Posit: The Concept of the Supernatural Cannot Exist.

[Mycroft]

I've been thinking about this a lot lately. Whether we mean 'supernatural' in terms of religious miracles, or whether we mean it in terms of ghosts or other such events, I posit that the concept of the supernatural cannot exist.

Conjecture:

Anything with the label 'supernatural' which is found to be a real part of the physical world (let us say someone proves ghosts exist), then whatever is behind that must be underpinned by a scientific principle and must, therefore, be a natural occurrence (assuming that no technology is the cause).

Anything natural cannot be supernatural, and anything supernatural which is proveable is, by default, natural, meaning that the concept fo the supernatural cannot exist.

Discuss.

 

[Nietzsche]

You're splitting hairs here using the literal definition of words while ignoring how they're used in common parlance.

 

[Faybull]

You're splitting hairs here using the literal definition of words while ignoring how they're used in common parlance.

Really, considering what mankind has the capacity, and ability to do, I'd say looking at the natural order, we are quite "supernatural".
If you want to discuss definitions, of the two further, holla.

 

[Mycroft]

You're splitting hairs here using the literal definition of words while ignoring how they're used in common parlance.

I'm quite well studied in semantics, sure, and I know what I'm doing. But if you take the 'concept' and not the definition, then the same theory applies.

 

[Sapiens]

What's to discuss?

Why people are afraid of the dark?

 

[lovemuffin]

The problem you're outlining, especially in the context of the miraculous, is similar to that of substance dualism in philosophy of mind. They are similar in that the issue is in explaining how some ontologically distinct kind of thing can interact with the natural world given what we know about how the natural world works. So I don't think it's a purely semantic issue as Nietzsche does. The section on interactionism here might be of interest.

I'm not really smart enough to solve the ontological issues but I've thought for a long time that dualisms will all fail because of this problem. In practice, with regard to Christian understanding of the miraculous, I don't think it rules out the idea of the miraculous per se (there are other objections of course), it just makes the natural/supernatural distinction a problematic way of explaining it

 

[Faybull]

What's to discuss?

Why people are afraid of the dark?

it isnt the dark they are afraid of, it is the light.

 

[Mycroft]

The problem you're outlining, especially in the context of the miraculous, is similar to that of substance dualism in philosophy of mind. They are similar in that the issue is in explaining how some ontologically distinct kind of thing can interact with the natural world given what we know about how the natural world works. So I don't think it's a purely semantic issue as Nietzsche does. The section on interactionism here might be of interest.

I'm not really smart enough to solve the ontological issues but I've thought for a long time that dualisms will all fail because of this problem. In practice, with regard to Christian understanding of the miraculous, I don't think it rules out the idea of the miraculous per se (there are other objections of course), it just makes the natural/supernatural distinction a problematic way of explaining it

Let me spin it another way for you:

Let's say jesus (suspending all disbelief here) really did turn water into wine. There must be a scientific principle behind that. Now assuming no technology was used, that makes the event of 'turning water into wine' a natural event, not a supernatural one.

 

[Sapiens]

Let me spin it another way for you:

Let's say jesus (suspending all disbelief here) really did turn water into wine. There must be a scientific principle behind that. Now assuming no technology was used, that makes the event of 'turning water into wine' a natural event, not a supernatural one.

Agreed ... but, so what? There is no supernatural, you're just springing the trap.

 

[Bunyip]

What i find most disappointing is that no discussion on this topic and the related notions of mind-body duality, consciousness and so on seems to ever get past quibbling about semantics.

Those who see the spirit/consciousness as some kind of real or existent property appear frighteningly committed to prevent any discussion or exploration of the idea beyond word play.

What I see is a great deal of quibbling about word meanings, but an absence of any meaningful discussion on these interesting and crucial notions beyond that.

 

[Faybull]

Let me spin it another way for you:

Let's say jesus (suspending all disbelief here) really did turn water into wine. There must be a scientific principle behind that. Now assuming no technology was used, that makes the event of 'turning water into wine' a natural event, not a supernatural one.

the story tells you the principle behind it. it wasn't kosher.

 

[lovemuffin]

Let me spin it another way for you:

Let's say jesus (suspending all disbelief here) really did turn water into wine. There must be a scientific principle behind that. Now assuming no technology was used, that makes the event of 'turning water into wine' a natural event, not a supernatural one.

I understand. You have to be careful not to beg the question though by assuming that "scientific explanation" necessarily entails no room for any sort of free-will like agency or unpredictability. Which it's natural to assume, given the way science has progressed, but since we're talking about explaining something which, if it exists, is not hitherto explained, the question has to be left open at least in this context. In other contexts you just conclude that it didn't happen. What I think is reasonable to conclude is that if we were to understand how something like that can occur, the explanation wouldn't involve some ontological split between natural and supernatural worlds. It would involve a broadening of our understanding of what constitutes nature.

 

[lovemuffin]

What i find most disappointing is that no discussion on this topic and the related notions of mind-body duality, consciousness and so on seems to ever get past quibbling about semantics.

Those who see the spirit/consciousness as some kind of real or existent property appear frighteningly committed to prevent any discussion or exploration of the idea beyond word play.

What I see is a great deal of quibbling about word meanings, but an absence of any meaningful discussion on these interesting and crucial notions beyond that.

You remind me I was going to write a post to you in one of the other threads but got busy and forgot. This is going to sound harsher than I intend it, I think, but it seems to me that in insisting that "real" means "physical", you're the one engaging in word play. Primarily it seems like a misunderstanding about how exactly synonymous synonyms have to be. The fact that words like "tangible" or "substantial" appear in the list of synonyms for real doesn't really settle the issue. Basically, you've been asserting, as I understand it, that any proposition that involves non-conceptual non-physical "realities" is already self-contradictory, and thus no further objection is required. But that's not really a reasonable objection. There is no logical contradiction inherent to the combination of "non-physical", "non-conceptual", and "real". Throughout history, in various contexts, people have proposed such realities and understood them to be non-contradictory. There are logically coherent meanings of the word "real" that allow this. Note also with regard to non-conceptual I don't mean that there don't exist concepts about those non-physical realities, but rather that there is the idea that the concepts have a real referent, which is non-physical. And to tie that back into this thread, there are some similar issues there with regard to interactionism, probably. But one thing at a time maybe

 

[Mycroft]

What i find most disappointing is that no discussion on this topic and the related notions of mind-body duality, consciousness and so on seems to ever get past quibbling about semantics.

Those who see the spirit/consciousness as some kind of real or existent property appear frighteningly committed to prevent any discussion or exploration of the idea beyond word play.

What I see is a great deal of quibbling about word meanings, but an absence of any meaningful discussion on these interesting and crucial notions beyond that.

If the 'spirit' did/does exist, then it must be measurable, and made up of materials familiar to the natural and scientific world (like atoms, electrons, quarks, etc).

 

[Mycroft]

I understand. You have to be careful not to beg the question though by assuming that "scientific explanation" necessarily entails no room for any sort of free-will like agency or unpredictability. Which it's natural to assume, given the way science has progressed, but since we're talking about explaining something which, if it exists, is not hitherto explained, the question has to be left open at least in this context. In other contexts you just conclude that it didn't happen. What I think is reasonable to conclude is that if we were to understand how something like that can occur, the explanation wouldn't involve some ontological split between natural and supernatural worlds. It would involve a broadening of our understanding of what constitutes nature.

But you can perfectly adequately argue it from a semantic point of view, it's simply that few people have a good understanding of semantics. So I could say: that if an event with the label 'supernatural' has a referent or an operant (that is, subject to an operation), then it immediately loses the label 'supernatural' and acquires the label 'natural'.

 

[Bunyip]

You remind me I was going to write a post to you in one of the other threads but got busy and forgot. This is going to sound harsher than I intend it, I think, but it seems to me that in insisting that "real" means "physical", you're the one engaging in word play.

Let me make this as clear as possible - I am 'insisting' no such thing, real is a synonym for physical in this context that is all - using words as they are commonly defined is not actually insisting or dictating. It is just the conventional way to compose a sentence and use words. The reason why people keep attacking me for 'insisting', 'demanding' (etc) that real and physical are synonyms is simply because they believe that there is an inference there that nobody seems willing or able to express, defend or argue for other than in pretending that it is wrong to use words as they are commonly defined. Which is frankly as absurd as it is desperate.

or inPrimarily it seems like a misunderstanding about how exactly synonymous synonyms have to be. The fact that words like "tangible" or "substantial" appear in the list of synonyms for real doesn't really settle the issue. Basically, you've been asserting, as I understand it, that any proposition that involves non-conceptual non-physical "realities" is already self-contradictory, and thus no further objection is required.

Quite the opposite - I am simply trying to move past quibbling about semantics to the meat of whatever this inference is that you are and others are taking issue with.

But that's not really a reasonable objection.

It is not my objection, remember you are telling ME that I am wrong to use words as they are commonly used - nobody seems able to get past attacking me for using words properly to WHY it is they so passionately object to the simple fact that in some contexts 'real' and 'physical' are sysnonyms.

There is no logical contradiction inherent to the combination of "non-physical", "non-conceptual", and "real".

Of course there is - in a specific context, which I have identified from the outset.

Throughout history, in various contexts, people have proposed such realities and understood them to be non-contradictory. There are logically coherent meanings of the word "real" that allow this.

Yes, and no matter how many times I specifically agree to that point - it never seems to register and this little pointless circle of semantic quibbling continues.

Note also with regard to non-conceptual I don't mean that there don't exist concepts about those non-physical realities, but rather that there is the idea that the concepts have a real referent, which is non-physical. And to tie that back into this thread, there are some similar issues there with regard to interactionism, probably. But one thing at a time maybe

 

[Bunyip]

If the 'spirit' did/does exist, then it must be measurable, and made up of materials familiar to the natural and scientific world (like atoms, electrons, quarks, etc).

Yes of course. I don't see anyone contesting that. But what is the significance?

 

[lovemuffin]

It's fine to use words as "commonly defined", and I won't even argue about what the common definition is. But if you want to discuss either spirit or any form of dualism in regard to philosophy of mind, you're going to have to understand those who speak about those things to be using an "uncommon" definition.

I apologize if I've simply misunderstood all your posts on the subject, to me it has never been clear at all that you were willing to do that, since the conversation kept sticking on whether or not it was possible for the non-physical to be "real". I don't think there's any real objection to stipulating that the word "real" has to be understood to include the possibility of that which is non-physical.

It's sort of the same for what quartermass said about spirit needing to be measurable. If you assume materialism, there is no conversation, since materialism is logically incompatible with what people call "spirit". In order to talk about it, you have to at least suspend judgement on the question long enough to consider the possibility that materialism is false. Or else the conversation ends with Me: "I experience the reality of the Spirit" and You: "All that exists is material and therefore there is no spirit"

 

[Faybull]

what orbits around what? Im guessing here i think it is a surprise.

 

[Mycroft]

Yes of course. I don't see anyone contesting that. But what is the significance?

That by being so, it is a perfectly (what we call) natural thing and not a supernatural thing at all. And that this applies to everything else. So everything currently considered 'supernatural' that can be found to 'have a basis in physicality' (shall we say?) is automatically not supernatural. So there can be no such thing as the 'supernatural' as an entire concept.