Objectivism: Three Objective Truths

[TheTrendyCynic]

This is an expansion and continuation of the discussion I began in the Evidentialism thread, and addresses the response to that post made by No*s. It shouldn't be necessary to read those posts if you haven't already; I believe I've adequately summarized them here.

OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Objectivist epistemology differs from other schools of philosophy in that it asserts that reality is real. This tautology should be meaningless, but at the heart of any objection to Objectivism is a denial of this 'empty' fact. Objectivism asserts that we are able to apprehend this objective reality: It asserts that knowledge is objective, that the analytic/synthetic dichotomy does not exist, and that logic is the one and only arbiter of objective truth.

Objectivism condemns as illogical and irrational any school of thought that introduces any chasm between reality and man's concept of that reality. It condemns any identification of language as arbitrary. It condemns any identification of concepts as abstracts without objective meaning. It condemns any assault on logic as that sole arbiter of truth.

In short, Objectivism defines and supports that which most of us already know: Reality exists, and it is not subject to the whims of thought or of society. It argues that any objection to this fundamental fact is not founded on reality, but on semantic trickery or philosophical sleight of hand that breaks down, necessarily, when studied in any detail.

Epistemological confusion arises when one considers the consequences of using logic as the sole arbiter of objective truth. Logic can only arrive at truth if it begins with truth; it can only arrive at a valid conclusion if it begins with valid premises. Where do these premises come from? They, too, must be logically supported, as conclusions with premises of their own. Logic, if defined this way, appears to be inherently circular: It results in an endless string of conclusions that must be supported by premises, which themselves must exist as conclusions which must be supported by their own premises, etc, etc.

To reduce this to a finite, conceptual, objective whole, there must be a foundation. There must be something at which this string of logic ends -- something that grounds it to reality. Other schools of thought deny this foundation, electing instead to exist in some formless, contradictory state of necessary ignorance bounded on all sides by infinite, arbitrary subjectivity. Objectivism passionately rejects this senseless state of adopted chaos.

Objectivism identifies the foundation of objective reality as three irreducable primaries: three axiomatic concepts that are as undeniable as they are unsupportable.

The Three Axiomatic Concepts of Objectivism

At the heart of Objectivist epistemology (and the root of its difference from any other school of philosophy) is the recognition of three inarguable truths; three axiomatic concepts that must be accepted, but cannot be proven. These axiomatic concepts are the only constituents of Objectivism that are accepted without the application of logic, because they are intimately self-evident from the first moment of a human's life. They are intimately linked to every aspect of that life, and are affirmed in their entirety by the very first fractional moment of awareness a baby can be said to recognize which, if words were possible at that stage, would be described as: "I am aware of something."

They are:

A) Existence: "I am aware of something." From the first moment of a baby's life, it is aware of and accepts the concept of existence. Existence exists is the first axiomatic concept; there are things that exist, and this state of existence is distinctly different from its absence. Existence subsumes and includes everything and, by everything, I of course refer to everything that exists -- the axiomatic concept cannot be proven or even phrased in any other way but circularly. Note that this axiomatic concept does not describe the nature of existence. Whether we're figments of some God's dream or hooked into some supercomputer a-la The Matrix, there is still a distinct difference between the state of 'being' and the state of 'non-being,' whatever the context. This difference is utterly inarguable and, thus, utterly objective.

B) Identity: "I am aware of something." There are things that can be distinguished from other things, and the existent that allows us to perform this differentiation is Identity. Once again, the nature of identity is irrelevant -- it is the objective fact that a thing is what it is and is not what it isn't; note, again, the necessary circular nature of the concept. This, too, is inarguable and objective. A direct correlation to this is the necessity of non-contradiction. An entity cannot both be A and be not-A, or it possesses no identity -- no existence. Definition is irrelevant to this fact: A thing cannot both have X and not have X, regardless of how you define 'X.'

C) Consciousness: "I am aware of something." The active state of awareness, through which all of existence and identity is processed, assimilated, retained and experienced, is the axiomatic concept of consciousness. Defining consciousness is impossible but through its constituent concepts: Awareness, thought, perception, emotion, etc. These do not define consciousness, they are merely listed components of consciousness; describing consciousness in such a fashion is akin to describing existence or identity by listing 'tree, leaf, stick, car, man;' you're just fortunate enough to have less constituent concepts to list.

Consequences of the Axiomatic Concepts

These three concepts share a number of characteristics:

1) They can only be defined as a tautology: A tautology, as mentioned above, is a repetitive, empty statement that says nothing. "Existence exists." "A is A." "Consciousness is conscious." Tautologies say nothing, because there is nothing to be said about these axiomatic concepts except 'They Are.' They cannot be further broken down into constituent concepts, they cannot be more intently defined, they can neither be logically supported nor objectively proven. They precede argument, thought and logic and, as such, are not subject to them.

2) They have no conceptual alternatives: A conceptual alternative is something that the original concept distinguishes itself from by means of a distinguishing characteristic. The concept 'table,' for example, serves to distinguish itself from 'chair' by means of its shape; all concepts, other than these three, distinguish themselves from other concepts in similar ways -- by first isolating a characteristic(s) that they share, then describing how the specifics of this characteristic(s) differ. This can be a hard point to grasp if you don't take a moment to consider a few examples. Envision some concepts, then define them. Every single one will be defined by distinguishing itself from related concepts. Fish are defined as being distinct from birds; fish are not defined as being distinct from 'green.' You will find that this is true of every single concept except Existence, Identity and Consciousness. In all three cases, the only alternative concept is the negation -- non-existence, non-identity, non-consciousness.

3) They are undeniable: By undeniable, I mean literally "un"-"deniable". It is fundamentally impossible, on any level, to deny them. To deny the truth of a concept, you cannot affirm that concept in doing so: If every attempt to disprove God had to begin by proving God existed, then God would be undeniable; to deny that something is a table, you cannot base your argument on the fact that it is a table. To deny that Martians exist, you cannot base your argument on the fact that they do exist. The only alternative is to employ concepts that are alternatives to the concept you are seeking to deny; and the only alternatives to the axiomatic concepts are their negations. To deny existence is to do so through non-existence; the moment you appeal to an existent (a word, a thought, a concept, an argument) in an attempt to deny existence, you have affirmed existence. To deny identity is to do so through non-identity; the moment you distinguish one concept from another, one thought from another, one point from another, you have affirmed identity. To deny consciousness is to do so through non-consciousness; the moment you apply any cognitive effort whatsoever, you have affirmed consciousness.

That is the heart of the inviolate truths of the axiomatic concepts: They are affirmed -- wholeheartedly embraced and objectively accepted -- with every attempt to deny them.

Next: The Source of Objectivist Logic

 

[TheTrendyCynic]

The Source of Objectivist Logic

From those three irreducable and inarguable primaries, all of logic springs. Based on these objective truths, the logical arguments arising from them are, themselves, objectively true.

To illustrate, here are some objectively true facts that follow from the above axiomatic concepts:

(1) (From B) Identities cannot contradict each other (ie. a tree cannot both have leaves and not have leaves). This was mentioned in the description of the axiomatic concept of Identity, but it is more properly described as a logical consequence and not an irreducable primary.
(2) (From 1) An existent has only one identity. Identity, it should be noted, does not refer to our description of the existent -- it refers to what the existent is. This is important, because it represents the primacy of existence, not the primacy of consciousness. Say we define a given existent as an 'existent,' an 'organism,' a 'pigeon,' a 'bird' or an 'animal.' All of those can be true, but they do not mean that this existent has five distinct identities. Our definitions only refer to different ways we conceptualize that existent's one identity. Much of the lunacy espoused by alternative schools of philosophy can be traced back to the epistemological error of assuming consciousness (how we perceive/define things) supercedes existence (how things actually are).
(3) (From 1, 2) The Law of Causality: In any given situation, an existent will behave as its identity necessitates, and cannot behave in any other way (to do so would contradict its identity, violating 1). If a ball (a concept formed in consciousness (C) containing the identity (B) of an existent (A)) hits another ball, the identities of the inclusive existents ("ball", "the motion/relationship of hitting") will demand an outcome that does not contradict those identities -- there can be only one outcome, for multiple outcomes imply multiple identities, which implies inherent contradiction. The identities of the existents leading to the outcome are the 'cause,' and the outcome (which is itself composed of the identities of its existents) is the 'effect.'

Each of those arguments was based solely on the objective truth of the axiomatic concepts. From them, further objective arguments can be made, and so on and so forth, shaping a cohesive and non-contradictory understanding of objective reality.

Next: Addressing No*s' points made in the Evidentialism thread.

 

[TheTrendyCynic]

Firstly, let me start by saying that No*s responded to the above information written in a decidedly different form (and I actually reworded some of it based on his points). I do recognize that addressing the rebuttal to an argument after I've rephrased the argument based on the meat of that rebuttal isn't quite fair, so I apologize if I've stacked the deck in any way.

The original posts can be found here.

And...how do you determine what really exists?

You have affirmed all three of the Objectivist axiomatic concepts in the very first line of your rebuttal to them.

A) Existence: You have recognized the state of being as distinct from the state of non-being. The nature of this state (dream, etc) is irrelevant; you have affirmed that such a state does exist. In short, that existence exists.
B) Identity: You have recognized that some things exist and other things do not exist; you have recognized that existents differ from other existents, and thus you have affirmed the concept of Identity. You employed no less than eight words, each of them existing as distinct linguistic symbols (forget their meanings or definitions; I am refering to the concrete WORDS you used) from each other with their own distinct identities, and you did so in a way that implied I should recognize this distinction in the same manner you did.
C) Consciousness: By asking that question, you have affirmed your own consciousness. Unless you wish to claim you do not think?

The rest of your rebuttals go towards the nature of these concepts. You ask how one perceives identity or existence -- that does not change the fact that there does exist identity, that there does exist existence, and that you are perceiving through the utilization of your consciousness. In fact, by implying that we perceive existence differently than it my really be, you are affirming the primacy of existence -- you are affirming that the reality of existence does not depend on our perception, but that existence is objectively real, outside and separate from our perception of it, and thus our perception of it may not be accurate.

So what if in order to "disprove them" I must "affirm them."

In the words of Ayn Rand: "Blank out." To affirm something means to accept it as true. You cannot disprove something by first accepting it as true; I would ask you how, but I already know you answer would be some variation of 'somehow:' The intrinsic blank-out at the heart of any subjectivist approach to epistemology.

I don't need to "disprove" them directly. I only need to clarify how we perceive reality. By doing so, I render your criteria into the realm of human perception, and away from objective reality. Once that is done, there isn't any need to "disprove" them. Their nature, in and of itself, does not extend to being an objectively true facts.

You've now waffled from primacy of existence back to primacy of consciousness. There is no 'realm' of human perception; perception is the means by which Consciousness (C) processes the Identity (B) of Existence (A). The methods and specifics of the nature of perception are irrelevant to the objective truth of what is being perceived.

The intrinsic implication of what you are saying is that existence relies on our perception. That is false. Perception relies on existence; it is entirely passive, and is subject only to the objective realities of existence.

Solely because we have defined leaves in such a way as to allow that. Without our assigning an interpretation of what constitutes "tree" and "leave," the distinction would be irrelevant.

Nonsense. An existent cannot both be X and be not-X; that is a self-evident fact of reality. Whether we define trees and leaves differently, the fact remains the same -- if 'this tree has leaves' is true, then 'this tree does not have leaves' is false.

We are incapable of knowing what an existent is. We only describe them, and that assumes the objective existence of the world and its contents. Making a distinction between something's being and its description is meaningless. All we have are definitions and perceptions, unless of course, when you see a pigeon, you perceive everything about it from the subatomic to the cellular to the tissue, to the organisms contained within it. I don't do that, and neither does anyone else.

You're getting into concept-formation here, and while that's a topic I look forward to discussing, I want to stick with the axiomatic concepts. Relating back to those, regardless of my understanding of what a pigeon is, it is inarguably true that a pigeon cannot both be a pigeon and not be a pigeon. It cannot possess more than one identity, whether or not I am able to perceive all the characteristics of that identity.

Omniscience is not a requirement for objectivity, only the axiomatic concepts are. That I do not perceive everything about a pigeon does not mean these characteristics do not exist -- to argue otherwise is to claim the primacy of consciousness.

We simplify what we see so that we can comprehend it. Without that simplification, we would be rendered unable to operate.

You are absolutely right -- this is the very heart of the Objectivist theory of concept formation. I believe that the consequences you perceive of this are unwarranted, though.

If something behaves "as its identity necessitates, and cannot behave in any other way," it does so because we have defined it to do what we have observed. When its actions contradict our definition, then we generally modify our definition.

Exactly. WHY do we modify our definition? If something could behave in any way, irrespective of its identity, why would we need to redefine our understanding of its identity when it behaves in an unexpected manner? Because an object cannot behave in a manner other than its identity demands, and if it appears to do so, then we know we are not understanding something about the identities of the involved existents. Independent of us, independent of our perception, independent of our consciousness, independent of our thoughts, feelings or wishes, the objective truth of reality is telling us that we are objectively wrong.

I realise I didn't address everything you said, No*s, but that's because you're moving into tangential topics of concept formation and the role that concepts and definitions play within our consciousness. I'd be happy to discuss this with you, but I'd like to keep this thread fixed to the topic of the axiomatic concepts.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

(1) (From B) Identities cannot contradict each other , ...
(2) (From 1) An existent has only one identity. ...

So much for wave/particle duality ...

(3) (From 1, 2) The Law of Causality: In any given situation, an existent will behave as its identity necessitates, ...

Sorry ... good try (it really was, by the way) but this semantic slight of hand won't cut it. Not only have you yet to address the problem of induction, you have no basis for asserting that identities necessitate anything or, for that matter, are ontologically stable through time and across domains.

 

[TheTrendyCynic]

So much for wave/particle duality ...

It may interest you to know that I have a Bachelors degree in physics, so I am intimately familiar with quantum mechanics and all of its implications.

The interesting thing about QM is that we cannot directly observe it; we only learn what we know of a photon's identity by its relationships to other existents (double-slit experiment, etc). We know the implications of the relationships of a photon's identity very well, but we have not perceived the identity that gives rise to those relationships.

'Particle/wave duality' is not saying that a photon is a particle and a wave at the same time. It can't; we've never observed a photon, so we can't say anything about what it is. It is saying that a photon behaves like a particle and a wave at the same time, and no further conclusions can be drawn because we are able to observe nothing but the photon's behavior. A photon could be 'X,' some third class of existent of which we are unaware, which can adopt both the behavior of particles and the behavior of waves.

How can a concept allow for what, in the context of our knowledge, is contradictory behavior?

Imagine an alien being that was incapable of comprehending the nature of 'acting,' who watches Titanic. He sees a person who is at once and simultaneously both the character he is playing (Jack) and the actor playing him (Leo). In the context of the alien being's knowledge, the identity of this person is contradictory: He is at once two people with two mutually exclusive identities.

We must allow for the same possibility in the nature of quantum mechanics -- that the context of our knowledge does not allow us a concept we are unable to observe; the concept that would, like 'acting,' explain the apparent contradiction posed by the particle-wave duality.

Yes, that was a rough analogy, as 'particle/wave duality' is much more complex than 'Jack/Leo duality.' I hope you can see the point behind it, though, which is the existence of a third concept of which we are unaware that would serve to preserve the Law of Identity.

Not only have you yet to address the problem of induction, you have no basis for asserting that identities necessitate anything or, for that matter, are ontologically stable through time and across domains.

I'm a little lost here, can you expand on your points a little more? What is the 'problem of induction?'

 

[No*s]

Firstly, let me start by saying that No*s responded to the above information written in a decidedly different form (and I actually reworded some of it based on his points). I do recognize that addressing the rebuttal to an argument after I've rephrased the argument based on the meat of that rebuttal isn't quite fair, so I apologize if I've stacked the deck in any way.

Don't worry. I'll tell you when I think you've butchered the argument.

You have affirmed all three of the Objectivist axiomatic concepts in the very first line of your rebuttal to them.

This is a pretty cocky statement, and it doesn't neccessarily follow (I explained why in my posts). I can just as easily assert, that when you argue against God you have demonstrated His objective existence. It is the same presupposition underlying the Anslem's onotological argument. It simply doesn't fly.

A) Existence: You have recognized the state of being as distinct from the state of non-being. The nature of this state (dream, etc) is irrelevant; you have affirmed that such a state does exist. In short, that existence exists.

Then you also affirm the existence of the Fantastic Four? They, also, are a dream of mine, but they don't exist. If you, or I, are figments of some other being's dream we have no more existence than them. However, if you affirm them both as a valid form of existence within your epistimology, then you give up objectivity. Therefore, the nature of this existence most certainly does matter. It has implications on how we interact with our world and our own thoughts, and not all of them positive for your epistimology.

I could well raise others views.

B) Identity: You have recognized that some things exist and other things do not exist; you have recognized that existents differ from other existents, and thus you have affirmed the concept of Identity. You employed no less than eight words, each of them existing as distinct linguistic symbols (forget their meanings or definitions; I am refering to the concrete WORDS you used) from each other with their own distinct identities, and you did so in a way that implied I should recognize this distinction in the same manner you did.

I affirm that I recognize a distinction. I simply say it is intrinsic to human thought, not to the natural world, and as such, it forces us to interpret things. Just because we view something in a way doesn't make it so, and this follows all the way down to the distinctions we make in things.

This isn't a problem for me. I believe I interpret reality, and as such, making distinctions and admitting they are to some degree (or entirely) artificial causes me no problems. It's natural for me to operate that way. You, however, are asserting our perceptions of concrete distinctions in objects as reality, hence the "objectivism:" the focus on objects and assertion of objectivity. If what I am asserting, that the distinctions are mainly, if not entirely, a product and neccessity of the human mind, then it undermines your assertions.

Now, rather than trying to say that I admit them, when I myself say I must simply to think, you may proceed to prove that how we look at reality is how it really is. You did not do so. You assumed your conclusion in your argument. Our perceptions are not neccessarily reality, and in fact, are almost certainly not reality.

C) Consciousness: By asking that question, you have affirmed your own consciousness. Unless you wish to claim you do not think?

Oh, I firmly agree that I have affirmed my own consciousness. I actually made that a key axiom in a thread I started a while back. However, you cannot hold it as an axiom when you simultaneously say you have logically proven it and fail to do so. You cannot prove you aren't a computer simply going through the motions. Your responses of "I" and "we" and "you" may be no different than a computer's using them. Your using them doesn't prove that you are truly conscious any more than a computer's.

The rest of your rebuttals go towards the nature of these concepts. You ask how one perceives identity or existence -- that does not change the fact that there does exist identity, that there does exist existence, and that you are perceiving through the utilization of your consciousness. In fact, by implying that we perceive existence differently than it my really be, you are affirming the primacy of existence -- you are affirming that the reality of existence does not depend on our perception, but that existence is objectively real, outside and separate from our perception of it, and thus our perception of it may not be accurate.

I can grant the possibility of "identities." I simply denied that we can ever actually understand them with objectivity. We must always interpret them, and so, we never deal with the objects in our mind, but our perceptions of them. This is an immutable simply because we use language. Language is a means of interpretation. Why do you say being, when I could just as easily break it down into ousia, ypostasis, fysis, and so on. It's much more precise, and it makes slightly different distinctions than English.

The words are interpretation. They are not reality, and they can never accurately represent reality. Our perceptions are limited to language and simplified sensory input, neither of which can be accurate. You cannot objectively know anything. The real question is how much we can accurately perceive, but admitting that problem denies the philosophy you have proffered.

In the words of Ayn Rand: "Blank out." To affirm something means to accept it as true. You cannot disprove something by first accepting it as true; I would ask you how, but I already know you answer would be some variation of 'somehow:' The intrinsic blank-out at the heart of any subjectivist approach to epistemology.

And I believe that to be utter nonsense. I argue against and about things all the time whose existence I don't accept. I don't believe in Superman. I actually have had this argument with a child, where I had to prove Supes didn't exist. Of course, I didn't believe in him, and my debating it with the child didn't mean I believed in it.

When I want to argue against something, I merely extrapolate the properties given to the thing. I can, then, treat it just like a video game. Calmly, and methodically, analyze what I can to demonstrate its falsity. In the foregoing system, I have presupposed the non-existence of the subject and endeavor to prove it.

You've now waffled from primacy of existence back to primacy of consciousness. There is no 'realm' of human perception; perception is the means by which Consciousness (C) processes the Identity (B) of Existence (A). The methods and specifics of the nature of perception are irrelevant to the objective truth of what is being perceived.

The intrinsic implication of what you are saying is that existence relies on our perception. That is false. Perception relies on existence; it is entirely passive, and is subject only to the objective realities of existence.

Actually, my assertion is that perception relies on existence, but it will never accurately depict existence. It seems to be a fundamental axiom of yours that perception can accurately depict existence. "The methods and specifics of the nature of perception are" quite relevant "to the objective truth of what is being perceived." The knowledge and "objective truth" that is gleaned from perception can only be as accurate as the perception that measured it. Further, it can only be as accurate as the interpretational framework in which it is placed.

These are not "irrelevant," but they are fundamental to any investigation of truth. They also undermine your epistimology. Where you perceive waffling, I am challenging your assumptions.

My presuppositions aren't a problem. I'm not claiming any form of "objectivism," nor am I claiming total subjectivity. I am, rather, claiming that we must interpret reality, and that interpretation will never be completely accurate, nor will it be inaccurate.

Nonsense. An existent cannot both be X and be not-X; that is a self-evident fact of reality. Whether we define trees and leaves differently, the fact remains the same -- if 'this tree has leaves' is true, then 'this tree does not have leaves' is false.

Again, our definitions and perceptions do not equate to reality. If I define "leaf" broadly enough, that can well be true. As Deut. pointed out, light has contradictory properties. Just because we define it, doesn't mean that it is true. Your argument requires that.

 

[No*s]

You're getting into concept-formation here, and while that's a topic I look forward to discussing, I want to stick with the axiomatic concepts. Relating back to those, regardless of my understanding of what a pigeon is, it is inarguably true that a pigeon cannot both be a pigeon and not be a pigeon. It cannot possess more than one identity, whether or not I am able to perceive all the characteristics of that identity.

Omniscience is not a requirement for objectivity, only the axiomatic concepts are. That I do not perceive everything about a pigeon does not mean these characteristics do not exist -- to argue otherwise is to claim the primacy of consciousness.

You are absolutely right -- this is the very heart of the Objectivist theory of concept formation. I believe that the consequences you perceive of this are unwarranted, though.

I disagree. If we cannot correctly perceive an object, then we certainly cannot claim to perceive its "identity." We may only interpret it, and those interpretations will always be simplified, and they will always be inaccurate to a degree. The consequences follow the reality. We can never perceive all the neccessary components that define an object, so we certainly cannot correctly perceive the object.

Anything less than correct perception is interpretation, and that is not objective.

Exactly. WHY do we modify our definition? If something could behave in any way, irrespective of its identity, why would we need to redefine our understanding of its identity when it behaves in an unexpected manner? Because an object cannot behave in a manner other than its identity demands, and if it appears to do so, then we know we are not understanding something about the identities of the involved existents. Independent of us, independent of our perception, independent of our consciousness, independent of our thoughts, feelings or wishes, the objective truth of reality is telling us that we are objectively wrong.

We modify them because they aren't accurate, and we learn this. We replace them with other definitions, which will be replaced later. If we could perceive reality with the accuracy your philosophy requires, then we would not be modifying our definitions.

I realise I didn't address everything you said, No*s, but that's because you're moving into tangential topics of concept formation and the role that concepts and definitions play within our consciousness. I'd be happy to discuss this with you, but I'd like to keep this thread fixed to the topic of the axiomatic concepts.

Frankly, how we define things and how we define what is real is an axiom in your system. If you want to open your philosophy to discussion, you must open those axioms to discussion.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

It may interest you to know that I have a Bachelors degree in physics, so I am intimately familiar with quantum mechanics and all of its implications.

Not in the least.

 

[TheTrendyCynic]

Note the topic of this thread -- I am not discussing the whole of Objectivist epistemology; that would be akin to starting a thread entitled 'Atheism' and going from there. It's a big topic, and it needs to be looked at in bite-sized pieces. As such, I'm going to keep dragging the line of conversation back to the three axiomatic principles I began this thread to discuss. Otherwise, it will devolve into one of those intensely gruelling back-and-forth novellas where each of our posts get progressively longer until we burn out on page 15 with the realisation that we've hopelessly entangled ourselves in the accomplishment of nothing.

Don't worry, I promise to start threads on concept formation and definitions once I've explored this topic a bit more, and you have some good points, so I'd like to see them there

I can just as easily assert, that when you argue against God you have demonstrated His objective existence.

You certainly cannot. Explain to me how I demonstrate the validity of 'God' every time I argue against him; to say that, you must show that I accept every single one of God's purported characteristics before I am even capable of denying him -- obviously that is not true. In the matter of existence, identity and consciousness, however, you MUST accept every characteristic of all three of those concepts before you can even formulate a rebuttal against them. You must, for example, recognize that 'being' and 'non-being' are mutually exclusive; you must recognize (Consciousness) that 'being' and 'non-being' (Identity) are distinct (Existence, as opposed to its absence).

They, also, are a dream of mine, but they don't exist.

Yes they do. They exist as a dream of yours. Again, you have affirmed your ABCs:

• A) Existence: "They are"
• B) Identity: "a dream"
• C) Consciousness: "of mine"

we have no more existence than them

There is no such thing as 'more or less existence;' there is only the state of existence, as opposed to its absence.

I can see where our confusion is arising from; you are moving the problem forward into the nature of existence and identity. I am not there yet. I am merely asserting that there is existence and identity. To illustrate what I mean by the differences in our stances, let me relate our dialogue about 'existence' to a fictional dialogue about 'the interior of a box.'

Me: There is an interior to this locked box.
You: But you do not know what is inside the locked box.
Me: That's true. But you just admitted there is an 'inside the locked box'
You: But you don't know the nature of this 'inside the locked box.' It could be filled with water, or it could be a portal to another dimension, or it could be the dreamscape of an extraplanar entity.
Me: It could. But, there is still an 'inside the locked box' that differs from 'outside the locked box,' whatever its nature.

Existence, Identity, Consciousness. In every sentence of the above dialogue, both you and I asserted them. To illustrate:

Me: [Implicit:] I am aware (C) (t)here is (A) an interior (B) to this (A) locked box (B).
You: But you (A, B) do not (B) know (C) what (A, B) is inside (B) the box (B)
... and so forth.

The axiomatic concepts are so intrinsically related to every single statement you could ever make, that it is fundamentally impossible to even suggest that there is an alternative to their objective truth.

Perhaps a way to illustrate it would be to adopt your theory: That existence, identity and consciousness are not objective. The only possible meaning of this is that there exist alternatives to them; that I need not rely on them at all times. If I did, then they would be objective. So, keeping that in mind, let's enter your epistemological mindscape, the mindscape of the blank-out...

... be afraid ...

I simply say it is intrinsic to human thought, not to the natural world

You are wrong. Intrinsic thought and the natural world are not distinct (not-B). You said it is intrinsic to human thought, and so, it is intrinsic to the natural world, and so, it is objective. You are a subjectivist. You are also an objectivist, since there exists no contradiction (not-B). Welcome to the club: We agree.

You, however, are asserting our perceptions of concrete distinctions in objects as reality, hence the "objectivism:"

I'm asserting nothing (not-C). Our perceptions are concrete distinctions in reality even though they are not (not-B). Our disagreement does not exist (not-A) and, in the absence of disagreement, there must be agreement. We agree.

However, you cannot hold it as an axiom when you simultaneously say you have logically proven it and fail to do so.

Of course I can! There is no such thing as a contradiction (not-A, not-B). We agree, even though we do not (not-B), since 'agreement' and 'disagreement' are not distinct (not-B). In fact, 'disagreement' doesn't even exist (not-A) -- you can't disagree with me, even though you can (not-A, not-B). We agree. This argument is over, even though it is not (not-B). This argument does not exist (not-A). These are not the Jedi you're looking for...

...

My head hurts, but I have done it -- I have proven that you and I are in perfect agreement. Refute the conclusions I drew upon braving the depths of your foggy epistemology, but do so without accepting Existence, Identity and Consciousness (since, after all, my purpose is to get you to accept them).

The fact of the matter is, any and all discourse breaks down when you deny your ABCs. You cannot even disagree with me unless you accept them.

There is no alternative to these three axiomatic concepts; there is no way they cannot be true. Thus, they are objective.

 

[No*s]

If you disallow questioning your epistimology, then you have disallowed questioning your objective truths. The latter follows the former. It is an essential presupposition, and to criticize any deductive argument you must criticize the presuppositions or demonstrate that the logic does not follow. You have just told me I cannot use one of those, disallowing a great many of the reasonable objections.

If I cannot question epistimology or assert it, then we are going to be left with "uh huh...nuh uh" statements like little children. You are making assertions about "three objective truths." If your presupposed epistimology is flawed, then so are those truths. What you are asking for is akin to if we were arguing about God in this thread, but I said that we must simply assume what I believe to be God's words. It would be worse if I moved the debate over how I know God's words to another thread and then declared that questioning them was verbotin.

This argument is a continuation of an argument on epistimology. If you wish to disallow them because you have changed threads, then I suggest we go back to the evidentialism thread. I was arguing that there, and I'll continue to do so. I will not argue within an objectivist phronema unless you can first demonstrate it, and I will not do so in a thread that started as a discussion about epistimology, anymore than you will debate core Christian truths without questioning Christian epistimology.

 

[TheTrendyCynic]

No*s, the problem here is that you are reading more into what I am saying than what is actually there. I am not ham-stringing your ability to argue my point, I am showing how your arguments are irrelevant to the point I am trying to make. Perhaps I went about it in the wrong way; I should have demonstrated that irrelevancy instead of just dismissing it.

Basically, the three axiomatic concepts are the very root -- the very foundation -- of Objectivist epistemology. Before sense data, before perception, before the nature of physical reality, before logic, the axiomatic concepts exist. You are discussing the nature of sense data ("can we trust it?"), you are discussing the nature of physical reality ("is it as real as a dream?"), you are discussing the nature of perception ("can we know something's identity?"). As I've said, these are very valid questions. In fact, they represent three very powerful arguments against Objectivism. But without understanding the basis of Objectivism, I can't move forward.

Let's look at one of your arguments that I set aside -- that we cannot trust our perceptions and, thus, any conclusions we draw with those perceptions are not objective.

In the three axiomatic concepts, I have not even touched on the issue of perception. This is why I disregarded all of your arguments based on weaknesses of perception -- that comes later. A being with no perception -- a being of nothing but consciousness -- must still affirm all three of the axiomatic concepts.

A) Existence: Every thought that being has exists, the only meaning of 'exist' serving to distinguish those thoughts from all of those infinite thoughts that being doesn't have. The 'non-existent' thoughts aren't even conceptualized; they do not exist. The moment they are considered, they become thoughts: They become existents; they exist. Existence exists, as distinct from non-existence.
B) Identity: Every thought that consciousness has is distinct from another thought; each thought has an identity, which consists of all the things that it is and excludes all the things it is not, regardless of that consciousness' ability to perceive this identity.
C) Consciousness: The very act of thinking presupposes consciousness.

I have, it is true, used words and definitions in the above description of this consciousness that may not be accurate. Regardless of what a 'thought' is or how it should be accurately defined, regardless of whether a thought is some element of reality or some element of something else, these are all characteristics of its identity, and all of these characteristics presuppose that, somehow, in some way, this thought exists.

Truly, you cannot object to these facts. You can object to the nature of existence -- which you have been. You can object to the nature of identity -- which you have been. But I have not made any claims of the nature of existence or identity. I'm not there yet.

If you wish to continue contesting the facts I've laid out in this post, then by all means do so -- but focus only on these facts. Debating the nature of perception can only happen if you agree that perception does exist, that it does have identity, that we are aware of it. If you don't agree with these facts, then we cannot move forward.

 

[TheTrendyCynic]

I'm glad you haven't responded yet, No*s -- it turns out I'm quite a bit wrong in my last post, which I learned after re-reading a few sections of 'Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology' to clarify a few things. I have also discovered that you are completely correct in insisting that the nature of perception needs to be addressed, so I profusely apologize for running you around in circles.

I've printed out this thread and will be going over everything this weekend, including those arguments I unfairly set aside. I'll post tomorrow or on Monday by explaining where I was wrong, and addressing those arguments of yours that I've learned are fundamentally relevant to the discussion we're having.

Hopefully, after that, we'll be back on track and able to discuss this responsibly.

 

[No*s]

OK, no problem .

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

You might also consider giving a bit more consideration to Kant and, at the very least, gaining some familiarity with Hume. The "Problem of Induction" is rather central to the Philosophy of Science.

 

[TheTrendyCynic]

Alright, I'm back.

The source of my confusion was a Wikipedia article on Objectivist epistemology that implied the first axiom ("Existence") only applied to the physical world, and not to existents of consciousness (thoughts, memories, emotions, etc); naturally, that would have invalidated my entire post. Fortunately, after rereading the appropriate sections of "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" (where Ayn Rand explains her entire theory), it became clear to me that Wikipedia is incorrect. While I am wrong for other reasons in my previous post, it's nothing so serious as to invalidate my entire stance.

I believe the problem we're having is one of communication. I think we agree, actually, and our debate stems from the fact that you think I'm saying more than I really am. I'm not defending the whole of Objectivist epistemology here -- I'm defending the root of it: the three axiomatic concepts. You have presented many valid objections to Objectivist epistemology, but they're all directed at elements I haven't even begun to discuss, and are still valid objections even if you do accept all three axiomatic concepts.

Me: There is an interior to this locked box.
You: But you do not know what is inside the locked box.
Me: That's true. But you just admitted there is an 'inside the locked box'
You: But you don't know the nature of this 'inside the locked box.' It could be filled with water, or it could be a portal to another dimension, or it could be the dreamscape of an extraplanar entity.
Me: It could. But, there is still an 'inside the locked box' that differs from 'outside the locked box,' whatever its nature.

That pretty much sums up the conversation we're having; I'm only trying to prove that existence, identity and consciousness exist. I am not asserting anything at all to do with their natures; at least, I don't think I am. If you think otherwise, please explicitly state what assertion you see me making as you refute it. That way I'll be able to see if I'm actually asserting that, or if you're misunderstanding my position.

Firstly, you're making a great many assumptions about the Objectivist use of the term 'objective.' To quote from Wikipedia (in this case, they're correct):

Objectivism derives its name from the conception of knowledge and values as "objective," rather than as "intrinsic" or "subjective." According to Rand, neither concepts nor values are "intrinsic" to external reality, but neither are they merely "subjective" (by which Rand means "arbitrary" or "created by [one's] feelings, desires, 'intuitions,' or whims"). Rather, properly formed concepts and values are objective in the sense that they meet the specific (cognitive and/or biocentric) needs of the individual human person. Valid concepts and values are, as she wrote, "determined by the nature of reality, but to be discovered by man's mind."

An objective concept is one that depends on objective reality, but is formed by man's mind. When we get to concept formation I'll go into this in more detail, but suffice it to say that the Objectivist approach to concepts is something akin to a filing system. A concept "table" is objective in the sense that it refers, directly, to elements of reality (every existent that falls into the category of 'table'). Even so, the concept "table" is entirely a mental construct; there is nothing intrinsic to reality that makes a 'table' different from a 'chair.' We separate them because we find such a convention useful, just as we might sort our paperwork at home into 'bills' and 'receipts.' The point is that the distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary (subjective), but at the same time it isn't intrinsic to reality (as if there was some 'tableness' and 'chairness' that we're able to recognize as being a concrete element of reality). Objectivity is sort of a middle-ground between the two, and I think you're seeing objectivity as necessarily being the opposite of subjectivity, which is where the confusion is arising from.

I'm getting WAAAY off track here. Back to the axiomatic concepts.

Existence

My position: There is a state, 'being,' that is distinct from the state 'non-being.'

The nature of this state is irrelevant; if you accept that the computer you are typing on is somehow different from the abacus you are not typing on, and that this difference is not solely a construct of your consciousness, then you accept the axiomatic concept of existence. Period. We can discuss the nature of existence at a later date.

Do you accept that there is a fundamental difference between the computer you're using and the abacus you aren't?

Identity

My position: All existents ('things that exist'), be they physical constructs or mental constructs or whatever, have a specific nature: There are some things that they are, and some things they are not.

This is where we're having some communications issues. I am not saying that we can understand the identity of an object. I am not saying we will EVER understand the identity of an object. A planet, orbitting a star millions of lightyears away has just as much identity as your own self-evident consciousness. Identity consists of everything that object is, and excludes everything it isn't; there isn't 'more or less' identity. We didn't add identity to water when we discovered its molecular structure -- we merely learned more about the identity that was already there, as it is already there in everything that exists.

To deny identity is to say that some existents and both be something and not be that thing, or that an existent can be everything, or that an existent can be nothing.

To give you a sense of what I mean by Identity, imagine what would happen if Kant mailed a muffin to Hume and Hume opened up the package and found a turtle. If they both rejected the concept of Identity, then they wouldn't ask any further questions -- nothing has identity, so there's no reason why this muffin couldn't also be a turtle. Please tell me you don't hold to that sort of thing... I'm sure they don't.

Identity has nothing to do with how we perceive it or how we know of it. Identity only speaks to the fact that certain things have certain characteristics and lack other characteristics.

Do you accept that all existents are some things, and not other things?

Consciousness

My position: Consciousness, an undefinable state of 'self,' is self-evident and undeniable, proven with every thought that enters your mind.

Thus far, this is the only axiomatic concept that I have gotten you to admit. What you do not see, though, is that admitting it also admits the other two. You accept consciousness exists. Wait. Back up. You accept that consciousness exists. You accept that consciousness exists, that it is, somehow, different from 'fish' and, so, you accept Identity.

This is where I was wrong in the above post. One evidence for the existence of the world outside of our own minds is the fact that consciousness cannot exist without content, and that content comes from our senses. Thus, when I was talking about a consciousness without perception in the above post, I was speaking of a contradiction in terms -- such a consciousness is simply not possible, as such a consciousness would not possess any capacity for conscious action.

I also want to, again, emphasize how important it is that you cannot deny the axiomatic concepts without affirming them. You seem to be trivializing this critical, critical fact, and it may have to do with the fact that you don't understand what I mean when I say 'you have to affirm them.' That's clear to me, because you compared it to disproving God. I don't have to accept that God exists to disprove him. You, however, DO have to accept that existence, identity and consciousness exist to disprove THEM: I challenge you to even ARGUE against them without making use of them -- and I don't mean 'making use of them' in the sense that an atheist makes use of God when he argues against him; I'm not making use of God, I'm referring to him. Not only do you have to refer to existence, identity and consciousness to disprove them, you ALSO have to USE them to disprove them. If, as you'd like to conclude, they do NOT exist, then how do you reconcile the fact that you're USING, ACCEPTING, AFFIRMING, SUPPORTING and BLISSFULLY ENJOYING them as you argue?

 

[No*s]

I just noticed your response.

I'm getting tired, though...it's late, so I'll get to it later.