PoE vs. Evolution - creationist's dilemma

[Copernicus]

Well, indeed about being responsible for whether or not we have sane, healthy minds -- but as for causal chains that affect our actions, many of those are free agency-caused and I can see the force behind arguing these are out of God's hands (within this conceptual framework) considering things like the butterfly effect. Even if many choices are determined by the environment they're going to be relatively unpredictable, and when future choices are affected by those unpredictable choices then it becomes much more difficult to make the argument that the physical environment alone is responsible for them.

I do not see the force of the argument that agency-caused actions take place independently of physical events taking place in a brain, but that is one of those leaps of faith you have to make in order for the argument to make any sense at all. You must concede that immaterial spirits (in the form of "agencies") can manipulate physical reality--e.g. events in a physical brain. That seems a pretty shaky assumption to me, but it seems necessary in order for transworld depravity to be a viable argument.

No one can imagine their way out of a truly illogical scenario, though. No matter how advanced your imagination is it simply isn't possible to conceive of a square-circle or a set of all sets which do not contain themselves as members. The PoE does work and it does show a logical contradiction so long as we defeat transworld depravity, which we can.

But we can unless your criterion for defeat requires proving a logical contradiction. I do not share your optimism that that is possible in logical arguments over the existence of God, although I've seen some pretty good logical arguments against the omnimax God. Theists with good imaginations simply create new "transworld depravity-like" scenarios to keep the argument going. You have committed yourself to proving a contradiction in their thinking, so they get to call the tune. One isn't likely to arrive at a "squared circle" moment in those arguments, although one can always hope.

The real value of logic is not just in proving contradictions but in choosing which side of a contradiction to believe (by proving consistencies with beliefs that are certain or beyond reproach). You can always prove one side of an empirical argument by declaring evidence from reality out of bounds. Human cognition would not even work if we couldn't maintain contradictory beliefs, because we would never be able to change our minds about anything.

I had a kind of epiphany in a robotics conference a few years ago when the discussion turned to nondeterministic methods for robot navigation around obstacles. One of the participants emphatically declared that we needed to have better, faster methods for eliminating contradictions. A friend of mine almost exploded (well, that is SOP for this particular friend ) that robots had to have ways of embracing and handling contradiction. The ability to believe two incompatible propositions is necessary before one can make a choice. If beliefs have to be based on certainty, then it becomes impossible to make any decisions at all, so the robot must always question its own decisions at some level. Evidential arguments are ultimately more important than purely logical ones, because they make it possible for us to navigate and survive in an uncertain world.

 

[tarasan]

I agree, though. Re-read my responses: my original dilemma assumed the truth of TD but tried to show an inconsistency anyway. Plantinga's initial response got through the inconsistency but raised a new one, to which I played Devil's Advocate to my own argument and discovered that indeed, the logical force of the argument fails thanks to possibility (3). I agree that I have not given a true dilemma between macroevolution and the PoE within the confines of TD. My argument failed, I killed it myself.

However, I'm pointing out that while the logical aspect of the argument failed, the implicatory aspect didn't necessarily fail: it still forces some theists into an uncomfortable and ad hoc position that might conflict with the extended beliefs of their theism. This is far weaker than I intended, yes, but it still presents something of a problem.

In any case, I still haven't even attacked TD itself, which I can do if you're up to defending it. That one I'm more confident about.



I wasn't posing the PoE itself or attacking TD directly. I was suggesting that TD might be inexhaustive in that there are some states of affairs which TD might not cover which might put a creationist into a dilemma between agreeing evolution happens or being forced to deal with the PoE again even if TD is true. It was a new, hybrid argument of my design. It didn't accomplish its goal (though I am still checking all the logical consistencies, that might change) but it still accomplishes some small amount of discomfort for some creationist conceptions by forcing creationists to accept ad hoc premises about PNFA's in order to dodge the dilemma.



But again this argument is within the framework of TD, assuming its truth. This argument does not attempt to refute TD, so it's no surprise that it doesn't. The argument attempts to show that even if TD is true that there are still gaps to cover to protect against the PoE.



That's fine, it's still useful in that regard if there's anyone out there to whom it could apply. If Christians (for instance) are fine with heavy PNFA roles in creation then the response simply doesn't apply to them. For now we can say that this argument is successful but only against a certain type of theist (those who deny that PNFA's can have a role in creation). In this respect it fails its original goal but it's still interesting nonetheless and still succeeds against some people.




Okay, I'll start a thread on refuting TD when I get the chance. See you there. Actually I'll wait until you answer this query: do you want it to be public or in the one-on-one section?

I would say yes to the one on one, but i am very busy at uni (after POE essay i gotta start work on my desertation on Molinism) so i would not have alot of brain power/ time to devote to it.

If you really wanted to damage some thiests doctrinal views i can help you there!

FWD causes some problem on:

1) the doctrine of heaven (TWD is true now..... so what makes heaven so different?? think about it Meow..

2) predestination ( the FWD is grounded in molonism, so whoever wants to call on it, has to grant that Molonism is true, heck just TWD is linked to Molonism and what with molonism being highly contraversail in some christian circles, I think it could cause the damage your looking for. especially if you push TWD as the only reasonable view!

or for a quick statement FWD or TWD kicks determinists, calvin loving christians in the teeth,

thats just two but there are others.

 

[Meow Mix]

I do not see the force of the argument that agency-caused actions take place independently of physical events taking place in a brain, but that is one of those leaps of faith you have to make in order for the argument to make any sense at all. You must concede that immaterial spirits (in the form of "agencies") can manipulate physical reality--e.g. events in a physical brain. That seems a pretty shaky assumption to me, but it seems necessary in order for transworld depravity to be a viable argument.

I'm not saying per se that free agency actions take place independently of physical events in the brain -- I'm convinced that the mind is just an emergent property of the brain, after all -- but what I was saying is that if God sets up the arena and fills it with free agents, not all of the free actions can be directly attributed to how God set up the arena due to the inherent unpredictability of free actions. I'm something of a compatibilist so I definitely appreciate the role of environment in making decisions but often decisions are affected by previous free decisions and they become distanced from being grounded solely by the environment.

Just as an example, suppose God creates the environment; say a woodland, and fills it with free agents. These free agents have a lot of choices they can make: do they hunt for food? Do they chop down trees to build homes? Do they make a fire and sit around it telling stories? Whatever they do, the next thing they do will be partly affected by their previous free choice -- and since God isn't directly responsible for which free choice they originally made, their next choice is a little less grounded in how God made the environment.

Their next choice after that will be affected by both previous free choices, and so will be even less directly grounded in how God created the landscape. Yes, it ultimately ties back to how God made the landscape, but the free agency builds on itself and makes future choices less directly deterministic (fatalistic might be the right word to make the point) such that it's less and less directly tied to how God made the arena.

This is all I was saying -- it is a good point that if God makes the arena that God is setting the bounds for the free will decisions (after all, we can't, say, walk on the ceiling) but I think it's too strong of an assertion to say that God creating the arena absolutely determines the decisions such that God would be culpable for those decisions. Furthermore, the connection becomes more tenuous as time goes on as unpredictable choices are made based on prior unpredictable choices.

Transworld depravity is just the idea that it's logically possible that in each possible world at least one free agent makes a morally wrong choice, such that it isn't even within the power of an omnipotent being to create a universe wherein all agents freely choose good and thus can't be blamed for the existence of agency-caused evil. It's sort of like arguing it's possible to flip a coin and have it come up heads eternally, but if it works it does solve the logical PoE. Fortunately, though, TD doesn't work.

But we can unless your criterion for defeat requires proving a logical contradiction. I do not share your optimism that that is possible in logical arguments over the existence of God, although I've seen some pretty good logical arguments against the omnimax God. Theists with good imaginations simply create new "transworld depravity-like" scenarios to keep the argument going. You have committed yourself to proving a contradiction in their thinking, so they get to call the tune. One isn't likely to arrive at a "squared circle" moment in those arguments, although one can always hope.

The real value of logic is not just in proving contradictions but in choosing which side of a contradiction to believe (by proving consistencies with beliefs that are certain or beyond reproach). You can always prove one side of an empirical argument by declaring evidence from reality out of bounds. Human cognition would not even work if we couldn't maintain contradictory beliefs, because we would never be able to change our minds about anything.

I'm convinced that PoE poses exactly that which you're skeptical of; it's just less clear cut than a married bachelor. The only escape from the logical force of the PoE at this time is TD and I know how to defeat TD. It actually isn't that hard, even: it makes unwarranted assumptions and begs the question, which I'll point out when I get into it with Tarasan.

I had a kind of epiphany in a robotics conference a few years ago when the discussion turned to nondeterministic methods for robot navigation around obstacles. One of the participants emphatically declared that we needed to have better, faster methods for eliminating contradictions. A friend of mine almost exploded (well, that is SOP for this particular friend ) that robots had to have ways of embracing and handling contradiction. The ability to believe two incompatible propositions is necessary before one can make a choice. If beliefs have to be based on certainty, then it becomes impossible to make any decisions at all, so the robot must always question its own decisions at some level. Evidential arguments are ultimately more important than purely logical ones, because they make it possible for us to navigate and survive in an uncertain world.

Indeed, I'm only slightly familiar with it but you should check out paraconsistent logics; which serve exactly that purpose

 

[tarasan]

althoug i am interested in seeing your arguement Meow Minx, it should be fun! XD

 

[Copernicus]

Thanks for the interesting reply, MM. I'll think about some of the points you made and try to respond when I get the chance. Gotta run atm.

I just want to push this out there for you to think about. Consider the field of robotics as a handy metaphor for the concept of God and free agency, where the programmer is God and the free agents are robots. Who is responsible when the robot screws up? The programmer? The robot? Nobody? All of the robots' routines for behavior in a chaotic environment are predetermined (including the self-reprogramming routines to optimize behavior based on learned robotic "experiences"). The big gotcha, of course, is that the human programmer is not omniscient and has no basis for calculating all possible outcomes. God is the super-calculator with perfect knowledge, so it isn't at all clear that deterministic chaotic systems would be a problem for him. Can chaos exist in the context of omniscience?

Watching a well-programmed humanoid robot navigate an obstacle course--deciding whether to jump, crawl, climb, how to step, etc.--is a very eerie experience.

 

[Meow Mix]

Thanks for the interesting reply, MM. I'll think about some of the points you made and try to respond when I get the chance. Gotta run atm.

I just want to push this out there for you to think about. Consider the field of robotics as a handy metaphor for the concept of God and free agency, where the programmer is God and the free agents are robots. Who is responsible when the robot screws up? The programmer? The robot? Nobody? All of the robots' routines for behavior in a chaotic environment are predetermined (including the self-reprogramming routines to optimize behavior based on learned robotic "experiences"). The big gotcha, of course, is that the human programmer is not omniscient and has no basis for calculating all possible outcomes. God is the super-calculator with perfect knowledge, so it isn't at all clear that deterministic chaotic systems would be a problem for him. Can chaos exist in the context of omniscience?

Watching a well-programmed humanoid robot navigate an obstacle course--deciding whether to jump, crawl, climb, how to step, etc.--is a very eerie experience.

It depends on what omniscience consists of. It's undoubtedly the state of having the maximal amount of absolute knowledge logically possible -- but it isn't clear on whether that includes all future knowledge or not, and even whether even if it was that this would be at odds with free will. (After all, suppose you had a video camera that captures video of 10 seconds ahead of time and you're a security guard who, for whatever reason, doesn't reveal this information to people before it happens to avoid paradoxes: does your knowing of what will happen in 10 seconds predetermine it or infringe the people's free will who are depicted on the tape? It seems prima facie that it does not).

The conception of omniscience that I think makes the most sense is that of direct divine epistemology, wherein God doesn't operate on doxastic justification (i.e., justifying beliefs [as we must] to form knowledge) because as things are actualized God simply has direct and infallible knowledge of exactly what that state of affairs is. No mistaking of mirages for oases for God.

As for the robot analogy, the idea behind free agency is that free agents have the power of causa sui, or the ability to be a cause in itself: inherently unpredictable because the cause has no precedent. Though I'm a compatibilist and lean towards the efficacy of free will or at least the illusion thereof I still have reservations about how much logical sense causa sui makes, but it is in fact the underpinning of free will theory no matter how you cut it.

Regardless of whether free agents having power of causa sui makes ultimate sense or not, if we're assuming free will for the sake of argument then we're also assuming causa sui, so in such a case the constructor of a robot with such power [of causa sui] would not be culpable for complex decisions by the robot unrelated to its foundations (which would be equivalent to a biological sentient's epistemic foundations and largely unresponsible for evil unless evil is directly programmed in, e.g. "I must kill humans.") This is because no programmer can by definition be responsible for causa sui choice in a creation by definition of what free will entails, because causa sui choice is made independently of states of origin.

 

[Meow Mix]

althoug i am interested in seeing your arguement Meow Minx, it should be fun! XD

Here's our one-on-one thread:

http://www.religiousforums.com/foru...an-meow-transworld-depravity.html#post2327983

Here's the discussion thread for everyone who wants to make comments or ask questions:

http://www.religiousforums.com/foru...ssion-thread-tarasan-meow-td.html#post2327986

 

[Copernicus]

...does your knowing of what will happen in 10 seconds predetermine it or infringe the people's free will who are depicted on the tape? It seems prima facie that it does not).

That's a very good question. I would have answered that it depended on one's perspective. From the perspective of the observer, it absolutely would cancel out free will. From the perspective of the observed, it would not. The observed would have the illusion of free will but the observer could only be observing an automaton.

The conception of omniscience that I think makes the most sense is that of direct divine epistemology, wherein God doesn't operate on doxastic justification (i.e., justifying beliefs [as we must] to form knowledge) because as things are actualized God simply has direct and infallible knowledge of exactly what that state of affairs is. No mistaking of mirages for oases for God.

OK, I get your point, but I think that what is left unexplained here is what we could possibly mean by "knowledge" of a "state of affairs". I have an idea what that might mean for an embodied human mind, which operates on the basis of associative memory that grounds out in bodily experiences. I'm not so sure how a disembodied mind could be said to have "knowledge", since it would have no experiences to ground out in.

As for the robot analogy, the idea behind free agency is that free agents have the power of causa sui, or the ability to be a cause in itself: inherently unpredictable because the cause has no precedent. Though I'm a compatibilist and lean towards the efficacy of free will or at least the illusion thereof I still have reservations about how much logical sense causa sui makes, but it is in fact the underpinning of free will theory no matter how you cut it.

Well, the question here is how to construe responsibility for the behavior of programmed autonomy. This is a real-world problem for roboticists, because they face a question of legal liability, just as God faces a question of responsibility in these discussions of theodicy. If a robot kills somebody, who is responsible? The programmer might not reasonably have foreseen the circumstances under which the robot's behavior would go awry, but can we say the same for God? This isn't even necessarily a question of absolute knowledge of the future but of reasonable expectation of how the future would play out. God's unlimited knowledge actually increases his liability for what happens after Creation, even if he is not directing the actions of his creations in real time.

Regardless of whether free agents having power of causa sui makes ultimate sense or not, if we're assuming free will for the sake of argument then we're also assuming causa sui, so in such a case the constructor of a robot with such power [of causa sui] would not be culpable for complex decisions by the robot unrelated to its foundations (which would be equivalent to a biological sentient's epistemic foundations and largely unresponsible for evil unless evil is directly programmed in, e.g. "I must kill humans.") This is because no programmer can by definition be responsible for causa sui choice in a creation by definition of what free will entails, because causa sui choice is made independently of states of origin.

I have serious doubts about your argument. The concept of causa sui is relevant to autonomous machines, but autonomous machines have varying degrees of autonomy. Certainly, none approach the complexity of the human brain, nor do robots operate on the same principle of associative reasoning. But I do think that the law would hold companies that design dangerous equipment culpable if that equipment's subsequent actions resulted in loss of life, limb, and property. The ultimate judgment, I think, would rest on whether the court decided that the company that built the machines had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent death, injury, and damage. And it would rest on the acceptance of risk by those who suffered the loss, ultimately. No human being ever asked to be born and thrust into the circumstances that God allegedly created, and God is supposed to be as knowledgeable about outcomes as it is possible to be. So I do think that the robotics analogy has something to teach us about theodicy.

 

[Koldo]

Hello!

About the camera capable of seeing 10 seconds ahead of time: It is not you ( or I, or anybody else for that matter ) knowing what will happen in the next 10 seconds that is going to predetermine it, rather it is the sole capable capability of such device to see ahead of time that does. If you are going to give the same answer to a given question in a given time no matter what then the future is already determined in a way or another. If such is the case, our free will may not be so free as we would like to think.

There are also of couple of other ways to see this matter:

1)Although free will exists, we may not have free will over everything. One choice may lead to a chain of reactions of varying size which can not be completely controlled. As an example:
You crossing a street when you were 5 years old may have lead you to the life you have today. Or your life may be compromised of smaller chains of reactions.Anyway, maybe we are not so unpredictable as we may think we are. We could be restrained to more things than we acknowledge, which gives us the false sense of free will.

2)Rather, the camera could be constantly flashing with new images: In one moment the observer could see a person in a spot and then in the next moment in another and so on. Which would mean the future constantly changes according to our choices, and every milisecond it changes according to our choices. Also the only thing we can see in the cam, in this scenario, is the more likely future we are headed towards which is changing non-stop.

About the robot analogy:

The programmer may not have directly programmed a command such as e.g. "I must kill humans.", but he programmed it with the following line : "When encountering a problem: Check the alternatives and do as you see fit.". By doing such and by understanding what are the physical capabilities the human programmer can easily predict how much damage the machine can do. Given an all-knowing and all-powerfull programmer it becomes easy to understand the creator of this machine is fully responsible for whatever it does.

 

[cottage]

I do not see how Plantinga gets theists off the hook with this kind of ploy. What can he possibly mean by "have been permitted to have a serious hand"? Who gave them permission, and who knew what they would be up to, having been given that "free hand"? Just because God does not directly create the torture device, that does not mean that he lacked control over its creation or responsibility for its use, especially in light of his alleged omniscience. Depraved indifference is doing nothing to prevent evil that one has the power to prevent. This is even worse, since knowledgeably granting permission was itself part of the chain of responsibility.

Yes, I agree. Every time this particular argument of Plantinga's comes up I wonder why some people find it compelling. However you look at it the free will defence is a theodical response that admits that God condones evil, or is unable or unwilling to prevent it, therefore I fail to see where this particular apologetic has merit over the others.

I have to say, though, when responding to the PoE it always makes me feel something of a bully. The subject is a pushover for atheists and sceptics, and in my view is the one argument that shows the popular conception of the Judeo-Christian God is impossible. (That does not of course mean that no God exists).

 

[tarasan]

Yes, I agree. Every time this particular argument of Plantinga's comes up I wonder why some people find it compelling. However you look at it the free will defence is a theodical response that admits that God condones evil, or is unable or unwilling to prevent it, therefore I fail to see where this particular apologetic has merit over the others.

I have to say, though, when responding to the PoE it always makes me feel something of a bully. The subject is a pushover for atheists and sceptics, and in my view is the one argument that shows the popular conception of the Judeo-Christian God is impossible. (That does not of course mean that no God exists).

well it seems to convince most philosphers, in fact most have left the logical problem of evil to go to the evidential.

you really have to understand the logic behind the problem of evil for it to make sense, so i advise you to read on it in depth.

 

[cottage]

well it seems to convince most philosphers, in fact most have left the logical problem of evil to go to the evidential.

you really have to understand the logic behind the problem of evil for it to make sense, so i advise you to read on it in depth.

Wow! That's a rather patronising response!

IActually, I've been studying the PoE since 1997, and I'll be very pleased to discuss with you any arguments you may have in respect of the inconsistent triad. Oh, and that perennial old chestnut: 'Most philosophers...etc', doesn't constitute an argument.

 

[tarasan]

Wow! That's a rather patronising response!

IActually, I've been studying the PoE since 1997, and I'll be very pleased to discuss with you any arguments you may have in respect of the inconsistent triad. Oh, and that perennial old chestnut: 'Most philosophers...etc', doesn't constitute an argument.

i wasnt making an arguement its just that the logic speaks for itself, if you want to make just extreme cliams then you cant get stroppy when someone takes advantage of that,

ohhh and make nonscelant way is just as patronising.

 

[cottage]

i wasnt making an arguement its just that the logic speaks for itself, if you want to make just extreme cliams then you cant get stroppy when someone takes advantage of that,

Okay, so what is 'the logic that speaks for itself'?

And what were the 'extreme claims'? I am entitled to my point of view (which I'm prepared to defend, incidentally).

ohhh and make nonscelant way is just as patronising.

I'm sorry but I have no idea what that means.

 

[tarasan]

Okay, so what is 'the logic that speaks for itself'?

And what were the 'extreme claims'? I am entitled to my point of view (which I'm prepared to defend, incidentally).

The Logical Problem of evil tries to show how the concept of God is explicitly Condradictory. to do this it cliams that there is an implicit contradiction in this logical set.

(1) God is omnipotent
(2) God is wholly Good
(3) Evil exists

To show that this logical set is explicitly contradictory the athiest has to add additional premises that must be neccessarily true.

the most famous example is from JL Mackie

(1) God is omnipotent
(1a) there is nothing an omnipotent God cannot do
(2) God is wholly God
(2a) a wholly good God would eliminate evil as far as it can
(3) evil exists

as we can see the additional premises do make the logical set explicitly contradictory, however these two additional premises must be neccessarily true. and when i mean neccessary i mean they must be as true as

"i can only be as tall as myself"
"red is a colour"

this puts a huge burden of proof on the athiest because it isnt just a matter that the premises are more plausible than their rebuttals they have to be true to succeed! therefore so long as my explanations are even plausible, they succeed in defeating the arguement.

this is what i mean by "extreme claims"

i never claimed you werent entitaled to your point of view i just found it a little rude so i spoke up, most acedemic athiests treat thiests claims very seriously (especially on the logical problem of evil, because of how little the thiest has to do to rebuke it) so i found your way of treating the problem of evil as you did annoying. something ive only found on popular athiest sites.

however your right i spoke of of turn and i was sorry, just a little taken aback by your attitude towards POE, from my studying I find it fiercely contested in acedemic circles.
[/quote]

 

[cottage]

The Logical Problem of evil tries to show how the concept of God is explicitly Condradictory. to do this it cliams that there is an implicit contradiction in this logical set.

(1) God is omnipotent
(2) God is wholly Good
(3) Evil exists

To show that this logical set is explicitly contradictory the athiest has to add additional premises that must be neccessarily true.

the most famous example is from JL Mackie

(1) God is omnipotent
(1a) there is nothing an omnipotent God can do
(2) God is wholly God
(2a) a wholly good God would eliminate evil as far as it can
(3) evil exists

as we can see the additional premises do make the logical set explicitly contradictory, however these two additional premises must be neccessarily true. and when i mean neccessary i mean they must be as true as

"i can only be as tall as myself"
"red is a colour"

this puts a huge burden of proof on the athiest because it isnt just a matter that the premises are more plausible than their rebuttals they have to be true to succeed! therefore so long as my explanations are even plausible, they succeed in defeating the arguement.

this is what i mean by "extreme claims"

i never claimed you werent entitaled to your point of view i just found it a little rude so i spoke up, most acedemic athiests treat thiests claims very seriously (especially on the logical problem of evil, because of how little the thiest has to do to rebuke it) so i found your way of treating the problem of evil as you did annoying. something ive only found on popular athiest sites.

however your right i spoke of of turn and i was sorry, just a little taken aback by your attitude towards POE, from my studying I find it fiercely contested in acedemic circles.

Okay. I think the problem here is that you initially banged of a respons to quickly(something we all do from time to time).

Many atheists address the PoE and the inconsistent triad as an argument against the existence of God. I maintain that the problem of evil is unanswerable (Theodicy and the apologetics only go around the contradiction while leaving it unassailed), but the existence of evil only shows that God cannot be the deity as understood in the Judaeo/Christian faiths, ie morally good without exception.

.

(1a)
“There is nothing an omnipotent God cannot do”

‘Omnipotent’ means that God can do anything that is logically possible.

(2a) If 1a is true, ie omnipotent, and wholly good (2), then it follows that 2a is incorrect.


But anyway it comes down to this:

The Logical problem:

This part is dead simple. If an omnipotent God is infinitely omni-benevolent and immutable then he cannot be sometimes omni-benevolent, sometimes not (p or not p). If God’s nature is to be benevolent, all-merciful, all-caring, and all-forgiving, ie those things augmented without limit, then there can be no occasion when he is other than that.

The evidential problem (and returning once more to the contradiction)

Someone dies alone in dreadful circumstances, and in great pain – as happens somewhere everyday. Where was the omnipotent, omni-benevolent God? The theist replies that the person didn’t die alone because God was with him/her. But that reply didn’t help the sufferer: it didn’t prevent the circumstances and it didn’t prevent a painful death. But it makes no sense to speak of God intervening and preventing the circumstances and the suffering, for a state of affairs ought to exist where those things are impossible. Why? Because that we can conceive of the foregoing it demonstrates that suffering has no necessary import, and we can conceive of a possible world without suffering. Now, as there can logically be only be one omnipotent God this means God, if he exists, will not be the equal of our possible God. God therefore is demonstrably not omnipotent and omni-benevolent, since we can conceive of a greater benevolence.

 

[tarasan]

Okay. I think the problem here is that you initially banged of a respons to quickly(something we all do from time to time).

Many atheists address the PoE and the inconsistent triad as an argument against the existence of God. I maintain that the problem of evil is unanswerable (Theodicy and the apologetics only go around the contradiction while leaving it unassailed), but the existence of evil only shows that God cannot be the deity as understood in the Judaeo/Christian faiths, ie morally good without exception.

that the point there is a different between a theodicy and a defense, a theodicy is an explanation as to how God and evil exist
a defense is how it might be.

for the logical problem of evil it must be neccessary that God and evil contradict, so if the thiests uses a defense then what he says

.

(1a)
“There is nothing an omnipotent God cannot do”

‘Omnipotent’ means that God can do anything that is logically possible.

(2a) If 1a is true, ie omnipotent, and wholly good (2), then it follows that 2a is incorrect.

this is true like I said it was an example which i used because it was the most well known.

But anyway it comes down to this:

The Logical problem:

This part is dead simple. If an omnipotent God is infinitely omni-benevolent and immutable then he cannot be sometimes omni-benevolent, sometimes not (p or not p). If God’s nature is to be benevolent, all-merciful, all-caring, and all-forgiving, ie those things augmented without limit, then there can be no occasion when he is other than that.

true, however if there are things that God cannot do then it is possible that he cannot acutalise a world without causing suffering, remeber just because he is all loving doesnt mean he can do everything as youve claim above, for the logical problem of evil you have to show an explicit contradiction you havnt shown that here.

The evidential problem (and returning once more to the contradiction)

Someone dies alone in dreadful circumstances, and in great pain – as happens somewhere everyday. Where was the omnipotent, omni-benevolent God? The theist replies that the person didn’t die alone because God was with him/her. But that reply didn’t help the sufferer: it didn’t prevent the circumstances and it didn’t prevent a painful death.

this seems to be the emotional problem of evil, you havnt shown how this is meaningless evil a better example i feel is a logical set it cuts out all the "fluff"

“

• There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without hereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
• An omniscient. Wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
• There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[FONT=&quot][1][/FONT]”

[FONT=&quot][1][/FONT]Copan Paul and Moser K Paul, The Rationality of Theism, Rutledge, USA, 2003, Pg 262

But it makes no sense to speak of God intervening and preventing the circumstances and the suffering, for a state of affairs ought to exist where those things are impossible. Why? Because that we can conceive of the foregoing it demonstrates that suffering has no necessary import, and we can conceive of a possible world without suffering. Now, as there can logically be only be one omnipotent God this means God, if he exists, will not be the equal of our possible God. God therefore is demonstrably not omnipotent and omni-benevolent, since we can conceive of a greater benevolence.

I can as well if causal determination is true, but ONLY if causal determination is true not if free will exists, however.

 

[Koldo]

The Logical Problem of evil tries to show how the concept of God is explicitly Condradictory. to do this it cliams that there is an implicit contradiction in this logical set.

(1) God is omnipotent
(2) God is wholly Good
(3) Evil exists

To show that this logical set is explicitly contradictory the athiest has to add additional premises that must be neccessarily true.

the most famous example is from JL Mackie

(1) God is omnipotent
(1a) there is nothing an omnipotent God can do
(2) God is wholly God
(2a) a wholly good God would eliminate evil as far as it can
(3) evil exists

(1a) there is nothing an omnipotent God canNOT do, right?



Omnipotent = unlimited power
Omnibenevolent = unlimited benevolence
benelevonce = disposition to do good

(1a) is implied just because of the meaning of the word Omnipotent, and (2a) is in fact the most obvious solution of : "(1) + (2) + (3)".

The formula would be : (1) + (2) + (3) = (2a) [Read it as: Omnipotent God + Omnibenevolent God + Evil Existance = Evil elimination by Omni God ]

But as of now it looks like : (1) + (2) + (3) = X

[ X is our current situation.]

Why the result is X and not (2a) is the big question.

Which means that either:

a) (1) is not true, (2) is not true, and/or (3) is not true.

OR

b) the solution of the formula is not (2a).

Anyone could approach either (a) or (b) to solve the problem. But either approach may end up sound just like made up excuses to don't accept the most obvious and give up your beliefs.

 

[tarasan]

(1a) there is nothing an omnipotent God canNOT do, right?



Omnipotent = unlimited power
Omnibenevolent = unlimited benevolence
benelevonce = disposition to do good

(1a) is implied just because of the meaning of the word Omnipotent, and (2a) is in fact the most obvious solution of : "(1) + (2) + (3)".

The formula would be : (1) + (2) + (3) = (2a) [Read it as: Omnipotent God + Omnibenevolent God + Evil Existance = Evil elimination by Omni God ]

But as of now it looks like : (1) + (2) + (3) = X

[ X is our current situation.]

Why the result is X and not (2a) is the big question.

Which means that either:

a) (1) is not true, (2) is not true, and/or (3) is not true.

OR

b) the solution of the formula is not (2a).

Anyone could approach either (a) or (b) to solve the problem. But either approach may end up sound just like made up excuses to don't accept the most obvious and give up your beliefs.

Curse my typo!!!!! i fail at the english language

btw omnipotent means "all powerful" not unlimited power.
ohhh and everyone approaches a1

mostly because the classic definition of omnipotent is that the creator of ex nihilo creates and keeps all things in existence. bestowing upon them their attributes, it follows then that all power steams from God ergo he is "all powerful"

saint augustine, aquanis etc all believed this, this isnt something new that christians have dreamed up, its been with us for about 1700 years...

 

[tarasan]

there I fixed the typo!!! now no one can see my shame!!!