anna.
colors your eyes with what's not there
Once again, if you know all the neural correlates (not saying we do, but it seems like a feasible goal), what else is required to 'understand consciousness'? If you know how to predict what a person is experiencing from, say, brain scans, what else is required?
If neuroscientists acknowledge the hard problem, and if they know there's something "else" required to understand consciousness, how do you think non-neuroscientists find it so easy to toss out solutions?
Let me give an analogy. We say some things have electrical charge. We say that because those things act in certain ways in certain conditions. To know those conditions and be able to predict the behavior in new situations *is* understanding what charge is.
Again. That falls under the purview of the easy problem. We understand how neurons fire, for example. What we don't know is why neurons firing in a certain part of the brain produces joy, or sadness.
I fail to see how the same would not be true for consciousness. If we are able to predict conscious states and find correlates with neural activities, isn't that *exactly* what is required to understand consciousness?
Well, if it is my brain that is processing the information, it makes sense that I am the one that experiences it, right? My brain wouldn't be processing the information and someone else experiencing it, right? We feel the process because 'feeling the process' is precisely what the brain does: it makes up a model that includes 'you' and processes incoming information with respect to that model. That *is* feeling or experiencing. I'm not sure what else is required.
If that was the case, wouldn't neuroscience be heralding this great achievement? Where's the celebration?