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Noam Chomsky on NATO...

Stevicus

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
Desires are not subject to record, so you are asking me to prove the unprovable. The Russian Empire made moves to occupy parts of Afghanistan in its drive South towards Persia, however. Note that at the time, the Amir of Afghanistan was a British ally.

Panjdeh incident - Wikipedia

Well, in contrast, the long-term Russian desire to retake Constantinople for Orthodoxy was pretty well-known and part of their national aspirations. If anything, the Crimean War was motivated by that more than anything else.

But instead of accepting the obvious (that the Russians wanted Constantinople), it seems the British made some speculative projections that this was somehow a precursor towards the Russians wanting to take over India, which doesn't appear to be a rational response.

But I was thinking that maybe there was some historical document, comparable or analogous to the German Schlieffen Plan, which was formulated as a hypothetical war plan (which they would later modify for actual use). I don't think there is one, because (as I mentioned earlier) a hypothetical Russian invasion of India from Central Asia in the 19th (or even 20th) century would have been a logistical nightmare and pretty much an impossibility.
 
My point is that it seems clear that they evaluated who was a threat or non-threat by very subjective and inconsistent criteria.

The French, for example, were far more expansionist and occupying places in close proximity to the British Empire and had the industries, manpower, and sea power to be a serious material threat to Britain - not just the Empire but the British home islands. But the British were allied with the French in the Crimean War, and they forged further alliances with that country later on.

Russia was far more distant and remote, and were sorely lacking in industries and any real sea power to be much of a threat at all. Their expansionism was land-based, for the most part. They had no real projection power beyond their own borders.

So, it seems that Britain judged threats or non-threats not by what other countries actually do, where they're located, or the size of the armies or navies. It seems just based on how they feel about the country or its government or any other highly subjective evaluations.

This all needs far too much context to be meaningful, but can start here:

The Concert of Europe refers to a general consensus among the Great Powers of 19th-century Europe to maintain the European balance of power, political boundaries, and spheres of influence. Never a perfect unity and subject to disputes and jockeying for position and influence, the Concert was an extended period of relative peace and stability in Europe following the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars which had consumed the continent since the 1790s.

Concert of Europe - Wikipedia

What kind of way is that to run a foreign policy? Among other things, it led to two world wars, near bankruptcy, abject dependence upon the United States, and in the end, you still lost the Empire you were trying to save.

How do you think Europe should have done things after the Napoleonic Wars? What was the magic solution to the rivalries and social forces that existed?

What would have been a "rational" foreign policy?
 

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Stevicus

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
This all needs far too much context to be meaningful, but can start here:

The Concert of Europe refers to a general consensus among the Great Powers of 19th-century Europe to maintain the European balance of power, political boundaries, and spheres of influence. Never a perfect unity and subject to disputes and jockeying for position and influence, the Concert was an extended period of relative peace and stability in Europe following the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars which had consumed the continent since the 1790s.

Concert of Europe - Wikipedia

Yes, I'm familiar with the Concert of Europe. It was also referred to as the Metternich System. Apparently, after defeating Napoleon, they got together and agreed that they wouldn't fight each other, just so they could be free to oppress and abuse their own people so they could go on getting richer.

It was a kind of "screw the peasants and workers" philosophy which worked in the short term, but the long-term abuse and oppression by the upper classes eventually led to the Revolutions of 1848. So, cause and effect. After that started a wave of nationalism which swept across Europe, in France, Germany, Italy, Russia - and among nationalities which were not independent.

But this doesn't really address the point I was making earlier. Still, since you mention the Concert of Europe, that made consider another aspect of this. If they were really that committed to having a long-term peace in Europe, then they should have unified in a full-court press on the Ottoman Empire to extricate them from the European continent. The Greeks wanted their independence, and Russia was willing to help them. Other Orthodox nationalities wanted independence from Turkey, and it seems natural that Russia would bond with their fellow Orthodox Christians who were living under the Turkish yoke.

It seems strange that the British and French would be okay with the Muslim Ottoman Empire controlling that much of Europe, along with the eastern Mediterranean and other strategic zones in the region. It makes no sense from a strategic viewpoint, even taking into consideration the security of their empires. In retrospect, after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, both the French and British gained key territories in the Middle East.

They would have been far better off if they had joined the Russians against the Ottoman Empire, which could have led to the independence of the Balkans far sooner than it actually happened. Moreover, Britain and France could have gained as well. That's why I said it was "curious." They wasted a golden opportunity mainly because they were afraid that Russia might try to grab India. But if they were on the Russians' side and defeated Turkey, they would have been able to sit down and agree on who gets what. Britain's security concerns could have been addressed and resolved.

When you think about it, World War I might have been averted, if not for the British fear that the Russians might try to grab India.

There seems to be a history behind that: Anti-Russian sentiment - Wikipedia

On 19 October 1797 the French Directory received a document from a Polish general, Michał Sokolnicki, entitled "Aperçu sur la Russie". This became known as the so-called "The Will of Peter the Great" and was first published in October 1812, during the Napoleonic wars, in Charles Louis-Lesur's much-read Des progrès de la puissance russe: this was at the behest of Napoleon I, who ordered a series of articles to be published showing that "Europe is inevitably in the process of becoming booty for Russia".[29][30] Subsequent to the Napoleonic wars, propaganda against Russia was continued by Napoleon's former confessor, Dominique Georges-Frédéric de Pradt, who in a series of books portrayed Russia as a power-grasping "barbaric" power hungry to conquer Europe.[31] With reference to Russia's new constitutional laws in 1811 the Savoyard philosopher Joseph de Maistre wrote the now famous statement: "Every nation gets the government it deserves" ("Toute nation a le gouvernement qu'elle mérite").[32][33]

Beginning from 1815 and lasting roughly until 1840, British commentators began criticizing the extreme conservatism of the Russian state and its resistance to reform efforts.[34] However, Russophobia in Britain for the rest of the 19th century was primarily focused related to British fears that the Russian conquest of Central Asia was a precursor to an attack on British-controlled India. These fears led to the "Great Game", a series of political and diplomatic confrontations between Britain and Russia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[35]

In 1843 the Marquis de Custine published his hugely successful 1800-page, four-volume travelogue La Russie en 1839. Custine's scathing narrative reran what were by now clichés which presented Russia as a place where "the veneer of European civilization was too thin to be credible". Such was its huge success that several official and pirated editions quickly followed, as well as condensed versions and translations in German, Dutch, and English. By 1846 approximately 200 thousand copies had been sold.[36]

In 1867, Fyodor Tyutchev, a Russian poet, diplomat and member of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, introduced the actual term of "russophobia" in a letter to his daughter Anna Aksakova on 20 September 1867, where he applied it to a number of pro-Western Russian liberals who, pretending that they were merely following their liberal principles, developed a negative attitude towards their own country and always stood on a pro-Western and anti-Russian position, regardless of any changes in the Russian society and having a blind eye on any violations of these principles in the West, "violations in the sphere of justice, morality, and even civilization". He put the emphasis on the irrationality of this sentiment.[37] Tyuchev saw Western anti-Russian sentiment as the result of misunderstanding caused by civilizational differences between East and West.[38] Being an adherent of Pan-Slavism, he believed that the historical mission of Slavic peoples was to be united in a Pan-Slavic and Orthodox Christian Russian Empire to preserve their Slavic identity and avoid cultural assimilation; in his lyrics Poland, a Slavic yet Catholic country, was poetically referred to as Judas among the Slavs.[39

So, my point is, maybe there was a bit more going on than just the British fear that the Russians might try to take India.

How do you think Europe should have done things after the Napoleonic Wars? What was the magic solution to the rivalries and social forces that existed?

What would have been a "rational" foreign policy?

Perhaps one that is more objective and practical, based on strategic interests, not on personal feelings or a sense of superiority or bigotry towards other nations.

In George Washington's Farewell Address, he favored a foreign policy which was probably more neutral, emphasizing trade and good relations with all nations, but playing no favorites among them. This was in the context of war between Britain and France at the time, with different factions advocating that America join one side or the other. But most Americans preferred to stay out of European wars.

The Metternich System was about protecting a system and a way of life for wealthy aristocrats and nobility, getting rich on screwing the peasants and workers, while some were going off to other lands to colonize and enslave the natives.

But setting that aside, if they wanted a secure and stable continent of Europe, it might have more advantageous if they had given fair consideration to other nations on that continent.
 
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