction using sufficiently similar submolecular components in a sufficiently similar structure given sufficiently similar states (e.g. located in the same place relative to the transporter, with the submolecular particles moving in the appropriate direction at the appropriate speed etc)... all of these processes include a 'technical' degree of variance of some sort, for this reason from a purely technical perspective TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin will be slightly different even if such a difference is beyond the capacity of then contemporary technology to identify.

From a more philosophical perspective however... assuming Type 1B for a moment... if we discount concepts such as the soul and vitalism, both TPA-Erin and TPB-Erin ARE Erin... TPB-Erin at Type1B step 3's completion is the same (discounting technical error) as TPA-Erin at Type1B step 1's completion. However from that moment on they diverge, they are two individuals who have very similar characteristics and an almost identical past (excluding temporal delay between step 1 and 3) - but their future developments are their own.

Of course the potential ramifications are enormous and there would potentially be significant psychological deviation in future development depending on whether they were TPA-Erin or TPB-Erin ((Though Erin's personality may well mitigate or excasserbate such problems)) the issue of self identity, potential legal implications and so forth.

 

[Meow Mix]

I read this but I'm not sure I understand what you mean. There seems to me to certainly be a quite different connection between past/future me compared to a TPB-me. That is, I continually experience and recall things in relation to a sense of "I/me"-ness. I have episodic memory. I can recall doing things and recall experiencing them through a "self" or "I/me" from which I differentiated even parts of my own body (thus I can speak of "my hand" or "my foot" as components of a body which is somehow not "me", as "I/me" is a sense of cohesion applied to memories and consciousness). However, as soon as TDB-me exists, that entity may be connected in the same way to all past experiences, but by being conscious he is immediately interpreting reality through a seperate frame of reference, a unique "I/me"-ness that I do not have. We are both connected to my past "self" but now with unique reference frames.

Maybe the problem is resolved if they consider themselves a clone? :thud:

 

[Willamena]

I agree they would; but that's what sparks the whole soliloquy about what "self" might be. I'm not sure what it is, if it's even coherent -- I only pointed out some things which I think it's not defined by. Sort of just eliminating some possibilities that seem at first to be obvious.

I think of it as the current state of memories. If we hold "self" to be the sum of memories, then even if there's a clone they will never be identically "self," simply because there are two sets of memories.

Does that make sense?

Well, I tried to raise an analogy to account for that apparent semantic paradox. I refer to seemingly different things when I refer to S(Even) ∩ S(Odd) and then refer to S(1) ∩ S(2), but despite my original choice to distinguish them with different symbols, they are in fact the same object -- Ø.

If they are the same object, you've eliminated the apparent paradox.

 

[Willamena]

Maybe the problem is resolved if they consider themselves a clone? :thud:

Buddhism has a phrase: birth and death. It refers to life-times, but also to the perspective of being in wake of "now," such that we are born to each instance of awareness. In that sense, we are each clones of the prior instance of being.

 

[bobhikes]

Well that's sort of what I'm asking (what is "self?") and saying ("there appear to be discrepancies in KIND, rather than quantity, between the intuitive notions of "self" and these different scenarios.")

I like this and beleive I have an answer

The self is the collection of experiences through the continuation of your molecular changes.

All things have a self, humans are self conscious not everything is self conscious. Teleporting a human makes this more complicated but teleporting a rock you would have the same problems. You would effectivly remove the self of Rock A and replace it with the new self Rock B. Most people wouldn't care though.

Another point I would like to make.

Time is the realization of changes to the self. Time does not exist without self consciousness.

 

[Penumbra]

Snipped a bunch that I simply agreed with, so wouldn't have said much other than "Good point, I agree" anyway!

Well, do you think there is something to the intuition, though, that there is some kind of identity-connection between you and past-you/future-you which seems different, in principle, than TPB-you?

Not sure.

If the teleporter works as advertised, and the "me" on the other side is constructed in such a way to have an identical body, identical personality, and identical memories, then her own intuition might tell her that she's still the same person, still me. It could feel similar to just waking up from a nap, or be so quick as to be almost not noticeable. (Can't be sure what the effects of such complicated technology would be without it actually existing.) But in that case, judging from the OP and the discussion points, she would likely be mistaken about still being the same person even though it doesn't feel to her like she's mistaken.

A teleporter just makes the situation cleaner. As in, instead of biological cell replacement, or discussions on the physics of constantly rapidly moving quantum particles that make up our bodies and brains, it describes a "clean break". But nothing particularly stands out as being inherently unique about it.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

If the teleporter works as advertised, and the "me" on the other side is constructed in such a way to have an identical body, identical personality, and identical memories, then her own intuition might tell her that she's still the same person, still me.

Of course. That was settled by Arnold Schwarzenegger in The 6th Day.

 

[atanu]

Nature of Self ?

Meow

We at the outset seem not to understand the Self (since that is the query). And yet we can copy it exactly as it is?

Suppose, you are standing in front of a mirror and I make several copies of your mirror image. What am I doing?

 

[atanu]

Self is not that which is seen/experienced mentally/sensually. It that which experiences.

 

[lunamoth]

Interesting thought experiment, MM, most of it is over my head but fun to think about the idea of the transporter selves none-the-less.

I think the self stays with the process of the individual, and there is nothing magical about it. I think the transporter experiment is like creating clones, regardless of whether the originating person remains or is destroyed.

If multiple selves are made, then multiple perspectives/selves/souls go forward from that point.

The interesting question is what might go on from the copies (original or downstream) that die or are purposefully destroyed.

 

[Penumbra]

Of course. That was settled by Arnold Schwarzenegger in The 6th Day.

Yep.

He incorrectly thought he was a continuous consciousness of an older individual but was instead a newly formed clone.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Yep.

He incorrectly thought he was a continuous consciousness of an older individual but was instead a newly formed clone.

I hate it when that happens. Especially on a Monday.

 

[idav]

Yep.

He incorrectly thought he was a continuous consciousness of an older individual but was instead a newly formed clone.

Nothing wrong with being a copy. Copying even happens in nature.

 

[Penumbra]

Nothing wrong with being a copy. Copying even happens in nature.

It becomes a bit "wrong" when two versions of the same person believe that the original person's family is theirs.

He saw a version of himself with his family, and naturally, freaked out.

 

[DreadFish]

My first thought is that, it is not the body or the memories or personality traits that are one's self. Like others have already mentioned, "self" is a mental fabrication that is applied to certain things, a body, thoughts, personality traits, memories, etc..

So, to get to a deeper point, and one that may seem incredibly hard to answer: is the awareness that thinks it's TPA-ERin, the same as the awareness that will think it's TPB-Erin. You know? What is that awareness that imputes "self" on certain things and then wonder's what it's nature is?