Fine, but there's quite a leap from "there's more to the world than physical stuff" to "God exists", IMO.
I agree. That's not my argument.
And, as I've pointed, out, "X" can be filled with any particular version of theism in turn just as easily as it can be filled with atheism.
Not so. Take Abrahamic monotheistic belief. 2/3 of the world holds to it.
Look at it this way: is Christianity right? Then Hinduism, Paganism, Buddhism and countless other religions spread despite being false. Are the Hindus right? Then the Christians, Muslims and Jews have spread their religion despite it being false... etc., etc.; no matter which version of God is correct, all the incorrect ones spread in spite of the fact they were worshipping something that didn't even exist.
Christianity does not hold that all competing religions have it all wrong. And what causes those other religions to flourish is what's right about them. Besides, to say that belief systems flourish despite whatever elements of falsity exist in them is trivially true.
Belief in no gods is "weird". So is belief in a triune God, belief in a unitarian God, and belief in many gods. All of these views are mutually exclusive, and each is only held by a minority of the people in the world.
How can a belief be "weird" when fully 1/3 of the world believes it? That's a highly significant minority (as opposed to the mere 5% of atheism -- truly a bizarre belief, statistically speaking). Perhaps all the various beliefs, taken severally, are believed by a minority. But what makes atheism unique is the enormity of its minority. A puny, nay almost insignificant, proportion of persons through the millennia have believed it, and even now, in its heyday (which is actually declining), perhaps 5% identify as atheist. Compare that with 95% of the world as theist, and atheism comes off as weird. Very weird.
And when you break these categories down further, each becomes weirder still: if belief in a monotheistic God is "weird" by itself, what about belief in God as a discrete entity, belief in a pantheistic God, belief in a panentheistic God, belief in a deistic God, etc., etc.?
As I've said, monotheism isn't weird. Worldwide, it's mainstream. Christian triune theism is believed by about 1/3 of the world. Again, far from weird. Panentheism is again not weird. It's believed by almost all the aboriginal societies that remain in the world, and proportionally, atheists can't hold a candle to them. Pantheism is believed by most religious Indians, not to mention not a few converts and semi-converts (like Richard Gere) worldwide. Add to that the aberrant semi-adoption of semi-Hinduism by New Age folks, and you've got quite a lump of humanity right there. Compared to atheism, these are downright common. Atheism? Still weird.
I don't think that an application of your argument in a way you don't like is necessarily a misapplication.
If that's all you'd done, I'd agree. However, the point of the division I've made is to show that there is something in common held by all theists -- an immaterial or spiritual element to the world -- that atheists deny. Atheists rail against the common wisdom of all mankind for all history. Therefore, atheism should not be given pride of place or be considered the default view. Nor should skepticism of theism be the default view, as argued by not a few atheists beginning with Antony Flew in the sixties (although he's changed his tune of late).
Is there a sort of spirituality claimed by theists of all types?
By "spirituality" I didn't mean specific spiritual practices. I meant only the view that the universe was essentially spiritual in some sense, either because it is god, it was created by god, or whatever. But whatever which way, we humans interact with that divinity in some way. Most of the world affirms something like this, which makes atheists downright weird.
I doubt that's true. And some atheists believe this as well, so I don't see how it can be used as a unique characteristic of theism.
In that case, you're in doubt about the way concepts and words work.
As do Buddhists (roughly), who normally can't be counted among theists, as well as some atheists who don't affiliate themselves with a specific religion.
Bhuddists aren't theists, but they're not materialists, either, so they'd still more comfortably fit on the theist side. They believe in souls, for example, which is highly unusual for atheists. But even when we account for atheists who believe in souls (and throw in those who believe in ghosts and demons and whatnot), I don't think this blunts the force of my argument one whit.
In the end, it seems your definition of spirituality, which was supposed to divide theism from atheism, leaves members of both groups on either side of the line.
Okay, let's clean it up anyway you like. Let's say that I'm only targeting materialistic atheism. That still represents the vast majority of that puny number of atheists. Atheism is still weird, statistically speaking. And remember, that doesn't amount to "atheism isn't true." It only means that atheists cannot presume that it's proper to remain skeptical of theism as a default view. The shoe's on the other foot. Given the uniqueness and peculiarity of atheism as compared with the actual beliefs of the entire world, perhaps we should be skeptical of a position that denies theism.
I don't see it as an issue of wisdom at all. The various theistic viewpoints may work for other people; none of them work for me... which isn't actually that different from most theists, for whom, generally, all theistic viewpoints but one don't work.
Well, if it works for the entire world but not for you, where's the problem? With the world or with you?
The variations in worldview amongst theists are much more than "minute variants on a belief system" and have major differences between them, even at the "very broad worldview scale".
Fair enough. But my argument still stands given that I'm comparing a materialist worldview with materialist-plus-something-spiritual worldview. So the parsings, distinctions (major or minor) among theisms actually don't make a difference.
The problem with this is that "theism" is not a position in and of itself; it's a descriptor of many positions.
For example, a deistic panentheist, a Celtic Pagan, a theistic Satanist and a Catholic are all theists, but they likely do no hold the same position on the nature of god(s), the implications of faith in those god(s), or... well, on any issue of belief, really. Theism is no more a single religious position than "not anarchism" is a single political position.
Edit: also, by re-defining theism as "all belief systems that affirm the existence of something other than physical stuff", you implicitly re-define atheism as strict materialism. Your re-definition is so broad that is incorrect.
Well, you're right and you're wrong. You're right that my very broad characterization wouldn't pass muster as a highly philosophical argument and requires fine-tuning. I'm not going to bother to do that apart from my attempts earlier in this post, although I think it can be done in such a way as to preserve the argument intact. After all, reflective atheists tend to be materialists. Of course, that's not all of them, but if a few thousand people fall outside that definition, it's no concern for me and doesn't blunt my argument.
You're also right that "a deistic panentheist, a Celtic Pagan, a theistic Satanist and a Catholic are all theists, but they likely do no hold the same position on the nature of god(s), the implications of faith in those god(s), or... well, on any issue of belief, really." But it doesn't matter. The point on which all these people would agree is that the atheist is wrong to assume that there's nothing to the world apart from physical stuff. And so what we find is that there is (admittedly thin) common ground among the bewildering vareity of theisms, a common ground against which the atheist sticks out like a coal pile in a ballroom, making the differences between the theisms seem downright petty and insignificant. So I think that my argument stands. And once more, the argument runs like this (and please note the conclusion because you've misstated it several times in your previous posts):
(a) As a matter of principle, it is epistemologically responsible to be skeptical toward views that are held by a very small minority of persons and that fundamentally subvert common wisdom, unless that minority can produce very strong arguments in its favor. In other words, the "default position" should be skepticism toward such views.
(b) Atheism is held by a very small minority of persons, and it subverts a perspective (theism) that has been (and is) held by the vast majority of persons for the vast majority of time.
(c) Therefore, the "default position" should be skepticism toward atheism unless and until atheists can produce very strong arguments in favor of its position.
Note that (c) does not entail the truth of theism or the falsity of atheism. Theism, for all its common sense and truthiness, might still be wrong. Despite the fact that only a very few have seen the light atheism, it may well turn out to be true. But as a person who has adopted theism or is puzzled about whether to be some variant of theist or an atheist, I think the path of wisdom is to be much more skeptical of atheism than theism (whichever brand you choose).
Your argument seems to be to take issue with (b). Should I assume, then, that you take no serious issue with the truth of (a) or the validity of the conclusion (c) as drawn from the conjunction of (a) and (b)?