Objective Morality Without God

[Brian2]

Well then, it would appear that we are in agreement. If I understand you correctly, God's commands are there to guide us, perhaps to give us structure or help us from being led "astray." But they are not the end-all-be-all of morality.

The example of Abraham may even serve as an example there. I think that, in the story, even Abraham thought that that killing his son was a reprehensible deed. Even God's commanding it would not make such an act morally acceptable. But the point of the story (which I'm not particularly a fan of, btw) was that obedience to God trumps all other concerns... even moral ones.

Obedience to God, the one who gave him Isaac in his old age and said he would be the father of nations through Isaac showed his faith and trust in God and was an act of righteousness.

So, since we both agree that Divine Command Theory is false (or do we?), the only other relevant arguments that I'm aware of are the lawmaker arguments that we looked at first. We can return to it if you wish, but I'm fine having made the points I've made. I don't need you to agree with me that God is not necessary for moral objectivity, but hopefully I've demonstrated that it's a reasonable position.

If you feel there is an argument that I have not treated yet that necessitates God for objective morality, we can look at that too. But aside from my points about the lawmaker arguments and the refutation DCT (which I didn't have to present), I've pretty much made my case.

OK I can't say that I have followed the ins and outs of it all however especially when it was spread out over a considerable time.

 

[Ella S.]

...my thesis is that pain is axiomatically bad. If something is an axiom, the presumption is that it doesn't require reasons to believe. It's obvious. THAT'S the hedonist's real argument. And I -personally- think its a self-evident axiom.

***

Let's consider a natural event... a person has her index finger pricked with a needle. This is a cause... with a bunch of effects.

1. Person's skin is broken by the needle.
2. The needle makes contact with nerve tissue.
3. The nerve tissue of the index finger becomes excited, sending pulses of electricity through the nervous system.
4. Some of this nervous activity reaches the brain and causes more neural activity to happen inside the brain.
5. The person experiences pain.
6. The person pulls their hand away because she has an aversion to the sensation of pain.
7. The person, afterward, thinks to herself, "That experience was bad."

Where in all these events does the badness lie according to the hedonist? It is only present in ONE of the above items. Which one?

Spoiler

Number 5.

That is the only candidate for something that is qualitatively bad. It's bad just because it happens. None of the other items on the list qualify as an event that could be objectively bad. But five is objectively bad, because it necessarily includes a certain qualitative element. Whether we like it or not, the qualitative element is there- in that event. You cannot explain it away or dismiss it. Whatever genuine badness necessarily accompanies number five is an objectively true thing. None of the others could be ethically important because they are dry matters of fact without a qualitative element that by necessity accompanies them.

I'm not really trying to dismiss that pain is bad, I just genuinely don't see how it is. For being supposedly self-evident, it isn't evident at all to me. The way you're describing our ability to recognize badness is something I find more confusing than anything.

I don't take truths on axioms. I arrive at truth through logical methodology. Even when I have a sensory experience, I compare it with other sensory experiences so that I don't fall victim to illusions or hallucinations as easily. It's the logical method that brings me truth.

I think my epistemology, which is process rationalism, is just incompatible with axiomatic moral truths.

I love Error Theory. I think it's the best refutation to realism. Hard to deny. But how can you be an error theorist and a realist? I see a dichotomy there. Can you explain?

I am a realist in the sense that I believe that moral statements are truth claims and they are cognitivist, thus they are statements about reality; they are just false. This is in contrast to, say, moral non-cognitivism, which a lot of other forms of moral skepticism and moral nihilism are based on. It's also in contrast to quasi-realism and fictionalism, where moral claims are also treated as truth claims but are known to not be truly real. I think most people who argue about the truth of moral claims in this way really do think they are having disagreements about reality, and so I temper my approach to that.

That has actually been a pebble in my shoe since you brought it up. I wouldn't want to use the term "intrinsically motivating." I would want to cite "reasons for" or "reasons against" when justifying one natural state over another. "Intrinsically motivating" seems a lil' dodgy. But I suppose the "reasons for/reasons against approach to normativity is controversial too.

It does seem, from my perspective at least, that ethical disagreements often devolve into appeals to emotion, particularly prosocial emotions. It's happened quite a few times to me here on RF, and each time I've rejected the obvious appeal to emotion only to make myself look callous and lose disagreements in the public eye. I think a lot of normativity is really focused on persuading people to take specific actions, in practice, and doesn't have much to do with truth at all unless you're debating with an ethicist or someone more philosophically inclined.

This makes me wonder if there's just a major disconnect between what most people experience as morality and what ethical philosophers are talking about. Moral psychology seems to support this, demonstrating that people tend to moralize their idiosyncratic preferences. I think this is a much more tenable position than the idea that we can arrive at moral truths self-evidently through moral intuition, as if moral intuition granted us access to truth through some unique form of sensory perception that specifically senses moral concepts. That kind of just sounds like ESP to me.

 

[Ella S.]

Obedience to God, the one who gave him Isaac in his old age and said he would be the father of nations through Isaac showed his faith and trust in God and was an act of righteousness.

Would you say that obedience to God should come from a place of earned loyalty? That we should be loyal to God because we recognize he is benevolent and wise and has already given us so much?

 

[MonkeyFire]

Objectivity is how it should to be most fair to everyone, and as the most certain way of rendering laws. Subjectivity is moral principle of love, we all get our own, that is faith, then there is greed. You see objective morality is about how you behave and act, and your due respect for our faithful men and women. Objectivity is the nature of laws, subjectivity is how we treat them.

 

[Brian2]

Would you say that obedience to God should come from a place of earned loyalty? That we should be loyal to God because we recognize he is benevolent and wise and has already given us so much?

To recognise God's love for us and wanting to please Him and love Him is no doubt a better place to come from than obedience out of fear.

 

[vulcanlogician]

It does seem, from my perspective at least, that ethical disagreements often devolve into appeals to emotion, particularly prosocial emotions. It's happened quite a few times to me here on RF, and each time I've rejected the obvious appeal to emotion only to make myself look callous and lose disagreements in the public eye.

I agree with you. Any moral realist system (if it is truly objective) can't involve an appeal to our emotions. It must involve logic from top to bottom.

Axioms or self-evident things can lie at the very bottom of such ethical systems (as I see it), but even these "self-evident" items cannot rely on our emotional dispositions.

I would argue that "pain being bad" isn't such an appeal, because its qualitative badness can be gauged without reference to human prejudices or emotions. But there's controversy there... or at the very least the need for a bunch of clarifications I need to make.

***

Also, I'm not done with your analysis of the Moorean argument. I was quite impressed with your work there. I decided that I need to give the original text AND your analysis a reread before proceeding. Right out of the gate I wanted to note that your objection about intrinsic motivations was very good. And I want to make sure my response is on the level of the analysis you provided.

So look forward to that and a more thorough response to your last post in the future.

 

[vulcanlogician]

OK I can't say that I have followed the ins and outs of it all however especially when it was spread out over a considerable time.

Yeah. It was spread out over time.I can summarize here, inputting your responses as I interpreted them. (Let me know if I misinterpreted any of your positions.

The question is this: Is God required for morality to be objective?
My answer: no
Your answer: yes

Here is how we defined objective morality: "Morality applies regardless of our endorsements, regardless of whether they get us what we want. Moral claims are true independent of any human attitude or opinion regarding them."

So far so good. We both think objective morality can't involve human attitudes or opinions, but that doesn't preclude God does it?

So, as far as I can tell there are two strategies for supporting the idea of God's necessity for morality. The first is to say that morality involves laws or rules and that laws or rules must have an author. These claims were expressed logically as arguments A and B.

Reminder:

Spoiler

Argument A:

1. If morality is objective, humans didn't create it.
2. If humans didn't create morality, then God did.
3. Therefore: If morality is objective, then God created it.

Argument B:

1. If there is a law, there is an author.
2. Morality involves laws.
3. Therefore: Morality needs to have an author.

4. There are only two possible authors of morality: humans or God.
5. Therefore: If humans didn't create morality, then God did.

My argument was that premise 1 of argument B is false. That means the conclusion is unsupported. The conclusion of argument B is premise 2 of argument A. Therefore, the conclusion of argument A is not supported. So we have no reason to accept the idea that moral laws require God as an author. You didn't really give much pushback there, but if you wish to now, go for it.



Next, we looked at Divine Command Theory (or DCT). DCT says that right and wrong do not inherently exist in reality, and that things only BECOME right or wrong by gods prescription or forbiddance of them.

Divine Command Theory:

"An action is only morally bad because God forbids it. An action is only morally right because God prescribes it."

In response to this you said:

It is not that an action is morally bad only because God forbids it and it is not that an action is morally right because God prescribes it. It is more that we are moral beings who can be led astray and need the guidance from God who knows morals.

That suggests that you think Divine Command Theory is false. And since we already agree, it didn't seem like I needed to refute Divine Command Theory. (But I can if it is required.)

So, if God is not needed as a lawmaker for morality AND Divine Command Theory is false, that means God is not required for objective morality. That means, when we ask the question, "Is God required for morality to be objective?" the answer seems to be, "no."

Even if God exists and is a perfect moral teacher whose commands ought to be followed, that doesn't mean that we NEED God in order to have objective morality. It just makes him a wise teacher who ought to be paid attention to. Like a good math teacher. Sure, you should listen to what they have to teach us about math, but that doesn't mean that math itself requires such a teacher to exist.

That's what we talked about so far. I'm open to any objections you might have. Is there any part of that you'd like to revisit? Is there something that deserves consideration that was not yet discussed? I'll approach any argument or objection you may have with an open mind.

 

[vulcanlogician]

I think any argument that relies on intuition is doomed to fail. We constructed logic for the express purpose of questioning and correcting our intuitions, because our intuitions are so prone to fallacy and bias. I think this is a poor approach to take on any subject, but especially one as important as morality.

We need to be clear on what intuition is first, and I imagine we are on the same page mostly. In colloquial language "intuition" can often mean some kind of clairvoyance. Philosophers, of course, mean something far more basic and stringent. Though there are debates among philosophers as to what an intuition actually is. (Are intuitions beliefs, dispositions toward beliefs, or mental faculties?)

I think intuitions can serve a limited role in philosophical discourse. Which is to say that intuitions themselves may be unsuitable to support controversial claims, but! They ARE suitable in pointing us toward a particular problem with a theory.

One fine example of this is the "pleasure machine" thought experiment. As a challenge to hedonism, the thought experiment proposes that we have the option to live out the rest of our lives in a pleasure machine, and everyone on Earth (including our friends and loved ones) have the option to do the same. This machine will keep us alive and healthy and also place us in a state of perpetual bliss and happiness.

I think this is a great test of hedonism. Hedonism says happiness and pleasure are the only intrinsic goods that exist. But our intuitions tell us that we would lose something "good" if we were to choose to live our lives out in the machine. And if our intuitions are correct on the matter, then hedonism must be false (at least monistic hedonism). This thought experiment arouses our intuitions in such a way that we suspect that pleasure and happiness can't be the sole goods with which we ought to be concerned. Do are intuitions answer the question for us? No. But they point us toward a problem. And then we can use logic and argument to iron out what exactly is going on.

The other issue is that Moorean ethics may require intuition for moral judgments (it's debated, anyway). The problem is with Moore's concept of goodness simplicita... or that goodness is a simple irreducible concept. To Moore, we err when we try to reduce an ethical good to a certain category (like pleasure or pain). He agrees that pleasure is good, but it is because we have a concept of good (goodness simplicita) that we understand prior to experiencing pleasure or pain that allows us to recognize that pleasure is good and pain is bad. Hedonists do not rely on such an understanding of goodness simplicita. Hedonists simply claim that our experience of pain has the quality of badness. Our intuitions have nothing to do with it as far as hedonism goes.

So, this is a problem with Moorean ethics as I see it. It isn't a refutation per se, but it certainly is cause for concern. One strategy is to deny the need for intuitions in Moorean ethics. All that is required, according to those who promote this strategy is a simple concept of simple goodness. But this is dissatisfying to philosophers. Philosophers are prone to poke and prod such claims and ask how exactly we can tell good from bad.

If you wade into the quagmire of Moorean intuitionism, there are some interesting arguments to be found. Moore famously postualted a hypothetical sunset which is experienced by no one. Moore thought that such a sunset could be good, even if there were no witnesses to it. This is a bold ethical claim (kinda reminds me of Plato) because the majority of ethicists claim that in order for something to be "good" ethically speaking it must be GOOD FOR someone. A person must be there to appreciate its beauty in order for it to be good.

Long story short, the newest strategy that has come about to support Moorean ethics (circa 2015) is put forth by the "New Mooreans." (Nandi Theunissen has done some incredible work on this!) The New Mooreans seek a middle ground between traditional ethics and Moorean ethics which agrees with the Moorean notion of goodness simplicita, but also agrees with the traditional ethical postulate that in order for something to be "good" it must be GOOD FOR a sentient being. The New Mooreans, because their involve the experiences of a sentient being as a brute fact of reality that speaks for itself, claim to have circumvented the need for intuitionism in the Moorean system. But the debate rages on. I don't know very much about the New Mooreans aside from one 45 minute lecture I listened to years ago, so I'm ill-suited to defend the position. (Aside from that, I was inaccurate with what I said in this paragraph. The New Mooreans agree with Moore in the existence of goodness simplicita. But they think that something being GOOD FOR someone explains why it is so.)

I tend to think of intuitions as reliable-but-fallible, much like our senses. I am bothered by any ethical system that relies solely on intuitions to form its concepts of good and bad, but I also would be tempted to work out the kinks in such a system if possible. That would require a lot of knowledge I do not currently possess. But, hey, I like to read, so I may pursue that avenue someday if I think it's worthwhile.

In the other direction, we have thinkers like Stephen Stich, whom I love. He is a very clear-thinking moral nihilist who launches a full-scale attack on the notion that moral beliefs can be true, citing that our environmentally developed intuitions MUST play a role in the formation of such beliefs. I can probably link you to some of his lectures if you're curious. He's done some incredible work in ethics.

Now, where I stand on intuition is described thusly: On a 1-10 scale, where 1 is our intuitions can never be trusted to give us any accurate information, and 10 is our intuitions can be depended upon as much as our senses to give us accurate information, I am about at a 5. Our intuitions CAN give us accurate information sometimes, especially to point out problems, but are unreliable as a sole foundation for a solid theory.

Where do you fall on this 1-10 scale? And why?

(I'm still working on a reply to your analysis of the article. I am doing a little reading about exactly what self-motivation has to do with ethics. It actually comes about as a response to Humean problems and is not assumed to suffice as a basis for ethics all by itself-- I think, anyway. Still reading.)

 

[wellwisher]

If you believe in God in all his glory and power, you will need to humble the ego. God make us; ego; peons in terms of hierarchy. The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom. This fear stops you in your tracks, so the ego has to think before acting. Without God the Human ego thinks it is higher than it is; irrationality. This makes easier to act before thinking. Wisdom leads to applied knowledge which needs objectivity, which, in turn, needs long term objectivity.

Secular morality cannot control the ego, unless it become more like a repressive monarchy which will use any tactic, including force, to restrict behavior. It comes back to fear to control the ego; regulatory state.

The difference between the two is the fear of God is more of an inner abstraction; individuality, that does not use the external physical jails or whips of the shady secular monarchy. God is more about individual self contained will and choice, instead of external force to do the will of the monarchy; forced choice. The ego never really changes from outside pressures, since once freedom is there, it will go back to its old ways. With God, since there is no tangible external punishment in this world. This is more enduring, since nothing internal changes if external culture decides to loosen. God is eternal and still the same. The internal drive of the entrepreneur does not depend on the external world, which often pushes against it. The get along type person, needs the external world for direction, since it has no inner rudder.

For example, in Democrats run cities in the USA, crimes, like shoplifting, are no longer punishable, so this crime is worse than ever. It is forcing businesses to shut down or leave. Did this crime go up among the faithful? The answer is no. This is one difference between religion and secular law. The faithful held steady due to the abstraction that are above them, even if man changes the rules to make crime pay. Secular will take advantage of the new laws.

The irony of this topic is the Political Left is the side that preaches that morality can be made better by man. It is also the side that teaches emotional thinking instead of logic; manipulates emotions. The irony is if you lead with emotions, the best moral logic system will be over your head. If the Left was not two faced, it would be teaching one to ignore emotions, instead of staying whiny and outraged. Control over emotions is how you differentiate logic and inference. Mr Spock of Star Trek is about reasoning without emotions; abortion is good based on emotions, not logic. What is the logic and how did earlier emotions and impulses, instead of rational behavior; night of passion, lead to this more long term need for abortion?

Even if the rational secular could form an ideal human set of objective laws, that are good for all, emotional thinking will not see that logic. Emotion often controls the ego. Unless the Left stops playing games that needs emotional thinking, the job of the secular rational morality, will be very difficult. Emotions allows for fiction instead of nonfiction. A good moral system will need to be nonfiction; based on cause and affect. The Left needs emotions for their fictional reality, and this will undermine even the best system of human rational morality. It ends up as forced conformity with reason not all there to allow individuality.

 

[Ella S.]

We need to be clear on what intuition is first, and I imagine we are on the same page mostly. In colloquial language "intuition" can often mean some kind of clairvoyance. Philosophers, of course, mean something far more basic and stringent. Though there are debates among philosophers as to what an intuition actually is. (Are intuitions beliefs, dispositions toward beliefs, or mental faculties?)

I think intuitions can serve a limited role in philosophical discourse. Which is to say that intuitions themselves may be unsuitable to support controversial claims, but! They ARE suitable in pointing us toward a particular problem with a theory.

One fine example of this is the "pleasure machine" thought experiment. As a challenge to hedonism, the thought experiment proposes that we have the option to live out the rest of our lives in a pleasure machine, and everyone on Earth (including our friends and loved ones) have the option to do the same. This machine will keep us alive and healthy and also place us in a state of perpetual bliss and happiness.

I think this is a great test of hedonism. Hedonism says happiness and pleasure are the only intrinsic goods that exist. But our intuitions tell us that we would lose something "good" if we were to choose to live our lives out in the machine. And if our intuitions are correct on the matter, then hedonism must be false (at least monistic hedonism). This thought experiment arouses our intuitions in such a way that we suspect that pleasure and happiness can't be the sole goods with which we ought to be concerned. Do are intuitions answer the question for us? No. But they point us toward a problem. And then we can use logic and argument to iron out what exactly is going on.

The other issue is that Moorean ethics may require intuition for moral judgments (it's debated, anyway). The problem is with Moore's concept of goodness simplicita... or that goodness is a simple irreducible concept. To Moore, we err when we try to reduce an ethical good to a certain category (like pleasure or pain). He agrees that pleasure is good, but it is because we have a concept of good (goodness simplicita) that we understand prior to experiencing pleasure or pain that allows us to recognize that pleasure is good and pain is bad. Hedonists do not rely on such an understanding of goodness simplicita. Hedonists simply claim that our experience of pain has the quality of badness. Our intuitions have nothing to do with it as far as hedonism goes.

So, this is a problem with Moorean ethics as I see it. It isn't a refutation per se, but it certainly is cause for concern. One strategy is to deny the need for intuitions in Moorean ethics. All that is required, according to those who promote this strategy is a simple concept of simple goodness. But this is dissatisfying to philosophers. Philosophers are prone to poke and prod such claims and ask how exactly we can tell good from bad.

If you wade into the quagmire of Moorean intuitionism, there are some interesting arguments to be found. Moore famously postualted a hypothetical sunset which is experienced by no one. Moore thought that such a sunset could be good, even if there were no witnesses to it. This is a bold ethical claim (kinda reminds me of Plato) because the majority of ethicists claim that in order for something to be "good" ethically speaking it must be GOOD FOR someone. A person must be there to appreciate its beauty in order for it to be good.

Long story short, the newest strategy that has come about to support Moorean ethics (circa 2015) is put forth by the "New Mooreans." (Nandi Theunissen has done some incredible work on this!) The New Mooreans seek a middle ground between traditional ethics and Moorean ethics which agrees with the Moorean notion of goodness simplicita, but also agrees with the traditional ethical postulate that in order for something to be "good" it must be GOOD FOR a sentient being. The New Mooreans, because their involve the experiences of a sentient being as a brute fact of reality that speaks for itself, claim to have circumvented the need for intuitionism in the Moorean system. But the debate rages on. I don't know very much about the New Mooreans aside from one 45 minute lecture I listened to years ago, so I'm ill-suited to defend the position. (Aside from that, I was inaccurate with what I said in this paragraph. The New Mooreans agree with Moore in the existence of goodness simplicita. But they think that something being GOOD FOR someone explains why it is so.)

This was a fascinating read. It gives me some ideas for contemplation and research.

I tend to think of intuitions as reliable-but-fallible, much like our senses. I am bothered by any ethical system that relies solely on intuitions to form its concepts of good and bad, but I also would be tempted to work out the kinks in such a system if possible. That would require a lot of knowledge I do not currently possess. But, hey, I like to read, so I may pursue that avenue someday if I think it's worthwhile.

In the other direction, we have thinkers like Stephen Stich, whom I love. He is a very clear-thinking moral nihilist who launches a full-scale attack on the notion that moral beliefs can be true, citing that our environmentally developed intuitions MUST play a role in the formation of such beliefs. I can probably link you to some of his lectures if you're curious. He's done some incredible work in ethics.

Now, where I stand on intuition is described thusly: On a 1-10 scale, where 1 is our intuitions can never be trusted to give us any accurate information, and 10 is our intuitions can be depended upon as much as our senses to give us accurate information, I am about at a 5. Our intuitions CAN give us accurate information sometimes, especially to point out problems, but are unreliable as a sole foundation for a solid theory.

Where do you fall on this 1-10 scale? And why?

(I'm still working on a reply to your analysis of the article. I am doing a little reading about exactly what self-motivation has to do with ethics. It actually comes about as a response to Humean problems and is not assumed to suffice as a basis for ethics all by itself-- I think, anyway. Still reading.)

I have to confess to some degree of hypocrisy here. I work mostly off of intuition in my everyday life. It was a problem for me when I was a child because I was able to do college-level math like calculus when I was in 2nd grade, but I had a hard time explaining my work. I just "knew" the answers. Intuition is almost necessary for the sake of creative problem solving, because creativity is not a rational process.

However, that experience did help me understand that intuition by itself is not enough. It might need to be relied upon when you're loose on time, such as in the timed math tests I was taking, but when your intuitions should be scrutinized and rationally analyzed when you have the time. Ideally, we could do this with every intuition, but real life does not always operate in that way. This is part of my draw to Stoicism; it helps me remain in that System 2 line of thought so I can more quickly analyze my intuitions before acting on them.

Even when it comes to creative problem solving, the actual creativity part is what you start with. After you brainstorm ideas, you scrutinize them to eliminate the worse ones and choose the best one. You don't just go with your first intuition.

So I would have to say that I fall squarely at 2. I think intuition is important, but its meaning is completely dwarfed by the work that must be done by our rational minds to refine intuition into something useful. I don't think that intuitions in and of themselves are reliable until they are double-checked by reason.

 

[lukethethird]

Just to get it out of the way, what is moral has changed over time. People used to think that sacrificing children to the gods was a moral act. We of course are horrified at that idea.

Well, you might be, most people on this forum believe it's perfectly legit. Am I right, people?

 

[Ella S.]

One fine example of this is the "pleasure machine" thought experiment. As a challenge to hedonism, the thought experiment proposes that we have the option to live out the rest of our lives in a pleasure machine, and everyone on Earth (including our friends and loved ones) have the option to do the same. This machine will keep us alive and healthy and also place us in a state of perpetual bliss and happiness.

I think this is a great test of hedonism. Hedonism says happiness and pleasure are the only intrinsic goods that exist. But our intuitions tell us that we would lose something "good" if we were to choose to live our lives out in the machine. And if our intuitions are correct on the matter, then hedonism must be false (at least monistic hedonism). This thought experiment arouses our intuitions in such a way that we suspect that pleasure and happiness can't be the sole goods with which we ought to be concerned. Do are intuitions answer the question for us? No. But they point us toward a problem. And then we can use logic and argument to iron out what exactly is going on.

This example actually highlights exactly why I find ethical philosophy so infuriating. I don't understand why people who are committed to the idea of hedonism wouldn't support the pleasure machine, when it's a logical consequence of their stated values. I don't see why the pleasure machine is treated as a refutation of hedonism or why hedonists accept it as a serious problem with their philosophy.

This is mostly because it isn't a logical counter-argument. The argument itself is clearly formatted identically to how an Appeal to Emotion is formatted. It comes across as, "Doesn't this consequence of your philosophy feel wrong to you?" If I was a hedonist, my reply would be, "It doesn't matter what I feel is right or wrong. I must admit that a pleasure machine would be good, based on the moral axioms I have affirmed the truth of." This is a reply that I seldom see in ethics, and it's the major reason why it seems to me like the "intuition" in ethics is really little more than irrationality.

 

[Ella S.]

If you believe in God in all his glory and power, you will need to humble the ego. God make us; ego; peons in terms of hierarchy. The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom. This fear stops you in your tracks, so the ego has to think before acting. Without God the Human ego thinks it is higher than it is; irrationality. This makes easier to act before thinking. Wisdom leads to applied knowledge which needs objectivity, which, in turn, needs long term objectivity.

Secular morality cannot control the ego, unless it become more like a repressive monarchy which will use any tactic, including force, to restrict behavior. It comes back to fear to control the ego; regulatory state.

The difference between the two is the fear of God is more of an inner abstraction; individuality, that does not use the external physical jails or whips of the shady secular monarchy. God is more about individual self contained will and choice, instead of external force to do the will of the monarchy; forced choice. The ego never really changes from outside pressures, since once freedom is there, it will go back to its old ways. With God, since there is no tangible external punishment in this world. This is more enduring, since nothing internal changes if external culture decides to loosen. God is eternal and still the same. The internal drive of the entrepreneur does not depend on the external world, which often pushes against it. The get along type person, needs the external world for direction, since it has no inner rudder.

For example, in Democrats run cities in the USA, crimes, like shoplifting, are no longer punishable, so this crime is worse than ever. It is forcing businesses to shut down or leave. Did this crime go up among the faithful? The answer is no. This is one difference between religion and secular law. The faithful held steady due to the abstraction that are above them, even if man changes the rules to make crime pay. Secular will take advantage of the new laws.

The irony of this topic is the Political Left is the side that preaches that morality can be made better by man. It is also the side that teaches emotional thinking instead of logic; manipulates emotions. The irony is if you lead with emotions, the best moral logic system will be over your head. If the Left was not two faced, it would be teaching one to ignore emotions, instead of staying whiny and outraged. Control over emotions is how you differentiate logic and inference. Mr Spock of Star Trek is about reasoning without emotions; abortion is good based on emotions, not logic. What is the logic and how did earlier emotions and impulses, instead of rational behavior; night of passion, lead to this more long term need for abortion?

Even if the rational secular could form an ideal human set of objective laws, that are good for all, emotional thinking will not see that logic. Emotion often controls the ego. Unless the Left stops playing games that needs emotional thinking, the job of the secular rational morality, will be very difficult. Emotions allows for fiction instead of nonfiction. A good moral system will need to be nonfiction; based on cause and affect. The Left needs emotions for their fictional reality, and this will undermine even the best system of human rational morality. It ends up as forced conformity with reason not all there to allow individuality.

You start off your post with an affirmation that your morality is based on fear, and then you attack other moral systems as being based on emotion. Fear is an emotion. In fact, it's one of the 4 cardinal Stoic passions, which Spock was specifically designed to lack by his authors since Vulcan philosophy is based on Stoicism.

The Stoics believed that morality came from reason and truth, not the fear of God. That's logical. And there's a reason why academics and scientists, the most educated and reasonable of us, tend to be Left-leaning.

 

[vulcanlogician]

So I would have to say that I fall squarely at 2. I think intuition is important, but its meaning is completely dwarfed by the work that must be done by our rational minds to refine intuition into something useful. I don't think that intuitions in and of themselves are reliable until they are double-checked by reason.

Really? 2? The fact that you think intuition can be relied upon to generate correct answers to math problems suggests to me that you are at least around 4 or 5. Note that even 10 only puts intuitions on par with the senses. I think even 10 is putting too much stock in intuitions, that's why I didn't bother making 10 mean "intuition is more reliable than our senses"... because that's an absurd position.

The reason I put myself at 5 is that I think our intuitions are reliable in many arenas, but I also acknowledge the limits of intuitions at precisely determining the truth. They are more like a compass than a map.

This example actually highlights exactly why I find ethical philosophy so infuriating. I don't understand why people who are committed to the idea of hedonism wouldn't support the pleasure machine, when it's a logical consequence of their stated values. I don't see why the pleasure machine is treated as a refutation of hedonism or why hedonists accept it as a serious problem with their philosophy.

A lot of commited hedonists do exactly as you recommend. They say the thought experiment is misleading. They would argue something like, the true thought experiment should be a choice between a pleasure machine and a suffering machine. A committed hedonist would say that living a normal life might make us happier than the pleasure machine... because a pleasure machine (despite its name) fails to produce many things that are in fact required for pleasure and happiness. (For instance, life outside of the machine provides variety in experience, or periods of displeasure that make pleasure all the more enjoyable when it occurs-- remember, hedonists think pain that leads to greater overall happiness is morally justified).

Also, I wouldn't call the thought experiment a "refutation of hedonism." It is merely a challenge to the idea that pleasure is the sole good. If the idea of pleasure being the sole good becomes dubious, then hedonism itself is dubious. It hardly counts as a refutation of hedonism if this is the case. I happen to see value in the underlying idea of the thought experiment. It points to a potential problem with hedonism that deserves investigation, or at the very least causes hedonists to have to explain themselves further. But I think hedonism survives such scrutiny and remains a viable theory. All of it leads to a more precise explanation. Even if hedonism is true, challenges like this get us closer to understanding WHY it is true.

Look at black hole singularities which suggest that Einsteins theories are problematic or incomplete. They don't stand as a refutation of Einstein, but they do indicate that there is a problem that needs to be worked out. All this gets us closer to a better description of the physical world.

This example actually highlights exactly why I find ethical philosophy so infuriating.

So you find ethics infuriating? Good.

That means you care about the truth of the matter... an invaluable quality in a philosopher. We've all seen folks who argue something one way or the other on these forums, not because they care about the truth of the matter, but because such an item supports their chosen religious or political affiliations. That's not good philosophy.

I like the old Socratic adage: "The only thing I know is that I know nothing."

Of course, we shouldn't assume absolute ignorance on our part. It would be dumb to start every debate with a tabula rasa... or zero assumptions whatsoever. But it would be even worse to be so satisfied with our own conclusions that we repel all challenges.

Of course, philosophers set out to find satisfying conclusions to ethical problems, and some issues are genuinely resolved as a result of such investigations. But more often than not, philosophers find themselves in a state of profound ignorance and profound dissatisfaction.

But what's worse? Realizing that you are in a profound state of ignorance? Or being in an even more profound state of ignorance that you think you already have the answer before conducting the investigation? I would rather be in the former category over the latter. But realizing how difficult the problem is is incredibly dissatisfying.

The reason Plato is one of the greatest philosophers ever to have lived is not because his theories are so strong. In fact, many of his theories are quite dubious. But what Plato teaches us is that when we reach that state of utter dissatisfaction, we are on the right track. That is where the real philosophy begins, so to speak. Look at Meno. In Meno, we set out to determine whether virtue can be taught. Socrates makes some headway in showing what the answer might be, especially with his demonstration of the slave boy learning some geometry. But what mostly happens through the course of the book is that we are presented with several deep and bothersome problems. Rather than offering a nice, tidy solution to each of these issues, Plato instead opts to leave his readers in a state of profound dissatisfaction over them at the end of the book. Oftentimes, the reader finishes Meno with less confidence in what they can determine about virtue than when they started. Many of Plato's early works end in this fashion. And Plato did that deliberately. That's the genius of Plato, and that's why his early works are still taught today in many introductory philosophy courses. Some philosophical issues require a lot of argument to even begin to make sense of them

It is much the same when we try to resolve ethical issues. Insofar as well-argued hedonism still has problems shows that we have learned enough about hedonism (and its strengths) to also recognize it has important weakness and problems as an ethical theory.

The reason you are "infuriated" or dissatisfied is that you are a good philosopher.

Had you done nothing but nod your head and express satisfaction with my arguments during our discourse, I would hardly have reason to clarify or support my positions. Neither of us would have reason to dig deep and present stronger arguments, and as a result, little of substance would have been said in the process. I'm incredibly grateful for your disagreements and challenges. They are of a high quality. I've produced better arguments because of your criticisms. And, hopefully, this goes in the other direction too.

(***)

PS: I'm STILL working on a reply to your criticism of the article. The reason why is that I am learning exactly WHY self-motivation was brought into the argument in the first place. As luck would have it, my old ethics textbook has a few pages devoted to it. (I'm also reading online sources.) It has to do with an argument formulated by Hume called the Moral Motivation Argument. (I have quoted the argument below if you desire to give it some consideration. It is an error theorist argument, so I thought you may be interested in reading it.)

1. Moral judgments are able, all by themselves, to motivate those who make them.
2. Beliefs are never able, all by themselves, to motivate those who hold them.
3. Therefore, moral judgments are not beliefs.
4. If moral judgments are not beliefs, they can't be true.
5. Therefore, moral judgments can't be true.
(quoted from The Fundamentals of Ethics by Russ Shafer-Landau)

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

To play devil's advocate...

What is wrong with suffering and how do you know? Can this reason be objective or does it come down to 'we don't like it'?

If morality isn't about avoiding avoidable suffering and / or increasing well-being... then what is it about?
If "bad" aren't those things that harm, hurt, increase suffering... then what is it about?
If "good" aren't those things that bring happiness, heal, increase well-being,... then what is it about?

Tbh, I'm kind of surprised how many times in discussions about morality, this question comes up. I've always considered it a given that that is what "bad" and "good" was actually about.


If bad/good doesn't ultimately pertain to suffering / well-being, then what does it relate to?

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

Alright, if we take your line of argument:

Whose well-being is it based on? Are you going to end up with a Utilitarian model? This has its own obvious problems.

What if someone suffers because of someone else's wellbeing?

You then justify theft, lying, possibly even rioting, revolution etc. in ways many people would object to on other bases. If the populace is suffering is it alright to kill the earls? To behead the King? The shoot the whole royal family?

In the aim of living in a secular state, is it morally justified to affect the wellbeing of the religious? To tell them to dress in certain ways that may go against their own moral standards and sense of well-being?

Or, more controversially, is there no place for suffering? Is all suffering always wrong - what about the kind that leads to self-reflection, awakening, renewed sense of self and purpose, desire to change oneself or one's attitudes? What about necessary suffering in childbirth, battle, fitness training, or non-physical ways such as hard study or emotional pain?

I'm having a hard time to take seriously that you aren't comprehending that it's not suffering itself that is immoral, but rather the act of inflicting suffering that is.

Even in a utopian peaceful world, where nobody has an argument ever, where health care is free for all, where violence is unthinkable... then still suffering will occur. People will still suffer from things like diabetees, schizofrenia, alzheimer, cancer, natural disasters, accidents, nasty falls, etc etc etc etc.

As for questions like "what if my wellbeing causes you suffering", these are imo questions that ignore individual rights vs group rights.

"The freedom to swing my arm, ends at your nose.", ever heard that expression?

Off course you'ld have to go on a case by case basis.
And the well-being / suffering thingy must also be objectively established in some way.

For example, me claiming that you are inflicting suffering on me by poking a voodoo doll with a needle, is not exactly going to fly.


Well-being here is meant as the standard human condition, taking into account somatic individual conditions.

In the sense that we can distinguish "healthy" from "sick".
And most of the time, these things are pretty straightforward.

The biggest discussion is imo usually not about if something is good / bad for suffering / well-being, but rather about the moral dilemma component in many judgement calls where we indeed have double effect: good for one, but potentially bad for the other.

In such cases, at times, there are in fact no right or wrong answers and it becomes a game of choosing "the lesser of two evils".


In summary, it again seems obvious to me that moral / immoral is about good / bad. And good / bad, is ultimately about actions/decisions that cause well-being / suffering.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Tbh, I'm kind of surprised how many times in discussions about morality, this question comes up. I've always considered it a given that that is what "bad" and "good" was actually about.


If bad/good doesn't ultimately pertain to suffering / well-being, then what does it relate to?

People want to claim biases toward pleasure and wellbeing. But I agree with you. There is no obvious bias.

We could even be super scientifical about things, and remove even the bias of "wanting to be moral" by proposing a situation where we want to take revenge on someone who has wronged us deeply.

Again, being completely objective, how could we do BAD to this person in a way that does not involve causing them harm or suffering? It's almost impossible to think of a way. I can't think of anything.

But I'm open to hearing any possible answers to that quandary.

 

[vulcanlogician]

My question is: If stealing is wrong for reasons, why can't those reasons be God's commandments?

I have an answer to that but not using objective morality.

Sorry, I missed this.

Short answer: that could be a reason to commit or not commit an act, sure. But if someone thinks such a reason is a moral reason, they still have all their work ahead of them to show how.

It's a fairly bad reason, methinks, when you compare it to other fundamental moral reasons, because the reason is ultimately "obedience to God."

You have already brought up a malevolent god yourself, so I think you see the issue here.

Also, how does it answer Socrates' question to Euthyphro?

"Does God condemn an act because it is immoral? Or is an act immoral because God condemns it?
(paraphrased, of course)

It seems if one's moral reason for doing something/abstaining from doing something is God's command, then their answer is "An act is immoral just because God condemns it." And that is a rather problematic position (as Plato showed some time ago) because it makes God's commandments arbitrary.

Some of God's commandments DO seem arbitrary. (For instance, the specific materials that are to be used to fashion Tabernacles.) But other ones (like the prohibition on stealing) are obviously not. Commitment to obey someone, even a celestial being, does not imply moral objectivity.

 

[vulcanlogician]

If an omnimax God created the world then he creates the rules. It's like a game.

Morality would be like a game mechanic , and, even if the players can't directly view what is happening under the bonnet, there would be objective way to maximise this, as in a game.

The only reason the concept of morality would even exist is because the God made it so, and there could be no morality apart from this.

But an omnimax God is not just omnipotent, but omnibenevolent. Omnipotence allows this God to do anything, but omnibenevolence (arguably) places constraints on his nature and sets limits to the deeds he will do.

Or does it? *vsauce music starts* I mean, if God is omnipotent, does that give him the power to define what omnibenevolent means? If so, we should just remove omnibenevolence from list of omnimax definition because once you assign the kind of sweeping omnipotence to God... that allows him to name evil acts as good, his omniscience supersedes his omnibenevolence. (ie. the term "omnibenevolent" loses all its meaning).

In my arguments, I assume a God who is omnipotent, but cannot defy the laws of logic. He can do anything that's logically possible to do. If God can defy the laws of logic, then there's no point in doing any reasoning about him whatsoever. Mind you, I'm not making the argument that God can't violate logic... but if he can, then zero logical arguments pertaining to him matter in the in the first place, even the ones you are making.

So can God defy the laws of logic? I think that's pretty important to settle before we proceed.

Why is stealing from strangers wrong when it benefits our in-group (and weakens an out-group, a potential future threat)?

According to an ethics which names some actions as good and others as bad, this isn't an issue. And that's the kind of ethics I like to argue.

Let's say that you are a member of a tribe (Tribe A), and your tribe is in constant conflict over resources with the neighboring tribe (Tribe B). Your two tribes are basically at war, and things are coming to a head. Tribe B is stealing from your food stores, and murdering your hunters when they encounter them in the woods. The fact is, your tribe (Tribe A) is in a desperate situation, and it becomes quite obvious that you need to weaken and destroy tribe B before your own tribe is destroyed.

If that's the case, you will probably resolve to do good things to tribe A and bad things to tribe B. That seems like the best means to achieve the desired end. But is it possible to be objective in how you go about that?

I'd say, yeah. You can be pretty methodical and scientific about it.

Kill members of tribe B on sight. Steal their food. Burn their huts. All those things are BAD for them. Objectively bad. Not just bad in your opinion. Any reasonable person, even those with no skin in the game, would agree: you are doing bad to them.

Is there a way to do objectively GOOD things for tribe A?

Sure. Raise their spirits, give them the food you stole from tribe B. Do whatever you can to make them safe and healthy. Nothing subjective in any of that. Those things are good for them.

And none of what I've said thus far has involved morality. It's all been about self-interest. You want tribe A to prevail. You want tribe B to be destroyed. That involves doing GOOD to tribe A and doing BAD to tribe B. The only part that pertains to morality is this: there is a such thing as objectively good and objectively bad actions towards others.

Now, let's forget the tribal wars. That example is over.

Let's say that you (for whatever reason) resolve that you want to do good to others (generally). But you aren't satisfied with doing things for others that merely seem good in your opinion. You want to do objectively good things for others. Well, as luck would have it, there may very well be objective criteria which you can use to determine the goodness of the act. Same goes for someone who resolves to avoid doing bad things to others. You can be objective about which actions you select to abstain from. (And, conversely, if you are a hopeless misanthrope, you could determine --objectively-- how to do BAD to others.)

That's all you need to form a system of objective morality. Once you have made the best determination you can make as to what the objective criteria for good and bad are, you simply need to remain logical from then on. Try to recognize and eliminate your biases as much as possible. I'm not saying this can be done without error, but the desired results can be more or less achieved.

Sure, there is lots of disagreement and lots of debate about the particulars of how to best go about this, but that's a good thing. We're all pretty ignorant on the matter of ethics (including myself) so logical discourse and relevant objections ought to enter into our conversations so that we can get closer to the truth of the matter. If you want to be objective, you need to address arguments that challenge your position.

I can make subjective arguments about why they should, but these are basically ideological fictions and can never be objective (and are arguably just the moralisation of the self-interest and perhaps jealousy of the less powerful).

Objective morality has absolutely nothing to do with persuading or coercing others to take certain actions. It's about figuring out what is objectively good and objectively bad. Full stop. If you are telling people what do do or why they should do it, you are simply exercising (or trying to exercise) influence over others. You may have self interested or moral motivations for doing such a thing. It differs on a case-by-case basis.

To me, the search for an atheistic objective morality is largely about the need for some groups to believe their subjective preferences are “rational” rather than being culturally conditioned and based on ideological fictions.

Maybe it is for some people. But I think philosophers are coming at the issue from a WAY different angle. I'm not a preachy moralist. I'm interested in the issue because it is intellectually interesting to me whether moral objectivity is true or not. I confess that the matter seems important to me personally, too. It'd be nice to be able to figure out if I'm doing the right thing or not. A few things like that. Ethics is important. But mostly I'm interested in the logical strength of ethical positions. I'm just nerding out for the most part.

Also, I don't think you are arguing in favor of moral relativism. Not very much, anyway.

Most of your arguments rather seem to support ethical egoism. Or maybe you are arguing psychological egoism. In either case, those theories differ greatly from moral relativism. Care to elaborate on which one of those you think is true in a godless world? (relativism or egoism?) Moral nihilism is also a valid answer (and it is WAY stronger than moral relativism). Moral objectivism is just as reasonable as any of those theories as far as I can tell.

 

[Augustus]

Kill members of tribe B on sight. Steal their food. Burn their huts. All those things are BAD for them. Objectively bad. Not just bad in your opinion. Any reasonable person, even those with no skin in the game, would agree: you are doing bad to them... And none of what I've said thus far has involved morality. It's all been about self-interest. You want tribe A to prevail. You want tribe B to be destroyed. That involves doing GOOD to tribe A and doing BAD to tribe B. The only part that pertains to morality is this: there is a such thing as objectively good and objectively bad actions towards others.

Are they objectively bad though?

For example, by killing their warriors we change the power balance in their society. By weakening the tribe maybe we force them to sue for peace or to move to a new area. These things could potentially improve their situation.

Even without this you could make some 'survival of the fittest' type argument, that every action is a learning experience that helps them in the long run. This current conflict is simply one of many that the tribe will have to face if it is to survive, and facing many small 'harms' makes you stronger like a kind of hormesis.

An objectively bad action would require no potential present or future benefit to arise from the situation.

But an omnimax God is not just omnipotent, but omnibenevolent. Omnipotence allows this God to do anything, but omnibenevolence (arguably) places constraints on his nature and sets limits to the deeds he will do.

Or does it? *vsauce music starts* I mean, if God is omnipotent, does that give him the power to define what omnibenevolent means? If so, we should just remove omnibenevolence from list of omnimax definition because once you assign the kind of sweeping omnipotence to God... that allows him to name evil acts as benevolent, his omniscience supersedes omnibenevolence. (ie. the term "omnibenevolent" loses all its meaning).

In my arguments, I assume a God who is omnipotent, but cannot defy the laws of logic. He can do anything that's logically possible to do. If God can defy the laws of logic, then there's no point in doing any reasoning about him whatsoever. Mind you, I'm not making the argument that God can't violate logic... but if he can, then zero logical arguments pertaining to him matter in the in the first place, even the ones you are making.

So can God defy the laws of logic? I think that's pretty important to settle before we proceed.

If the hypothetical God were omnibenevolent then I suppose there would be limits, although there are a number of ways we could think about benevolence (limiting violence v allowing free will etc.)

Also, maybe the God fills the world with NPCs and lets bad things happen to them so that the real humans get to experience a range of emotions and make their challenges more meaningful.

I suppose as most people who do believe in God think he is good, we can assume limitations for the sake of discussion.

Let's say that you (for whatever reason) resolve that you want to do good to others (generally). But you aren't satisfied with doing things for others that merely seem good in your opinion. You want to do objectively good things for others. Well, as luck would have it, there may very well be objective criteria which you can use to determine the goodness of the act. Same goes for someone who resolves to avoid doing bad things to others. You can be objective about which actions you select to abstain from.

That's all you need to form a system of objective morality. Once you have made the best determination you can make as to what the objective criteria for good and bad are, you simply need to remain logical from then on. Try to recognize and eliminate your biases as much as possible. I'm not saying this can be done without error, but the desired results can be more or less achieved.

Sure, there is lots of disagreement and lots of debate about the particulars of how to best go about this, but that's a good thing. We're all pretty ignorant on the matter of ethics (including myself) so logical discourse and relevant objections ought to enter into our conversations so that we can get closer to the truth of the matter. If you want to be objective, you need to address arguments that challenge your position.

I don't think a kind of moral reductionism where we identify 'good acts' and 'bad acts' treat them in isolation works.

The problem is that the world is complex. We cannot predict impact on the whole from the modification of single variables as there is too much potential for unintended consequences due to non-linearities, emergent effects, dynamic feedback loops, etc.

So one might decide it is "objectively" good to protect a child from harm and scientifically go about making them as safe as possible.

But is this the best thing for the child's long term development as they enter a world where they have to be alert to threats and be robust to negative experiences?

Not to mention what works for one child might have the opposite effect on another.

Humans lack the information and cognitive abilities to judge such things accurately on a consistent basis.

Also, I don't think you are arguing in favor of moral relativism. Not very much, anyway.

I'm more inclined towards value pluralism than pure relativism.

So, at least practically, we can judge some actions better than other without being purely arbitrary, but there are a wide range of values that are equally 'correct' and there is no objective way to prefer one over the other (individual versus collective rights for example).

Humans aren't blank slates and there do appears to be some roughly universal values, but how exactly these manifest themselves can lead to very different outcomes.