On "Indirect Doxastic" Voluntarism

[Jayhawker Soule]

For background:

Doxastic voluntarism is the philosophical doctrine according to which people have voluntary control over their beliefs. Philosophers in the debate about doxastic voluntarism distinguish between two kinds of voluntary control. The first is known as direct voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that if a person chooses to perform them, they happen immediately. For instance, a person has direct voluntary control over whether he or she is thinking about his or her favorite song at a given moment. The second is known as indirect voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that although a person lacks direct voluntary control over them, he or she can cause them to happen if he or she chooses to perform some number of other, intermediate actions. For instance, a person untrained in music has indirect voluntary control over whether he or she will play a melody on a violin. Corresponding to this distinction between two kinds of voluntary control, philosophers distinguish between two kinds of doxastic voluntarism. Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that people have direct voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs. Indirect doxastic voluntarism, however, supposes that people have indirect voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs, for example, by doing research and evaluating evidence.

< -- snip -- >​

2. Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism

Is indirect doxastic voluntarism true? Consider the following cases. First, suppose you walk into a room that is dark but has a working light that you can turn on by flipping the switch on the wall. When you walk into the room, you believe the proposition the light in the room is off. You realize, though, that you could change your belief by flipping the switch, so you flip the switch. The light comes on, and subsequently, you believe the proposition the light in the room is on. Second, suppose a usually trustworthy friend tells you that Paul David Hewson is one of the most popular singers of all time. You have no idea who this Hewson fellow is, but you would like to know whether you should trust your friend and, hence, believe the proposition Paul David Hewson is one of the most popular singers of all time. So, you do some research and discover that Paul David Hewson is the legal name of the incredibly popular lead singer for the Irish rock band U2. Consequently, you come to believe that Paul David Hewson is one of the most popular singers of all time. Thus, there are at least two cases in which someone has indirect voluntary control over his or her beliefs.

These cases, however, are not unique. The first illustrates that people have indirect voluntary control over whether they will believe any proposition, if they have voluntary control over the evidence confirming or disconfirming the proposition. The second illustrates that people have indirect voluntary control over whether they will believe many propositions, provided that they can discover evidence confirming or disconfirming these propositions, that they choose to seek out this evidence, and that they form their beliefs according to the evidence.

The significance of cases such as these is widely recognized among participants in the debate about doxastic voluntarism. (For summaries of such cases, see, for example, Alston 1989, Feldman 2001.) In fact, they are so widely accepted that philosophers seem to have reached a consensus on one aspect of the debate, recognizing that indirect doxastic voluntarism is true. [source]​

So, the consensus is that indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, but does that in any way take the issue of direct doxastic voluntarism off the table? Does not the question then become one of whether we can choose what we believe to be credible evidence?

And what are the implications if the answer to this question is "No"?

 

[Willamena]

My vocabulary contains a word for "choose to believe; to acquire a belief concerning a proposition merely for practical reasons, regardless of the truth of the proposition..."

That's make belief.

 

[Sunstone]

Fascinating thread! At this point I lean towards the notion we cannot consciously choose which evidence we believe is credible. But I'm just going by introspection in arriving at that opinion.

If I hit my thumb with a hammer, the resulting pain constitutes evidence that I have hit my thumb with a hammer. Can I really believe that evidence is incredible? I suppose -- and I only suppose this -- that for me to really believe that evidence is incredible, the neurons in my brain must somehow fail to associate the pain with my memory of hitting my thumb with a hammer. And could their failure be due to a choice I've made?

I've got to think about this....

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

If I hit my thumb with a hammer, the resulting pain constitutes evidence that I have hit my thumb with a hammer.

Some evidence is overwhelming and we're wired to acknowledge it as credible and interpret it more or less correctly. To decide that one has not hit one's thumb with a hammer is to override a good deal of (forgive the pun) painstakingly evolved neurophysiology. Responding appropriately to the hammer is a common trait.

But response to, for example, revelation is widely divergent. Does this suggest ...

• divergent neurophysiology ... ?
• backwardness on the part of the theist ... ?
• myopia on the part of the nontheist ... ?

... or something else?

 

[kai]

well i had a look,
you know curiosity killed the cat and all that,
but now its time for me to run awwaaayyyyy!!!!




and for a little while my name will be by such an auspicious thread title ha ha,

 

[sandandfoam]

Does not the question then become one of whether we can choose what we believe to be credible evidence?

And what are the implications if the answer to this question is "No"?

I am not sure that we can choose what we believe but I am inclined to think that we can.
I'm going to have to think of how (if) I can back that up.
I think if one accepts some version of central state identity theory then I think one has to accept we have no choice in what we believe.
One implication of a "No" answer for me would be that I completely misconceive the nature of myself.

 

[Wandered Off]

I think at best we can influence what we believe, but the extent of our control is more limited than many of us like to think. Our greatest influence over our beliefs is exercised by acting as a gatekeeper of what information we seek.

To give this a religious spin, I think the idea that we can't directly or consciously control our beliefs undermines certain literal religious tenets that require belief as a condition to avoid divine punishment.

 

[sandandfoam]

I'm going to have to think of how (if) I can back that up.
I think if one accepts some version of central state identity theory then I think one has to accept we have no choice in what we believe.
One implication of a "No" answer for me would be that I completely misconceive the nature of myself.

The reason I think we can choose what we believe is rooted in my belief that mind and brain are not one. Benett and Hacker put it well - "Being conscious, as opposed to unconscious of something, as opposed to not noticing it or not attending to it, do not occur in the brain at all. Of course they occur because of certain events in the brain[italics in original]...the stomach can be said to be digesting food but the brain can not be said to be thinking". I believe the mind to be more than brain.
I think we can choose what we believe because I think the ability to choose is an attribute of mind (as opposed to brain). I agree with Karmiloff-Smith who in arguing for an epigenetic modular mind says that the more highly pre specified a cognitive system is the less flexible and creative that mind could be. I think her argument can be extended and used for choice. I think that flexibility and creativity evidence the ability of the human mind to choose.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

The reason I think we can choose what we believe is rooted in my belief that mind and brain are not one.

Then you should have no problem with a benign and trivial test. For the remainder of the week, believe I'm an elf.

 

[Wandered Off]

I think we can choose what we believe because I think the ability to choose is an attribute of mind (as opposed to brain).

Is it a conscious choice though? It's not the same as, say, choosing tea over coffee with a meal. If it were that kind of choice, I could simply choose to believe that, say, all rocks are made of chocolate despite physical evidence otherwise. [EDIT: Or that Jay is an elf...] Regardless of how I try, though, I am unable to ignore the other evidence, which removes at least some element of choice from the equation.

 

[sandandfoam]

Then you should have no problem with a benign and trivial test. For the remainder of the week, believe I'm an elf.

Your mocking contempt for my belief may indeed be well placed, I can only try my best with the blunt tools that I have. Also, I'm clearly too dense to see the relevance of believing you are an elf.
Maxwell Bennett who I quoted above

Being conscious, as opposed to unconscious of something, as opposed to not noticing it or not attending to it, do not occur in the brain at all. Of course they occur because of certain events in the brain[italics in original]...the stomach can be said to be digesting food but the brain can not be said to be thinking

is professor of neuroscience at the university of Sydney, would you consider stooping to address his point?
edit - my point being that he is asserting that mind and brain are not one - your comments to me were based on that assertion. Would you also ask him to believe you an elf?

 

[Willamena]

Fascinating thread! At this point I lean towards the notion we cannot consciously choose which evidence we believe is credible. But I'm just going by introspection in arriving at that opinion.

If I hit my thumb with a hammer, the resulting pain constitutes evidence that I have hit my thumb with a hammer. Can I really believe that evidence is incredible? I suppose -- and I only suppose this -- that for me to really believe that evidence is incredible, the neurons in my brain must somehow fail to associate the pain with my memory of hitting my thumb with a hammer. And could their failure be due to a choice I've made?

I've got to think about this....

If I may reword it a bit... In the case of my thumb being hit, the resulting pain constitutes evidence that my thumb was hit. If I saw the hammer fall, the resulting image combined with the resulting pain constitutes evidence that a hammer hit my thumb. If I see the hammer in someone's hand, again the resulting image adds more information to the conclusion drawn. Each piece of evidence is credible; its credibility is what makes it "evidence". Evidence is that convincing piece of information that we accredit with truth.

The OP question seems to spin in on itself: it is a question about belief in evidence, yet the evidence is what spurs belief (supports the proposition made).

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

The reason I think we can choose what we believe is rooted in my belief that mind and brain are not one.

Then you should have no problem with a benign and trivial test. For the remainder of the week, believe I'm an elf.

Your mocking contempt for my belief may indeed be well placed, ...

There was no "mocking contempt."

..., I can only try my best with the blunt tools that I have. Also, I'm clearly too dense to see the relevance of believing you are an elf.

That, however, clearly deserves contempt of some kind.

The suggested test stands.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

The OP question seems to spin in on itself: it is a question about belief in evidence, yet the evidence is what spurs belief (supports the proposition made).

That is, indeed, the problem. The appeal to indirect doxastic voluntarism seems to accomplish little. We are still confronted with the question of whether we can choose our belief, be it a belief in a particular proposition or in the legitimacy and weight of the evidence used to evaluate the proposition.

 

[rojse]

An interesting thread.

If we accept the premise that there is a scientific explanation for the acceptance of certain beliefs, particularly religion, we usually include a study of the brain and psychology in this explanation. Since we cannot easily alter the brain, except for medical procedures, surely the conclusion that belief is partially involuntary becomes a forgone conclusion?

A more emotive argument is that if we did have a choice in our beliefs, why would so many of us choose beliefs that are counterproductive to social acceptance, or bring about the potential for physical harm?

 

[doppelganger]

I think at best we can influence what we believe, but the extent of our control is more limited than many of us like to think. Our greatest influence over our beliefs is exercised by acting as a gatekeeper of what information we seek.

I think that's a very astute observation. But the extent to which one is willing to receive and consider new information and perspectives, or only seek out information one expects they will already agree with (or interpret anything they find to fit with what they already believe) may itself also not be something over which a person has a "choice." So, while the degree to which a person open-mindedly encounters new information would be a major factor in shaping the beliefs as that new information is assimlated into existing beliefs, it's still possible that that too is not a matter over which there is some conscious control other than the appearance of "choice" after the fact.

 

[michel]

An interesting thread.



A more emotive argument is that if we did have a choice in our beliefs, why would so many of us choose beliefs that are counterproductive to social acceptance, or bring about the potential for physical harm?

I may be being dense, but could you give me examples of such beliefs ? ( Counter productive..........)

 

[rojse]

I may be being dense, but could you give me examples of such beliefs ? ( Counter productive..........)

Choose to be an atheist, for example.

 

[rojse]

Your mocking contempt for my belief may indeed be well placed, I can only try my best with the blunt tools that I have. Also, I'm clearly too dense to see the relevance of believing you are an elf.

If you could choose to believe what you want, believing that Jayhawker Soule is an elf should not be a problem.

 

[Nade]

My reasoning on this:

The criterion by which people believe a statement seems to be whether it is true or not. It is simple enough to use the scientific method to determine whether something is true, however, neurologically, the accepted "truth" of a statement is not depended on the scientific method. What comes into play here is the subconcious mind and biological wiring as well as emotions. For example, scientists have demonstrated the pattern of neruonal firing that represents the rule that humans tend to believe statements they recieve first, rather than statements they recieve later. The same patterns have been found for such subconcious elements as emotional attachement, proft/loss analysis, fairness, and a host of other factors that exclude the scientific method.

Since these patterns are neruologically hard-wired into the brain, it seems evolutionary processes are at work. Indeed, most of the patterns could be conjectured to help one survive in fast moving environments where one doesn't have the time to do research.

The brain, on the other hand, should not be mistaken for an implaible organ. Repeated attempts of the mind to override hardwired responses typically result in success, as the plasticity of the brain makes it able to adapt to any stimulus input. There was a good article in Discover magazine, where scientists stimulated a man's brain to grow neuronal tissue around a transmitter for a computer mouse. With training, the brain was able communicate with the computer and move the mouse around, without concious effort.