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Professor Susan A. Handelman.

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
How is it, the Christian wonders, that Jews so stubbornly adhere to the sign, refuse the consolations of instantaneous unveiling of presence, can exist so well within the realm of temporality? Jews are so strangely at home in exile, in the play of signs, in the wandering of figurative language, and in their own constant physical wanderings: strange literalists who take figures for things, refusing to acknowledge their real referents, remaining under the curse of the original sin by refusing to believe in the incarnate word. What collusion with Satan enables them to exist so well in the realm of difference, in the infinite regression of signs, in the cacophony of words and interpretations, in the endless referentiality of the letter, without the redeeming ultimate referent of the word?​
Professor Susan A. Handleman: The Slayers of Moses, p.120.​

Normally I'd name an examination after a book or idea and not a person. Professor Susan A. Handelman (who by the way is a practicing Jew, such that there's a lot of tongue in cheek in the statement quoted above) is author of The Slayers of Moses, which is one of the most brilliant evaluations of the difference between Christian heremeneutics and language theory ----versus Jewish ways of understanding language and thought ---that one is likely to encounter even in a fairly robust search. Nevertheless, having studied the book, I don't have the greatest grasp on what the title implies, such that for me, as well as others, the name "Susan A. Handelman" is a fitting signifier for the referent that is her wonderful thought-provoking analysis.



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
How is it, the Christian wonders, that Jews so stubbornly adhere to the sign, refuse the consolations of instantaneous unveiling of presence, can exist so well within the realm of temporality? Jews are so strangely at home in exile, in the play of signs, in the wandering of figurative language, and in their own constant physical wanderings: strange literalists who take figures for things, refusing to acknowledge their real referents, remaining under the curse of the original sin by refusing to believe in the incarnate word. What collusion with Satan enables them to exist so well in the realm of difference, in the infinite regression of signs, in the cacophony of words and interpretations, in the endless referentiality of the letter, without the redeeming ultimate referent of the word?​
Professor Susan A. Handleman: The Slayers of Moses, p.120.​

Normally I'd name an examination after a book or idea and not a person directly. Professor Susan A. Handelman (who by the way is a practicing Jew, such that there's some tongue in cheek in the statement quoted above) is author of The Slayers of Moses, which is one of the most brilliant evaluations of the difference between Christian heremeneutics and language theory ----versus Jewish ways of understanding language and thought ---that one is likely to encounter even in a fairly robust search. Nevertheless, having studied the book, I don't have the greatest grasp on what the title implies, such that for me, as well as others, the name Susan A. Handelman is a fitting signifier for the referent that is her wonderful thought-provoking analysis.

Having somewhat exhaustively discussed many of the heremeneutical difference between Jewish thought versus Christian thought in previous threads, the idea here is not so much to lay the groundwork or even circumscribe the differences in a general way (multiple threads could be referenced where that's already occurred, for instance see essay Monomeism: The Meontology of Jewish Identity) but to attempt to evaluate what I see as the extreme importance of where Professor Handelman takes her reader at the end of her examination.

To her great credit, at least as I see it, she lays out the fact that Christian hermeneutics follow a natural, Platonic, binary, logical, arguable, framework, whereas Jewish language theory and thought, while existing outside the Christian hermeneutic, also seems to exist outside the binary logic and Platonic/Western philosophizing that so empowers Christian language theory. A person reading The Slayers of Moses multiple times could be forgiven for thinking that Professor Handelman, while exhaustively laying out the differences between the two kinds of thought, leaves Jewish hermeneutics and thought dangling without a reasonable justification beyond that it is what it is, Jewish. Professor Handelman shows how reasonable and logical the Christian way of addressing language and thought is, how different the Jewish way is, without offering, so far as I can ascertain, a logical or philosophical grounding for Jewish thought and language theory.



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Having somewhat exhaustively discussed many of the heremeneutical difference between Jewish thought versus Christian thought in previous threads, the idea here is not so much to lay the groundwork or even circumscribe the differences in a general way (multiple thread could be referenced where that's already occurred, for instance see essay Monomeism: The Meontology of Jewish Identity) but to attempt to evaluate what I see as the extreme importance of where Professor Handelman takes her reader at the end of her examination.

To her great credit, at least as I see it, she lays out the fact that Christian hermeneutics follow a natural, Platonic, binary, logical, arguable, framework, whereas Jewish language theory and thought, while existing outside the Christian hermeneutic, also seems to exist outside the binary logic and Platonic/Western philosophizing that so empowers Christian language theory. A person reading The Slayers of Moses multiple times could be forgiven for thinking that Professor Handelman, while exhaustively laying out the differences between the two kinds of thought, leaves Jewish hermeneutics and thought dangling without a reasonable justification beyond that it is what it is, Jewish. Professor Handelman shows how reasonable and logical the Christian way of addressing language and thought it, how different the Jewish way is, without offering, so far as I can ascertain, a logical or philosophical grounding for Jewish thought and language theory.

So as not to leave the reader totally in the dark concerning what follows, Handelman's basic claim is that Christian thought functions by relating every word, sentence, sign, emblem, idea, to a root word, idea, sign, which functions as a transcendental-signifier that unlike all the words, ideas, signs, that grow out of that root, isn't itself the product of, nor dependent on, some other sign, word, idea, or signifier, for its existence or meaning. Though all other words, signs, ideas, grow out of the transcendental-signifier, it isn't itself precisely like anything that grows out of it. It is utterly singular and unique אחד though it supports, in a thoughtful way ,everything that comes out of it.

In Platonic/Christian thought, this transcendental-signifier is something like the "umovable mover." It exists as a logical necessity to protect conceptualism from either the fatality of an infinite regression (words which gain their entire meaning from interplay with other words, none of which has it's own, singular meaning in itself), or else the idolatry of a simulacrum. A simulacrum, unlike an infinite regression, functions by positing a quasi-transcendental-signifier that's really a golem, or zombie, since it doesn't act so much like a root, but is supposed to circumscribe an infinite regression, keeping it from the death of meaning inherent to infinitely regressive thought, by means of some invisible or magic quality or power that remains infinitely outside the thought it circumscribes, guards, and protects. "Simulacra are copies that depict things that either had no original, or that no longer have an original" (Wikipedia, Simulacra and Simulation). In a sense, a simulacrum is an infinite regression circumscribed within a circumspect boundary that implies the lack of a need for a transcendental-signifier.

Which begs the question: What's the difference between a simulacrum, versus a reality grounded in a transcendental-signifier?




John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
In Platonic/Christian thought, this transcendental-signifier is something like the "umovable mover." It exists as a logical necessity to protect conceptualism from either the fatality of an infinite regression (words which gain their entire meaning from interplay with other words, none of which has it's own, singular meaning in itself), or else the idolatry of a simulacrum. A simulacrum, unlike an infinite regression, functions by positing a quasi-transcendental-signifier that's really a golem, or zombie, since it doesn't act so much like a root, but is supposed to circumscribe an infinite regression, keeping it from the death of meaning inherent to infinitely regressive thought, by means of some invisible or magic quality or power that remains infinitely outside the thought it circumscribes, guards, and protects. "Simulacra are copies that depict things that either had no original, or that no longer have an original" (Wikipedia, Simulacra and Simulation). In a sense, a simulacrum is an infinite regression circumscribed within a circumspect boundary that implies the lack of a need for a transcendental-signifier.

This inductive strategy is tautological since by setting an arbitrary boundary to reality, the subject makes the boundary necessarily bound reality within itself. This unjustified elevation to necessity of an arbitrary boundary (the cell membrane) forces everything circumscribed within the cell membrane (such as biology and language) to be necessarily accepted as the beginning and the end of reality itself. To accomplish this feat, the subject must invert the true logic that is the case (the subject is circumcised from infinity by circumscribing itself within an arbitrary cell membrane/boundary)—and become convinced that the infinite is reflected perfectly within the autopoietic (or homeostatic) self-centered structure of the circumscribed subject.


As presented by Handelman and other thoughtful Jews (Daniel Boyarin for instance), Jewish thought, by not acknowledging a transcendental-signifier that grounds thought and conceptualism (keeping if free from functioning merely as a simulacrum circumscribed inside an arbitrary boundary condition that makes it seem like something more than what it is, an infinite regression), appears to leave Jewish thought susceptible to all the accusations it's received from the non-Jewish world ever since it was confronted by that non-Jewish world. The intelligentsia of the non-Jewish world, using natural philosophy, logic, Platonic duality, etc., created a philosophical/conceptual structure that challenged Jewish thought to a dual of sorts. Church scholars like Thomas Aquinas:

. . . created an intellectual structure of faith that is so internally coherent, so logically consistent, and so religiously devoted that its advocates could not imagine how anyone could honestly consider its claims and not assent. Thomas, in other words proved it.​
James Carroll, Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews, p. 305.​

James Carroll points out that Church scholars like Aquinas produced syllogisms so tightly constructed, so syllogistically precise, that when they used them to show the fulfillment of of the Tanakh in the Gospels, it seemed impossible for Jews to reject the seemingly clear fact that the "signs" in the Tanakh were in many cases nearly perfect analogical symbols for their supposed "referents" in the Gospels. It seemed as though Jewish thought had to refuse the very nature of a sign referring to a referent (as is the case in non-Jewish thought) in order to keep Jewish thinking from thinking itself into oblivion. When Jews gave their simulacra-esque response to their Christian interlocutors it seem almost demonically designed to allow Jews to read the scriptures any willy-nilly way they liked rather than having to subject them to an objective logical process based on what seems like a reasonable assumption that it's possible to ground the pronouncements of the holy writ by use of a logic or philosophy guaranteed by something like a transcendental-signifier. When thoughtful Christian interlocutors were confronted by the simulacrum-esque responses of their Jewish brothers, the Jewish responses:

. . . seem like splitting the hair of the prophet, which left them asking, Why don't Jews get it? Positively assessing the Jewish refusal to recognize patterns of "fulfillment" in Christianity, as Abelard saw it, one would regard Jews as "invincibly ignorant." A negative assessment would see the stubborn Jews as less than human. Here is Abelard's nemesis, Bernard: "A Jew might complain, perhaps, that I go too far in baiting him when I term his understanding `ox-like' . . . `The ox,' he says, `knows his owner, and the *** his master's crib: Israel has not known Me, My people had no understanding' [Isaiah 1:3]. You see, O Jew, I am milder than your own prophet: I put you on par with the beasts, he puts you beneath them!"​
Ibid. p. 304.​



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
This inductive strategy is tautological since by setting an arbitrary boundary to reality, the subject makes the boundary necessarily bound reality within itself. This unjustified elevation to necessity of an arbitrary boundary (the cell membrane) forces everything circumscribed within the cell membrane (such as biology and language) to be necessarily accepted as the beginning and the end of reality itself. To accomplish this feat, the subject must invert the true logic that is the case (the subject is circumcised from infinity by circumscribing itself within an arbitrary cell membrane/boundary)—and become convinced that the infinite is reflected perfectly within the autopoietic (or homeostatic) self-centered structure of the circumscribed subject.


As presented by Handelman and other thoughtful Jews (Daniel Boyarin for instance), Jewish thought, by not acknowledging a transcendental-signifier that grounds thought and conceptualism (keeping if free from functioning merely as a simulacrum circumscribed inside an arbitrary boundary condition that makes it seem like something more than what it is, an infinite regression), appears to leave Jewish thought susceptible to all the accusations it's received from the non-Jewish world ever since it was confronted by that non-Jewish world. The intelligentsia of the non-Jewish world, using natural philosophy, logic, Platonic duality, etc., created a philosophical/conceptual structure that challenged Jewish thought to a dual of sorts. Church scholars like Thomas Aquinas:

. . . created an intellectual structure of faith that is so internally coherent, so logically consistent, and so religiously devoted that its advocates could not imagine how anyone could honestly consider its claims and not assent. Thomas, in other words proved it.​
James Carroll, Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews, p. 305.​

James Carroll points out that Church scholars like Aquinas produced syllogisms so tightly constructed, so syllogistically precise, that when they used them to show the fulfillment of of the Tanakh in the Gospels, it seemed impossible for Jews to reject the seemingly clear fact that the "signs" in the Tanakh were in many cases nearly perfect analogical symbols for their supposed "referents" in the Gospels. It seemed as though Jewish thought had to refuse the very nature of a sign referring to a referent (as is the case in non-Jewish thought) in order to keep Jewish thinking from thinking itself into oblivion. When Jews gave their simulacra-esque response to their Christian interlocutors it seem almost demonically designed to allow Jews to read the scriptures any willy-nilly way they liked rather than having to subject them to an objective logical process based on what seems like a reasonable assumption that it's possible to ground the pronouncements of the holy writ by use of a logic or philosophy guaranteed by something like a transcendental-signifier. When thoughtful Christian interlocutors were confronted by the simulacrum-esque responses of their Jewish brothers, the Jewish responses:

. . . seem like splitting the hair of the prophet, which left them asking, Why don't Jews get it? Positively assessing the Jewish refusal to recognize patterns of "fulfillment" in Christianity, as Abelard saw it, one would regard Jews as "invincibly ignorant." A negative assessment would see the stubborn Jews as less than human. Here is Abelard's nemesis, Bernard: "A Jew might complain, perhaps, that I go too far in baiting him when I term his understanding `ox-like' . . . `The ox,' he says, `knows his owner, and the *** his master's crib: Israel has not known Me, My people had no understanding' [Isaiah 1:3]. You see, O Jew, I am milder than your own prophet: I put you on par with the beasts, he puts you beneath them!"​
Ibid. p. 304.​

In her praise of James Carroll's book (quoted above), Professor Susannah Heschel laments that for two thousand years Jews have been waiting for a Christian who would understand their experience. And although James Carroll's Constantine's Sword indeed attempts to understand things in a more positive light for Jews, it, with other works, like say Nancy's, Excluding the Jew within Us, seem like shallow gifts given more in the sense of a guilt offering (to appease the guilt of the giver) than something that comes from a genuine appreciation of the Jewish experience.

A true gift to Judaism would seemingly stare the statements of Abelard, and Bernard (quoted above) directly in the face; not merely to label them with a shallow scholarly criticism of "antisemitism" (without addressing the seemingly rational arguments they ---Abelard and Bernard --give), but would present arguments as compellingly sound as the "antisemites" (or more so) but coming directly from a true account of the Jewish experience. A true gift to Judaism would be a Christian understanding of Judaism that could argue persuasively against the antisemitic arguments rather than just hand-wringing about "antisemitism" and name calling "antisemites" and then glad-handing the Jewish targets of the attacks.

Daniel Boyarin, referencing El'ad Lapidot, notes that many of those who glad-handingly support the labeling of arguments and interlocutors as "antisemitic" and "antisemites" often understand less well than the so-called "antisemites" that Jews are real entities, genuinely other/different persons (from non-Jews), such that in a vertiginous paradox, the antisemites give more respect to Jewish existence and experience (by at least acknowleding the reality of its paradoxical essence) than do many of those "anti-antisemites" who haven't even got so far as the antisemite when it comes to percieving and acknowledging the reality, and extreme difference, of the Jewish experience.

This form of opposition to Jewish collective existence has been discussed at length and powerfully contested in a very important recent book by El’ad Lapidot of the University of Lille, to whose work I return here [Lapidot, Jews out of the Question] At first glance, this form of antagonism to “the Jews”—anti-anti-Semitism—seems more benign than others, in that it is generated out of the fight against anti-Semitism. Lapidot’s fascinating book indicts this discourse of opposition to anti-Semitism—“anti-anti-Semitism”—for tacitly but essentially claiming that any statement about Jews or Jewish is ipso facto anti-Semitic: “Anti-anti-Semitism fundamentally rejects anti-Semitic knowledge of the Jewish: as mere perception, construction, projection, imagination, fantasy, and myth. . . . Anti-anti-Semitism most fundamentally tends to criticize anti-Semitism not for thinking against Jews, but for thinking of Jews at all, namely for engaging Jews as an object of thought, as an epistemic entity.” Along with Lapidot, I, too, totally reject the proposition that there is nothing to be said about Jews; what there is to say is that there are Jews and historically/existentially, we have made something of that, something perceptible, graspable, and evaluable.​
Boyarin, Daniel. The No-State Solution (pp. 124-125). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.​



John
 
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Bthoth

Well-Known Member
How is it, the Christian wonders, that Jews so stubbornly adhere to the sign, refuse the consolations of instantaneous unveiling of presence, can exist so well within the realm of temporality?​
Interesting use of a term.... 'temporality'

I see the "the wandering of figurative language' with that term used
Jews are so strangely at home in exile, in the play of signs, in the wandering of figurative language, and in their own constant physical wanderings: strange literalists who take figures for things, refusing to acknowledge their real referents, remaining under the curse of the original sin by refusing to believe in the incarnate word. What collusion with Satan enables them to exist so well in the realm of difference, in the infinite regression of signs, in the cacophony of words and interpretations, in the endless referentiality of the letter, without the redeeming ultimate referent of the word?​
I summarize the with 'what is real' is the homeland, not a place. The wandering is based on not knowing.
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
This form of opposition to Jewish collective existence has been discussed at length and powerfully contested in a very important recent book by El’ad Lapidot of the University of Lille, to whose work I return here [Lapidot, Jews out of the Question] At first glance, this form of antagonism to “the Jews”—anti-anti-Semitism—seems more benign than others, in that it is generated out of the fight against anti-Semitism. Lapidot’s fascinating book indicts this discourse of opposition to anti-Semitism—“anti-anti-Semitism”—for tacitly but essentially claiming that any statement about Jews or Jewish is ipso facto anti-Semitic: “Anti-anti-Semitism fundamentally rejects anti-Semitic knowledge of the Jewish: as mere perception, construction, projection, imagination, fantasy, and myth. . . . Anti-anti-Semitism most fundamentally tends to criticize anti-Semitism not for thinking against Jews, but for thinking of Jews at all, namely for engaging Jews as an object of thought, as an epistemic entity.” Along with Lapidot, I, too, totally reject the proposition that there is nothing to be said about Jews; what there is to say is that there are Jews and historically/existentially, we have made something of that, something perceptible, graspable, and evaluable.​
Boyarin, Daniel. The No-State Solution (pp. 124-125). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.​

Professor Boyarin's claim that Jews have made something perceptible, graspable, and evaluable, is a gross understatement in context, since Boyarin, with Handelman, make it possible, through their "Jewish" insight, for a non-Jew, and more particularly a Christian, to potentially fulfill the desire noted by Susannah Heschel (to understand Jewish experience), since in Carroll's book, Thomas Aquinas and his antisemitic ilk are said to be using "natural reason, to which all are compelled to assent" (p. 305), while there's serious question as to whether, not withstanding a reasonable argument for it, non-Jewish thought's "transcendental signifier", or "Logos," is indeed something natural reason can justify in a way that transcends a significant circularity? In other words, it's no doubt reasonable, maybe even beyond reasonable, to posit a transcendental signifier that protects dialogical thought from an infinite regression or a simulacrum. But puting a mark on a given entity said to be the transcendental signifier, or Logos, surely, logically, rationally, and reasonably, goes beyond the natural reason to which all are compelled to assent?

Luther's Reformation culminated in the idea of interpretation not as a set of rules but as a condition of one's being, as the Dasein of Heidegger and the demythologized text of Bultman, and as Gadmer's definition of hermenutics as "not a problem of method . . . not concerned with a method of understanding by menas of which texts are subjected to scientific understanding like all other objects of experience."​
Susan A. Handelman, The Slayers of Moses, p. 130.​
In context, Handelman's statement that Luther's heremeneutic rejected a set of rules and leaned toward true interpretation being related to the epistemological/spiritual condition of the interpreter, comes out of her earlier statement that:

As we have seen, when the Christian's claims were rejected by the Jews, they in turn rejected the validity of the Jewish tradition of interpretation ---the oral law which had been handed down side by side with the written scriptures ---and tried, through the Christian claim of a new covenant, to make obsolete and unnecessary all the commentary, explanation, and interpretation of the Rabbis. They reread and reinterpreted the Scriptures in terms of the figures of Jesus, with Luther arguing for a similar kind of rejection of traditional interpretation by the body of the church in favor of immediate, individual, inspiration . . ..​
Ibid.​

Handelman appears to be implying that Luther wanted to revert to a quasi-Jewish heremeneutic that relies on the condition of the interpreter's spiritual being (e.g., the status of the Sages and or the Chachamim) rather than some natural, reasonable, set of rules to which all are compelled to assent. Who would deny that Luther is, for Christian thought, something like a Sage or Chacham whose deep insight comes not from reason and rules (alone) that compel assent, but from the state of his spiritual being? Indeed, Luther experienced persecution from the Roman Church akin to what Judaism and the Jews experienced from the Roman Church. More than that, prior to his antisemitic phase (the last years of his life) Luther was a considerable champion of European Jews who marveled at how, using their own heremeneutic (to some extent), i.e., the Jewish principle of interpretation, Luther single-handedly handed the Roman Church a great and lasting defeat that resulted to some extent in greater freedom for Jews and Judaism. In point of fact, one could argue that Luther's antisemitic phase came upon him precisely when he struggled to understand the paradoxical relationship between his own quasi-Jewish heremeneutic versus the Christian ideology he was using it to justify.



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Interesting use of a term.... 'temporality'

I see the "the wandering of figurative language' with that term used

The most fascinating property of language is its capacity to make metaphors. But what an understatement! For metaphor is not a mere extra trick of language, as it is so often slighted in the old schoolbooks on composition; it is the very constitutive ground of language.​
Julian Jaynes, The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 48.​


I summarize the with 'what is real' is the homeland, not a place. The wandering is based on not knowing.

That's the premise of Daniel Boyarin's No-State Solution. I don't think it works. And I suspect deep down he knows that too.




John
 

Bthoth

Well-Known Member
The most fascinating property of language is its capacity to make metaphors. But what an understatement! For metaphor is not a mere extra trick of language, as it is so often slighted in the old schoolbooks on composition; it is the very constitutive ground of language.​

That's another gem that you provided. The word 'consitutive' is rarely if ever used in basic conversation. But I have to agree with your use and appreciate the linguistic aptitude to provoke rational thought.

I am not familiar with what you have referenced but I did spend a few moments to look into the sources.

I can agree that language is quite intuitive when used correctly. If I possessed such a skill, I would have written many books.
That's the premise of Daniel Boyarin's No-State Solution. I don't think it works. And I suspect deep down he knows that too.
I was unaware that dialogue was written on the metaphor of Israel as the pursuit of knowledge. Has D. Boynarin ever published the conclusion that 'the name' of g-d, is the capstone when conveyed in mathematical theorem? Hence the 'holy of holies'.
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
I was unaware that dialogue was written on the metaphor of Israel as the pursuit of knowledge. Has D. Boynarin ever published the conclusion that 'the name' of g-d, is the capstone when conveyed in mathematical theorem? Hence the 'holy of holies'.

I can't parse any of these statements? They don't appear to reference anything discussed in this thread or elsewhere to my knowledge.



John
 

John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Handelman appears to be implying that Luther wanted to revert to a quasi-Jewish heremeneutic that relies on the condition of the interpreter's spiritual being (e.g., the status of the Sages and or the Chachamim) rather than some natural, reasonable, set of rules to which all are compelled to assent. Who would deny that Luther is, for Christian thought, something like a Sage or Chacham whose deep insight comes not from reason and rules (alone) that compel assent, but from the state of his spiritual being? Indeed, Luther experienced persecution from the Roman Church akin to what Judaism and the Jews experienced from the Roman Church. More than that, prior to his antisemitic phase (the last years of his life) Luther was a considerable champion of European Jews who marveled at how, using their own heremeneutic (to some extent), i.e., the Jewish principle of interpretation, Luther single-handedly handed the Roman Church a great and lasting defeat that resulted to some extent in greater freedom for Jews and Judaism. In point of fact, one could argue that Luther's antisemitic phase came upon him precisely when he struggled to understand the paradoxical relationship between his own quasi-Jewish heremeneutic versus the Christian ideology he was using it to justify.

The distinction between a Jewish hermeneutic versus a Christian one seems to revolve around the concept of the "transcendental signifier." As Handelman makes clear, the concept is powerful in that it acts to anchor thought and interpretation so that words and concepts can function without the infinite regression (a sort of perpetual-motion Goldberg-machine) that exists if a word's meaning is gained only, and wholly, by means of its interaction with other words and concepts (each of which functions the same way creating an infinite regression or a simulacrum). Though it's not a perfect fit, the relationship between biological evolution, in the Neo Darwinian sense (i.e., meaningful interactions between the environment and the organism taking place in a relativistic sense that's not guided by design or a transcendental Designer) versus Creationism, functions along similar lines:

I do not know how to argue the question of whether it is better to see human beings in this biologistic way or to see them in a way more like Plato's or Kant's. So I do not know how to give anything like a conclusive argument for the view which my critics call "relativism" and which I prefer to call "antifoundationalism" or "antidualism." It is certainly not enough for my side to appeal to Darwin and ask our opponents how they can avoid an appeal to the supernatural. That way of stating the issue begs many questions. It is certainly not enough for my opponents to say that a biologistic view strips human beings of their dignity and their self-respect. That too begs most of the questions at issue. . . The controversy between those who see both our species and our society as a lucky accident, and those who find an immanent teleology in both, is too radical to permit of being judged from some neutral standpoint.​
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, xxxxii.​
In a similar vein, Boyarin says:

"Christianity" and "Judaism" are names, then, for the poles of an irresolvable antinomy or aporia; neither can sublate the other, nor is there yet any third term that can clearly resolve this antithesis. Even in the absence of the synthesis, the thesis and the antithesis themselves can perhaps protect us each from the excesses of the other.​
Daniel Boyarin, Gender (the final statement in essay).​
There's strong argumentation that Richard Rorty's "antifoundationalism" or "antidualism" results, always, in a nihilistic infinite regression, or else a simulacrum where "knowing" is an illusion protected from knowing that it's an illusion by being circumscribed inside a magic fence forming a happy-go-lucky simulacrum inside. Judaism is fundamentally different in that it posits a creator/designer/transcendental signifier all the while acknowledging the difficult, indeed the seemingly impossible, chore of revealing or labeling, seeing face-to-face, this designer/creator/transcendental signifier. The seminal distinction between Judaism and Christianity is Judaism's understanding that the transcendental signifier must remain transcendental, versus the Christian belief that it, he, has become flesh and blood.



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
There's strong argumentation that Richard Rorty's "antifoundationalism" or "antidualism" results, always, in a nihilistic infinite regression, or else a simulacrum where "knowing" is an illusion protected from knowing that it's an illusion by being circumscribed inside a magic fence forming a happy-go-lucky simulacrum inside. Judaism is fundamentally different in that it posits a creator/designer/transcendental signifier all the while acknowledging the difficult, indeed the seemingly impossible, chore of revealing or labeling, seeing face-to-face, this designer/creator/transcendental signifier. The seminal distinction between Judaism and Christianity is Judaism's understanding that the transcendental signifier must remain transcendental, versus the Christian belief that it, he, has become flesh and blood.

With that as the conceptual backdrop or context, the alleged stubborn-ness, the "invincible ignorance" of the Jew, starts to look more like an invincible virtue that refuses to fall into the fatal idolatry that assumes the transcendental signifier can become the temporally (carnal/finite) transcendental signifier. Judaism appears to possess an "invincible virtue" that refuses to entertain a tautologically oxymoronic "temporally-transcendent" signifier (a transcendental signifier that's not transcendental).

The virtue in the Jewish position could be examined by imagining an alien from a highly advanced technological world visiting earth in the guise of the "return of Christ Jesus." This advanced alien could have the Bible memorized (or instantaneously accessible to its brain) so that it could quote the words of Jesus verbatim as though it were merely remembering what it/he said all those years ago. It could turn water to wine (using the hyper-advanced technological prowess) and potentially even revive bodies that had died recently (again using hyper-advanced technological prowess). Beyond that, it might be capable of feats of illusion far beyond the ken of modern man's ability to deconstruct the illusion.

If the majority of the world took to worshiping this return of Jesus Christ, what argument could doubters pose, what possible qualification could conclusively reveal that this alien was other than the return of Jesus Christ; particularly if this alien possesses the power to instantaneously incinerate the doubters after a mock trial of some sort.

That's precisely the Jewish problem with the first incarnation of Jesus Christ. Yes he performed miracles. Yes he knew the Law as well as anyone of his day (so says Rabbi Jacob Neusner). He may even have fulfilled many prophesies related to Messiah. But when he claims he's deity, that he is the transcendental signifier (such as when he tells the Jews the entire Tanakh is written about him), he's challenging human beings to accept, or worship, an idol (carnal, temporal, deity/transcendental signifier) unless and until we know precisely how we who are born into a simulacrum, an infinite regression, are supposed to authenticate something perfectly beyond the apprehension of our carnal pay-grade?



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
That's precisely the Jewish problem with the first incarnation of Jesus Christ. Yes he performed miracles. Yes he knew the Law as well as anyone of his day (so says Rabbi Jacob Neusner). He may even have fulfilled many prophesies related to Messiah. But when he claims he's deity, that he is the transcendental signifier (such as when he tells the Jews the entire Tanakh is written about him), he's challenging human beings to accept, or worship, an idol (carnal, temporal, deity/transcendental signifier) unless and until we know precisely how we who are born into a simulacrum, an infinite regression, are supposed to authenticate something perfectly beyond the apprehension of our carnal pay-grade?

Precisely this, is the nature of Jacques Derrida's attempt to deconstruct the Logos (an attempt labeled "shattering the Logos" or even "crucifying the Logos"):

Deconstruction endeavours [sic] to show the operation of logocentrism in all its forms, and to show that the transcendental signifieds are constructed within the province of language and textuality in relation to other concepts. Such concepts move from being a reality beyond language to concepts within language. They become discourses. By virtue of the Derridean concept of differance, meanings become infinitely elusive as they differ and defer in an endless chain of signification, moving from one signifier to another, giving rise to innumerable meanings in the “traces” that are left between signifiers, without ever reaching an absolute signified, thereby deconstructing the myth of the absolute “transcendental signified.”​

Mambrol's statement pierces the right side or heart of the Logos and logocentrism in the important sense that Judaism posits the written word as preeminent or antecedent to the spoken word so far as closeness to God is concerned. More than that, the written word doesn't point to some invisible reality, ontology, transcendental signified, or signifier; in its antecedence and preeminence it produces, whether through adulteration or not, the very chain of meaning that since it's endless, produces meaning without ever reaching an absolute signified.

The tendency to gather various meanings into a one is, as we have seen, characteristic of Greek though in general: it's movement towards the universal, the general, the univocal. The Rabbinic tendency, by contrast, is towards differentiation, metaphorical multiplicity, multiple meaning. . . there is no confinement of meaning within the ontology of substance. (This [false] liberation from ontology of substance is, of course, precisely Derrida's intent).​
Susan A. Handelman, The Slayers of Moses, p. 33 (bracket mine).​

Since Derrida's endless production of meaning has no end, and thus no transcendental, teleological, beginning:

Reading and interpreting as an endless horizontal sequence of knowing-by-part can never render the simultaneous whole presence that Augustine seeks. Because language cannot express this essence of perfect sameness, and because there is such an irremediable gap between this simultaneous apprehension of truth and man's nature, the incarnation becomes the bridge of an otherwise unfathomable abyss. God descends into human language, into human time and history: the word becomes flesh. And this doctrine becomes the only possible escape from man's exile into language. Jesus is the essential link between signifier and signified because with the doctrine of the incarnation the substance and its representation are one and the same.​
Ibid. p. 120.​

Add to this Boyarin:

Christian theories of the Logos in flesh seem better equipped to address this issue. For Christians, the magic language [able to express perfect sameness of sign and signified] has appeared on earth and spoken itself, thus answering to Philo's aporia. The prologue to the Gospel of John makes this point in its utterance that through the Torah it had proved impossible to communicate Logos to humans and that only through the Logos's actual taking on of human flesh was God made knowable to the people.​
Daniel Boyarin, The Word and Allegory; or, Origen on the Jewish Question (bracket mine).



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
Precisely this, is the nature of Jacques Derrida's attempt to deconstruct the Logos (an attempt labeled "shattering the Logos" or even "crucifying the Logos"):

Deconstruction endeavours [sic] to show the operation of logocentrism in all its forms, and to show that the transcendental signifieds are constructed within the province of language and textuality in relation to other concepts. Such concepts move from being a reality beyond language to concepts within language. They become discourses. By virtue of the Derridean concept of differance, meanings become infinitely elusive as they differ and defer in an endless chain of signification, moving from one signifier to another, giving rise to innumerable meanings in the “traces” that are left between signifiers, without ever reaching an absolute signified, thereby deconstructing the myth of the absolute “transcendental signified.”​

Mambrol's statement pierces the right side or heart of the Logos and logocentrism in the important sense that Judaism posits the written word as preeminent or antecedent to the spoken word so far as closeness to God is concerned. More than that, the written word doesn't point to some invisible reality, ontology, transcendental signified, or signifier; in its antecedence and preeminence it produces, whether through adulteration or not, the very chain of meaning that since it's endless, produces meaning without ever reaching an absolute signified.

The tendency to gather various meanings into a one is, as we have seen, characteristic of Greek though in general: it's movement towards the universal, the general, the univocal. The Rabbinic tendency, by contrast, is towards differentiation, metaphorical multiplicity, multiple meaning. . . there is no confinement of meaning within the ontology of substance. (This liberation from ontology of substance is, of course, precisely Derrida's intent).​
Susan A. Handelman, The Slayers of Moses, p. 33.​

Since Derrida's endless production of meaning has no end, and thus no transcendental, teleological, beginning:

Reading and interpreting as an endless horizontal sequence of knowing-by-part can never render the simultaneous whole prescence that Augustine seeks. Because language cannot express this essence of perfect sameness, and because there is such an irremediable gap between this simultaneous apprehension of truth and man's nature, the incarnation becomes the bridge of an otherwise unfahomable abyss. God descends into human language, into human time and history: the word becomes flesh. And this doctrine becomes the only possible escape from man's exile into langauge. Jesus is the esential link between signifier and signified because with the doctrine of the incarnation the substance and its representation are one and the same.​
Ibid. p. 120.​

Add to this Boyarin:

Christian theories of the Logos in flesh seem better equipped to address this issue. For Christians, the magic language [able to express perfect sameness of sign and signified] has appeared on earth and spoken itself, thus answering to Philo's aporia. The prologue to the Gospel of John makes this point in its utterance that through the Torah it had proved impossible to communicate Logos to humans and that only through the Logos's actual taking on of human flesh was God made knowable to the people.​
Daniel Boyarin, The Word and Allegory; or, Origen on the Jewish Question (bracket mine).

None of this seems to dent the invincible virtue of the Jewish understanding that even if a transcendental signifier makes great sense, nevertheless, finding, labeling, or worshipping, some transcendental signifier is just as likely to be the worship of a devil, a chimera, or a doppelgänger of the transcendental signifier, as it is to have somehow found the real deal. The latter appears impossible.

Derrida's claims are doubtless true for the Christian tradition. What we have stressed as unique about Rabbinic thought, however, is its escape from precisely this Greco-Christian ontotheological mode of thinking. Writing, the Holy Text, is the privileged term in Rabbinic thought; it not only precedes speech, but precedes the entire natural world. Rabbinic thought does not move from the sensible to the ideal transcendent signified, but from the sensible to the Text. And that is Derrida's path as well, a movement from ontology to grammatology, from Being to Text.​
Susan A. Handelman, The Slayers of Moses, p. 168.​

A paragraph later, Handelman begins the passion-ed description of a non-Jewish ideology that in context has elevated an idol, a doppelgänger, as it were, as though it, he, and not the Torah scroll, lied, originally, in the bosom of the Father:

Derrida's analysis is especially intriguing because he shows the persistence of this ontotheology even in the likes of such as Saussure. Writing is seen not merely as exterior, but as a threatening exterior from which spoken language must be protected, a corrupt menace that can erupt and disrupt the self-enclosed interiority of the soul. "Saussure," Derrida tells us, "sees writing as perversion, debauchery, dress of corruption and disguise, a festival mask that must be exorcised, i.e., warded off by the good word," even as "original sin."​
Ibid.​

Derrida equating Saussure's "written word" with the "original sin" almost seems to justify Saussure in the sense of the written word coming (so to say) precisely from what the "pen-is" that first writes Cain into the world as the poster-child of the fall, as well as being the first word, the original word, associated with the fall from (out of) a paradise existing prior to what the pen-is, and what comes to be when what the pen-is, and what it produces, is considered antecedent and preeminent to any previous set of affairs (so to say). For those who defend grammatology against the logos, what the pen-is, is fancied having written the scroll lying there in the bosom of the Father as the schematic for the world. The Father's writing-device (what his pen-is) is pictured uncut, unscathed, unmarked, or remarked on, having, in that natural, pristine state, written the words from which the world will emanate.

Derrida is a vigorous polemicist, adept at contorting the arguments of others to fit his own needs, but his particular ironic use of passages and adjectives to characterize negative attitudes toward writing is curious:​
Ibid.​
What comes out of, or after, the colon (so to say), seems like a fitting parallel to the thinking that took place when the Christian Logos was put on trial for the same foul Derrida is about to give an impassioned account of (i.e., negative attitudes toward writing, deriding the very writing ---with what the pen is ---that purports to produce the world without first producing some first, or original, sin).

. . . "the perverse cult of the letter-image," "the sin of idolatry," "perversion that engenders monsters," "deviation from nature," "principle of death," "deformation, sacrilege, crime," "the wandering outcast of linguistics," "expatriated, condemned to wandering and blindness, to mourning," "expelled other." The descriptions are overtly theological, and the logos described as the "historical violence of speech dreaming its full self-presence, living itself as its own resumption. . . . auto-production of a speech declared alive . . . a logos which believes itself to be its own father, being lifted above written discourse," is obviously the Christian logos, the son dreaming himself to be his own father, born into the flesh and elevated above all texts and written discourses. And that exiled, wandering, mourning, condemned outcast, accused of unredeemed original sin, is the Jew, the carrier of the letter, the cultist of Writing.​
Ibid. p. 169.​



John
 
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John D. Brey

Well-Known Member
What comes out of, or after, the colon (so to say), seems like a fitting parallel to the thinking that took place when the Christian Logos was put on trial for the same foul Derrida is about to give an impassioned account of (i.e., negative attitudes toward writing, deriding the very writing ---with what the pen is ---that purports to produce the world without first producing some first, or original, sin).

. . . "the perverse cult of the letter-image," "the sin of idolatry," "perversion that engenders monsters," "deviation from nature," "principle of death," "deformation, sacrilege, crime," "the wandering outcast of linguistics," "expatriated, condemned to wandering and blindness, to mourning," "expelled other." The descriptions are overtly theological, and the logos described as the "historical violence of speech dreaming its full self-presence, living itself as its own resumption. . . . auto-production of a speech declared alive . . . a logos which believes itself to be its own father, being lifted above written discourse," is obviously the Christian logos, the son dreaming himself to be his own father, born into the flesh and elevated above all texts and written discourses. And that exiled, wandering, mourning, condemned outcast, accused of unredeemed original sin, is the Jew, the carrier of the letter, the cultist of Writing.​
Ibid. p. 169.​

In context, the key phrase from Handelman's quotation of Derrida concerns the "logos which believes itself to be its own father, being lifted above written discourse." This Logos, as Handelman notes, is clearly none other than Jesus, whom the Christians fancy the son of God. Derrida is right to use passionate language when speaking of these things since many of the differences between Jewish and Christian thought revolve around this "Logos" that's thought of as the transcendent-signifier anchoring all things.

In the prologue to John's Gospel this transcendent-signifier is said to be the Logos that was "with" God, and which is God, and through which God created all things. Boyarin notes (Borderlines, p.129) that the first verse in this Gospel appears to be an ancient midrash similar to a later version found in the Talmud. In the latter, as Boyarin notes, the subject, i.e., the "Logos," is transferred to Torah, "For both, of course, the Logos (or anti-Logos) is generated out of the same basic concatenation of Genesis 1, and Proverbs 8, but whence the bosom"? The Talmudic understanding is that the Torah scroll lies in the bosom of the Father as something like the plan, or schematic, from which the world is constructed. In John's Gospel, the Son, rather than the scroll, is lying in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18; Colossians 1:16).

Boyarin focuses important attention on the idea of the binary, or binitarian God. It's this binary nature of God that's important to the dialogue between, and differences in, Jewish versus Christian thought, since the second god in a binary system is going to be a mediator or go-between between God and creatures. It's this mediatorial concept that Christianity grasps onto as Christ the transcendental-signifier who signifies the Father, that Judaism recognizes as problematic in the sense that if God can't "appear" or speak for himself (by reason of logical, or theological, nuances) then he can't necessarily speak for the fact that Jesus is his mediator. The belief that Jesus is the Son of God is left to the determination of the very creatures who suddenly have the ability to determine that the second god is a fitting mouthpiece for the first. But if they can determine that, then why bother with the second god in the first place? If creatures can find and label the transcendental-signifier, then it seems like the purpose of the transcendental-signifier (to give them that ability) is negated. There seems to be a peculiar circularity in the Christian position?

Unfortunately, a similar problem haunts the Jewish idea that the Torah scroll speaks for God. In fact, as Boyarin points out repeatedly (in at least a half-dozen essays), there would appear to be a logical and theological superiority in having a living mouth speak for God, rather than a written text. Derrida's "deconstruction," though it deconstructs the Western concept of a transcendent-signifier (who, or which, can be found out and labeled by the very creatures the transcendental-signifier is supposed to enlighten ----seemingly implying they're already enlightened since they can find out the transcendent-signifier and label it prior to using it), also, and more so, deconstructs the transcendental authority of the Torah scroll lying in the same bosom of the Father Christians see Jesus lying.



John
 
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